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The modern economic and financial systems have not so far secured a just and fair 
system of distribution of wealth and have frequently been exposed as containing systemic 
instabilities. In response, some think that there is no choice but to follow the laws and claims 
of Capitalism. Others have argued that it is time to revive and implement Socialism. Still others 
have voiced their support that the Islamic model would be the best solution. This thesis, which 
is an interdisciplinary and a comparative work, aims to suggest a new solution. The alternative 
system introduced in this research project is a comprehensive paradigm and three-tier model. 
The first tier covers the ultimate objective (social justice), the new foundational theory (rights-
and-duties balance/benefits-and-burdens balance “Balancism”) as well as  fundamental 
principles and policies of the model (e.g., distribution of the proceeds of natural wealth 
resources according to the reasonable and legitimate needs of human beings, distribution of 
subordinate wealth on the basis of contribution, application of an unlimited proportionate 
liability standard instead of the current limited liability norm, implementation of sharing-in-
income arrangement instead of modern labour employment structure, securing basic essential 
needs of humanity, preventing concentration of wealth, and minimizing risk rather than taking 
advantage of it). In the second tier, major tools, products, and facilities are suggested for 
distribution of the proceeds of primary wealth resources and also for for-profit, profit-free, 
philanthropic, microfinance, intermediary, and risk hedging activities. The third tier deals with 
the superstructure and political regime of the alternative system. It consists of a “House of 
Wealth” and a “House of Market Control”. The Houses have to follow and apply the rules of 
balance, the first in the system of distribution of primary wealth and the second in the 
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1.1 General Introduction 
The modern economic and financial systems have proved to be flawed and have 
been the subject of much criticism. They have not so far secured a just and fair system 
of distribution of wealth and have frequently been exposed as containing systemic 
instabilities. This thesis recognises these problems and aims to find a model with its 
own new foundational theory in which the competing interests of different 
participants are better balanced and that is more stable, just and fair in terms of the 
distribution of wealth, with the eventual goal of showing that all countries would be 
happier if they follow the new system.  The research is an interdisciplinary and a 
comparative work and it also benefits from Islamic law, economics and finance as well 
as Western (especially US and UK) best practices and law.       
The alternative economic, business and financial system suggested by the thesis 
is a three-tier model. The first tier covers the ultimate objective, the new foundational 
theory, and fundamental principles and policies of the model. In the second tier, all 
major and necessary tools, products and services are provided. The third tier covers 
the superstructure and controlling authorities of the system.  
Regarding the first tier, the ultimate objective of the alternative model is to 
achieve “social justice”, following the achievement of a better balanced economic and 
financial system.1 In this context, this research project considers justice to be the same 
as a balance of rights and duties. The new foundational theory introduced by the 
research project is called “Rights-and-Duties Balance” generally and “Benefits-and-
Burdens Balance” in a specific economic context. The fundamental principles and 
policies- derived from the ultimate objective and foundational theory of the thesis- on 
                                                   
1
 To achieve social justice, justice should be met in every aspect of social life such as education, 
culture, economy, politics and business opportunities.  The focus here is made on economic and 
financial aspects of social justice.   
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the basis of which the second tier of the model (tools and products) is built up are 
categorised into two different types. The first type of principles and policies governs 
distribution of the proceeds of primary wealth. The second type of principles and 
policies deals with the circulation of subordinate wealth.  
In the second tier of the model, major tools, products, and facilities are 
suggested for “distribution of the proceeds of primary wealth resources” and also “for 
profit”, “profit-free”, “philanthropic”, “microfinance”, “intermediary”, and “risk 
hedging” activities mainly with respect to the circulation of subordinate wealth. This is 
the backbone of how the second tier is built up. The starting point is to determine how 
the proceeds of natural wealth resources can be distributed. The suggestion is that it 
should be distributed according to reasonable needs of humanity. As far as the 
circulation of subordinate wealth concerned, the issue is to identify and recognise the 
economic, business and financial needs of humanity and then seek proper solutions to 
fulfil these needs. In fulfilling the needs, the first question is how one can acquire or 
dispose of an asset. The aim of the former is to respond to the demands of an asset 
applicant and the latter of an asset holder. The needs of an asset applicant or asset 
holder are either: for profit-making, for no profit (profit-free), philanthropic, or for 
microbusiness purposes. In other words, an asset may be used in one of these ways: 
using the asset for generating profit; allowing somebody else to use or enjoy the asset 
free of charge; surrendering the ownership of the asset for some good purposes; or 
the combination of these ways- i.e., for microbusiness purposes. All these categorised 
purposes require their own specifically-tailored instruments, forms, and products. In 
addition, sometimes a person needs somebody else’s services to carry out his legal and 
administrative actions or economic, business and financial affairs. For this purpose, 
specifically-tailored intermediary tools and services are provided. Moreover, the 
necessary needs of people, especially investors, have always been to secure and 
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protect their properties against risk. For this purpose, specifically-tailored risk 
protection tools and facilities are offered.  
Finally, the third tier deals with the superstructure and political regime of the 
alternative system. It consists of a “House of Wealth” and a “House of Market Control” 
including authorities that may be set up under each of these Houses where it is 
necessary for proper management and control of the system. The “House of Wealth” is 
run by a Board of Trustees, who are entrusted with administrative management power 
of the primary wealth and elected directly by members of the public or indirectly by 
representatives of the public e.g., through a Parliemant. The main function of this 
House is to manage natural wealth resources and distribute the proceeds of these 
resources among members of the public. The “House of Market Control” is also set up 
to control the proper circulation of subordinate wealth in the system. The House of 
Market Control is an independent, exclusive, unified and central regulatory, 
supervisory authority responsible for controlling the market and the proper circulation 
of subordinate wealth. Both the House of Wealth and the House of Market Control 
have to follow and apply the rules of balance, the first in the system of distribution of 
primary wealth and the second in the circulation of subordinate wealth, in order to 
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1.1 Ultimate Aim  
Social Justice 
1.2 Foundational Theory 
Rights-and-Duties Balance/Benefits-and-Burdens Balance “Balancism”  
1.3 Fundamental Principles and Policies 
With Respect to Natural Wealth Resources 
 
i. The Absolute Ownership of All Natural Wealth Resources (Land, Minerals, Water Bodies and Others) Belongs to 
The Creator Who Has Entrusted Them For the Joint Benefit of All Human Beings  
ii. The Proceeds of Natural Wealth Resources Are Distributed According to the Reasonable and Legitimate Needs of 
Humanity and, as to Some Resources, They May Be Distributed According to the Contribution (Such As Work 
Effort) of Human Beings Made for Utilisation of Natural Wealth 
iii. The (Subordinate) Ownership of The Natural Wealth Resources Always Remain with The People As A Whole and 
The Ownership Of  These Wealth Origins Is Not Transferable To Anybody Else Including The State   
 
With Respect to Profit-Making Products and Collective Schemes  
i. Distribution of Ownership and Liability Should Be According to The Amount of Contribution Made to a Given 
Business Activity by Every Participant  
ii. An Unlimited Proportionate Liability Standard is Implemented Instead of the Current Limited Liability Practice 
iii. Legal Personality Concept is Adopted For Practical Reasons and Only For Very Limited Purposes  
iv. Ownership and Control Unity Applies  
v. Profit  and Loss Sharing Scheme is Implemented Instead of Modern Labour Employment Structure (i.e., Employer-
Employee Relationships and Fixed-Compensation Schemes are Abolished)     
With Respect to Not-For-Profit Facilities  
i. The House of Wealth Is in Charge of Securing Basic Essentiasl Needs of Human Beings Such As the Provision of a 
Dwelling House, Education and Health Care Facilities and the Supply of Basic Infrastructure Utilities    
ii.  Not-For-Profit Facilities is Essentially to Help Others Free of Charge and For Some Good Purposes        
With Respect to Microbusiness/Microfinance Products 
i. These Products Are Designed to Empower Poor to Obtain Their Economic Independence and Transmit Them from 
Not-For-Profit Stage (i.e., Bondage and Dependence) to For-Profit (i.e., Self-Reliance and Independence) Phase  
ii. These Products Are Basically Cooperative-Oriented Schemes Seeking to Foster a Spirit of Cooperation Across the 
Society     
With Respect to Intermediary Tools and Services   
i. Intermediary Services That Used for Not-For-Profit Purposes Are Rewarded on Fixed-Compensation Basis  
i.  Intermediary Services That Used for For-Profit Purposes Are Rewarded on Sharing-in-Benefits Basis  
ii. Payment and Deposit Service Providers/Institutions Receive Only Service Fee and the Ownership and Control of 
the Payments and Deposits Always Remain  with the Customers and Depositors Themselves  
iii. Concentration of Wealth Is Prevented For Systemic Instability Concerns     
With Respect to Risk Hedging Tools and Facilities  
i. Risk Should Be Minimized Rather Than Taking Advantage of Risk and Trading in It  
ii. Risk Hedging Schemes/Institutions Should Not Get Involve in Investment and Trade Activities    
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The Second 





Tier of the 
Model (4): 
Philanthropic  
The Second Tier 




Wealth Tax), Sadaqa 
(Voluntary Almsgiving), 
Hiba (Voluntary Gift), 
Waqf (Voluntary 
Endowement) 
Islamic Products:  
A’riya (Use-Free 
Contract), Qard Hasana 
(Interest-Free Loan), 
Haq Intifa (Enjoyment 
Privilege) 
Islamic Products:            
Musharaka (Partnership Contract), 
Ijara (Leasing Contract), Ijara wa 
Iqtina (Leasing with a Purchase 
Option Contract), Ji’ala (Flexible 
Reward Contract), Mu’awada 
(Exchange Contract), Bay’ (Sale 
Contract), Sarf (Currency and Gold 
Exchange Contract), Salam 
(Forward Contract), Bay Shart (Sale 
with a Repurchase Option 
Contract), Murabaha (Cost plus 
Mark-Up Sale Contract), Istisna 
(Manufacturing or Construction 
Order Contract)  
Western Best Practices: 
Partnership, Joint Stock Company, 
Venture Capital, Mutual Funds, 
Private Equity Fund  
Islamic Products:                      
Wakala (Agency Contract), Wadi’a/Amana (Deposit-Taking Facility), Hiwala 
(Assignment of a Debt or Credit Contract), Aqd Daman (Debt Guarantee Contract), 
Ijara al-Shakhs (Labour Contract), and Ji’ala (Fixed Reward Contract) 
Western Best Practices:             




The Second Tier of 
the Model (6): 
Intermediary Tools 
and Services e.g., 
Transfer of Funds and 
Exchange Services 
The Second Tier of 
the Model (7): 
 Risk Hedging Facilities 
Islamic Products:                          
Rahn (Mortgage Contract or Pledge or Lien), Aqd Daman (Debt Guarantee), Kifala 
(Personal Surety), Takaful (Mutual Kifala/Surety), Sulh (Compromise or Dispute 
Settlement Contract)     
 
The Second 








Western Best Practices:  
Cooperative, Pension Fund, (Charitable) Trust  
The Second Tier of the Model (1): The Distribution of the Proceeds of the Natural Wealth Resources Can Be Made by 
Way of the Following: A’riya (Use Free Contract), Haq Intifa’ (Enjoyment Privilege), Muzara’a (Sharing Crops), Musaqat 
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House of Controlling For-Profit Activities  
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Activities  
House of Controlling Philanthropic 
Activities  
House of Controlling Mircrobusiness 
Activities  
House of Controlling Intermediary 
Activities  
House of Controlling Risk Hedging 
Activities   
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Historically, whenever financial hardship has gone beyond the tolerable level for 
those of limited means, movements have sprung up against economic inequality. The 
most recent movement in this regard is the “Occupy Movement” using the slogan “We 
are the 99%”, protesting against the ever-increasing gap between rich and poor.2 
Today, there continue to be many people who live in poverty and are unable to 
provide for their basic needs, such as: food, housing, health and education while most 
of the wealth is controlled by a small percentage of people. In particular this includes 
multinational corporations and a few so-called ‘mega’ banks worldwide and they 
                                                   
2
 The first Occupy protest that received wide media coverage was Occupy Wall Street in New York City, 
which started in September 17, 2011 and was followed in major cities around the world. Some 
organizers and supporters called the day as the United States Day of Rage. The primary goal of the 
Movement is to change the dominant economic structure into something fairer and more just. See Colin 
Moynihan ‘Wall Street Protest Begins, With Demonstrators Blocked’ (City Room, Blog of The New York 
Times, September 17, 2011) Retrieved March 04, 2013. See also Paul Harris ‘Occupy Wall Street: The 
Protesters Speak – The Anti-Capitalist Protesters Who Have Set up Camp in Lower Manhattan Are 
Becoming a Fixture of the Area’ (London: News Blog, Blog of The Guardian, September 21, 2011) 
Retrieved March 04, 2013. The Financial Times published an editorial in October 17, 2011 supporting the 
Movement. It ends by saying that this “cry for change” must be “heeded”. The New York Times also 
published an editorial in October 8, 2011supporting the Movement. It ends by saying that “it is not the 
job of the protesters to draft legislation. That’s the job of the nation’s leaders, and … the public airing of 
grievances is a legitimate and important end in itself. It is also the first line of defense against a return to 
the Wall Street ways that plunged the nation into an economic crisis from which it has yet to emerge”. 
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decide how the world economy is to be run.3 They have made many countries 
dependent on banking loans and other credit facilities. This bondage has significantly 
undermined the dignity and independence of many countries and affected their 
                                                   
3
 The findings of a University of Zurich (Swiss Federal Institute of Technology) research published on 19 
September 2011 uncover what anti-capitalist activists and movements have been claiming for years- 
that a very few group of deeply interconnected entities- especially banks- tied together in an extremely 
entangled web of control actually run the global economy. The research is the first to study all 43,060 
transnational corporations and the web of ownership between them- and formulated a “map” of 1,318 
companies that sit at the heart of global business and within this group a “super-entity” of 147 
companies  that control 40% of the wealth within the multinational business network. As per the 
researchers, each of the 147 companies is owned by other companies within the “super-entity” 
essentially creating a self-contained network of wealth. According to the researchers, this concentration 
of wealth in the hands of a small group of corporations, when those entities become too 
interconnected, it can cause chain reactions that can shake the economy systematically. In other words, 
the close connections mean that the network could be alarmingly susceptible to shocks and collapse. As 
per co-author of the study James Glattfelder “If one [entity] suffers distress, this propagates [itself]”. 
This evidence fits with the late-2000s financial crisis experience that began as a problem of excessive 
liabilities at a very few of financial entities. Since these entities had financial connections to the rest of 
the financial industry, their bankruptcy took down the entire financial system. In their conclusion, the 
researchers claim that their study is evidence that the world may need global anti-trust policy and rules- 
that designed to keep entities from becoming too large and too interconnected in their sector, or from 
joining de facto arrangements to cooperate with their competitors. According to the study, the top five 
corporations are: Barclays (a British bank), Capital Group Companies (a US-based investment 
management organisation), Fidelity Investments (a US-based multinational financial services 
corporation), AXA Insurance (a French global insurance group) and State Street Corporation (a US-based 
financial services holding company).  See Stefania Vitali, James B. Glattfelder, and Stefano Battiston ‘The 
Network of Global Corporate Control’ (available online at 
http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/1107/1107.5728v2.pdf) (Retrieved on 19 March, 2013). For a very 
brief discussion and analysis of the work see http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2011/10/24/super-entity-
147-global-economy-swiss-researchers_n_1028690.html (Retrieved 19 March, 2013); 
http://thebluestates.wordpress.com/2011/10/25/40-of-worlds-wealth-controlled-by-super-entity-of-
147-companies (Retrieved 19 March, 2013); and http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-
2051008/Does-super-corporation-run-global-economy.html (Retrieved 19 March, 2013).  
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decisions and policies.4 Whatever the purpose, money or credit is available mainly as a 
loan with interest, in truth also in many Islamic countries. The lending institutions, 
banks in particular, are often not concerned about whether their advanced loans are 
invested in productive activities or consumed; and neither is their interest linked to the 
outcome of any productive activity. Their interest is fixed and predetermined and must 
be paid irrespective of the fact that the advanced loans were intended for 
consumption, or the productive investments resulted in losses.5 These, at least 
somewhat, irresponsible forms of financing have led to major problems and the 
                                                   
4
 In their function as vehicles for the extension of developed country consumption patterns, 
multinational corporations act as a tool for exercising the indirect control associated with dependence 
(and intervention in all stages of the decision-making process of the host nation states). Dependence, in 
this context, implies some kind of unequal social relationship where one party enforces control over 
and acquires value from another (see Helge Hveem ‘The Global Dominance System: Notes on a 
Theory of Global Political Economy’ (Journal of Peace Research, 4, 1973) p. 333 pp. 319-340. Thus 
dependency means both a decrease in the ability to determine policy independently and an 
asymmetrical relationship where one social unit is able to control and constrain, either directly or 
indirectly, the development of another- mainly to the  benefit of the former (see Stephen J. Kobrin 
‘Multinational Corporations, Sociocultural Dependence, and Industrialization: Need Satisfaction or Want 
Creation?’ (College of Business, Tennessee State University, The Journal of Developing Areas, Vol. 13, 
No. 2, Jan. 1979) p. 116. However, it should be made clear that, as Cohen notes “dependence is a matter 
of degree rather than kind; economies are more or less dependent, rather than absolutely dependent or 
not” (see Benjamin J. Cohen ‘The Question of Imperialism: The Political Economy of Dominance and 
Dependence’ (New York: Basic Books, 1973) p. 191). Furthermore, as per Kobrin, dependence does not 
result from a deliberate policy of exploitation; it may well be structural (Stephen J. Kobrin ‘Multinational 
Corporations, Sociocultural Dependence, and Industrialization: Need Satisfaction or Want Creation?’ 
(College of Business, Tennessee State University, The Journal of Developing Areas, Vol. 13, No. 2, Jan. 
1979) p. 116). However, Knorr disagrees with this idea. As per Knorr “we insist that there is no 
neocolonialism unless there is an effective tise of power for deliberately establishing and maintaining an 
exploitative relationship” (see Klaus Knorr ‘The Power of Nations: The Political Economy of International 
Relations’ (New York: Basic Books, paperback ed., 1971) p. 255. As an example of dictating economic 
policies by the large money lenders, when Greece was recently in severely financial distress due to its 
huge sovereign debts, IMF, the European Central Bank and the European Commission proposed bailouts 
dictating several rounds of tough austerity measures that had to be implemented by Greece in retun. 
The implementation of these measures could clearly contribute to a severe and prolonged economic 
contraction of the crisis-striken Greece and severely affect the economic conditions of life of Greek 
citizens (see http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-20706994).      
5
 See A. L. M. Abdul Gafoor ‘Interest, Usury, Riba and the Operational Costs of a Bank’ (Kuala Lumpur: 
A. S. Noordeen, 2005) Chapter 2, also available online at http://users.bart.nl/~abdul/article4.html  
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shortcomings found in modern finance.6 This irresponsibility is similarly found in the 
world of investment. In order to earn more profits, investment firms and businesses 
are much more interested in investing their wealth in highly risky and speculative 
activities, no matter that these kinds of investments may create a lot of externalities 
and affect the economy systemically.7 Moreover, in much the same way, irresponsible 
governments spend much of the accrued wealth in unnecessary areas, in particular for 
strengthening their own political ambitions.8 
                                                   
6
 As per Zaman, irresponsible interest-based borrowing and lending leads to banking crises from time 
to time simply because fixed liabilities cannot be performed from an income stream which is flexible. 
Such crises bring about a lot of hardships and costs on all members of the public, but mostly on the 
poor. See Arshad Zaman and Asad Zaman ‘Interest and the Modern Economy’ (Islamic Economic Studies 
Vol. 8, Issue 2, April 2001) pp. 71-72. Ferraro and Rosser describe the current debt crisis happening in 
the world economy and the hardships inflicted on many segments of society by this crisis. See Vincent 
Ferraro and Melissa Rosser ‘Global Debt and Third World Development’ in Michael Klare and Daniel 
Thomas ‘World Security: Challenges for a New Century’ (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994, pp. 332-
355).   
7
 Romano argues that the fail of market discipline is due basically to human greed. He believes that 
greed is a central factor that “transforms … a moderately risky investment strategy into one of high-risk 
speculation” which in turn may cause devastating externalities especially systemic risk. See Roberta 
Romano ‘A Thumbnail Sketch of Derivative Securities and Their Regulation’ (Maryland Law Review, Vol. 
55, 1998) p. 79. As per Schwarcz, discussing in the context of hedge funds, investment firms and 
businesses might indirectly cause banking systemic risk insofar as these firms and businesses lack of 
regulation enables them to make risky investments, including risky loans. This dilemma, however, does 
not result from the nature of these investment firms but, rather, out of their unregulated nature, 
enabling them to do risky investments if they intend to do so. See Steven L. Schwarcz ‘Systemic Risk’ 
(The Georgetown Law Journal, Duke Law School Legal Studies Paper No. 163, Vol. 97, Issue 1, 2008) p. 
202, fn. 42.   
8
 When public elections and also economic downwards create public demand for immediate actions, 
politicians focus on demand-side (“Short-Run Politics”) more than supply-side (“Long-Run Productivity”) 
policies. Demand-side policies are usually taken to grant immediate benefits on specific interest groups 
in order to attract more votes in favour of the politicians, while supply-side policies are usually aimed at 
increasing the productive capacity of the economy to promote prosperity of the members of the public. 
Supply-side policies require new initiatives and investments that can take years to generate new 
income. Also, since effective supply-side policies impose immediate burdens on politically influential 
groups, these policies are often resisted by these groups. See Dwight R. Lee ‘The Keynesian Path to 




1.2.2 Questions  
The main questions that this research tries to answer are: is there an alternative 
solution? If any, what is a solution? What should be the ultimate goal of the new 
alternative solution and what are the foundational theory and fundamental principles 
and policies on the basis of which the new model/system should be built up? What is 
meant by justice in general and social justice in particular in economic and financial 
context, and how can it be achieved, if at all? What is meant by wealth and how is it to 
be distributed in human society? What is meant by the rights and duties of human 
beings? What is the relationship between rights and duties in a general framework and 
the relationship between benefits and burdens particularly in an economic context? 
What are the reasonable and legitimate economic, business, and financial needs of 
humanity and should they be responded to? What does reasonable and legitimate 
mean in this context? What are the necessary and major concepts, products, services 
and institutions of the alternative model, responding to different legitimate and 
reasonable needs, including: profit-making, not-for-profit, microfinance, intermediary 
and risk hedging needs? How should the whole system be run and controlled in order 










1.2.3 Necessity and Importance 
Modern financial systems have failed to respond to the reasonable and 
legitimate economic and financial needs of humanity in a fair, just, and balanced 
manner and consequently have failed to bring about lasting social prosperity and meet 
social justice. That is why academics and policymakers largely agree that it is necessary 
to look for a new paradigm.9 Undoubtedly, the new paradigm has to respond to all 
reasonable and legitimate economic and financial needs of individuals, businesses, 
not-for-profit organisations and governments in a fair and just manner in order to 
achieve social welfare and social justice. As will be discussed later, academics and 
policymakers have in recent years dedicated much effort to finding a new solution but 
have been unable to introduce a new foundational theory that would rival the theories 
underpinning Capitalism and Marxism. To date academic scholarship and regulatory 
reforms have focused only on some aspects of the economy especially the banking 
system, capital markets, and taxation and risk insurance sectors. Therefore, the 
demands of policymakers and the strength of public opinion especially from the lower 






                                                   
9
 As per Sklair “capitalism cannot provide the conditions for most people on the planet to have 
satisfying lives and that alternatives ... are urgently required”. As per him, the most effective alternative 
will be a focus on the globalization of human rights and responsibilities and to achieve this, humanity 
will have to move on from the dominant capitalist system. See Leslie Sklair ‘Capitalist Globalization: Fatal 
Flaws and Necessity for Alternatives’ (Brown Journal of World Affairs, Volume 13, Issue 1, Fall/Winter 
2006) pp. 29 and 35. For more about the efforts that have been made in practice to develop new 




The aim of the research project is to suggest a new solution to contribute to the 
academic scholarship dealing with the alleviation of poverty, fair and just distribution 
of wealth, financial stability and social prosperity. It is intended to introduce a new 
direction that the economic, business and financial policymakers may adopt and follow 
irrespective of their social, legal or religious backgrounds.10 In the suggested model, 
social justice and equitable distribution of wealth prevails over efficiency rules.   
It should be acknowledged that since the primary aim of the research is to 
provide a systemic approach for a new alternative model, it must inevitably cover all 
major elements of the system. This thesis tries to address and discuss almost all 
necessary elements of the model but without going into great detail about every single 
element or comparing them with their counterparts in different legal, economic and 
financial systems. However, some key concepts such as right (haq), justice, balance, 
wealth, asset, limited liability, musharakas (partnership-like structures), waqf (trust-
like structure), zakat (tax-like concept), public finance, and the legal nature of money 
and electronic currency have been dealt with in great detail and have been compared 
in different Islamic schools of thought more than other elements of the model. Some 
elements of the model do require further scholarly research and also comparative 
studies. A list of topics that require further academic study is provided in the 
conclusion of the research project. 
                                                   
10
 It may be argued that religious-minded policymakers as well as individuals would resist the 
application of any rules that had not originally arisen from the teachings of their religion but had been 
borrowed and transformed from the secular Western world. However, research conducted by Foster 
has concluded that this has not been problematic, at least in the Islamic world. Many Islamic countries 
as well as Muslims have adopted and followed many Western-style concepts and institutions. Foster 
calls this phenomenon “the Acceptance Mentality” i.e., accepting with no practical resistance. See 
Nicholas HD Foster ‘Islamic Perspectives on the Law of Business Organisations II: The Sharia and the 
Western-style Law of Business Organisations’ (European Business Organization Law Review, vol. 11, 
issue 2, 2010) pp. 279-282.     
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1.3 Outline of the Thesis 
The thesis is organised in the following manner. The first chapter deals with the 
background, context and methodology of the research as well as all three parts of the 
first tier of the model (the ultimate aim, foundational theory, and fundamental 
principles and policies), after giving a general introduction and explaining the 
problems, questions, necessity, importance and aim of the research project. The 
second chapter offers some key concepts and their implications in Islamic law. The 
third chapter deals with the first part of the second tier of the model i.e., distribution 
of primary wealth, which is followed by an introduction to the distribution of 
subordinate wealth including the general law of transactions. The fourth chapter deals 
with part two of the second tier of the model i.e., profit-making products and 
collective schemes, after distinguishing different needs and purposes in the context. 
The fifth chapter covers parts three, four, and five of the second tier of the model i.e., 
profit-free, philanthropic, and microbusiness facilities. The sixth chapter deals with 
part six of the second tier of the model, i.e., intermediary tools and services. The 
seventh chapter covers part seven of the second tier of the model, i.e., risk protection 
tools and services. The eighth chapter deals with the last tier of the model, i.e., the 
superstructure and political regime of the model (covering the House of Wealth and 
the House of Market Control, “HMC”). Finally, the thesis concludes with the ninth 










1.4 Background and Context 
In the aftermaths of economic and financial crises- leaders, policymakers and 
thinkers always suggest that the crisis requires the re-examination of basic 
assumptions of modern economic and financial systems. In this regard, the major 
assumptions, such as the rationality, risk and reward structures and distribution of 
benefits are reassessed and very diverse opinions on how to construct a new, 
sustainable and just economic and financial system have been offered.11 
                                                   
11
 For an interesting explanation in this regard see Kevin T. Jackson ‘The Scandal BeneathThe Financial 
Crisis: Getting aView from Amoral-Cultural Mental Model’ (Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, Vol. 
33, pp. 735-778) (also available at http://www.harvard-jlpp.com/33-2/735.pdf). For example, according 
to Jackson (p. 778), “what is lacking in the received narratives of the financial crisis is a robust 
conception of moral virtue, human dignity, and the common good”. Jackson points out that market 
failure occurs mainly due to a more general failure of responsibility, not only in business associations but 
also in the general culture. On this basis, according to him, the big lessons that can be learned by policy 
makers and regulators are to be found in focusing on moral reform rather than introducing new rules 
and regulations. As per Jackson, virtue cannot be substituted by regulation.  
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The most recent financial crisis, which triggered also an economic crisis12, has 
again attracted the wide attention of policymakers, academics, and industry actors to 
consider the feasibility and sustainability of the modern economic and financial system 
especially its resistance against financial crises and its fairness regarding the 
distribution of wealth. Some think that there is no choice but to follow the laws and 
                                                   
12
 Usually, the success or failure of any economy is determined by the degree of success of its financial 
system simply because modern economies are finance-dominated ones. That is why the focus of the 
research model is on the financial sector among other sectors (i.e., economic and business sectors). In 
the modern sense, every developed financial system consists of capital markets and financial 
institutions. The “Anglo” model is often known for focusing more on capital markets. The “Continental” 
model is frequently characterised as being more suspicious of capital markets and dependent more on 
institutions, in particular banks. Political economy literature contrasts Anglo-Saxon model with the 
Continental model typical of Germany. In the political economy scholarship, the appeal of the 
Continental model lies in the bank-based financial system and Anglo-Saxon model is characterised by 
the ideology of a well-developed and liquid capital market i.e., capital market-based model. For more in 
this regard see John Zysman ‘Governments, Markets and Growth’ (Cornell University Press, 1983); 
Wolfgang Streeck and Kozo Yamaura ‘The Origins of Neoliberal Capitalism’ (Ithaca, Cornell University 
Press, 2005); Chuck C. Kwok and Solomon Tadesse ‘National Culture and Financial Systems’ (Journal of 
International Business Studies, Vol. 37, March 2006); Iain Hardie and David Howarth ‘Die Krise but not La 
Crise? The Financial Crisis and the Transformation of German and French Banking Systems’ (Journal of 
Common Market Studies, Vol. 47, November 2009); B. Tricker ‘Corporate Governance: The Ideological 
Imperative’ in H. Thomas and D. O'Neal ‘Strategic Integration’ (SMS, Wiley, Chichester, 1999). UK and 
the US are usually considered two exemplary capital market-based national financial systems. However, 
an ever-increasing literature on the political economy of European finance shows the weakness of the 
classical view of the UK as an obviously capital market-based and Germany as a clearly bank-based 
system. See Iain Hardie and David Howarth ‘What Varieties of Financial Capitalism? The Financial Crisis 
and the Move to Market-Based Banking in the UK, Germany and France’ (Paper presented at the ISA 
Conference 2010, New Orleans, 2010) and also see Chris Howell ‘The British Variety of Capitalism: 
Institutional Change, Industrial Relations and British Politics’ (British Politics, Vol. 2, July 2007, pp. 239-
264). Also, it should be considered that this approach is too basic: banks need markets (e.g., to raise 
capital) and markets need facilitating institutions (e.g., clearing infrastructure and underwriters). Many 
continental banks are main market players, particularly in derivatives and, on the other side, community 
banks in the US are the backbone of micro-business finance. See Iain Hardie and Sylvia Maxfield ‘What 
Does the Global Financial Crisis Tell Us About Anglo-Saxon Financial Capitalism?’ (Paper Prepared for 
Workshop on The Financial Crisis, EMU and the Stability of Currencies and the Financial System, 
University of Victoria, October 1, 2010).   
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claims of capitalism.13 Others have argued for the necessity of a new alternative to the 
prevalent capitalist system. It has been argued that it is time to revive and implement 
Socialism in lieu of Capitalism.14 Still others have voiced their support that the Islamic 
                                                   
13
 Rejecting the maximizing imperatives at the central core of capitalism, McKibben in his book titled 
‘Deep Economy: The Wealth of Communities and the Durable Future’ suggests a case for moving beyond 
“hyper-individualism” and instead focusing on local economies. But, however, he does not propose any 
fundamental structural change. “Shifting our focus to local economies,” he mentions, “will not mean 
abandoning Adam Smith or doing away with markets. Markets, obviously, work.” In his essay titled “The 
Greenback Effect: Greed Has Helped Destroy the Planet- Maybe Now It Can Help Save It” McKibben 
takes his market belief still further strong. “Markets are powerful” and they solve all problems, he says. 
All we must do is to reform our use of them by building in the information they need to function to 
address shortcomings and work properly. To those who believe that we must go “beyond capitalism” to 
solve our problems, McKibben has this answer: we cannot wait for structural change. It takes too long 
and we simply cannot risk delay. “Markets are quick” he writes. “Given some direction, they’ll help”. See 
Bill McKibben ‘Deep Economy: The Wealth of Communities and the Durable Future (New York: Times 
Books, 2007) pp. 2 and 105; Bill McKibben ‘The Greenback Effect: Greed Has Helped Destroy the Planet- 
Maybe Now It Can Help Save It’ (Mother Jones, May/June 2008).   
14
 Schumpeter, in his well-known work contribution to political economy in 1942, argues for 
capitalism’s inability to survive and warns of the inevitable coming of socialism. See Joseph Schumpeter 
‘Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2003). His main argument begins with 
Part II of his book “Can Capitalism Survive?”. Through the first chapters of Part II, Schumpeter criticises 
mainstream economics and in the last chapters of Part II discusses why capitalism cannot survive. Part III 
of the book starts dealing with “Can Socialism Survive?” and of particular interest is chapter XXVI of Part 
III in which Schumpeter argues why a socialist economy is a feasible proposition. However, it should be 
noted that, as per Ravier, Schumpeter does not argue, as Marx did, that capitalism must fail due to the 
inherent contradictions within the capitalist structure of production and consumption. Schumpeter's 
viewpoint is quite the opposite. He believes that it is the very success of capitalism at creation of wealth 
and raising the living standards of people that finally undermine the social institutions that stood to 
protect it. The gradual disappearance of those institutions unavoidably creates conditions under which 
capitalism would find it harder to last. Furthermore, the disappearance of the essential social framework 
causes the social forces turn to socialist approaches and practices across the society. See Adrian O. 
Ravier ‘Capitalism, Socialism and Public Choice’ (Libertarian Papers, Vol. 2, Issue 26, 2010) pp. 1-2. In 
addition, as per Wolff, the late-2000s crisis, especially in the US and Western Europe, has renewed the 
criticism of capitalism as a viable system. Since 2007, when the crisis started, social movements e.g., 
Occupy Wall Street have been much quicker than was the norm for social movements in the last 
decades and they explicitly target capitalism. Request for Marx’s writings have risen. New fresh interest 
in socialism and socialist political parties is greatly in evidence. Anarchist refusals of capitalism are in 
fashion. Public view polls evidence widespread hostility towards capitalism and equally significantly 
good attitudes towards socialism. See Richard Wolff ‘Alternatives to Capitalism’ available at 
http://www.rdwolff.com/content/alternatives-capitalism. Published On February 11, 2013 (will appear 
in Critical Sociology Journal in May 2013).           
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model would be the best solution.15 Particular attention is devoted to Islamic 
economics and finance.     
Historically, between the eighth and eleventh centuries when the Church in the 
West strictly prohibited the making of interest, financial institutions practising in the 
West and in the Islamic world were quite similar. The similarity of these two systems, 
however, began to diverge gradually up to the present age. The Catholic Church in the 
West devised and practised the very first concept of “corporation”, which was later 
used by many others, such as universities and merchants – finally taking shape into its 
most developed variant, the incorporated joint-stock company. Corruption and the 
abuses of the Inquisition in the practises of the Catholic Church led to Protestantism in 
the sixteenth century. Important teachings in Protestantism, and ones which attacked 
the Catholic Church, were that “hard work”, “honesty”, and a “fully-merited business 
and profit” should be regarded as virtuous deeds. Two centuries later, a new 
                                                   
15
 According to Al-Hassani, human being is naturally motivated to pursue his/her self-interest, which 
may often be in conflict with the interest of the public. This undeniable conflict is the main cause of 
many social and economic difficulties from which human societies have no way to avoid. The history of 
humanity has proved that none of materialistic economic philosophies have been able to provide a 
proper lasting solution in this regard. As per Al-Hassani, this is due to the lack of the role of religion (din) 
in these materialistic thinkings. That is why, as per him, Islam, being the din of God (Allah), is the “one 
and only source which can provide Iqtisad [economy] with a unique solution: to reorient man’s 
motivations and direct all his individual interests in such a way as to satisfy those of the public”. This can 
be accomplished because Islam can trigger the spiritual capacities of human being which provide him 
with a new perception of life and existence. See Bakir Al-Hassani ‘Iqtisad: The Islamic Alternative for 
Economics’ (Lanham: IMAMIA Centre, 1988) p. 45. Also, as per Chapra, the simultonous focus on both 
the material and the spiritual aspects of human life is a unique feature of Islamic economic system. The 
spiritual and the material are so strongly connected with each other that they together may provide a 
source of mutual stength and human welfare and, on the other side, a neglect of either cannot lead to 
prosperity of mankind. As per Chapra, since capitalism and socialism are both originally “secular and 
either a-moral or morally neutral”, the mentioned synthesis of the material and the spiritual is missing in 
both of them. See M. Umar Chapra ‘The Economic System of Islam: A Discussion of its Goals and Nature’ 
(London: The Islamic Cultural Centre, 1970) pp. 8-9. As per Evans “the practicalities of the present 
economic situation require the observer to consider that Shari'a-compliant financing may present an 
appealing alternative to the apparent failures of Western financial systems”. See McKean James Evans 
‘The Future of Conflict between Islamic and Western Financial Systems: Profit, Principle and 
Pragmatism’ (University of Pittsburgh Law Review, Vol. 71, Issue 4, Summer 2010) p. 836.   
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movement named the “Enlightenment” began that not only discarded almost all the 
values taught by the Church, e.g., the moral values which had controlled business 
conduct for centuries but also criticised the religious aspect itself. Consequently, a new 
single-minded form of Capitalism, in the modern sense, emerged with its most well 
known tenets of uncontrolled maximisation of profit, overconsumption, and 
exploitation of labour. In contrast, the major deviations in the early classical Islamic 
economic policy are significant divergences over the same period in land-ownership 
system, fixed wage rate and remuneration for labour on an hourly, daily, weekly, 
monthly, or annual basis as well as the introduction of the concept of limited liability 
into a business context, improper taxation policy, over-interference of the state in the 
economy, and conventionalisation (i.e., Westernisation) reality, that is to say a mere 
mimicking and imitation of Western finance in the Islamic world especially in the 
present age, whilst failing to restore the lost Islamic heritage.16 It is argued that with a 
time-lag of some 200 to 450 years, when the Church in the West applied the 
prohibition of interest (between the eighth and eleventh centuries), Western 
economies adopted institutional borrowing from the Islamic world rather than 
inventing it themselves. This is the main reason why Islamic and Western economies 
had significantly similar institutions. It is said, however, that in the area of public 
finance, autonomous independent city-states in the West with different political 
                                                   
16
 For a similar approach and also for more detail in this regard see Murat Cizakca ‘Islamic Capitalism 
and Finance: Origins, Evolution, and the Future’ (Edward Elgar: Studies in Islamic Finance, Accounting, 
and Governance, 2011) pp. xx-xxvi. 
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systems invented institutions which were quite different from those implemented in 
the centralised Islamic empires.17  
In modern sense, as far as the international18 and Western19 financial system is 
concerned, the practical reaction and problem solving attempts as well as intellectual 
efforts to deal with the problems created by the financial crises have focused 
                                                   
17
 For more detail see Gene W. Heck ‘Charlemagne, Muhammad and the Arab Roots of Capitalism’ 
(Berlin: De Gruyter, Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur Des Islamischen Orients, 2006); Murat Cizakca ‘A 
Comparative Evolution of Business Partnerships, Islamic World and Europe with Specific Reference to 
the Ottoman Archives’ (Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1996); Murat Cizakca ‘Cross-Cultural Borrowing and 
Comparative Evolution of Institutions between Islamic World and the West’ (In S. Cavaciocchi (Ed.), also 
available at www.mcizakca.com); Murat Cizakca ‘A History of Philanthropic Foundations, The Islamic 
World From the Seventh Century to the Present’ (Istanbul: Bogazici University Press, 2000).    
18
 At international level, most initiatives have focused on the effective regulation and control of 
international financial markets especially banking institutions by an international financial authority. 
This has been largely due to the emergence of a single global market in financial services and also the 
devastating externalities and systemic risks that increasingly complex international banking and financial 
conglomerates can create in the economic and financial systems if they go bankrupt. Some leading 
scholars in the West have argued for such an extensive international response and have analysed the 
adopted structure and regulatory framework in this regard (of major international efforts in this regard 
is Basel Committee on Banking Supervision I, II, and now III). In great detail see George Alexander 
Walker ‘International Banking Regulation, Law Policy & Practice’ (Kluwer Law International, 2001).  In his 
book, Walker examines the inherent problems in relation to cross-sector methods of regulatory policies 
and argues for a new ‘larger integrated response’ to cope with the serious concerns of the ‘single global 
market of the new millennium’. In this regard, Walker offers several alternatives: ‘Global Authority or 
Committee Revision’, ‘Separate Co-ordinating Committee or Agency’, and ‘Committee Development 
Programme’ (pp. 355-362).   
19
 Whenever the research project refers to Western concepts, it mainly means those concepts that are 
practised in US and English jurisdictions.    
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extensively on “financial regulation”20 initiatives rather than any thoughts of an 
alternative financial model.21  
A spirit of experimental pragmatism has been the main intellectual force behind 
financial regulation in the US - what works in shoring up the system? In general, it 
starts with the premise that the market has failed, an analysis is done of this failure, 
and an attempt to fix it is made. Basically, legislators and regulators in the US have 
been more interested in preserving the capitalist system. The best examples of this 
were the reforms of the 1930s which did not give way to the widespread socialist 
attitude of the time. Public anger of the financial class and lack of knowledge among 
the general population about the financial system’s functions have, over time, led to 
                                                   
20
 As per Véron, financial reform has been a major focus of the initial global policy reaction to the late-
2000s financial turmoil and it can be said that the mentioned crisis has been transformational point for 
financial regulatory policy, at least in the US and Europe. See Nicolas Véron ‘Financial Reform after the 
Crisis’ Chapter 2 in Barry Eichengreen and Bokyeong Park ‘The World Economy after the Global Crisis: A 
New Economic Order for the 21st Century’ (Hackensack, NJ: World Scientific Pub., 2012) p. 7. As per 
Rottier and Véron, at the first G-20 summit in November 2008, more than four-fifths of the action items 
in the summit’s final declaration were regarding financial regulation and only about one-fifth on broadly 
related subjects such as tax, controls on capital flows, actions to fight against terrorism financing and 
money laundering, and general reform of the Bretton Woods Institutions. See Stéphane Rottier and 
Nicolas Véron ‘An Assessment of the G20’s Initial Action Items’ (Brussels: Bruegel, Bruegel Policy 
Contribution, Issue 2010/08, September 2010) p. 2.   
21
 For an effective solution in modern economies, some leading scholars have suggested the necessity 
of a combination of market forces (i.e., industry practices) and governmental intervention (i.e., 
regulation); although they acknowledge that this approach may still not work very well because of the 
problems of regulators’ limited insight into the market and also the invisible hands in the market. They 
argue for functionalism rather than formalism and realism. As per these scholars, “law and …” 
movements e.g., the “law and economics” movement (the movement that tries to examine the legal 
rules and their implications from the viewpoint of economic efficiency and wealth distribution) has now 
become popular where there is a greater interest in more empirical research to prepare legislation and 
check its effects after its application in the society. See Jan H. Dalhuisen ‘Dalhuisen on Transnational 
Comparative, Commercial, Financial and Trade Law’ (Hart Publishing, vol. 1, 4
th
 edition, 2010) pp. 126-
132, 257-262. For more see also R. A. Posner ‘Economic Analysis of Law’ (Aspen Publishers Inc., 8
th
 
edition, 2010); WM Landes and RA Posner ‘The Influence of Economics on Law: A Quantitative Study’ 
(Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 36, 1993) p. 385; RH Coase ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (Journal of 
Law and Economics, vol. 3, 1960) p. 1.           
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laws and regulations that are not fully thought through. Rules against short-selling22 
and the ever increasing criminalisation of financial regulatory enforcement23 are good 
examples of this. Beginning in the 1960s and maturing in the 1970s and 1980s, a 
                                                   
22
 Section 1 0(a)(1) of the 1934 Act states that: “It shall be unlawful for any person ... to effect a short 
sale ... in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities 
exchange ...”. This Section was first implemented by the SEC in early 1938, through the introduction of 
rule 10a-1 of the 1934 Act, known as the “uptick rule”. See Erik R Sirri ‘Regulatory Politics and Short 
Selling’ (University of Pittsburgh Law Review , Vol. 71, Issue 3, Spring 2010) p. 522.   
23
 Of major reforms of the 1930s are the enactments of six major federal securities acts which contain 
provisions imposing heavy fines or imprisonment or both on a number of prohibited conducts. The 
common feature of all these federal securities acts is that one who “wilfully” violates any of the 
provisions of the statutes and regulations thereunder commits a criminal offense. The 1934 Act, known 
as the “truth in securities” law, imposes a disclosure obligation on issuers in order to prevent fraud and 
misrepresentation in the primary distribution of securities. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
regulates secondary trading in the securities markets and governs the operations and activities of 
dealers and brokers. It imposes direct governmental regulation such as banning the manipulation of the 
prices of securities traded on the exchanges, prohibiting manipulative or deceptive devices and practices 
in the sale or purchase of securities on exchanges, and restricting severely insider trading. It also 
involves a resort to SEC-supervised self-regulation of the securities exchange markets. The Public Utility 
Holding Company Act of 1935 which empowers the SEC to regulate interstate public utility holding 
company systems which are involved in the electric utility business or in the retail distribution of natural 
or manufactured gas. The main purpose of the Act is to limit the utility holding company’s operations to 
an integrated system by requiring physical integration and corporate simplification of the system. The 
Trust Indenture Act of 1939 introduces certain statutory standards to trust indentures according to 
which bonds, debentures, notes and similar debt securities are offered for public sale. This Act regulates 
heavily the character and conduct of the indenture trustee. The Investment Company Act of 1940 
requires the registration and disclosure of the financial condition and investment policies of publicly 
held companies involved in the business of investing, reinvesting and trading in securties. The Act tries 
to protect the interests of all the investment company’s security holders by preventing changes in 
investment policies without shareholder approval, by regulating the custody of company assets, and by 
forbidding transactions between the company and its fiduciaries without SEC approval. The 
complementary Investment Advisors Act of 1940 regulates individuals involved in the business of 
providing advice, analysis or reports on securities by requiring their registration. The Act contains anti-
fraud provisions and imposes a duty on the investment advisor to maintain books and records which are 
subject to inspection. It also requires the advisor to reveal the nature of her interest in any transaction 
she has executed on behalf of her client. The original criminal sanctions imposed on offenders by the 
above mentioned six federal securities acts have remained intact to the present time. It is noteworthy 
that there are several other federal criminal statutes which may, and usually do, apply in criminal 
prosecutions in the securities area. See James R. Gillespie ‘Securities and Exchange Commission and 
Criminal Violations of the Federal Securities Laws’ (Indiana Legal Forum, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Fall 1967) pp. 
154-156, 161, 163, and 180.  
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movement pushing for deregulation24 started advocating the efficacy of markets as 
allocators of capital and disseminators of information and the inefficiencies of 
government regulation and interference in the economy.25 Frequently cited as an 
example of deregulation in practice, the Financial Modernisation Act of 1999 (the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLB)) was a complex and interesting piece of American 
regulation. However, the dominance of deregulation has now been undermined by the 
                                                   
24
 See George Alexander Walker ‘Financial Markets and Exchanges’ in Michael Blair QC, George Walker 
and Stuart Willey ‘Financial Markets and Exchanges Law’ (Oxford University Press, 2
nd
 edition, 2012, pp. 
3-43) p. 4. According to Walker, this deregulation movement that was followed by many countries from 
the late 1980s and early 1990s onwards led to the creation of a truly global financial and capital 
marketplace. As per Walker, the main cause to this fundamental change was significant increases in the 
growth and apetitie for capital and investment at the national level and also internationally. The cross-
border development of banking business, and then insurance and securities, supported by technological 
advances and other computer hardware and software support were also reasons for the emergence of 
this truly global financial market.      
25
 During this time, the federal government of the United States eliminated or substantially reduced 
the general controls or guidelines on prices and wages throughout the economy including financial 
sector. Changes in financial regulation were compelled by significant developments in the financial 
markets. Commercial and savings banks had been subject to interest rate restrictions on their deposits 
since the 1930s. These restrictions have caused considerable problems only when market interest rates 
soared rapidly, first in the late 1960s and also in the late 1970s. Small depositors were especially 
suffered losses by these ceilings on interest rates. The development of the money market mutual funds 
in the 1970s offered depositors deposit-like accounts with higher market interest rates and this fact led 
to a significant reduction of deposits in the banking system. Congress consequently reacted to these 
developments in 1980 by authorising the gradual removal of interest rate ceilings by 1986. Another Act 
in 1982 allowed banks to introduce new types of accounts to both small and large depositors. These 
new types of accounts became very popular and increased the interest payments to depositors with no 
substantial effect on interest rates to borrowers. Other provisions of the 1982 Act authorised the 
acquisition of a failed bank by an out-of-state bank or by a bank of a different type. See William A. 
Niskanen ‘Economic Deregulation in the United States: Lessons for America, Lessons for China’ (Cato 
Journal, Vol. 8, Issue 3, Winter 1989) pp. 657and 662. In his paper (p. 668), Niskanen concludes that the 
path to deregulation is not without difficulties, but it is the road to economic development. He writes, a 
government that represents the nation, rather than the interests of certain groups, will choose this road 
to prosperity.       
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recent financial crisis.26 The new Act in the US after the late-2000s financial crisis, the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DFA),27 attempts to 
correct one of the perceived flaws in the GLB by giving the Federal Reserve authority 
to systemically regulate major banking institutions and other financial firms as a whole.        
Similar to the US’s approach as explained above, the UK’s response to the 
systemic financial problems has focused more on financial regulation rather than on 
                                                   
26
 Some economists, legal scholars and others have argued that deregulation may precede and cause 
financial turmoils or contribute to their severity by leaving economies insecure when a financial crisis 
occures. For some literature arguing that deregulation contributed critically to current global financial 
turmoil see James Crotty ‘Structural Causes of the Global Financial Crisis: a Critical Assessment of the 
New Financial Architecture’ (Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 33, 2009) pp. 563-580 (as per Crotty 
at p. 575 “the severity of the global ﬁnancial crisis and the global economic recession that accompanied 
it demonstrate the utter bankruptcy of the deregulated global neoliberal ﬁnancial system and the 
marketism it reﬂects”; Patricia A. McCoy et al.‘Systemic Risk through Securitization: The Result of 
Deregulation and Regulatory Failure’ (Connecticut Law Review, Vol. 41, Issue 4, 2009) pp. 493-541 (as 
per McCoy et al at p. 493, deregulation policy and regulatory failure with respect to asset-backed 
securities markets created a bubble in housing industry and massive fraud in this market); Brian J. M. 
Quinn ‘The Failure of Private Ordering and the Financial Crisis of 2008’ (New York University Journal of 
Law & Business, Vol. 5, Issue 2, Summer 2009) pp. 549-616 (according to Quinn at p. 597, financial crisis 
of 2008 proved that that “the efficient capital markets hypothesis has run its course as an animating 
principle for deregulatory trend of the past three decades”. Still other scholars have laid the fault not on 
less or de-regulation, but instead on the failure of existing and also newly introduced regulations and 
regulatory enforcement regimes. Some scholars argue that the crisis rooted not in deregulation but 
stemmed from failed or flawed existing regulation. For instance, see Charles W. Calomiris ‘Another 
“Deregulation” Myth’ (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, On the Issues, Oct. 2008) 
available at http://www.aei.org/files/2008/10/29/20081029_5723624OTICalomiris_g.pdf (Retrieved on 
March 9, 2013). Calomiris argues that the 2004 change in the SEC's rule on net capital which proved to 
be unsuccessful in fixing the problems at Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns is not an example of 
deregulation but failure of new regulation which contributed to the severity of the late-2000s financial 
crisis.    
27
 The DFA was signed into law by President Obama on July 21, 2010 after a year-long process. The 
DFA mainly introduces a framework to be built on by the financial regulators. It is argued that it will take 
many more years for the regulatory organism to fully adapt to the reforms under the DFA. 
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planning for an alternative financial model.28 The U.K. Tripartite Authorities namely 
H.M. Treasury, Bank of England, and the Financial Services Authority, worked together 
to contain the financial crisis in the United Kingdom and of important measures they 
took in this regard were the use of Bank of England as lender of last resort to provide 
necessary loans to failing banks, increasing the coverage limit of the country’s deposit 
insurance system, widening the use of collateral the Bank of England would accept for 
liquidity, extending lending to the economy, limiting bonuses, government 
intervention with blanket guarantees and recapitalisation, and the introduction of the 
asset protection scheme.29 More specifically, as evidence of regulation initiative in the 
UK, following the late-2000s financial crisis, the UK government enacted the Banking 
Act 2009 which introduced a “Special Resolution Regime” (SRR) for banks in financial 
difficulties and modified insolvency and administration law as it applies to banks. It 
also amended the “Financial Services Compensation Scheme” (FSCS). Furthermore, the 
Financial Services Act which came into force from 1 April 2013 delivers fundamental 
reform of financial regulation in the UK. It introduces a clear and consistent regulatory 
framework, replacing the uncertainty and insufficiency of the failed Tripartite system. 
                                                   
28
 For example, after Northern Rock was faced by the liquidity crisis in 2007, it was forced to accept 
emergency funding from the Bank of England and later was taken into public ownership through its 
acquisition by the Treasury. The concerns surrounding Northern Rock crisis were considered by the 
House of Commons Treasury Committee in an initial report on “The Run on the Ruck” on 26 January 
2008. An exploratory discusstion paper on “Banking Reform: Protecting Depositors” was issued by the 
Tripartite Authorities on October 2007 and this was followed by an official consultation document on 
“Financial Stability and Depositor Protection: Strengthening the Framework” on 30 January 2008. See 
George Alexander Walker ‘Banks and Banking’ in Michael Blair QC, George Walker and Robert Purves 
‘Financial Services Law’ (Oxford University Press, 2
nd
 Edition, 2009, pp. 681-752) pp. 747-750. See also 
George Alexander Walker ‘Northern Rock Falls’ (Bankers’ Law, Vol. 2, Issue 2, 2008) pp. 4-12; George 
Alexander Walker ‘The Deconstruction of Financial Risk’ (Palgrave Journal of Banking Regulation, 
October 2008) 1, 2; and George Alexander Walker ‘Credit Crisis- Regulatory and Financial Systems 
Reform’ (Butterworths JIBL, November 2007) pp. 567-572.     
29
 For a detail explanation of each of these measures see Dalvinder Singh ‘U.K. Approach to Financial 
Crisis Management’ (Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems, Vol. 19, Issue 3, Winter 2011) pp. 
869-870.    
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This Act is mainly made up of amendments to the Financial Services and Markets Act 
2000 (FSMA). The Act provides regulators with broad powers to combat future risks to 
financial stability and to ensure that consumers will be treated fairly. It takes 
significant steps to direct the focus of regulators to rebuild a confident competition in 
a banking sector that has become too concentrated. The Act gives the Bank of England 
responsibility for protecting and enhancing financial stability through converging 
macro and micro prudential regulation. The Act abolishes the Financial Services 
Authority (FSA) and introduces a new regulatory architecture consisting of the 
Financial Policy Committee (FPC), the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) and the 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA); and furthermore the Act empowers authorities to 
go beyond “tick-box” compliance and furthers a regulatory culture of judgment, 
expertise and proactive interventionist approach.30         
In modern sense, as far as the initiative of Islamic banking and finance 
concerned, it was first emerged in the 1950’s and the first group of Islamic investment 
banks were developed in Egypt and Malaysia in the early 1960’s.31 Oil revenue shocks 
in the 1970s caused a wealth transfer that made contemporary Islamic banking and 
finance a viable reality. In modern Islamic banking and finance, two distinct 
approaches rival each other: Sharia-compliant (quasi-Islamic) approach and Sharia-
based (Islamic) approach.32  
                                                   
30
 For more in this regard see HM Treasury website at http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/press_126_12.htm. On 19 December 2012, the Financial Secretary to the Treasury, Greg 
Clark, said that “I am delighted that the Financial Services Bill has received Royal Assent today [and]… 
these reforms [under the Financial Services Bill] as well as those in the forthcoming Banking Reform Bill- 
can help rebuild confidence and trust.”  
31
 See Ali Malik, Muhammad Shaukat Malik, Haider Shah ‘An Analysis of Islamic Banking and Finance in 
West: From Lagging to Leading’ (Asian Social Sciences, vol. 7, no. 1, January 2011) p.180. For more detail 
see also Y. Karbhari, K. Naser & Z. Shahin ‘Problems and Challenges Facing the Islamic Banking System in 
the West: The Case of the UK.’ (Thunderbird International Business Review, 2004) pp. 46, 5, 521-543.  
32
 See International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) ‘Islamic Capital Market Task Force’ 
(2004) pp. 5, 14.     
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The Sharia-compliant approach which is also known as the “Conventionalisation 
or Westernisation” approach creates the products by first identifying the modern 
financial products and services and then removing or modifying any non-Sharia-
compliant elements to make them acceptable instruments from the viewpoint of 
Sharia.33 It is criticised that mainstream Islamic banking and finance does not reflect 
the inner dimensions of the Islamic tradition and that not only is not established based 
on classical Islamic jurisprudence, but it also deviates from the “spirit” of Sharia if not 
the letter. It has been convincingly argued that this practice of modern Islamic banking 
and finance leads to considerably “high costs, lower profits, and most importantly, a 
dilution of respectability”.34 The main reason that modern Islamic financial products 
(i.e., Sharia-compliant instruments) are losing their respectability is that the 
contemporary Islamic banking and finance industry has been more interested in 
‘creative lawyering’ and/or ‘financial (re)engineering’ rather than going forward on the 
basis of any organic fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) arising functionally out of the 
objectives of Sharia (Maqasid al-Sharia). The so-called rates of profit in many of the 
modern “Sharia-compliant” products are benchmarked to the prevalent interest rate 
in the monetary market such as LIBOR. These Sharia-compliant financial products 
involve the “exact same transfer of credit and risk” and often require the same types 
of security to ensure their performance.35 It is for this reason that the modern Sharia-
                                                   
33
 For more see Mahmoud A. El-Gamal ‘Islamic Finance: Law, Economics, and Practice’ (Cambridge 
University Press, 2006) p. 8. As per El-Gamal, the starting point in contemporary Islamic banking and 
finance is modern financial practices, from which it moves away insofar as some modern practices are 
deemed forbidden in Sharia. Notably, from the point of view of Sharia, it is commendable to follow the 
applicable canons (i.e., law of the land) so long as canons do not contravene the requirements of Sharia. 
However, as per more strict interpretations, some Ulama (leading Sharia experts) believe that any law of 
the land is to be checked by reference to Maqasid al-Sharia i.e., Objectives of Sharia.      
34
 A major criticism of Islamic banking and finance is the incremental transaction costs, i.e., the so-
called “price of being Muslim” and hazards associated with irrational pietism.  
35
 See Caner K. Dagli ‘Islamic Law, Shariah-based Finance, and Economics’ (College of the Holy Cross: 
pre-publication draft) pp.12-13.      
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compliant products are facing an ever increasing Sharia risk and therefore, there is an 
urgent need to overhaul the modern Islamic financial products and institutions within 
the framework of true Islamic teachings, i.e., Maqasid al-Sharia.36 For this purpose, 
some Islamic scholars have argued that the current research and scholarship should 
focus on the way that Maqasid al-Sharia (Objectives of Sharia) can be internalised by 
the Islamic institutions in their financial transactions.37 Thus, realistically, the so-called 
Sharia-compliant instruments are not true Islamic alternative products. In addition to 
the conventionalisation concern, given the current focus of the contemporary Islamic 
                                                   
36
 The Objectives of Sharia (Maqaasid al-Sharia) are categorised into those objectives that are 
essential, complementary, or desirable. In this thesis, whenever Maqasid al-Sharia is referred to they are 
only the essential objectives that are taken into account. Among the essential objectives, “protection of 
property” (hifz al-maal) is especially relevant to the research project here, although it is impossible to 
separate each of the objectives from the others. For more in this regard, see Caner K. Dagli ‘Islamic Law, 
Shariah-based Finance, and Economics’ (College of the Holy Cross: pre-publication draft) pp. 2-3.     
37
 See Mohamad Akram Laldin Fundamentals and Practices in Islamic Finance’ (Kuala Lumpur: 
ISRA/INCEIF, 2008), pp. 71, 77.     
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banking and finance on two main prohibitions in Islamic finance namely riba38 and 
gharar,39 it is argued that modern Islamic banking and finance has been built up on 
two pillars: one pillar is translation, and the other pillar is prohibition. From another 
perspective, the banks and financial institutions that have in recent years been set up 
to do Islamic banking and finance are indeed organised along the lines of Anglo-
                                                   
38
 Riba, literally, means an excess or increase. In Islam, as per Quran (2:275) “God has forbidden riba.” 
Similar condemnations against riba (usury-like concept) are also found in other religious texts 
from Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity, and Hinduism. Therefore, the prohibition on riba is not unique to 
Islam and it has been called by different names through history. It is interesting to compare riba with 
Hebrew ribit and other pre-Islamic prohibitions on “usury,” e.g., usury in Code of Hammurabi (c. 1760 
BC), usury in Hinduism and Buddhism (the earliest recording of usury in Hinduism goes back to 
the Vedic texts of Ancient India (2000-1400 BC) where the usurer (kusidin) is mentioned numerous 
times and interpreted as any lender with an interest.  More references on interest charges are found in 
the later Sutra texts (700-100 BC), as well as the Buddhist Jatakas (600-400 BC).  It was in this latter 
period of time that the first sentiments of contempt for usury are found. For more in this regard see Jain 
Lakshmi Chandra ‘Indigenous Banking in India’ (Macmillan and Co., limited, 1929, digitized 2010); and 
also consult http://ibfn.wordpress.com/2009/04/24/money-matters-usury-in-hinduism-and-buddhism. 
Note also the idea that is attributed to Plato “…capital may not exceed principal”; and also note 
Deuteronomy (23:19&20) “you shall not lend upon interest to your brother, interest on money, interest 
on victuals, interest on anything that is lent for interest. To a foreigner you may lend upon interest, but 
to your brother you shall not lend upon interest; that the LORD your God may bless you in all that you 
undertake in the land which you are entering to take possession of it”.   
The two basic types of riba in Islamic law are: a) riba in the Quran (called riba al-Jahiliyya / riba al-
nasiya/riba al-qardi), and b) riba in Hadith (called riba al-fadl/riba al-mua’mali). The former relates to the 
present day money-loans and transactions on credit using money, while the latter relates to commodity-
based transactions (exchanges). According to the latter, in order to avoid riba, any difference in quantity 
or quality in barter-exchanging of the same commodities/species is not allowed. However, in a banking 
and finance context, the major concern is the former riba i.e., dealing with money and credit 
transaction. As per a Hadith attributed to Prophet Muhammad “the worst and the most detrimental 
business is riba” (inna sharr al-makasib al-riba). See Al-Shaykh Muhammad bin al-Hasan al-Hurr al-Amili 
‘Wasaeel al-Shia’ (Tehran: Al-Maktaba al-Islamiyyah, vol. 12/20, 6
th
 edition, 1403 Lunar Hijri Calendar) p. 
426, Hadith no. 23280. 
39
 In Islamic law, the essence of risk is closely connected to the concept of gharar. Gharar is often an 
element of deception either through ignorance of the goods or services, the price, or through the 
incorrect description of the goods or services, in which one or both parties stand to be deceived through 
ignorance of an essential element of exchange. Gharar is divided into three types, namely gharar faahish 
(excessive), which vitiates the transaction, gharar yaasir (minor), which is tolerated and gharar 
mutawassit (moderate), which falls between the other two categories. Any given transaction can be 
classified as a forbidden activity because of gharar faahish (excessive) or disproportionate risk. See 
IOSCO ‘Analysis of the Application of IOSCO's Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation 
for Islamic Securities Products’ (2008) p. 35. 
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American40 financial practices rather than as organisations native to any Islamic 
tradition. Following the modern corporate governance rules, they run on the basis of 
these principles in exactly the same way as modern institutions: a) owners are 
separated from the professional management team (separation of ownership and 
control); b) equity holders are separated from the class of depositors/creditors; and c) 
a limited liability ‘shield’ is still operated.  
In contrast to the Sharia-compliant approach, as per Sharia-based41 approach, 
the product design or, on a larger scale, the design of a new viable alternative 
economic and financial system has to evolve from the translation or institutionalisation 
of the original sources of Sharia.42 As per Taqi Usmani, in an Islamic setting, business 
transactions and institutions can never be disentangled from the underlying Islamic 
objectives and ethical purposes.43 To be ‘Islamic’ it is not sufficient that the design of 
the transactions and institutions follow Islamic rules and principles, but it is also 
necessary that the objective and outlook of the business products and institutions 
reflect the identity of Islam which is distinguished from that of conventional business 
and finance.44 However, a modern understanding of Islamic finance is very limited. It 
                                                   
40
 As per Dodge v. Ford Motor Company, 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668. (Mich. 1919), a (modern) 
business corporation is organised and carries on basically for the profit of its stockholders/shareholders. 
The powers of the directors of the organisation have to be exercised to that end. The power of directors 
is to be employed in the choice of means to achieve that end, and does not extend to a change in the 
end itself, to the decrease of profits, or to the non-distribution of revenues among 
stockholders/shareholders in order to dedicate them to other purposes. At present, there are many 
contemporary Islamic business and financial institutions organised on the basis of this principle. From an 
Islamic perspective, it may be argued that, shareholder wealth maximisation is viewed as deficient.     
41
  Major reasons for the appeal of “Sharia-based” financing are: a) to revive a sense of religious and 
cultural identity (identity politics); and b) to continue a tradition, to do business in the same way as 
pious predecessors.  
42
 See Mohamad Akram Laldin ‘Shari’ah Compliant vs Shari’ah Based Product’ (ISRA Bulletin, vol.2, 
April 2009).  
43
 The reason is largely that Islam governs all aspects of human life with a set of rules and principles.  
44




has been concentrated on the prohibition of riba (interest) and has not taken into 
account many other fundamental concepts and rules of Islam which distinguish it from 
those of modern finance. 
In contemporary Islamic banking and finance, the dominant approach is to model 
the economics of a conventional debt financing as any of the classical nominate 
contract forms in Islam by altering the substantive features of the Islamic nominate 
contracts. The philosophy and underlying rational of Islamic banking seems to have 
been entirely overlooked because the instruments of musharaka (profit and loss 
sharing arrangements), the ideal instruments of financing and distributive justice 
according to Sharia have been ignored. The Islamic banks instead use the instruments 
of murabaha (cost plus mark-up sale) and ijara (leasing) within the context of the 
modern benchmarks like LIBOR etc., where the outcome of the product is not much 
different from the interest-bearing transactions.45 Even murabaha and ijara are not 
implemented according to the rules required by Sharia. The basic concept of 
murabaha in Islam is that the financier should buy the commodity and then sell it to 
the client on the basis of deferred payment with a mark-up. From a Sharia point of 
view, it is essential that the relevant goods have come into the ownership and at least 
be in the constructive possession of the financier before it is transferred to the client. 
The financier will have to shoulder the risk of the goods during the period it remains 
under the ownership or possession of the financier. However, in practice, many Islamic 
                                                   
45
 See Muhammad Taqi Usmani ‘An Introduction to Islamic Finance’ (Hague: Kluwer Law International, 
2002) pp. 165-167. Islamic banks and financial institutions have been forced to use murabaha and ijara 
techniques and their variants excessively in order to compete with conventional banks especially in 
providing an assured comparable rate of return for deposits. They have also been forced to use these 
pre-determined fixed return tools rather than contingent return instruments to avoid any potential 
mismatch of funds in both the liability and asset side of their balance sheets and also the liquidity 
shortage concerns.    
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banks and financial institutions do not follow this. For instance, as per Taqi Usmani46, 
some Islamic financial institutions have wrongfully thought that murabaha can be a 
substitute for interest, for all practical considerations. Therefore, they use murabaha 
arrangements even when the client needs capital for the expenses of running his 
operation, such as for payment of salaries or bills for the commodities and services 
that are already consumed or received. Clearly, murabaha cannot be used in this 
circumstance because no goods are being bought by the financier. In some 
circumstances, the client buys the goods on his own prior to any arrangement with the 
financial institution and then a murabaha is agreed on the basis of a buy-back scheme. 
This is again in contrast to Sharia because the buy-back scheme is unanimously ruled 
as illegitimate in Sharia.47 In other circumstances the client himself is appointed as the 
agent of the financial institution to buy certain goods and to resell it to himself 
immediately after taking possession of the goods. This is not in conformity with the 
salient features of murabaha in Sharia. If the client himself is appointed as the agent to 
buy the goods, his capacity as an agent has to be distinguished from his capacity as a 
purchaser which means that after buying goods on behalf of the financial institution he 
must inform the financial institution that he has bought the goods on its behalf and 
then the goods should be transferred to him via the financial institution by way of a 
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 See Muhammad Taqi Usmani ‘An Introduction to Islamic Finance’ (Hague: Kluwer Law International, 
2002) pp. 164-167.  
47
 However, this understanding should be distinguished from bay shart (sale-with-a-repurchase-




proper offer and acceptance.48 Until the second transaction occurs between the 
financial institution and the client, the ownership benefits and also the risk of the 
acquired goods by the client as the agent would belong to the financial institution. 
Murabaha is a type of bay (sale) contract and it is a firm rule of Sharia that the price in 
sale transactions has to be agreed at the time of transaction. The agreed price can 
neither be increased nor reduced without mutual agreement once it is determined by 
the parties to the contract. In practice, however, some financial institutions unilaterally 
increase the price of a murabaha contract in the case of delay in payment which is 
illegitimate according to Sharia. Some financial institutions roll-over the payment of 
the price of a murabaha contract in the case of default by the client. Clearly, this 
practice is not allowed by Sharia simply because once the goods are sold to the client it 
cannot once again be the subject matter of another sale to the same client. In ijara, as 
per Taqi Usmani49, in the same way as murabaha, some requirements of Sharia are 
usually overlooked. It is a precondition for a valid ijara transaction that the lessor 
shoulders the risks associated with the ownership of the leased property and that the 
usufruct of the leased property must be made available free of any burdens to the 
lessee for which he will have to pay a certain rent. However, in practice, some Sharia 
rules are violated in a number of ijara transactions. Even in the case of demolition of 
the leased property due to force majeure causes, the lessee is still obliged to keep 
paying the agreed rent which means that the lessor neither assumes the damages that 
                                                   
48
 However, it seems this is not problematic from at least the viewpoint of the Islamic Shia school of 
thought. As per Iran Civil Code article 198 “[in a transaction] either or both parties may represent 
another. It is also possible that one person represents both parties to a transaction”. One person may 
even transact with himself as a party to a transaction and as an agent of the other party to the 
transaction. However, in these circumstances, the terms of the self-dealing contract should be 
reasonable. See also Iran Civil Code article 1072, and also Iran Commerce Code articles 358, 373 and 
374.    
49
 See Muhammad Taqi Usmani ‘An Introduction to Islamic Finance’ (Hague: Kluwer Law International, 
2002) pp. 166-167.  
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occurred to his property nor delivers any usufruct to the lessee. This kind of ijara 
arrangement is contrary to the basic rules of Sharia.   
Adjudications and court decisions in the West50 especially in the UK and the US 
with regard to the re-characterisation51 of some major so-called Islamic business and 
financial products namely musharaka (partnership), murabaha (cost-plus sale), 
mudaraba (venture capital), istisna (construction finance), ijara (leasing), and sukuk 
(bond-like certificates) confirms the dominance of the Sharia-compliant approach in 
contemporary Islamic banking and finance. Usually, the courts in the UK and US have 
re-characterised so-called Sharia-compliant transactions that are not native to true 
Islamic traditions and also substantive features in the Islamic nominate contracts but 
rather mere replications of conventional debt-based financing practices and thus have 
applied their own forum laws in order for the re-characterisation and translation of the 
so-called Sharia-compliant transactions into their own applicable financing techniques. 
                                                   
50
 For an analysis of some cases concerning Islamic finance and business transactions adjudicated in 
the UK, the US, Malaysia and India see Zulkifli Hasan and Mehmet Asutay ‘An Analysis of the Courts’ 
Decisions on Islamic Finance Disputes’ (ISRA International Journal of Islamic Finance, vol. 3, issue 2, 
2011) pp. 41-71. Also for an analysis of the reaction of Western secular courts to Islamic business and 
financial contracts especially on the matters of conflicts of laws and recharacterisation concerns see 
Nicholas H. D. Foster ‘Encounters between Legal Systems: Recent Cases Concerning Islamic Commercial 
Law in Secular Courts’ (Amicus Curiae, November/December 2006) pp. 2-9.       
51
 According to Dalhuisen, in secular jurisdictions, Islamic financial products encounter two special 
risks: the “recharacterisation of the proprietary interests” and the “clerical opinion”. He believes that 
the Islamic financing cases will necessarily be recharacterised if they were brought in for adjudication 
before secular courts in the US and the UK - and they are most likely to be recharacterised or converted 
into secured lending transactions under Article 9 UCC by the US courts. He further argues that, in 
bankruptcies, the shareholders may not be able to use the shield of limited liability because it is 
arguably contrary to the principles of Islamic law. See Jan H. Dalhuisen ‘Dalhuisen on Transnational 
Comparative, Commercial, Financial and Trade Law’ (Hart Publishing, vol. 3, 4
th
 edition, 2010) p. 168.       
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Some major examples of this are Symphony Gems case,52 Shamil Bank of Bahrain 
case,53 and the bankruptcy case East Cameron.54  
A very interesting Sharia-based economic (including business and finance) 
doctrine, reflecting the inner dimensions of Islam is provided by the great Islamic 
scholar Muhammad Baqir Sadr in his well-known book Iqtisaduna (“ Our Economy”). 
He attempts to introduce Islamic economic doctrine in the light of the laws and 
objectives of Islam. He argues for Islamic economics as a true alternative to Capitalism 
and Marxism and rejects any potential claim that Islamic economics is a combination 
                                                   
52
 Islamic Investment Company of the Gulf “IICG” (Bahamas) Ltd. v. Symphony Gems N.V. & Others, 
High Court of Justice Queen's Bench Division Commercial Court [QBD (Comm Ct)] (13th February, 2002). 
It is said that this was the first time a Western court ruled on an Islamic banking and finance transaction. 
For a critical discussion on this case see Arshad A. Ahmed and U. F. Moghul ‘Contractual Forms in Islamic 
Finance Law and Islamic Investment Company of the Gulf (Bahamas) Ltd. v. Symphony Gems N.V. & 
Others: A First Impression of Islamic Finance’ (Fordham International Law Journal, vol.  27, December 
2003) pp. 150-194. It is interesting to compare this case with Barclay Commerce Corp. v. Finkelstein, 11 
A.D.2d 327, 328 (N.Y. App. Div. 1960). There is a Rabbinic prohibition on charging two prices: lower cash 
price and higher credit price. Incremental credit cost would be ribbis. The alternative arrangement used 
was heter iska (investment contract), but the court ruled that heter iska was “merely in compliance in 
form with Hebraic Law”. The court dismissed the religious characterisation of the arrangement and 
viewed it as a conventional interest-based debt instrument. A similar result is also found in 
Arnav Industries, Inc. Employee Retirernent Trust v. Westside Realty Associates, 180 A.D.2d 463, 579 
N.Y.S.2d 382 (1st Dept 1992).      
53
 Beximco Pharmaceuticals Ltd & Others v. Shamil Bank of Bahrain EC [2004] EWCA Civ 19 (28 January 
2004). England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) decided on 28 January 2004 following an 
appeal from the judgment of Justice Morison dated 1 August 2003.  The most important single issue in 
this case was the construction and effect of the form of the governing law clause contained in the 
financing agreements. That clause was as follows: “Subject to the principles of the Glorious Sharia’a, this 
Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of England.” 
54
 This is one of the most eye-catching cases on how the sukuk (Islamic securities) may be treated in 
the US bankruptcy courts. On 16 October 2008, East Cameron Partners (a small oil and gas producer firm 
with producing lease holdings in the East Cameron 71 and 72 gas fields 20 miles offshore of Louisiana), 
which was the issuer of the first sukuk launched by a US-based company, filed for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy in the US District Court for the Western District of Louisiana. The bankruptcy filing of East 
Cameron Partners renders a test for whether US courts recognise the securitisation of assets and also 
examines the claim that sukuk are basically different from interest-based debt. For detail see a report by 
Blake Goud ‘East Cameron Sukuk Sinks’ (Islamic Business & Finance’s US correspondent, Islamic Capital 
Markets) Available via the Internet at www.cpifinancial.net  
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of Capitalism and Marxism.55 He believes that Islam possesses an economic order in its 
own right. According to him, Islamic economic doctrine is based on three principles: 
multi-ownership right, limited liberal economy56, and social justice.57 Regarding the 
issue of ownership, Islam, at the same time and equally, recognises three different 
types of ownership: private, public, and state.58 With regard to the limited liberal 
economy, there are two restrictions that limit the self-interested economic activities of 
individuals. One is an internal force or recommended rules i.e., moral values that guide 
a person on how to act in economic life, e.g., engaging in socially beneficial businesses 
rather than merely pursuing his self-interested purposes. The other is normative rules 
that are dictated by Sharia which expressly prohibit economic activities such as 
hoarding and exploitation of labour and also recognises the intervention and 
supervision of the state59 in the market for the protection of public interests and social 
rights. Concerning social justice60, he believes that it is comprised of two concepts: 
                                                   
55
 See Muhammad Baqir Sadr ‘Iqtisaduna’ (Qom: Bustan-e Ketab Press, 2003) pp. 43-50, 331-355. This 
book is written between 1960 and 1961.    
56
 For more detail on the concept and scope of freedom and liberty (hurriyyah) in Islam especially in an 
economic and business context see Quran (4:59); Saduq Abi Ja’far Muhammad bin Ali bin al-Hussein bin 
Musa’ bin Babawayh  ‘Ilal al-Sharaye’ (Al-Maktabat al-Haydariyyah, vol. 1/1, 1385 Lunar Hijri Calendar) 
p.253; Muhammad Hussein al-Tabatabaee ‘Al-Mizan Fi Tafsir al-Quran’ (Beirut: Mu’assasa al-Alami li al-
Matbu’aat, vol. 1/20, 1390 Lunar Hijri Calendar) p.253; Abi Muhammad al-Hasan bin Ali bin al-Hussein 
bin Sho’bat al-Harrani ‘Tuhaf al-Uqul’ ( Daar al-Kutub al-Islamiyyah, 1384 Lunar Hijri Calendar) p.347.    
57
 See Muhammad Baqir Sadr ‘Iqtisaduna’ (Qom: Bustan-e Ketab Press, 2003) pp. 281-292. 
58
 In Islam, according to Sadr, the ownership right or the ability to benefit from wealth distribution is 
basically linked to two factors: labour and need. See Muhammad Baqir Sadr ‘Iqtisaduna’ (Qom: Bustan-e 
Ketab Press, 2003) pp. 281-292.  
59
 With regard to the legitimacy and also necessity of the intervention of the state in economies see 
Muhammad Baqir Sadr ‘Iqtisaduna’ (Qom: Bustan-e Ketab Press, 2003) pp. 685-692. 
60
 In Islamic scholarship, social justice has not been defined clearly. For a detail discussion on the origin 
and also the implications of justice in Islam see Alaa’eddin Ali al-Muttaqi bin Hisam al-Din al-Hindi ‘Kanz 
al-Ummal Fi Sunnan al-Aqwaal wa al-A’maal’ (Birut: Mu’assasa al-Risaalah, vol. 6/16, 1399 Lunar Hijri 
Calendar) p.367, Hadith no. 16101; Muhammad Hussein al-Tabatabaee ‘Al-Mizan fi Tafsir al-Quran’ 
(Birut: Mu’assasa al-Alami li al-Matbu’aat, vol. 4/20, 1390 Lunar Hijri Calendar) p.116; Abi Muhammad 
al-Hasan bin Ali bin al-Hussein bin Sho’bat al-Harrani  ‘Tuhaf al-Uqul’ (Daar al-Kutub al-Islamiyyah, 1384 
Lunar Hijri Calendar) pp.204, 282.    
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public joint-and-several responsibility61and social balance.62 From a methodological 
perspective, according to Sadr, Islamic economics is not science but rather a new 
approach that only gives general clues and guidance on how to act in economic life and 
how to run the economy.63 He believes that the essence and philosophy of the Islamic 
economic order is based on justice, which in turn has to be implemented and also 
evaluated on the basis of two factors: ethical/moral values, rather than specific 
scientific rules and present realities – mainly economic ones.64 Surprisingly, he states 
that the starting point as well as the primary source of the Islamic economic order is 
Sharia, that is to say Islamic economics has to be extracted from the sources of Sharia. 
That is why, as per Sadr, Islamic economics has not been created or invented at some 
point in the past but rather has been discovered from Sharia i.e., from those rules of 
Sharia that relate to economic life and were originally found in the Quran and Sunnah. 
Therefore, an Islamic economist, unlike a secular economist, is not free to do whatever 
he sees fit. According to Sadr, the Islamic economist and this also applies to the Islamic 
state as well, is limited to following the general framework of Islamic economic 
objectives, policies, and rules that are discoverable from Sharia.65            
Another interesting systemic idea that has in recent decades emerged in the 
world of Islamic economics is an approach based on Islamic moral economy. This 
systemic approach, whose emergence in the modern sense goes back to the 1960s, 
was suggested as a solution to the failure of economic development as well as the rise 
of Islamic political identity in the Muslim world. The major scholars who have 
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 See Muhammad Baqir Sadr ‘Iqtisaduna’ (Qom: Bustan-e Ketab Press, 2003) pp. 661-669.  
62
 See Muhammad Baqir Sadr ‘Iqtisaduna’ (Qom: Bustan-e Ketab Press, 2003) pp. 671-683. 
63
 See Muhammad Baqir Sadr ‘Iqtisaduna’ (Qom: Bustan-e Ketab Press, 2003) pp. 315-319, 359-365, 
and 369. As per Sadr, Islamic economics is only a part of the whole code covering all aspects of the life 
that a Muslim should follow in his lifetime in order to achieve the ultimate objective. See Muhammad 
Baqir Sadr ‘Iqtisaduna’ (Qom: Bustan-e Ketab Press, 2003) pp. 293-391.    
64
 See Muhammad Baqir Sadr ‘Iqtisaduna’ (Qom: Bustan-e Ketab Press, 2003) pp. 290-292.    
65
 See Muhammad Baqir Sadr ‘Iqtisaduna’ (Qom: Bustan-e Ketab Press, 2003) pp. 369-407.  
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developed the Islamic moral economy idea are: Chapra,66 Ahmad,67 Naqvi,68 Siddiqi,69 - 
of the more recent scholars who are advocating the development of this thinking is 
Asutay.70 The fundamental concepts of tawhid (unity of God), adalah (justice), haq 
(right), ihsan (beneficence), rububiyyah (staying on the path to perfection), and 
tazkiyah (spiritual purification) provide the axiomatic foundation of this Islamic moral 
economy approach. All these concepts are in turn considered to be included under the 
general framework of Objectives of Sharia (Maqasid al-Sharia). The assumption of a 
morally-oriented human being- homoIslamicus- is at the heart of its methodological 
foundation.71 When it comes to applying the fundamental principles of the Islamic 
moral economy to Islamic banks and financial institutions, it goes much further than 
                                                   
66
 See M. U. Chapra ‘Islam and the Economic Challenge’ (Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 1992); and 
also M. U. Chapra ‘The Future of Economics: An Islamic Perspective’ (Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 
2000). 
67
 See K. Ahmad ‘Economic Development in an Islamic Framework (in K. Ahmad and Z. I. Ansari eds., 
Islamic Perspectives: Studies in Honour of Mawlana Sayyid Abul A’la Mawdudi)’ (Leicester and Jeddah: 
Islamic Foundation and Saudi Publishing House, 1979) pp. 223-240; K. Ahmad ‘Islamic Approach to 
Development: Some Policy Implications’ (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1994); K. Ahmad ‘The 
Challenge of Global Capitalism (in J. H. Dunning ed., Making Globalization Good: The Moral Challenges of 
Global Capitalism)’ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) pp. 181-209.     
68
 See S. N. H. Naqvi ‘Ethics and Economics: An Islamic Synthesis’ (Leicester: Islamic Foundation, 1981); 
S. N. H. Naqvi ‘Islam, Economics, and Society’ (London: Kegan Paul International, 1994); and also S. N. H. 
Naqvi ‘Perspectives on Morality and Human Well-Being: A Contribution to Islamic Economics’ 2003  
69
 See M. N. Siddiqi  ‘Muslim Economic Thinking: A Survey of Contemporary Literature’ (Leicester: The 
Islamic Foundation, 1981).   
70
 See Mehmet Asutay ‘Conceptualising and Locating the Social Failure of Islamic Finance: Aspirations 
of Islamic Moral Economy vs. the Realities of Islamic Finance’ (Asian and African Area Studies vol. 11, 
issue 2, 2012) pp. 93-113; Mehmet Asutay ‘A Political Economy Approach to Islamic Economics: Systemic 
Understanding for an Alternative Economic System’ (Kyoto Journal of Islamic Area Studies, vol. 1, issue 
2, 2007) pp. 3-18; and also Mehmet Asutay ‘Conceptualisation of the Second Best Solution in 
Overcoming the Social Failure of Islamic Banking and Finance: Examining the Overpowering of 
Homoislamicus by Homoeconomicus’ (IIUM Journal of Economics and Management, vol. 15, issue 2, 
2007) pp. 167-195.       
71
 This very challenging premise is similar to what is assumed of a human being in a Capitalist economy 
i.e., a “rational” human being. The same criticisms levelled against the rationality of human beings may 
similarly be applicable to the moral-orientation of individuals. On this basis, the conclusions derived on 
the basis of these premises may be very challenging particularly due to the reality of greed and pursuit 
of self-interest in the nature of human beings.    
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the mere prohibition of riba and a holistic approach to financing society as a whole is 
assumed.72         
On a very small scale, for the purposes of overhauling contemporary Islamic 
banking operations, some Islamic scholars73 have suggested the following major 
changes in this regard. Firstly, that there should be no interest on the deposits of the 
fund-providers;74 but, their capital has to be guaranteed. Secondly, that lending and 
investing have to be distinguished. Bank loans have to be interest-free but with a 
service charge, while investments have to be on the basis of profit and loss sharing 
(mudaraba) schemes. Commercial banks will be able to advance funds but they will 
not be allowed to involve in investment-financing schemes. However, the proposed 
overhaul allows commercial banks to engage in investment-financing through 
investment banks and investment companies under specific circumstances where it 
would be socially desirable and commercially viable to engage in such investment-
financing. Finally, that the value of capital lost due to inflation has to be compensated. 
As per the above approach, commercial banks should act as mere service providers 
instead of money-lenders or investment-partners. According to Abdul Gafoor, 
depositors are deemed as lenders to the bank with no interest but they are assured 
that their funds/deposits will be repaid fully.75 Some scholars believe that Islamic 
                                                   
72
 See Mehmet Asutay ‘Conceptualising and Locating the Social Failure of Islamic Finance: Aspirations 
of Islamic Moral Economy vs. the Realities of Islamic Finance’ (Asian and African Area Studies, vol. 11, 
issue 2, 2012) p. 99; Mehmet Asutay ‘Islamic Banking and Finance and its Role in the GCC and the EU 
Relationship: Principles, Developments and the Bridge Role of Islamic Finance (in C. Koch and L. 
Stenberg eds., The EU and the GCC: Challenges and Prospects) (Dubai: Gulf Research Centre, 2010) pp. 
35-58; Mehmet Asutay ‘Conceptualisation of the Second Best Solution in Overcoming the Social Failure 
of Islamic Banking and Finance: Examining the Overpowering of Homoislamicus by Homoeconomicus’ 
(IIUM Journal of Economics and Management, vol. 15, issue 2, 2007) pp. 167-195.     
73
 A. L. M. Abdul Gafoor ‘Islamic Banking & Finance: Another Approach’ (Kuala Lumpur: A.S. Noordeen, 
2000) pp. 3-4.   
74
 In Islam, one may earn in the form of wages, profits, awards, and rents but not interest (riba).  
75
 See A. L. M. Abdul Gafoor ‘Islamic Banking & Finance: Another Approach’ (Kuala Lumpur: A.S. 
Noordeen, 2000) pp. 6-7. 
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finance and banking favours ‘changing the inherently asymmetrical contractual 
relationship between borrowers and lenders to reduce inequity’ between the 
providers and recipients of funds in relation to risks and rewards structure. They argue 
that a riba-based financial system, which has been at the centre of the recent financial 
crisis, burdens disproportionate risks of repayment on the borrower, who must repay 
the principal of loan and also its compounded interest, whether the investment or 
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 See Ehsan Habib Feroz ‘Wrongs to Rights’ (Islamic Horizons, March/April 2009), pp. 22-24. Available 
via the Internet at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1409140. Also, see Ehsan Habib Feroz and Blake 
Goud ‘Grameen La Riba Model: A Strategy for Global Poverty Alleviation’ (Journal of Islamic Economics, 
Banking and Finance, vol. 5, issue 2) p. 2.    
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1.5 The Research Methodology  
This thesis employs a foundational and qualitative research methodology and 
does not concern itself with any quantitative data analysis. An interaction of both 
deductive and inductive reasoning methods was used in the library-based research. A 
deductive method was mainly used in researching the foundational theory and an 
inductive process in the part devoted to building up the new alternative economic, 
business and financial model. To prove the elements of the theory as well as the 
model, religious supporting authorities along with intellectual reasons are provided.  
In the history of the development of economic theories, it is widely argued 
whether it is the economic changes and developments that force the creation of new 
economic theories (a bottom-up process) or the abstract economic theories that 
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create or affect the trend of economic developments (a top-down process).77In other 
words, one approach is that policymakers should determine the policies and priorities 
that they see are proper and on the basis of which enact laws and issue rules and 
regulations (a deductive approach) to run the economic and financial system. The 
other attitude is that they are the economic realities and changes that force the 
policymakers to set the policies and priorities and implement them in society and 
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 For a sample of detail discussion in this regard see Harry Elmer Barnes ‘Economic Science and 
Dynamic History’ (Journal of Social Forces, Vol. 3, Issue 1, November 1924) pp. 37-56. According to 
Barnes at p. 40, some economic thinkers, who had inspired by the thoughts of Newton, who had proved 
that certain basic laws, especially the law of universal gravitation, control the movement of the heavenly 
bodies, deduced the premise that this natural order and natural law must operate to govern social and 
economic issues as well, and that it considered to be an affront to God to interfere by legislation in the 
regulation of economic processes. Also as per Barnes at p. 41, beginning with Ricardo, his followers 
turned their attention primarily to the problems of value and distribution and the method of this school 
was entirely deductive, and many members of the school were disdainful of the quantitative 
measurement of economic issues, “Ricardo once contending that if the facts of contemporary economic 
life did not square with his well thought out theory it was so much the worse for the facts”. In contrast, 
as per Barnes at p. 43, Schmoller, in his famous Grundriss der Allgemeinen Volkwirthschaftslehre “makes 
elaborate use of biological, ethnographic, statistical and psychological material, all woven together and 
interpreted from the genetic standpoint. Absolutism in theory is largely abandoned, the metaphysical 
and logical deductive method eschewed, and great emphasis is laid on the facts and processes of 
economic evolution in relation to all the major departments of economic life and activity”. Having 
learned of these thoughts, as per Barnes at p. 43, beginning with Heeren in the late 18th century and 
taking then a solid form with Sismondi and Richard Jones, some economic thinkers concluded the fact 
that that sound economic theory must be laid on the recognition of the interaction between economic 
institutions and processes and the rules and principles to be extracted from a study thereof, and to 
recognize that the wide differences in types of economic life in the past calls for a tentative and 
comparative approach to the problem of economic generalizations. According to Barnes, far the most 
synthetic, complete and dynamic trend in economic theory has been that expansion of the historical 
approach now well-known as institutional economics. This way of studying economic phenomena 
focuses primarily on a complete understanding of the sociological context of economic processes. “The 
interrelation of economic and other social institutions and activities must be completely understood”. 
Finally, as per Barnes at pp. 47-48, that is why the dogma of unchangeable “economic laws” applying to 
all peoples with different cultures and sociological background has to be much criticised. Economic laws 
have to be formulated only on the basis of many repeated phenomena under the similar conditions. And 
also another problem in the method of formulating economic laws lies in the fact that the economic 
evolution of humanity is not yet a completed process. Therefore, even if we could find out enough 
similarities and repetitions in the economic life of the past, we would not be warranted in articulating 
fixed and invaiable universal laws, for we could not be sure that the developments of the future would 
not prove falseness of all generalizations based on the past.  
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economy (an inductive approach). Comparing this to legal systems, the former 
approach is much more similar to civil law and the latter fits better with common law 
systems. The adopted approach in the research is a kind of interaction of both 
methods: a set of general objectives, policies and rules (following the former 
approach) in parallel to best customary practices78 (following the latter approach) are 
integrated to provide a proper economic, business, and financial model. Sometimes, 
religious beliefs, ideals or fundamental values of humanity set the policies and 
priorities to run the economy and in some circumstances it is the realities, customs 
and practices that dictate the policies and priorities of the economy.  
The methodology of the research is also inspired by the similar method that was 
used at the beginning of the Islamic religion more than fourteen centuries ago. Islam 
introduced a new worldview and objectives while recognising the teachings of the 
previous religions79 namely Christianity and Judaism and also adopting customs and 
                                                   
78
 For more details on the nature, definition and validity of proper customs or best practices as an 
autonomous legal source especially in the context of transnational private law see Jan H Dalhuisen 
‘Dalhuisen on Transnational Comparative, Commercial, Financial and Trade Law’ (Hart Publishing, vol. 1, 
4
th
 edition, 2010) pp. 155-163; and also from the same author see ‘Custom and its Revival in 
Transnational Private Law’ (Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law, vol. 18, issue 339, 
2008).  As per Dalhuisen, three different types of custom (best practice) should be distinguished: a) a 
custom that operates as an autonomous source of law b) a custom whose validity and enforcement 
comes from codifications or statutes; c) a custom (or practice) whose operation depends on the intent 
of parties to a contract. He (in fn. 327) further points out that not all customs and practices have the 
same legal nature. According to him, some customs and practices have no legal effect such as 
behavioural patterns, routines and habits, and some customs may acquire legal significance but can be 
rendered unenforceable by informing the other party to a given contract.  
79
 It should be noted that the religion of Islam, as per the Quran, is considered the last and complete 
version of the Christianity and Judaism. Islam expressly recognises these religions but claims for its own 
finality and completeness. See the Quran (3:84) and (33:40).  
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best practices of the time with only some marginal changes.80 Similarly, the idea of 
Balancism is introduced as a new alternative thinking on the basis of fundamental 
values, rules, norms, and principles and also the contemporary best practices, which 
are in conformity to the implications of the foundational theory of Balancism i.e., 
“Rights and Duties Balance (RDB)” especially its variant in an economic context which 













                                                   
80
 The Islamic rules that were indeed originally best practices of the time and later confirmed by Islam 
are called ahkam imdaee. For more in this regard see Mahmoud bin Jafar ‘Qawame’ al-Fudul’ (chap-e 
sangi, p. 198); Abi Ishaq Ibrahim Gharnati a.k.a. Shaatibi (tashih-e Muhammad Muhyi al-Din Abd al-
Hamid) ‘Muwafiqat’ (Egypt, vol. 2) p. 54; Baqir Bihbahani ‘Al-Fawaeed al-Atiq’ (Damime-ye Fusul) p. 3; 
Muhammad Jafar Jafari Langroodi ‘Huquq Madani: Sulh wa Rahn’ (Ibn Sina, vol. 1, 1
st
 edition) pp. 201-
202; Muhammad Jafar Jafari Langroodi ‘Huquq Madani: Wasiyyat’ (Ibn Sina, vol. 2, 1
st
 edition) p.26.  
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1.6 The First Tier of the Model (1): The Ultimate Aim (Social 
Justice/Social Balance)     
The ultimate goal of the model/system (i.e., “social justice”) is deduced from the 
highly respected values of human societies as well as some fundamental principles of 
Islam found in the Quran and Sunnah. As per the Quran (2:143) “thus, We (i.e., the 
Creator/God) have made of you an Ummah (i.e., a unified society) justly balanced, that 
you might be witnesses over the (other) nations, and the Messenger (i.e., the Prophet 
Muhammd) a witness over you”81  
Social justice, in general, requires justice in many aspects of a society including 
(but not limited to) politics, the economy, education, and financial realms. Among all 
these social aspects, this research is concerned only with economic, business and 
financial spheres. For example, if one was to think what was meant by justice in 
politics, one would say it means balance between power and the accountability of the 
people in charge of running the country. If there was no proper balance between these 
two, then the conclusion is that the political system is unjust (because it is 
imbalanced).   
As illustrated before, justice, by definition, has two dimensions: right (positive 
aspect) and duty (negative aspect). Regarding the positive aspect, it means giving a 
person what he deserves. In terms of the negative aspect, it means preventing a 
person from harming the right of others and, if any harm is done, forcing him to 
                                                   
81
 For more supporting authorities in this regard see the Quran (57:25), (7:29), (3:18), (4:3), (55:9), 
(5:8&42), (2:282). The term al-Mizan is mentioned several times in the Quran in verses urging human 
beings for fairness in dealings among themselves (6:152, 7:85, 11:85) and as a metaphor for the 
Creator/God standard of right and wrong revealed by the prophets: “we sent down with Our 
Messengers [Prophets] the Book and the Balance so that people might behave equitably and uphold 
justice” (see 57:25 and also 42:17, 55:7-9). Given the Aristotelian influence on Islamic philosophy, it is 
not surprising that the concept of social justice may have strong Aristotelian undercurrents, but this is 
not further explored.      
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compensate or honour his obligation towards others whose rights are affected. To 
achieve social justice, there has to be a balance between the “rights” and “duties” of 
any human being. In other words, there must be a balance between what he deserves 
to have and also to receive from others in the society (including the society as a whole) 
and the obligations that he has to discharge towards the others in the society 
(including the society as a whole). It thus becomes clear that an integral part of social 
justice is “social responsibility”82. Any economic activity (e.g., the allocation of 
resources, using capital and doing trade and investment activities to generate profit) 
should not only be for self interested reasons but also for the benefit of society at 
large. In other words, in any individual activity there has to be some balance between 
self interest and social interest. It is not legitimate to make profits at the expense of 
society. That is why a proper economic system should have a socially responsible 
trading and investing mechanism. Social responsibility further requires that no one 
should take advantage of someone else’s distress and problems and should not exploit 
him when suffering hardship. All human beings should in fact help each other and 
perform kindnesses for each other. 
Following the general understanding of the scales of justice, I would argue that 
justice is achieved when the two sides (one side i.e., the positive side is considered as 
“rights” and the other side i.e., negative side as “duties”) of the scales are in a 
balanced position. Some Islamic scholars have however understood the concept of 
justice in a different way. They have focused more on equality in this regard.83 Some 
scholars have referred to vertical justice (i.e., equality) between God and human 
                                                   
82
 Al-daman al-ijtimaee  
83
 See for example A. Smirnov ‘Understanding Justice in an Islamic Context: Some Points of Contrast 
with Western Theories’ (Philosophy East and West, vol. 46, no. 3, 1996)  p. 337. The focus on equality is 
made by referring to Quran (49:13); Sahih Al-Bukhari (1623, 1626, 6361); Sahih Muslim (98); and Sunan 
Al-Tirmidhi (1628, 2046, 2085).  
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beings and horizontal justice among human beings themselves.84 Equality is obviously 
equal to justice in some cases but it is not in all circumstances. I would argue that the 
true meaning of justice is “balance” rather than equality or any other similar concept. 
In some cases equality brings about injustice. Intellectually, the basic argument is that 
human beings are created with unequal needs and granting them an equal share of the 
proceeds of natural wealth is in itself unjust. They have to be granted in proportion to 
their reasonable and legitimate needs, which are not absolutely equal for all human 
beings. In addition to some other possible intellectual arguments, interestingly, there 
are some religious authorities that reject the consideration of equality as equivalent to 
justice.85 
 
                                                   
84
 The relevant Quranic verses that often cited in this regard are Quran (4:135) “… be upholders of 
justice, and bearers of witness to truth for the sake of Allah/God, even though it may either be against 
yourselves or against your parents and kinsmen, or the rich or the poor: for Allah is more concerned 
with their well-being than you are. Do not, then, follow your own desires lest you keep away from 
justice…” According to this verse, equal treatment is considered to be an important part of justice. It 
may be argued that this concept can be used with regard to regulating business relationships and 
relationships among market participants. See also Quran (16:90) “Surely Allah enjoins justice, kindness 
and the doing of good to kith and kin, and forbids all that is shameful, evil and oppressive”.  
85
 For example see the Quran (39:9) “are those who know equal to those who do not know?” It is well 
understood from this verse of the Quran that the people who try and do their best for the benefit of 




1.7 The First Tier of the Model (2): The Foundational Theory 
(Rights-and-Duties86 Balance/Benefits-and-Burdens Balance “Balancism”)   
The foundational theory of the model is inspired and deducted by the following 
intellectual reasons, human values, policies, and religious authorities.    
First, nobody can be burdened with a duty save to one’s capacity.87 The following 
are the logical consequences of this statement: a) duty (taklif) follows right (haq): in 
other words, duty comes after the granting or acquisition of the right. Therefore, the 
originality of this is with the concept of right and not with duty; b) there has to be a 
balance between the rights and duties of a person; c) the maximum duty which can be 
imposed on a person will not go beyond his rights and abilities. 
Second, everybody has to enjoy the fruit of the good that one has acquired and 
suffer for the wrong that one has committed.88 The necessary effects of this are: a) 
whoever does an atom's weight of good shall enjoy it; and whoever does an atom's 
weight of wrong shall behold it89; b) no one shall avail anyone anything.90  
                                                   
86
 Note that right (haq) and duty (taklif) have different manifestations. Ownership, return (including 
profit which is generated as a result of the property/maal conversion e.g., as a result of investing capital 
in investment activity, or rent i.e., the yield of property/maal itself such as through the lease of car), and 
wages (i.e., remuneration in return for the provision of labour services) are all dealt with within the 
concept of right/haq. Liability, in its different manifestations e.g., accountability, loss and damages, is 
dealt with within the concept of duty/taklif.    
87
 Laa yukallif Allahu nafsan illa wus’aha. See the Quran (2:233&286), (6:152), (7:42), (23:62), (65:7). In 
terms of economic and financial capacity, the Quran (65:7) “Allah (God) does not burden any human 
being beyond the means that He has bestowed upon him” is implicity concerned with the duty limit of a 
person pertaining to primary wealth. The Quran (2:233&286), (6:152), (7:42), and (23:62) implies the 
duty limit of a person pertaining to his total capacity/ability (both the primary and secondary wealth 
acquisitions). What is meant by primary/natural wealth is the wealth created by God with no 
contribution from human beings. Secondary/subordinate wealth means any wealth acquired as a result 
of the contribution of human beings.    
88
 Laha maa kasabat wa alaiha maa iktasabat. See the Quran (2:286). See also the Quran (6:164) 
“everyone shall bear the consequence of what he does and no one shall bear the burden of another”   
89
 See the Quran (99: 7&8). 
90
 Laa tajzi nafsun an nafsin shay’aa …See the Quran (2:48). 
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Third, nobody can own something unless it is acquired as a result of one’s (effort) 
contribution.91 This statement has several important implications. Firstly, unless the 
one’s share from the proceeds of primary wealth and also the owner of a property 
disposes his ownership right voluntarily for the benefit of someone else, contribution 
(sa’y) is the only cause and valid source of ownership acquisition including (but not 
limited to) right, profit and enjoyment. However, it should be noted that natural 
wealth resources, which have been created by God with no participation by human 
being have to be distributed equitably among all human beings according to their 
reasonable needs. Natural wealth resources are hereafter referred to as 
primary/natural wealth and the wealth created as a result of the contributions of 
human being is hereafter referred to as secondary/subordinate wealth, which is 
acquired or distributed according to the amount of contribution made by any human 
being. The second implication is that distribution or one’s acquisition of benefit is 
determined based on the amount of one’s contribution.92 A further implication is that 
sa’y (contribution) is a generic term and it includes any tangible and intangible 
contribution made for the acquisition of valuable things e.g., acquisition of ownership 
right. 
Fourth, it is further can be stated that anybody who benefits from a business 
shall bear all associated costs and losses with that business.93 The major implication of 
this is that loss follows profit, and also that nobody should bear the burden of 
another.94    
                                                   
91
 Laysa lil insan illa maa sa’a. See the Quran (53:39-41), (76:22), (21:94), (17:19), (88:9), (18:103-105). 
See also the Constitution of Iran article 46 “everyone is the owner of the fruits of his legitimate business 
and labour …”.   
92
 See the Quran (3:30).   
93
 See al-Majallah al-Ahkaam al-Adliyyah articles 85 and 87. It is also recorded as al-ghunm bi al-ghurm 
or al-kharaj bi al-daman (“benefit through burden” or “benefit corresponds burden” or “entitlement to 
benefit follows corresponding assumption of burden).     
94
 See the Quran (53:38).       
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Fifth, finally, regarding the notion that harming the rights of others (including the 
abusive exercise of one’s own legitimate right) is not allowed, and if any losses and 
damages incurred by the victim as a result of the harmful action they shall have to be 
cured and remedied entirely,95 clearly shows that one may exercise one’s rights 
without harming the rights of others. If any harm is created- even as a result of the 
exercise of one’s rights, the injured party is entitled to full compensation.96 One’s 
property has to be protected like one’s blood.97      
Considering the above fundamental concepts, the concept of justice is 
understood as follows. Justice is recognised at two different levels; at the individual 
level and at the social level.98 Justice in an individual context is there to ensure one's 
right to entitlements whether it is rights over primary wealth or a secondary right 
earned as a result of a contribution and also, not to harm or take away one’s legitimate 
right without one’s valid consent. At the social level, Islamic thinkers have not provided 
                                                   
95
 See Muhammad bin al-Hasan al-Hurr al-A’mili ‘Wasaeel al-Shia’ (Tehran: Al-Maktabat Al-Islamiyyah, 
vol. 17/20, 6
th
 edition, 1403 Lunar Hijri Calendar) p.333, Hadith no. 32241; Hasan Bojnourdi ‘Al-Qawaeed 
al-Fiqhiyyah’ (Qom, vol. 6, 1384 Solar Hijri Calendar) pp. 9, 12, 78; the Constitution of Iran article 40, 
section 5 of article 43, and part 2 of article 46; Murtaza Mutahhari ‘Barrasiye Ijmaaliye Mabaniye 
Iqtisade Islami’ (Tehran: Hikmat, 1403 Lunar Hijri Calendar) pp.175-177; and also Muhammad Taqi 
Ja’afari ‘Manaabe Fiqh (a.k.a. Rasaaeel Fiqhi)’ (Tehran: Mu’assasa Nashr Karamat, 1
st
 edition, 1377 Solar 
Hijri Calendar) pp. 132 and 134.        
96
 See Hasan Bojnourdi ‘Al-Qawaeed al-Fiqhiyyah’ (Qom, vol. 2, 1384 Solar Hijri Calendar) pp. 17-39. 
See also Iran Civil Code article 238.      
97
 This saying is attributed to the Prophet Muhammad. Also, see the Constitution of Iran articles 46 
and 47.    
98
 According to Pipkin, justice is in its nature social, because it exists in the right relation of individuals 
one to another. But when the term “Social Justice” is used it is meant the collective expression that is 
given to the idea of justice by the laws and practices, the orders and the social provisions which 
respresent the will of the community. As per Pipkin, to answer to what is meant by Social Justice, we 
must first try to find a complete idea of the community/state, looking at the multiply relations within it, 
each of which contributes to the aggregate of Social Justice. Pipkin writes, while the development of the 
idea of Social Justice is examined in this or that community/state, it must be understood that it is only 
by an international order that the full conception of Social Justice can be achieved”. See Charles W. 
Pipkin ‘The Idea of Social Justice: A Study of Legislation and Administration and the Labour Movement in 
England and France between 1900 and 1926 (1927)’ (available at HeinOnline) pp. ix and x of the 
introduction.               
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a clear definition of social justice, however it is often understood as either social 
equality (musaawat99), social equity (insaaf100), social balance (tawaazun101), equal 
access to opportunities102, social/public interests (al-masaalih al-
ijtimaeiyyah/a’mmah103), or government interests (al-masaalih al-hukumiyyah104). 
Mutahhari,105 a leading Islamic scholar, believes that social justice is in fact a flexible 
concept, that is to say at the social level the rights of some people will unavoidably 
always be harmed. A just rule is one which is most beneficial and least harmful. As can 
be seen from this definition, social justice equals social interests.   
In western terminology, according to Stammler, the word justice has two 
meanings. One meaning is that justice is to follow and carry out whatever the law 
determines. The other meaning of justice denotes “the ultimate aim of law”. As per 
this meaning, all legal volition has to serve a single fundamental idea and hence any 
legal volition has to be judged by this standard. As per Stammler, different ideas have 
been provided regarding the the second meaning i.e., the ultimate aim of law and 
                                                   
99
It seems this understanding is made by reference to the rights of people in primary wealth. However, 
I would argue for equitable distribution of primary wealth rather than its equal distribution (though, an 
equitable distribution may in some cases happen in the form of equal distribution). Equitable 
distribution means distribution according to the “reasonable needs” of a human being. The type and 
amount of reasonable needs of human beings may differ from one to another.   
100
 It is true to say that this understanding is made by reference to the rights/share of people in 
primary wealth. People will enjoy the primary wealth on the basis of their “reasonable needs”.   
101
 It is true to say that this understanding is a more comprehensive understanding of justice whether 
it is applied at the individual level or social level and whether it refers to the rights of people in primary 
wealth resources or in secondary wealth. This understanding of justice can also to some extent be found 
in the writing of Muhammad Baqir Sadr, a leading (late) Islamic scholar, in his well-known book 
“Iqtisaduna” where he refers to social balance (al-tawazun al-ijtimaeiyyah) and social responsibility (al-
daman al-ijtimaaeeiyah) as the ultimate objective of Islamic economics. See Muhammad Baqir Sadr 
‘Iqtisaduna’ (Qom: Bustan-e Ketab Press, 2003).  
102
 For example see the Constitution of Iran article 3 section 9. This definition of justice is widely 
accepted in western world.   
103
 It is true to say that this understanding is a society-favoured definition of justice. It allows for the 
harming of the rights of individuals if the interests of society require it to do so.  
104
 It seems this definition can only be justifiable in a dictatorship country.     
105
 See Murtaza Mutahhari ‘Barrasiye Ijmaaliye Mabaniye Iqtisade Islami’ (Tehran: Hikmat, 1403 Lunar 
Hijri Calendar) pp. 14-16 and 27.  
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among all these the “pleasure” doctrine is widely accepted. According to this theory 
“the highest law of human volition is the attainment of personal pleasure and the 
avoidance of pain”.106     
The applied definition of social justice in this research project is social balance 
(tawaazun) and social interest (masaalih) is considered just one important factor when 
it comes to the balancing test in order to determine whether a given right can be 
exercised or it has to be prevented from exercising. What is meant by balance is a 
balance between rights/benefits and duties/burdens.107   
As stated above, one’s rights are either granted through one’s equitable share in 
primary wealth or earned as a result of one’s contribution in creating secondary 
                                                   
106
 See Rudolf Stammler (Translated from the German by Isaac Husik, University of Pennsylvania) ‘Idea 
of Justice’ (University of Pennsylvania Law Review and American Law Register, Vol. 71, Issue 4) pp. 303-
311.   
107
 The universe is in balance. When an event occurs in the universe, something else occurs to balance 
it out. So, everything in the universe should be balanced including rights and duties and also benefits 
and burdens. If there is a right, there should be a duty to balance it out. If there is a benefit, there 
should be a burden to balance it out. Everybody will have to shoulder the negative side of his rights or 
benefits, that is to say duties or burdens respectively. Otherwise, justice fails. Scales are considered to 
be the symbol of balance i.e., justice. One side carries negative aspects i.e., duties or burdens or the 
similar weights and the other side carries positive aspects i.e., rights or benefits or the similar values.       
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wealth.108 The distribution of primary wealth is not problematic. To be just, it has to be 
distributed according to the type and amount of reasonable needs of people. It is the 
latter category i.e., secondary wealth where distribution is such a major concern. To be 
just, it has to belong to one as a result of one’s contribution in creating it.   
Contributions may be made either in the form of intangible (software) or 
tangible (hardware).109 Major intangible contributions are labour, expertise, 
                                                   
108
 In western terminology, according to Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, what is allowed to 
people to do or owed to people, as per some legal system, social covenant, or ethical theory is a “right”. 
In other words, “right” is either a permission to do something, or an entitlement to be done unto e.g., 
“right to welfare”, or a permission not to do something, or an entitlement to be left alone (i.e., “non-
interference”) e.g., “right to not to vote”. See Stanford University ‘Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy’ 
(First published Mon Dec 19, 2005; substantive revision Sat Jul 2, 2011) Retrieved Mon March 11, 2013. 
However, it should be noted that, there is wide difference on the definition of right in different 
areas/contexts. For example, the following are some definitions given to “right” by different theorists: 
“to have a right is to have a “valid claim”- Joel Feinberg ‘Doing & Deserving; Essays in the Theory of 
Responsibility’ (Princeton University Press, 1970) p. 257; ““in the strictest sense” all rights are claims”- 
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld ‘Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning and Other 
Legal Essays’ (Yale University Press, 1919) p. 36; “a right, in the most important sense, is the conjunction 
of a freedom and a claim-right”- John Leslie Mackie ‘Can There be a Rights-Based Moral Theory?’ in 
Jeremy Waldron ‘Theories of Rights’ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984) p. 179; “rights are 
permissions rather than requirements. Rights tell us what the bearer is at liberty to do, not what he 
must or must not do”- Robert B. Louden ‘Rights Infatuation and the Impoverishment of Moral Theory’ 
(Journal of Value Inquiry, Vol. 17, Issue 2, 1983) p. 95; “no one ever has a right to do something; he only 
has a right that some one else shall do (or refrain from doing) something”- Glanville Williams ‘The 
Concept of Legal Liberty’ in Robert S. Summers ed., Essays in Legal Philosophy (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1968) p. 125; “a right is an established way of acting”- Rex Martin ‘A System of Rights’ 
(Oxford University Press, 1993) p. 1; “a person who says to another ‘I have a right to do it’ is not saying 
that … it is not wrong to do it. He is claiming that the other has a duty not to interfere”- Joseph Raz 
‘Ethics in the Public Domain’ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) p. 275; “it is hard to think of rights 
except as capable of exercise”- H. L. A. Hart ‘Essays on Bentham: Jurisprudence and Political Philosophy’ 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982) p. 185; “a right is a power which a creature ought to possess”- 
John Plamenatz ‘Consent, Freedom, and Political Obligation’ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1938) p. 
82; “all rights are essentially property rights”- Hillel Steiner ‘An Essay on Rights’ (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1994) p. 93; “rights are themselves property, things we own”- Joel Feinberg ‘Social Philosophy’ 
(Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1973) p. 75. For a survey and a brief discusstion on different features of 
“right” in western terminology see Leif Wenar ‘Rights and What We Owe to Each Other’ (The Journal of 
Moral Philosophy, 2011).   
109
 As per New York’s business corporation law, a contribution may be made in the following ways: 
money (cash or cheque); tangible or intangible property; labour or services already performed for the 
corporation; a binding obligation/promise to pay in the future in money or property; a binding 
obligation/promise to perform future services having an agreed value.     
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reputation, technology, and know-how or any other forms of intellectual property. 
Capital and equipment, or any other forms of physical property and chattels are 
considered tangible contributions. In partnership/business forms, gains have to be 
shared in proportion to the contributions made to the business scheme by different 
participants. This is how the competing interests of different participants110 would be 
balanced in an equitable and just manner. This understanding is obviously contrary to 
the dominant corporate laws where employees receive fixed remunerations and the 
business shareholders utilise all the profits.   
This wide definition of contribution would enhance efficiency. It would 
encourage people/investors to get together and create more value because they 
understand that they would benefit from direct participation in group economic 
activities by way of their contribution in whatever form they can do it - whether it be in 
the form of intangible or tangible. Obviously, this view differs from the modern 
economic policies and moves away from the dominant role of capital in the economy. 
This new approach is more efficient and, in addition to the fact that it fosters 
community, it furthers the economic development simply because it recognises new 
types of contributions and makes it possible to mobilise and use the different talents 
and abilities of people in the development process of the economy. 
                                                   
110
 It may be said that in all economic (business/partnership) groups e.g., enterprises, the community 
and society is also considered a contributor. The society as a whole provides a secure business 
environment and other social protections. Therefore, for their contributions, the community and society 
have to be compensated and benefit proportionally according to the contribution made to the business 
enterprises. The activities of enterprises should always be beneficial to the society as a whole, otherwise 
they should be prevented from occurring (because a business enterprise cannot operate to the 
detriment of its contributor/stakeholder). The right of society can be compensated in the form of tax 
(zakat) or in any other appropriate ways.     
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In a balancing test, the opposite side of rights/benefits is duties/burdens.111 To 
be just and equitable, one’s duties have to be in balance with one’s rights. Therefore, 
distribution of burdens/losses follows distribution of benefits/profits. In the event of a 
business loss, the entire loss shall be borne by all participants in proportion to their 
contributions. However, the entire pecuniary loss will have to be shouldered solely by 
providers of the tangible contribution and the loss of intangible providers is that they 
will gain nothing.112 As per the Quran, the limit to one’s duties or burdens is the point 
at which one’s ability is in its ultimate capacity.113 Debtors are obliged to satisfy their 
duties to their full capacity, i.e., with their entire assets and properties minus the cost 
of their basic living necessities. Debtors cannot limit their liability as long as they are 
able to honour their obligations. It is not permitted that the creditor is left unsatisfied 
if the debtor is able to satisfy his debts considering the debtor’s full capacity.114 
Otherwise, it will be seen as unjust enrichment.115  
On the basis of the above understanding, a standard liability rule in a business 
context has to be shifted from the current dominant limited liability rule to an 
                                                   
111
 In western terminology, an “obligation” is often defined as a claim arising out of some specific 
relation between two or more parties, resulting from the consent or conduct of one or some of them, 
which gives the other party or parties to ask for some definite act or forbearance from the other party 
or parties to the relationship. See Frederick Pollock ‘First Book of Jurisprudence’ (Burt Franklin Publisher, 
1967) p. 87. Some scholars have provided the most fundamental division of obligations by the terms 
declared or consensual on the one hand and prescribed or constructive on the other hand. The term 
“consensual” shows the will or declaration of assent by one or some parties, whether expressed or 
implied. The term “prescribed” is to indicate all those obligations which are fixed and imposed by law 
regardless of consent or voluntary assumption, such as quasi contracts and constructive trusts. See 
Henry W. Ballantine ‘Classification of Obligations’ (Canadian Law Times, Vol. 41, Issue 6, June 1921) p. 
438.      
112
 However, in bankruptcy cases, where the debt obligations of the collective scheme go beyond the 
entire contributions, the intangible contributors will also be liable towards the enterprise creditors in 
proportion to their contributions made to the collective scheme.    
113
 The Quran (2: 286)  
114
 There is some interesting Sharia evidence on this, although it is not directly relevant. As per the 
Quran (83: 1&3) “It is not just and fair, if those who, when they take from others by measure or weight, 
take their full share; but, when they measure or weigh for others, give less than their due”.  
115
 See the Quran (4:29). 
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unlimited proportionate liability norm. Under the unlimited proportionate liability rule, 
receivers of the profits of business shall share the liability of the business 
proportionately and pro rata provide full compensation to any harmed parties. In 
contrast to this, as per the modern limited liability standard, a participant of a business 
activity avoids bearing a loss greater than his amount of contribution to the business 
enterprise. Under limited liability governance, if the business enterprise incurs a loss 
and becomes insolvent, the loss cannot go beyond the contributed capital of the 
investor, and if the liquidated value of the assets of the business enterprise are not 
sufficient to satisfy all its debt obligations, the creditors of the business will have no 
right of recourse to the personal assets of the investors for the rest of their claims.116 It 
thus becomes clear that the application of the limited liability rule would in some 
circumstances lead to the legitimisation of unjust enrichment, which is not only 
prohibited in Sharia117 but also disallowed in many jurisdictions.  
Legalising the limited liability standard has persuaded businesses to establish 
unlimited separate legal entities to carry out their highly risky business activities 
through these entities and do not take into account the negative externalities of their 
adventurous activities. Their sole concern is in fact to maximise their profits as much as 
                                                   
116
 As a general rule, even the directors of the business entity who might have been responsible for the 
insolvency of the business, are not held responsible towards the entity creditors for the rest of their 
receivable debts.  
Despite the application of a proportionate liability standard, it is not however (for practical 
considerations) wrong to implement a joint & several liability initiative in favour of the creditors of the 
business collective scheme. However, any contributor will ultimately be held liable proportionately 
according to his contribution.       
117
 See the Quran (4:29) “do not devour one another’s belongings illegitimately i.e., without the valid 
consent of the property holder”. 
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they can at the expense of others,118 no matter how injurious their self-interest is to 
society as a whole.    
Another persuasive argument against limited liability in a business environment 
is that the higher the level of business activity, the more precautionary measures are 
required to reduce the probability of risk in the market especially to avoid systemic 
risk. In other words, the level of liability should be adjusted with the level of economic 
activity in the society. Surprisingly, the liability standard for businesses whose level of 
activity obviously goes much beyond that of non-businesses and individuals is lower 
than the liability standard set for the latter group whose level of activity and systemic 
risk is much lower than the former group.  
As per Taqi Usmani,119 even though there is no express mention of the concept 
of limited liability in the original sources of Sharia, the viewpoint of Islamic Fiqh120 
regarding limited liability may be derived by way of inference by doing some sort of 
ijtihad121 from the principles found in the Quran, the Sunnah122 and Islamic 
jurisprudence. As for his initial thinking he argues for the legitimacy of limited liability 
in Sharia. However, he mentions that this is neither his final conclusion nor a definite 
opinion and it requires further research to verify it. In his reasoning on limited liability, 
he argues that its legitimacy is closely linked to the notion of the legal personality of 
modern business enterprises which are treated as separate entities and as fictitious 
persons holding the same legal status of a natural person in all their dealings. 
                                                   
118
 However, in order to avoid the distortion of competition in the market, some detrimental business 
behaviours are prohibited in modern antitrust/competition laws and practices, such as in the US 
Antitrust Law and EU and UK Competition Laws.   
119
 See Muhammad Taqi Usmani ‘An Introduction to Islamic Finance’ (Hague: Kluwer Law International, 
2002) pp.150-160.     
120
 Islamic jurisprudence    
121
 It means a Sharia expert’s reasoning to find appropriate rules for new problems following the 
underlying Sharia principles.  
122
 It means the authenticated practices and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad (and his companions).  
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Therefore, the major challenge in this regard, according to him, is whether the theory 
of the “juridical person” is acceptable under Sharia or not. If it is concluded123 that the 
“juridical person” is in fact acceptable from a Sharia viewpoint - which in fact it is, the 
logical result will be to accept the notion of “limited liability”.124 Also according to him, 
it is a logical result because when a natural person dies insolvent, the claim of his 
creditors will be limited to the estate of the indebted deceased and the same rules will 
apply to an insolvent business entity. After insolvency, the business entity will be 
liquidated and the liquidation of a business entity is comparable to the death of a 
natural person simply because a business entity can no longer exist after its liquidation 
when its legal life terminates. 
Some Islamic scholars125 have noted that there have been some important 
practices that are treated in Sharia as separate entities and can be used as evidence of 
                                                   
123
 Taqi Usmani argues that there are some compelling precedents from where the notion of juridical 
person may be inferred by ijtihad. See Muhammad Taqi Usmani ‘An Introduction to Islamic Finance’ 
(Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002) pp.150-160.   
124
 For some discussion in this regard see Muhammad Taqi Usmani ‘The Principle of Limited Liability 
from the Shariah Viewpoint’ (New Horizon, Aug-Sept 1992) p. 22. 
125
 For more detail and the arguments for and against the limited liability see Imran Ahsan Khan 
Nyazee ‘Islamic Law of Business Organization: Corporations’ (Islamabad: The Islamic Research Institute 
Press, vol. 2, 1998) pp. 104, 117; Nabil Saleh ‘Arab International Corporations: The Impact of the Shari’a’ 
(Arab Law Quarterly, vol. 8, 1993) p. 180. As per Foster, there is no strong authority in Sharia to support 
the existence of a Western-style (i.e., comparable to the West) concept of legal personality as well as 
limited liability in Islamic law. He also warns that the comparison of rules between Sharia and Western 
law can lead to dangerous consequences if the comparison is made without taking the context into 
account. See Nicholas H. D.  Foster ‘Islamic Perspectives on the Law of Business Organisations I: An 
Overview of the Classical Sharia and a Brief Comparison of the Sharia Regimes with Western-Style Law’ 
(European Business Organization Law Review, vol. 11, issue 1, 2010) pp. 32-33. For a deeper discussion 
on legal personality and limited liability see also Nicholas H. D.  Foster ‘Islamic Perspectives on the Law 
of Business Organisations II: An Overview of the Classical Sharia and a Brief Comparison of the Sharia 
Regimes with Western-Style Law’ (European Business Organization Law Review, vol. 11, issue 2, 2010) 
pp. 283-288.    
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a juridical person in Islam. These important practices are waqf (endowment),126 
a’qila127 (members of a tribe responsible for paying the blood money on behalf of a 
member-murderer of the tribe), the mosque, baytul maal,128 ma’taraka mutawaffa,129 
and also the “limited liability of the master for debts arising out of his slave’s 
activities”.130 However, it may be argued for the following reasons, that none of these 
are strong enough evidence as to the existence of limited liability in Sharia especially in 
business and finance context. Firstly, all the above mentioned religious institutions or 
legal precedents are implemented in not-for-business context except the last one. It is 
argued that when slavery was historically in fashion, there was a kind of slave who was 
used as trade intermediary tools and provided with an initial capital by their masters to 
carry out trade. The ownership of seed capital remained entirely with the master and 
whatever income the slave earned belonged exclusively to the master. If in the course 
of trade, the slave incurred debts and the amount of initial capital plus income were 
not enough to set off the debt obligations, the creditors had a right to sell the slave 
                                                   
126
 Waqf is an endowment, which consists of the surrender or detention of a property and the 
devotion or dedication of its profits to some good causes. For arguments made against the existence of 
legal personality in waqf see Timur Kuran ‘The Absence of the Corporation in Islamic Law: Origins and 
Persistence’ (American Journal of Comparative Law, vol. 53, 2005) pp. 822-823. See also Imran Ahsan 
Khan Nyazee ‘Islamic Law of Business Organization: Corporations’ (Islamabad: The Islamic Research 
Institute Press, vol. 2, 1998) pp. 104, 117.  
127
 See Iran Islamic Criminal Code articles 221 and 260. 
128
 Baytul Maal literally means “public treasury”. It also means the Islamic state exchequer.  
129
 It means the estate left by a deceased person. 
130
 See Murat Cizakca ‘Islamic Capitalism and Finance: Origins, Evolution, and the Future’ (Edward 
Elgar: Studies in Islamic Finance, Accounting, and Governance, 2011) p. 39. Murat argues that there are 
some clues in the writings of the Islamic medieval jurists which show the existence of “judicial 
personality” in Islamic law e.g., mosques, waqfs (he argues that waqf itself, on the name of waqf can 
borrow and lend), and baytul maal are considered to hold separate judicial personalities. See also 
Muhammad Taqi Usmani ‘An Introduction to Islamic Finance’ (Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002) 
pp. 150-160. Concerning the application of juridical personality in sharkat or a partnership context, 
Buyukcelebi argues that, for example in sharkat al-inan, if the sharkat/partnership is established on the 
basis of kifala (personal surety) it will be considered to possess judicial personality (simply because in 
kifala “all real person transactions” can also be fulfilled by the partnership), but if it is formed on the 
basis of wakala (agency) it will not be considered to have judicial personality. See Ismail Buyukcelebi 
‘Islam Hukukunda Inan Sirketi va Nevileri (Erzurum: Ataturk Universitesi Doktora Tezi, 1981), p. 76. 
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and recover their claims out of the acquired price. However, if the claims were not 
settled even after sale of the slave, the creditors did not have a right of recourse to the 
personal assets of the master for the rest of their claims. Assuming the mentioned 
practice of slavery in the initial period of Islamic history, the policy of Islam was to 
abolish any form of slavery practice and it was finally brought to an end. Therefore, the 
rules of slavery practice are inapplicable today. Secondly, they are themselves not 
strong enough to prove the salient features of a “juridical person” as it is practiced in 
contemporary practices. Finally, even assuming the existence of the notion of “juridical 
personality” in Sharia,131 it does not necessarily prove the validity of limited liability in 
Islam especially in the context of business activities. After all, however, it seems the 
precedents mentioned above are somewhat acceptable to show the legitimacy of 
juridical personality or separate legal entity in Sharia but in a very limited concept 
(which is by far different from what is practiced and understood of legal personality 
today). The acceptable legal personality from the viewpoint of Sharia is merely for 
practical considerations and it may not be used to contravene any injunction of 
Sharia.132   
Having examined the concept of benefits as well as burdens in the research on 
the burdens-and-benefits balance theory, the last important issue about the theory is 
                                                   
131
 As per Sanusi, a juristic person is not prohibited in Sharia and the Islamic legal system does truly 
recognise the concept of judicial personality with no objection. The legal personality of waqf and baytul 
maal has been recognised for centuries in the practices of Sharia. See Mahmood Mohamed Sanusi ‘The 
Concept of Legal Entity and Limited Liability in Islamic Legal System’ (Malayan Law Journal, vol. 3, 2009).  
132
Taqi Usmani believes that the notion of ‘limited liability’ should not be utilised for the purpose of 
deceiving people and avoiding the ordinary liabilities resulting from a profitable business. He suggests 
that it would be fair if its use is restricted to public companies, but as for private companies or 
partnerships, it would not be justifiable to apply the concept of limited liability with a possible exception 
for the sleeping partners in a partnership or the shareholders of a private company who do not in 
practice participate in the conduct or management of the business. See Muhammad Taqi Usmani ‘An 
Introduction to Islamic Finance’ (Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002) pp.150-160. 
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the application of the balancing test:133 the strength of benefit/interest versus the 
magnitude of burden/harm as a result of the exercise of one’s rights. The balancing 
test is met when the entire external effects outweighed by legitimate benefit and 
interest of the one who exercises his rights (and also the benefits for society), taking 
into account less burdensome alternatives i.e., restrictive means. To determine 
whether conducting a given economic behaviour or business transaction is acceptable, 
an extensive cost-benefit analysis test is applied, i.e., the potential benefits (positive 
externalities: whether it be pecuniary or not) resulting out of the business or economic 
conduct has to be weighed against the potential burdens (negative externalities: 
whether it be pecuniary or not)134. To be socially acceptable,135 the usefulness of the 
conduct to the society must outweigh the severity of the potential harms to the 
society.136 In other words, in circumstances in which the unreasonable and substantial 
interference with the rights of others or the interests of society as a whole outweighs 
the individual and social utility of the business conduct, the concerned business activity 
has to be prohibited and must be capable of being enjoined by a court injunction.137 
Generating profits by hurting others or by violating the basic rules and principles of 
society is condemned as a wrongful conduct.  
                                                   
133
 As mentioned before, (social) interest (masaalih) is considered a very important factor in the 
outcome of a balancing test.  
134
 See the Quran (2:219) “they ask you about drinking and gambling. Say, there is great harm in both, 
though there is some benefit also for the people. But the harm thereof is far greater than their 
benefit…”.  
135
There would however be some difficulties with the notion of “socially acceptable/responsible 
activity”. The problem is its subjective nature. Different people will have different conceptions and 
assessments about what constitutes social acceptability/responsibility. To tackle this subjectivity 
concern, a transparent and methodological screening process has to be introduced.  
136
 It may be further argued that to be legitimate and socially acceptable the given business/economic 
activity of an investor has to bear some social utility and make a positive contribution to the society (in 
addition to benefiting the investor himself).  
137
 As per the Constitution of Iran article 40 “no one is entitled to exercise his rights in a way that is 
injurious to others or detrimental to public interests”.   
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Accordingly, balance of harms has to be taken into account in the permissibility 
of a business transaction or an economic activity; thus, a party or the society seeking a 
preliminary injunction to deter the performance of a given business transaction or 
economic activity must show that the threatened injury to them (arising out of the 
prospective act) outweighs the injury to the party seeking to carry out the business (if 
he forbears the exercise of his right). Also, in cases where a party (not the society) 
seeking a preliminary injunction argues that the given business product is “defective” 
(i.e., wrong, needlessly dangerous or unavoidably hazardous), they must show that the 
injunction would not adversely affect the public interest.138 For example, consider that 
a new financial institution is set up to provide financial services. However, the 
establishment of this new institution is detrimental to the interests of the previously 
established financial institutions but is a socially desirable business because it furthers 
social interests. In this scenario, although the previously existing institutions suffer an 







                                                   
138
 For a similar analysis see Muneer Awad v. Paul Ziriax et al., Case No. CIV-10-1186-M, U. District 
Court for the Western District of Oklahoma (9 November 2010), pp. 14-15. Text of decision available via 
the Internet at http://www.politico.com/static/PPM152_101109_shariah_tro.htmlm (accessed 10 July 
2011). See also W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 638 (1943).   
139
This kind of “opportunity loss” does not fall within the scope of “loss” (darar). 
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1.8 The First Tier of the Model (3): The Fundamental Principles and 
Policies 
 
The fundamental principles and policies which govern just distribution of primary 
wealth and proper circulation of subordinate wealth are derived from the ultimate 
objective and foundational theory of the thesis. A very fundamental principle is that 
that the equitable distribution prevails over efficiency rule. On this basis, in case there 
is any conflict between distribution and efficiency rules, the distribution policy will 
override the efficiency theory. This is simply because the social balance and 
consequently the just distribution of wealth in a human society are given priority over 
the concentration and maximization of material wealth.   
Regarding the distribution of natural wealth resources, every human being is 
entitled to enjoy and benefit from natural wealth resources entrusted to them by the 
absolute owner (the Creator) yet nobody can claim to be the beneficiary of a specific 
part of the natural wealth until it is distributed in a legitimate manner. All human 
beings should enjoy the proceeds of natural wealth according to their reasonable and 
legitimate needs and, regarding some natural resources, in proportion to their 
contributions made such as according to their work efforts for utilisation of the wealth 
resources. However, people can never acquire the ownership of these wealth 
resources and it remains always under the control of the public as a whole. 140 
                                                   
140
 The major natural wealth resources are lands, minerals and natural water bodies. These natural 
resources (immoveable) are known as the “origins” of wealth (also called raqabat al-maal) that the 
ownership of which can never be acquired by the people individually. For a detail definition and the 
scope of natural wealth resources see Muhammad Hasan al-Najafi a.k.a al-Muhaqqiq al-Najafi ‘Jawaahir 
al-Kalaam fi Sharh Shara’e al-Islam’ (Daar al-Kutub al-Islamiyyah, vol. 16/43, 2
nd
 edition, 1362 Solar Hijri 
Calendar) p.132. See also Muhammad Baqir Sadr ‘Iqtisaduna’ (Qom: Bustan-e Ketab-e Qom Press, 2003) 
pp. 419-469, 471-493, 495-498.      
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Consequently, the people are unable to transfer the ownership and control of these 
wealth resources to anybody else including the state. 
With respect to profit-making products and collective schemes, distribution of 
ownership, profits, losses and liability is made according to the amount of contribution 
made by every participant to a given business activity. Ownership and control unity is 
applied. There is no room for the application of currently dominant limited liability 
norm and instead an unlimited proportionate liability standard is implemented. This 
change is to follow the rules of balancism and also discourage taking highy risky 
business activities which may cause devastating systemic instabilities. The application 
of legal personality concept is adopted due to practical concers but only for very 
limited purposes. Profit and loss sharing arrangement is implemented instead of 
modern labour employment practice; in other words, employer-employee relationship 
structure is abolished in business environment. 
Concerning the not-for-profit activities, the House of Wealth is in charge of 
securing basic essentiasl needs of members of the public such as a dwelling house, 
education and health care facilities and the provision of basic infrastructure utilities. 
The supply of not-for-profit facilities made by anybody is essentially to help others free 
of charge and for some good purposes. 
As regards microbusiness activities, microfinance tools and products are 
designed to empower poor to obtain their economic independence in order for 
transmitting them from the bondage and dependence status to self-reliance and 
independence level. The instruments designed for microbusiness purposes are 
basically cooperative-oriented schemes seeking to foster a spirit of cooperation. 
With regard to intermediary tools and services, in cases where an intermediary is 
used for not-for-profit purposes the intermediary has to be rewarded on fixed-
compensation basis and in the case of using the services of an intermediary for profit-
making purposes the intermediary has to be rewarded on sharing-in-benefits basis. 
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Payment and deposit intermediaries that are set up to provide services such as funds 
transfer and exchange services will receive only service fee in return for the provision 
of intermediary services. The ownership and control of the payments and deposits, 
unlike the modern banking practices, always remain with the customers and 
depositors themselves. This change is to follow the rules of just distribution of wealth 
and mainly to prevent concentration of wealth which may lead to systemic instability 
problems.  
In connection with risk hedging tools and facilities, the philosophy and 
underlying rational for risk insurance is to minimise risk rather than taking advantage 
of risk and trading in it. The institutions and collective schemes that are established to 
provide risk hedging services should not be allowed, unlike modern insurance and risk 
hedging practices, to get involve in investment and trade activities. This change is 
mainly to avoid the inflation of risk which may essentially cause systemic instability 








Key Concepts and Their 





Islam1 is a religion originating in its current form in Arabia in the 6th/7th century 
AD. To understand the inner dimensions of Islam, it is necessary to examine the Islamic 
intellectual heritage2 in depth. This goes much beyond Sharia, and is out of the scope 
of this thesis. If Islam is considered to be an ocean, its shoreline is Sharia. In other 
words, Sharia is the touchstone for whether an act is within or external to, the religion 
                                                   
1
 “Islam” is an Arabic word. It means that one’s life should be according to the will of God.  
2
 What is meant by Islamic intellectual heritage is ‘the ways of thinking about God (absolute), the 
world, and human beings - established by the Quran and the Prophet and elaborated upon by 
generations of practising Muslims’. For more see William C. Chittick ‘Can the Islamic Intellectual Heritage 
be Recovered?’ (1998)  Available via the Internet at 
http://www.allamaiqbal.com/publications/journals/review/oct98/2.htm. As per Chittick (pp. 4, 10-11), 
Islamic intellectual heritage has mostly been lost in the modern world. According to him, modern 
“intellectual forces”, and modern “attitudes and social forces” have come to be two major obstacles to 
the recovery of Islamic heritage. The former are closely connected with the methods of thinking that 
developed in Western Europe and America and now dominate the modern world (“the gods of 
modernity”). These gods of modernity have now been internalised by modern-day Muslims, who have 
either enthusiastically adopted them as their own or been exposed to them without their choice or 
awareness. The former have in turn given rise to the latter ones i.e., “attitudinal obstacles” across the 
Islamic society that prevent recovery of the Islamic heritage.These sorts of attitudes and habits of mind 
have now become embodied in and dominate the institutions and frameworks of modern society. 
Unlike the Islamic view in which God’s prophets share tawhid (“asserting that the God is one”), the great 
prophets of modernity- Descartes, Rousseau, Marx, Freud- reject tawhid and they argue for takthir 
(“asserting that the gods are many”). The fact is that one can only reject God’s oneness by inventing 
new gods to replace Him. God’s prophets all focused on theology (rooted in tawhid), in contrast to the 
modern prophets whose focus have been on science (rooted in takthir). The former looks down from 
above and can easily understand the interconnectedness of all things in the world, while the latter is 
stuck on the level of multiplicity- the lowest scope of reality- and its main concern is to dissect this 
multiplicity for new inventions. As per its own premises, the invisible domains do not fall within the 
scope of science (but, in theology these sorts of domains- including the God itself that is indeed the 
major invisible domain, called ghayb- are given special consideration. Modern times and modern 
thought- contrary to Islamic thought that (up until recent times) is characterised by a tendency toward 
unity- lack any single purpose. The consequence is an ever-increasing multiplicity of purposes and ever-
increasing clashes of different desires. 
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of Islam3. Sharia is an extensive web of rules and recommendations touching on all 
aspects of the lives of human beings. It directs Muslims and often the people in 
general, how to behave individually and collectively. 
 
2.2 The Concepts of “Must Do” (Amr) and “Must Not Do” (Nahy) in 
Islam4  
Islam has ruled some specific acts as prohibited (haram) acts, and recommended 
some specific acts as abominable (makruh) acts. Major prohibited acts or those subject 
to nahy include: riba (an excess in the exchange of exact same products, such as the 
exchange of money against money or wheat against wheat with some excess taken 
from one of the parties to the exchange); ghabn (intolerable imbalanced loss, mainly 
as a result of unconscionability in a transaction); gharar (unnecessary disproportionate 
risk and excessive uncertainty); qimar (gambling); maysir (speculation/betting); israf 
(consumption or spending beyond the reasonable needs); itlaf (consumption or 
expenditure with no need to do so); ihtikar (hoarding); inhisar (monopoly); and 
istithmar (exploitation of another’s right/contribution especially another’s labour).5 A 
specific abominable or at least one that is recommended to avoid is being involved in 
the funeral business. In contrast, Islam has ruled some specific acts as wajib/fard (must 
                                                   
3
 In the thesis, whenever “Sharia” is referred to it means the Islamic canonical texts (substantive 
sources) i.e., Quran and Sunnah, including the Hadith literature. Whenever the term “Islamic law” is 
used in general it includes not only the Islamic canonical texts i.e., Sharia but also the primary 
methodological sources of law in Islam (these methodological sources i.e., the techniques that have 
been devised to develop Sharia will be discussed shortly).  
4
 In general, in Islam, human acts are divided into: ibadat (spiritual acts) and mua’malat (economic, 
business, and financial acts). The concern of the research project is the latter ones but not the former 
ones. The rules of amr (must do) and nahy (must not do) governing ibadat and mu’amalat are different 
and they may render different effects.  
5
 For some regulatory support in this regard see the Constitution of Iran article 43 (sections 4-6).  
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do or obligatory) acts i.e., the acts subject to amr, and recommended some specific 
acts as mandub/mustahab (recommended to do) acts. The main obligatory (wajib) acts 
are respect for the rights of others, returning deposits under custody, satisfaction of 
due debt obligations, and doing work and business for the fulfillment of the basic 
needs of family. Recommended to do (mustahab) acts in Islam are doing any business 
and economic activities that are useful for society as a whole. All the remaining acts 
that are not rated in one of the above four categories are deemed halal/mubah 
(permissible) acts.  
There are several important points with regard to amr (“must do”) and nahy 
(“must not do”) orders in Islam. In some cases, the proper legal sanction relating to the 
“must do” or “must not do” orders is not clear. The civil sanction in Sharia is 
batil/faasid i.e., invalid/void (vis-à-vis sahih/naafiz i.e., valid), and the criminal sanction 
is ma’siyat (sinful). However, it should be noted that an act e.g., a business transaction, 
may be considered a grave and sinful (ma’siyat) act, for which the violating investor 
would be responsible in the Hereafter (qiyamat); but, this sinful act would not 
necessarily always render the business transaction void (batil).6   
                                                   
6
 For details on different views on the legal sanctions of amr and nahy see Mirza Abulqasimq Qomi 
‘Qawanin al-Usul’ (Tehran, chap-e sangi, vol. 1) p. 154. He states five different views in this regard. See 
also Abulqasim Kalantari (Taqrirat Murtaza Ansari) ‘Matarih al-Anzar’ (chap-e sangi) p.16. He mentions 
ten different ideas in this regard. As per some Islamic jurists such as Mirza Naeeni, the purpose of amr 
and nahy rules is to warn people of the benefits (masaalih) and risks (mafaasid) of their acts. That is why 
it is argued that in general the philosophy of Islamic rules is cost and benefits analysis. See Muhammad 
Ali Kazimi (Taqrirat Mirza Hussein Naeeini) ‘Fawaeed al-Usul’ (Muassese Nashr Islami) pp.221, 471-472. 
He also distinguishes two different nahy (must not do): nahy irshadi and nahy mawlawi. According to 
him, the former nahy invalidates the relevant transaction entirely, but the latter invalidates only the 
effects in certain circumstances but not the possibility and permissibility of its formation forever e.g., 
ordering not to do business when calling for prayer i.e., salat (in other words, doing business is a 
permissible act but it is not enforceable if it is done at the time of calling for prayer).  
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2.3 The Nature and Definition of Right (Haq) vis-à-vis Duty (Taklif) 
Islamic rules are closely connected with the concept of huquq (rights) and takalif 
(duties) of human beings, that is to say the definition of haq  (right) and taklif  (duty) 
under Sharia. That is why the starting point in Islamic law must be centred on the 
concept of haq vis-à-vis taklif.  
According to Islam, in a more particular context, haq is defined as the power that 
a person holds, according to law, over another person or property or both - whether it 
is material, such as a right of tenancy, or intangible and non-material, such as an 
intellectual right.7 In a more general context, haq means everything that God8 or 
anybody on behalf of God has granted to a person including rights with a more specific 
meaning, and also includes takalif.9 To address the concept and the scope of law10 as it 
is understood in the modern sense, the provided second general definition of haq 
seems to be a more suitable and comprehensive one. 
                                                   
7
 This is the definition of haq (right) as per the Shia school of thought. For a similar definition see Sayf 
Allah Isfahani ‘Bulghat al-Faqih’ (chap-e sangi, 1328 Lunar Hijri Calendar) p.3; Musa Najafi (Tagrirat Mirza 
Hussein Naeini) ‘Monyat al-Talib’ (Qom: Ahmadiyya, chap-e sangi, vol. 1, 1373 Lunar Hijri Calendar) 
p.41; Muhammad Kazim Tabatabaee (bi-khatte Zayn al-A’bidin) ‘Hashiye bar Makasib’ (chap-e sangi, 
1326 Lunar Hijri Calendar) pp. 54-56.  
 
8
 As per Islamic scholars, the true legislator in Islam, called Shaare, is God. That is why the recognition 
of God as the only qualified legislator (Shaare) and consequently the recognition of God’s unique 
characteristics is a very necessary step in understanding Islamic law. See Abi Hafs Umar bin Muhammad 
al-Nasafi (a.k.a. Masoud bin Umar Taftazani) ‘Sharh al-Aqaeed al-Nasafiyyah’ (chap-e Usmani, 1326 
Lunar Hijri Calendar) p.112.  
9
 See Musa Najafi (Tagrirat Mirza Hussein Naeini) ‘Monyat al-Talib’ (Qom: Ahmadiyya, chap-e sangi, 
vol. 1, 1373 Lunar Hijri Calendar) p. 41.  
10
 In Islamic terminology, the word that is used to equate law is huquq.  
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2.4 The Implications of Right 
According to Islamic jurisprudence, in the Shia school of thought,11 the major 
effects or salient features of haq albeit in its more particular meaning are that it can be 
waived; for example, the waiver of a receivable debt by a creditor;12 and also that it 
can be transferred both in an active way (e.g. a sale)13 and a passive one (e.g. 
inheritance)14.   
 
2.5 The Origin of Right   
With regards to the origin of haq (right), Islamic scholars’ opinions are divided 
into two general categories.15 There are the “free will” advocates who are of the view 
that the function of law is only to limit the scope of freedom of the will of people and 
nothing more. According to this idea, haq is not given by law to the people though it 
                                                   
11
 See Muhammad Kazim Tabatabaee (bi-khatte Zayn al-A’bidin) ‘Hashiye bar Makasib’ (chap-e sangi, 
1326 Lunar Hijri Calendar) p. 54; Musa Najafi (Tagrirat Mirza Hussein Naeini) ‘Monyat al-Talib’ (Qom: 
Ahmadiyya, chap-e sangi, vol. 1, 1373 Lunar Hijri Calendar) p.42; Murtaza Ansari ‘Makasib’ (bi-chape 
Zayn al-A’bidin) p. 79. 
12
 See Iran Civil Code article 289.   
13
 See Iran Civil Code articles 338-339. 
14
 See Iran Civil Code article 867. 
15
 See Muhammad Ja’far Jafari Langroodi ‘Maktabhaye Huquqi dar Huqug-e Islam’ (Tehran: Ganj-e 
Danesh, 3
rd
 edition) pp. 5-6, 65-69.    
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can be limited, organised or taken away under certain conditions by law.16 This is the 
dominant idea among Islamic scholars. The “anti-free will” proponents advocate the 
view that any haq is created and granted by law and people essentially have no haq 
save that granted to them by law - i.e., by God or on behalf of the God, according to 
the view of Islam. 
 
2.6 Different Types of Right 
In respect of different types of haq, from one perspective, haq is either 
controlled by the will of people (haq annaas) or the will of God (haq Allah). The former 
are the rights which are capable of being waived by the people – these are also called 
private rights. For example, the property right arising out of a business activity is a 
private right and it can be transferred, waived, or compromised. Any right which is 
absolute and not capable of being waived, compromised or exchanged falls within the 
second category, - called public rights. From one perspective, haq is either claimed 
against an object (property) including the profits17 thereon (which is called an 
                                                   
16
 For supporting evidence see Quran (2:29) “He (God/Allah) it is Who created for you all that there is 
on the Earth (world)”. According to a Hadith “anything that God allowed people to do or benefit from is 
halal (permitted) and anything that God prohibited is haram (forbidden); regarding the things that God 
is silent on, then the people are free to act or benefit from them; people then may take them as they 
are and ask God to make it desirable for them though God does forget nothing”. It may be said that the 
mere silence of God and non-issuance of the rule on a necessary issue implies that the decision on the 
given issue has been left up to the people to decide on it (whether freely to act on it or not to act). In 
other words, in Islamic jurisprudence, to know whether an act is a permitted act or not, it is enough to 
see whether there is any specific constraint according to Islamic canonical texts or substantive law (i.e., 
Sharia). The absence of the Sharia constraint is enough reason to conclude that the given act is 
permitted. 
17
 See Iran Civil Code article 328 “if anyone destroys the property of another person, he will be held 
responsible and must either produce its equivalent or its value, whether or not the object (property) 
was destroyed intentionally and whether it was the actual object (property) or profits thereon that were 
destroyed; if he causes defect or damage to such object (property), he is responsible for the 
depreciation in value”. 
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ascertained right18), or against a person (which is called a personal right19). According 
to Islamic law, the holder of an actual right prevails over the holder of a personal 
right.20 The relationship of a person with an object (asset) can be in one of the 
following forms: a) ownership right including the ownership of the object (ayn) itself 
and/or only the profits (manfa’at) thereon21; b) enjoyment privilege22; and c) an 
easement interest in the property of someone else23. The main difference between the 
ownership right of profit and the enjoyment privilege is that, the former is a property 
or property right (i.e., an asset) of its holder and it has to be incorporated in the 
holder’s/owner’s balance sheet as per accounting rules. Consequently, the 
holder/owner of profits, unlike the grantee of enjoyment privilege, has a right to 
transfer the profits (arising out of a given object/property). In other words, the 
enjoyment privilege is solely limited to its grantee and he cannot transfer it to third 
parties. It is in this limited scope that the usurper or trespasser of the enjoyment 
privilege can be held liable against the owner of the relevant object (property) or 
profits, but not the grantee of the enjoyment privilege.    
                                                   
18
 Examples of an ascertained right (haq ayni) are the right of the holder of collateral against the 
collateral and the right of the car owner against the car.    
19
 Examples of a personal right (haq shakhsi/haq dhimmi/haq dayni) is the right of makful lah/creditor 
(for whom the summon of the debtor is ensured by a third party called kafil) against the kafil, who 
ensures the presence of the debtor when summoned by the makful lah/creditor, and also the right of 
madmun lah/creditor (for whom the payment of his receivable debt is guaranteed by a third party called 
damin) against the damin, who guarantees the satisfaction of the receivable debt of the madmun 
lah/creditor if the debtor defaults to pay madmun lah/creditor.  
20
 See Ibn A’bidin ‘Rasa’eel’ (chap-e Usmani, vol. 2/2, 1320 Lunar Hijri Calendar) p. 194; also Ashrafi 
‘Sha’aeer al-Islam’ (chap-e sangi) p. 290. 
21
 Haq al-malikiyyat   
22
 Haq al-intifa’   
23
 Hag al-irtifaq bi-milk ghayr  
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2.7 Legitimacy Rules and Contextual Rules 
In Islamic law, from the perspective of the content of rules, the rules are divided 
into two broader categories: legitimacy rules24 and contextual rules25. The different 
types of legitimacy rules are the rules concerning: a) wajib/fard (obligatory acts); b) 
halal/mubah (permissible acts); c) mandub/mustahab (recommended acts); d) makruh 
(abominable acts); e) haram (prohibited acts). The different types of contextual rules 
are the rules regarding: a) sabab (cause); b) shart (condition); c) maane’ 
(impediment/obstruction); d) rukhsat (no default allowed); e) azimat (limited default 
                                                   
24
 Ahkam taklifiyyah 
25
 Ahkam waz’eeyyah  
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allowed); f) sahih (valid); g) faasid (invalid/void); h) tagdir al-shareeyyah (fiction).26 
Unlike the first ones, in the content of the second category rules, there are no issues 
concerning the recommendation, order or obligation to act or not to act in a particular 
way. The first category rules are originally found in the Quran and the Sunnah including 
                                                   
26
 Note that sabab (cause) is different from what is called illat tammah (complete cause). Illat tammah 
(complete cause) equals sabab (cause) + shart (condition) + adam-e maane’ (the absence of the 
obstruction or impediment). For example, according to Iran Civil Code article 370, the conclusion of the 
sale contract is the cause of the transfer of ownership from the seller to the buyer and vice versa. But 
the possibility or the power of the seller to enable him to deliver the subject matter of the sale contract 
(goods, etc) to the buyer is a condition to give an effect to the cause (the conclusion of the contract). 
The legislature/law might sometimes not give an effect to the contract despite the existence of both the 
cause and condition. In other words, under some circumstances and for the protection of public 
interests, the legislature might impose an obstacle or an impediment on some transactions. For example 
the legislature might not allow the sale and purchase of some specific goods. In this case, because of the 
impediment imposed by the legislature, the contract cannot be effective.   
Any transaction/act that complies with the rules and regulations in effect is considered a sahih (valid) 
transaction/act, but if it violates the rules and regulations in effect it is ruled a faasid (invalid/void) 
transaction.  
From one specific perspective, according to Islamic law, haq is sometimes taken into account vis-à-vis 
hukm (mandatory rule). In these circumstances, what is meant by haq is a “default rule”, which can be 
ignored or waived. Hukm (mandatory rule), in turn, is divided into two categories: rules that can never 
be violated or circumvented (called azimat) and the rules that can in some cases be avoided or 
circumvented for necessary needs or urgent and exigent situations (called rukhsat). For the supporting 
evidence as to the latter rules (rukhsat) see the Quran (2:185) “Allah wants to show leniency to you and 
does not desire to show any hardship”; (5:6) “Allah does not desire to impose any hardship upon you”; 
(22:78) “He has not imposed upon you any hardship in religion”; (4:28) “Allah wants to lighten your 
burdens, for human being was created weak”; and for more see Quran (24:61); (33:38 & 50); and 
(48:17).      
In Islamic scholarship, it is argued that tagdir al-shareeyyah (Sharia fiction) is also a type of contextual 
rule. However, it can be in two different forms: one is when an inexistent thing is presumed to be in 
existence or another is when an existing thing is presumed to be inexistent. Regarding the former one, 
for example, consider that the legislature presumes an existing thing in the past whose existence is now 
under doubt, still to be existing (called istishab; the presumption of continuity). With regard to the latter 
one, consider that the legislature gives retroactive effect to the termination of a contract and it is 
deemed null and void from the beginning and not from the time of the termination of the contract 
(called atf bima sabaq).   
There is no uniformity and consensus (i.e., ijma’) among Islamic scholars in respect of the number of 
contextual rules in Islamic law. However, the major contextual rules are those that were explained 
above. For more on contextual rules see Muhammad Ali Kazimi Khorasani (Tagrirat-e Mirza Hussein 
Naeeini) ‘Fawaeed al-Usul’ (Najaf, chap-e sangi, vol. 4, 1339 Lunar Hijri Calendar) p.147; Ahmad bin Idris 
(a.k.a. Qaraafi) ‘Alfuruq’ (Dar Ihya’ al-Kutub al-Arabiyyah, vol. 1, 1
st
 edition, 1344 Lunar Hijri Calendar) p. 
161.   
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the Hadith literature, but the second category rules have been introduced gradually by 
the state (legislative body) or through the juristic inferences or interpretations of the 
Sharia experts27 in order to protect the public interest and/or respond to the ever-
changing needs of the society. In other words, the second category rules have to be 
introduced and also changed contextually within the framework of Sharia. The second 
category rules cannot violate or circumvent the first category rules. That is why when it 
comes to determining whether a given rule, act or product is consistent with Islam or 
not, it is necessary to examine its compliance or compatibility with the Islamic 
canonical texts or substantive rules (i.e., Sharia), and these can be termed legitimacy 
rules. Legitimacy rules are inapplicable if the person does not have enough power, 
liberty/freedom or knowledge to follow them. Regarding the contextual rules, none of 
the mentioned conditions i.e., power, liberty, and knowledge need to be applied to the 
person. In other words, they are automatically applicable and are generally not subject 
to any condition, excuse or exemption. Another important point to remember is that 
that there is no direct relationship between the legitimacy and contextual rules.28 A 
given action or inaction may be illegitimate, but compatible with the contextual rules 
and vice versa. For example, legally a debtor may give an undivided property, whose 
ownership belongs jointly to the debtor and his partner/co-owner, to the creditor as a 
pledge though it is illegitimate to dispose or possess an undivided property without the 
consent of the partner (co-owner).29 In circumstances where it is unclear whether a 
given rule is a legitimacy or a contextual (legal) one, it is deemed a contextual (legal) 
rule simply because the legitimacy rules require an absolute basis - that they exist in 
the Islamic canonical texts. For example, it has been hotly debated whether the rule 
                                                   
27
 Mujtahids  
28
 Contextual rules in Islam are in fact to some extent similar to the concept of legal rules as they are 
understood in modern secular legal systems. 
29






that forces the performance of the undertaking promises under a given contract is a 
legitimacy rule or a contextual rule. Some have argued that it is a contextual rule, but 
some others believe that, by virtue of a canonical text found in the Quran,30 it seems to 
be a legitimacy rule.31   
 
2.8 The Law of Silence in Sharia 
It is well acknowledged that it is not possible to predict and introduce every 
single necessary rule to cover all events, acts and circumstances in the present and 
future. The following paragraph will discuss the cases in which Sharia is thought to be 
silent.32 The first case is where no rule in Islamic canonical texts is found to address a 
specific circumstance or problem. For example, where no specific definition of a 
customary practice has been provided in Sharia. The second is where Islam has 
confirmed and adopted the rules that were in practice prior to the advent of Islam. For 
instance, the Quran ratified and adopted the rule on sale contracts33 that were in use 
prior to the rise of Islam. Thirdly, where Sharia has allowed the governing rule in 
respect of some specific cases to customary practice.34 Fourthly, where the scope of a 
general rule has to be decided by virtue of customary practice. For example, according 
to the Quran, the validity of any business transaction and the taking of possession of a 
                                                   
30
  As per the Quran (5:1) “… awfoo bi al-uqud …” (honour your promises).   
31
 See Shams al-Din Muhammad a.k.a. Shahid Awwal ‘Al-Qawaeed’ p.251; Muhammad Mahdi Kazimi 
Khalesi ‘Anaawin’ (vol. 2) p. 56; Muhammad Ali Kazimi Khorasani (Tagrirat-e Mirza Hussein Naeeini) 
‘Fawaeed al-Usul’ (Najaf, chap-e sangi, vol. 4, 1339 Lunar Hijri Calendar) p.137; Ahmad bin Idris a.k.a. 
Qaraafi ‘Alfuruq’ (Dar Ihya’ al-Kutub al-Arabiyyah, vol. 3, 1
st
 edition, 1344 Lunar Hijri Calendar) pp. 131, 
215-216.    
32
  See Muhammad Jafar Jafari Langroodi ‘Maktabhaye Huquqi dar Huqug-e Islam’ (Tehran: Ganj-e 
Danesh, 3
rd
 edition) pp. 71-78. 
33
 See the Quran (2:275) “Allah made trade lawful/legitimate”.  
34
 “Everything that is considered desirable among the Muslims/people, it is good before God as well”. 
See Jalal al-Din Suyuti Shafiee (tashih-e Ali Maliki) ‘Al-Ashbaah wa al-Nazaeer’ (Egypt) p. 80.     
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property by way of trading is subject to the consent of the parties.35 This is a general 
rule introduced in the context of trade and to determine whether it is also applicable 
in non-business contexts, e.g., insurance dealings, it needs to be referred to and 
interpreted according to the commercial practices in the relevant community, industry, 
or society. A further case is where Sharia has allowed the appropriate governing rule 
to be one created by a reasoned understanding and decision by those living in the 
society; or determined on the basis of justice and equity. Some Islamic scholars36 have 
argued that any just and equitable act, product or rule falls within Sharia and it is 
considered lawful and legitimate in Islam. The last case that will be mentioned here 
where Sharia is silent is over the rules that are deemed necessary to be accepted 
because of the urgent needs of the people and exigent circumstances in the society. 
For example, it is possible to guarantee either the purchaser or the seller against any 
contingent claims that may be raised by a third party in relation to the ownership of 
the asset of sale or the consideration respectively. This is called daman uhda.37 This is a 
rule that does not exist in the Islamic canonical texts, but it has been developed due to 
the needs of people in society. That is why it is said38 that the public need is considered 
an urgent and exigent circumstance and makes the necessary applicable rule 
legitimate. It is worth mentioning that according to the Hanafi school of thought,39 any 
opposing customary practice that comes into use after the relevant rules/laws are in 
effect, overrides the relevant rules/laws although it is contrary to the laws simply 
                                                   
35
 See the Quran (4:29) “do not devour one another's possessions wrongfully; rather than that, let 
there be trading by mutual consent”.  
36
 See Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah ‘Al-Turuq al-Hakamiyyah fi al-Siyasat al-Shareeyyah’ (Cairo, 1961) p. 16.    
37
 See Iran Civil Code article 697.  
38
 See Muhammd Mujahid ‘Manaahil’ (Tehran, 1274 Lunar Hijri Calendar) p. 138; Shams al-Din 
Muhammad a.k.a. Shahid Awwal ‘Al-Qawaeed’ pp 56-57, 128; Ibn A’bidin ‘Rasa’eel’ (chap-e Usmani, vol. 
2, 1320 Lunar Hijri Calendar) p. 161.    
39
 Note that in Islam, there are two major schools of thought: Sunni and Shia. The Sunni school of 
thought, in turn, consists of four major schools of thought: Hanafi, Hanbali, Shafiee and Maliki.   
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because if the customary practice is not accepted it will cause a lot of hardship and 
conflict in the society.40 Having discussed the issue of silence of law in Islamic law, it is 
worth mentioning that there are two different groups of Islamic scholars on the issue 
of silence of law in Islam. There are those who believe that there are some cases and 
circumstances where no specific canonical text in Sharia can be found to address the 
problem. The main reasons in this regard are those mentioned earlier, adding the 
point that the rules found in Sharia are limited while the events that have to be 
addressed by proper rules are infinite.41 This is the dominant idea among Islamic 
scholars.42 The other group rejects the silence of law problem in Islam. They argue that 
a comprehensive version of Islamic law, covering all necessary circumstances can be 
found in the Quran and Sunnah including the Hadith literature. However, although 
some Sharia scholars in both Sunni and Shia schools of thought support this idea, it is 
not, in any case, practical since the said comprehensive version is inaccessible today.43 
                                                   
40
 See Ibn A’bidin ‘Rasa’eel’ (chap-e Usmani, vol. 2 1320 Lunar Hijri Calendar) pp. 130, 140-141.    
41
 Al-nusus ma’dudah wa al-hawadith mamdoodah. See Shams al-Din Sarakhsi ‘Al-Mabsoot’ (Egypt: 
Sa’adat, vol. 16) pp. 62-63; Sayf al-Din Ali al-Amidi ‘Al-Ahkam fi Usul al-Ahkam’ (Egypt, vol. 4) p.159; Ibn 
Qayyim al-Jawziyyah (tashih-e Abd al-Rahman al-Wakil) ‘E’laam al-Muqein’ (Egypt, vol. 1, 2
nd
 edition) pp. 
375-376.          
42
 See Muhammad Ja’far Jafari Langroodi ‘Maktabhaye Huquqi dar Huqug-e Islam’ (Tehran: Ganj-e 
Danesh, 3
rd
 edition) p. 76.   
43
Some Shia jurists argue that, according to some Ahadith, a complete version of Islamic canonical 
texts (called Jame’a or Sahifat al-Faraed) had been explained by the Prophet to his son-in-law (i.e., Ali) 
and Ali had written it down at the time. But this version of the canonical book was never published due 
to some problems and special circumstances at the time. Also, some Sunni jurists like Ibn-Qayyim reject 
the problem of the silence of law in Islam. They believe that Sharia encompasses all rules that people 
and society need for their life and there is no need for juristic inference by analogy and any other 
methodological sources of law in Islam. See Abi Ishaq Ibrahim Gharnati a.k.a. Shaatibi (tashih-e 
Muhammad Muhyi al-Din Abd al-Hamid) ‘Muwafiqat’ (Egypt, vol. 3) p.246; Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah 
(tashih-e Abd al-Rahman al-Wakil) ‘E’laam al-Muqe’een (Egypt, vol. 1, 2
nd
 edition) pp. 376, 378.        
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2.9 The Sources of law in Islam 
The sources of law in Islam are either recorded writings44 namely the Quran and 
Sunnah including Hadith literature or the logical conclusions and juristic 
understandings and judgements of Sharia experts demonstrated contextually in 
compliance with the letter and spirit of the Quran and Sunnah45. As per the Sunni 
school of thought, fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence that covers the different interpretations 
and the thoughts of Islamic jurists) takes precedence over Sunnah (including the 
Hadith literature). In contrast, the Shia school believes that Ali (who lived with the 
Prophet Muhammad from his earlier childhood) recorded all sayings (Hadith) of the 
Prophet Muhammad in a book called Jame’a, and it is believed that Jame’a was to be 
submitted by the earlier Imam to his successor and so on. Therefore, as per Shia 
thinking, it was after the full recording and preparation of Jame’a (i.e., Sunnah 
including the Hadith literature) that the fiqh was developed.46 As per the Shia school of 
thought, the sources of law in Islam are the Quran, Sunnah including the Hadith 
literature, ijma (juristic consensus) and aql (the personal intelligent judgement). 
However, ijma is not supported by all Shia scholars and that is why there are some Shia 
scholars who do not support ijma as a separate source of law in Islam.47 The same is 
true about aql. However, although Shia scholars initially resisted accepting ijma and 
aql as separate sources of law, these concepts were eventually adopted by the 
majority of Shia scholars.48 According to the majority of Sunnis, the sources of law are 
Quran, Sunnah including the Hadith literature, ijma and qiyas (the juristic inference by 
                                                   
44
 Manqul or nass  
45
 Ma’qul  
46
  See Ali Hasan Abd al-Qadir “Nazaratun A’mmah” (Cairo) p. 120.  
47
 See Sayf al-Din Ali al-Amidi ‘Al-Ahkam fi Usul al-Ahkam’ (Egypt, vol. 1) p.223. At the time of al-Amidi 
(lived 551-631 Lunar Hijri Calendar), the Shia school was against the concept of ijma.     
48
 See Muhammad Ja’far Jafari Langroodi ‘Maktabhaye Huquqi dar Huqug-e Islam’ (Tehran: Ganj-e 
Danesh, 3
rd
 edition) pp. 216-217.   
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analogy). However, there is a minority of Sunni scholars who argue that the Quran and 
Sunnah including the Hadith literature are the only sources of law in Islam. On the 
other side, there are groups of scholars from different schools of thought of the Sunni 
school who have argued for more sources of law in Islam including, but not limited to, 
ray (personal opinion), istihsan (the juristic approbation to overrule the juristic 
inference), istislah (cost and benefit analysis, to overrule the juristic analogy), sadd al-
dharae (impeding the preliminary means). The Shia school refuses to consider them as 
separate sources of law in Islam. Bina’ uqala49 (a kind of good customary practice) has 
been introduced as a source of law in Islam by some Shia scholars. The following are 
the differences between aql (the personal intelligent inference) and bina’ uqala: a) 
bina’ uqala is a function or performance (i.e., a reality or an act in practice), but aql is a 
logical conclusion50; b) bina’ uqala is dependent on repetition of an act in practice, but 
aql is not dependent on an act practised in reality; c) the adoption of bina’ uqala is 
subject to passing the cost and benefit analysis, but the inference of aql (intelligent) is 
an abstract rule51 and not dependent necessarily on cost and benefit analysis. There 
are numerous legal fictions52 that have been developed and are widely used by Sharia 
scholars particularly the Islamic jurists from the Shia school of thought. The most well-
known one is istishab (the presumption of continuity). Istishab means the presumption 
of the persistence/continuance of a fact that was undoubtedly in existence in the past 
but its existence at present is under doubt.  
                                                   
49
 The practice and understanding of wise people  
50
 It seems that, according to Islam, an Islamic ruling whose illah (underlying logic) is not 
understandable, its wisdom (hikmah) has to be sought in Maqasid al-Sharia (i.e., Objectives or Purposes 
of law in Islam).       
51
 For example see Iran Civil Code article 194 “the words, signs or other acts that by virtue of which the 
parties to a transaction make the transaction, must be coordinated so that each party understands and 
accepts the transaction which the other party intended to make, otherwise the transaction will be null 
and void”.  
52
 Foorud qanooniyyah or usul amaliyyah 
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Some Sharia jurists53 have criticised the Shia school of thought because of their 
overuse and over-practice of usul amaliyyah (legal fictions). Regarding the use of 
ijtihad54 (the juristic inference), Sunni and Shia schools of thought have held different 
views. The Shia school believes that ijtihad is permitted whenever it is necessary and it 
never ends, but the Sunni school, albeit those Sunni jurists who in principle agree with 
the concept of ijtihad at all, believe that the gate of ijtihad is closed after the passing of 
the founders of the Hanafi, Hanbali, Maliki and Shafiee schools of thought.55 Due to 
the insufficiency and incomplete responsiveness of the Islamic canonical texts to the 
ever-changing needs of people and human societies, the majority of Islamic jurists 
have developed the scope of Islamic law sources over time, through the introduction 
of new legal concepts in strict conformity to the letter and spirit of Sharia. The major 
legal innovations in this regard are impeding the preliminary means56, ever-
changeability of Sharia rules following new good customary practices57, the intelligent 
judgements58, rule of inherency59, and judicial precedence60. The compilation of good 
customary practices and also the recognition of the regulations of other nations 
(bordering on Islamic lands) have largely contributed to the development of Islamic 
law since the early ages of Islam. These recognised rules and regulations are called 
                                                   
53
 See Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah (tashih-e Abd al-Rahman al-Wakil) ‘E’laam al-Muqe’een’ (Egypt, vol. 1, 
2
nd
 edition) pp. 376-378.  
54
 Ijtihad means a juristic inference or the interpretation of Islamic canonical texts in the cases of 
silence, ambiguity, and conflict of Sharia rules.   
55
 See Muhammad Ja’far Jafari Langroodi ‘Maktabhaye Huquqi dar Huqug-e Islam’ (Tehran: Ganj-e 
Danesh, 3
rd
 edition) pp. 219-220. 
56
 Sadd al-dharae  
57
 Taghyeer Shar’ bi-taba’ee urf 
58
 Tashree’ bi-aql  
59
 Qa’eeda mulaazima  
60
 Rawiyye-ye qada’ee  
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ahkam imdaee61 (verified rules and regulations) and were largely adopted from Roman 
law, Iranian (Sassanid) law and Jewish (Talmud) law.62  
 
2.10 Conclusion 
The above key concepts and their implications in Sharia63 help us to see how 
Islamic law differs from what is understood by modern secular legal systems namely 
civil law and common law.64 Given the diversity of opinions on many issues from the 
viewpoint of different Islamic schools of thought, it can be concluded that Sharia or 
Islamic law is not only unsuitable in its applicability as a governing law but is also 
problematic and risky in the realm of international business and financial transactions. 
 
                                                   
61
 See Mahmoud bin Jafar ‘Qawame’ al-Fudul’ (chap-e sangi) p. 198; Abi Ishaq Ibrahim Gharnati a.k.a. 
Shaatibi (tashih-e Muhammad Muhyi al-Din Abd al-Hamid) ‘Muwafiqat’ (Egypt, vol. 2) p. 54; Baqir 
Bihbahani ‘Al-Fawaeed al-Atiq (Damime-ye Fusul)’ p. 3; Muhammad Jafar Jafari Langroodi ‘Huquq 
Madani: Sulh wa Rahn’ (Ibn Sina, vol. 1, 1
st
 edition) pp. 201-202. 
62
 Ali Hasan Abd al-Qadir “Nazaratun A’mmah”, Cairo, pp. 8-9.  
63
 For an interesting contemporary research on the origins and evolution of Sharia see W.B. Hallaq, 
The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law (Cambridge University Press, 2004).  
64
 However, as per Al-Gamal, Islamic jurisprudence is very much like a case law system (casuistry), that 
is to say built chiefly on analogy to precedents. In cases where no legislative canonical texts or canonised 
consensus is found, jurists resort to some process of ijtihad (juristic inference). See Mahmoud A. El-
Gamal ‘Islamic Finance: Law, Economics, and Practice’ (Cambridge University Press, 2006) pp. 15-20, 27-
30. The Islamic term for juristic inference or process is called ijtihad i.e. doing one’s best (to get the most 
proper decision). In other words, ijtihad is a Sharia expert’ reasoning to find appropriate rules for new 
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3.1 The First Part of the Second Tier of the Model (1): The Nature 
and Distribution of Primary Wealth  
 
Every human being is entitled to enjoy and benefit from natural wealth resources 
(primary wealth) yet nobody can claim to be the beneficiary of a specific part of the 
natural wealth until it is distributed among the people. In Islam, it is believed and well-
accepted that God owns1 everything including all the wealth in the world. As per the 
Quran, God has entrusted2 all things to human beings as a whole3 because of the sense 
of responsibility and trustworthiness that mankind possesses compared to other 
creatures in the world. Therefore, human beings may benefit from all the wealth in the 
world entrusted to them by God, albeit subject to specific limitations.4 All human 
beings have to share the proceeds of natural wealth jointly according to their 
reasonable and legitimate needs and, regarding some natural resources, in proportion 
to their contributions such as according to their work efforts. Under certain 
                                                   
1
 See the Quran (5:120) “to Allah belongs the dominion of the heavens and the earth and all that is in 
them and He has full power over everything”; the Quran (2:284) “to Allah belongs whatever is in the 
heavens and the Earth”; the Quran (4:126) “whatever is in the heavens and in the earth belongs to 
Allah; Allah encompasses everything”; Fakhr al-Din bin Muhammad Tureihi ‘Majma al-Bahrein wa Matla 
al-Nayyerin’ (vol. 1) p. 108 “the right of dominance belongs only to Allah (God) and his Messenger”; 
Murtaza Ansari ‘Makasib’ (bi-khatte Zayn al-A’bidin) p.162; Muhammad bin al-Hasan al-Hurr al-Amili 
‘Wasaeel al-Shia’ (Tehran: Al-Maktaba al-Islamiyyah, 6
th
 edition, 1403 Lunar Hijri Calendar, vol. 6/20) 
p.364.    
2
See the Quran (33:72) “we offered the trust to the heavens and the earth and the mountains, but 
they refused to carry it and were afraid of doing so; but man carried it”. Human beings are considered to 
be the viceregents of Allah (God) in the Earth. See the Quran (35:39) “It is He Who made you viceregents 
in the earth”. See also the Quran (57:7); (10:14); and (6:165).  
3
 See the Quran (2:29) “He (God) it is who created for you all that there is on the Earth”. For the 
interpretation of this hadith and also the interaction of public and private rights see Muhammad 
Hussein al-Tabatabaaee ‘Al-Mizan fi Tafsir al-Quran’ (Beirut: Mu’assasat al-A’lami li al-Matbou’aat, vol. 
4/20, 1390 Lunar Hijri Calendar) pp. 170-171.  
4
 A social human being, intuitively and instinctively, has an excessive desire to acquire or possess more 
material wealth than he actually needs or deserves. Due to the greedy and avaricious nature of a social 
human being, his economic behaviour has to be regulated.  
 97 
 
circumstances, people may receive priority to enjoy the proceeds of natural wealth if 
they make them usable and productive.5 However, they can never acquire the 
ownership of these wealth resources (called raqabat al-maal) but in fact they remain 
under the control of the public (as a whole) forever. Some Islamic scholars may limit 
the ownership of proceeds (raw materials) derived from these original wealth 
resources to those who have directly contributed their work effort in this regard, e.g., 
catching fish through fishing in seas, cutting wood from the trees in jungles and the 
exploration and extraction of oil from oil reservoirs.6 In other words, they may limit the 
causes of ownership to only direct contributions of labour and exclude the 
contributors of tools, machines and capital from taking any ownership right. They 
                                                   
5
 However, this enjoyment is limited (e.g., limited for the lifetime of human beings and also limited for 
a legitimate and reasonable enjoyment) and it is not absolute. For more in this regard see Muhammad 
bin al-Hasan al-Hurr al-Amili ‘Wasaeel al-Shia’ (Tehran: Al-Maktaba al-Islamiyyah, vol. 13/20, 6
th
 edition, 
1403 Lunar Hijri Calendar) pp. 356, 360, 363, Hadith numbers 24553, 24566, 24576. See also the Quran 
(4:5).       
6
 “Nobody can own something unless it is acquired as a result of one’s effort”. See the Quran (53:39-
41), (76:22), (21:94), (17:19), (88:9), (18:103-105). See also the Constitution of Iran article 46 “Everyone 
is the owner of the fruits of his legitimate business and labour …”. For more detail see Muhammad Baqir 
Sadr ‘Iqtisaduna’ (Qom: Bustan-e Ketab-e Qom Press, 2003) pp. 549-571. If a person (muwakkil) employs 
somebody else (wakil) as his agent (on the basis of wakala i.e., agency) in order to acquire raw materials 
from natural wealth resources, the produced raw materials belong to wakil/agent, who has in fact 
directly produced them rather than muwakkil. The same rule is applicable in the case of ijara (hiring) 
contract where an employer (musta’jir) hires a worker (ajir) in order to acquire raw materials from the 
natural wealth resources. The acquired raw materials would belong to ajir rather than musta’jir. Some 
Islamic jurists have distinguished these two. They believe in retaining the acquired raw materials by 
muwakkil (principal) in the case of wakala (agency) arrangement; however, not by musta’jir in the case 
of ijara (hiring) contract (i.e., it would belong to ajir and not musta’jir). It is not allowed that the 
musta’jir retains the acquisitions and productions and in return compensates the worker for his services 
rendered in the production process. See Muhammad Hasan al-Najafi a.k.a al-Muhaqqiq al-Najafi 
‘Jawaahir al-Kalaam fi Sharh Shara’e al-Islam’ (Daar al-Kutub al-Islamiyyah, vol. 26/43, 2
nd
 edition, 1362 
Solar Hijri Calendar) p. 334; Ali bin Abdulkafi al-Sabki ‘Takmilat al-Majmu lisharh al-Muhadhab’ (Egypt: 
Sharkat al-Ulama’, vol. 11/18) p.8; Muwaffaq al-Din Abi Muhammad Abdullah bin Ahmad bin 
Muhammad bin Quda’mat and Shams al-Din Abi al-Faraj Abulrahman bin al-Shaykh Abi Umar 
Muhammad bin Ahmad bin Quda’mat al-Muqaddasi ‘Al-Mughni wa al-Sharh al-Kabir’ (Daar al-Kitab al-
Arabi, vol. 5/12,1403 Lunar Hijri Calendar) p. 204; Al-Fadil al-Miqdad bin Abdullah al-Suyuri ‘Al-Tanqih al-
Raa’e li Mukhtasar al-Shara’e’ (Maktabat Ayatullah al-Mar’ashi, vol. 2/4,1404 Lunar Hijri Calendar) p. 
285.   
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argue that the labour contributors will in return compensate the suppliers of tools, 
machines, and equipment for their customary rental fees7 and also repay the exact 
principal amount of capital providers with no excess (to avoid riba). However, as per 
the implications of the thesis foundational theory, it is fair to say that the ownership of 
the proceeeds8 has to be shared pro rata among the contributors, no matter in what 
form the contributions are made.9 In any case, the acquisition of ownership right in the 
proceeds has to be of an equal value to the contributions made in deriving the 
proceeds from the natural wealth resources, and any excess value would go to the 
public as a whole.  
                                                   
7
 See Abi al-Qasim Najm al-Din Jafar bin al-Hasan a.k.a al-Muhaqqiq al-Hilli ‘Al-Shara’e (a.k.a Shara’e al-
Islam)’ (Mu’assasa Isma’eeliyan, vol. 2/2, 1408 Lunar Hijri Calendar) p.108; Shams al-Din Sarakhsi ‘Al-
Mabsoot’ (Beirut: Daar al-Ma’rafat, vol. 2/15), p. 346; Abi Mansour al-Hasan bin Yusuf bin al-Mutahhar 
al-Asadi a.k.a Al-Allama al-Hilli ‘Qawa’eed al-Ahkaam’ (Manshoorat al-Radi, vol. 1) p. 244.     
8
 The owners of the proceeds (assets) retain a right of control over these assets and they may use, 
dispose, and transact with them as they wish.   
9
 Some Fuqaha (Sharia jurists) believe that the only investment contract that is allowed in the 
production of raw materials is a muzara’a (crop-sharing) contract, and some others have added 
mudaraba (capital and labour partnership) contract to the legitimate investment contracts in this 
regard. As per Iran Civil Code article 518 “muzara’a is a contract in virtue of which one of the two parties 
gives to the other a piece of land for a specified time so that he shall cultivate it and share the 
proceeds”. Some Sharia experts (e.g., Sadr) believe that, although muzara’a does not seem to be 
contrary to Sharia, it has been ruled out during the passage of time in Islamic history. For this argument, 
they often refer to the following Hadith attributed to the Prophet Muhammad “everybody who 
possesses a piece of land has to use it to produce agricultural products, and if he cannot do this he has 
to then pass it to another farmer to cultivate it for production purposes, and he cannot lease it to 
another just to earn rental fees”. See Murtaza Mutahhari ‘Barrasi-ye Ijmaali-ye Mabaani-ye Iqtisad-e 
Islami’ (Hikmat, 1
st
 edition, 1403 Lunar Hijri Calendar) pp. 57-58. See also Muhammad bin al-Hasan al-
Hurr al-Amili ‘Wasaeel al-Shia’ (Tehran: Al-Maktaba al-Islamiyyah, vol. 17/20, 6th edition, 1403 Lunar 
Hijri Calendar) p. 345 Hadith no. 32274 “the land belongs to God and He has endowed it to human 
beings for their enjoyment. If a possessor of land does not use it for three consecutive years without 
valid justification, the land is taken from his possession and it passess to others to use it”. For somewhat 
different views regarding the ownership of land see Abi Jafar Muhammad bin Mansour bin Ahmad bin 
Idris al-Hilli a.k.a Muhammad bin Idris al-Hilli ‘Al-Sara’eer’ (Mu’assasat al-Nashr al-Islami, vol. 1/3, 2
nd
 
edition, 1410 Lunar Hijri Calendar) p. 477. See also Al-Muhaqqiq al-Sayyed Muhammad Jawad al-
Husseini al-A’mili a.k.a al-Muhaqqiq al-Thani ‘Miftaah al-Karamat’ (Mu’assasa A’al al-Bayt, vol. 7/10) p.3.   
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3.2 An Introduction to the Creation and Circulation of Subordinate 
Wealth10  
Unless it is used or consumed by the owner himself, an asset may be disposed of 
either for the production of further wealth (i.e., for generating profits), for no profit, or 
for philanthropic purposes.  
Regarding consumption, Islam has prohibited israf (exceeding the limits of 
reasonable and legitimate needs i.e., extravagance) and tabdhir (unnecessary and 
wasteful expenditure or consumption i.e., dissipation).11 Both israf and tabdhir refer to 
quantitative and qualitative aspects of economic life. In economic terms, israf refers to 
over-allocation or over-distribution of wealth and tabdhir relates to unnecessary 
allocation or unnecessary distribution of wealth.  
Hoarding and the accumulation (ihtikar) of any goods and commodities that fall 
within the essential consumption needs of people is absolutely forbidden. Rather, 
                                                   
10
 The notion of wealth is closely connected to the concept of property. Interestingly, it should be 
noted that in the definition and recognition of wealth/property, the primary property is basically not 
distinguished from the subordinate property both in western terminology and also in Islamic law. As per 
Supreme Court of the United States, “the right to exclude others” is “one of the most essential 
constituents in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterised as property”. See Kaiser Aetna v. 
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) and also subsequent decisions following this approach e.g., 
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 
1044 (1992); and Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987). However, some scholars 
argue that the right to exclude others from a valued source i.e., a resource that is scarce relative to the 
demand for it by human beings is beyond just “one of the most essential” elements of property- it is the 
“sine qua non” i.e., a necessary and enough condition of identifying the nature and existence of 
property (and is indeed the border line between “property” and “nonproperty” or “unowned things”).  
Merrill, however, points out that those who are given the right to exclude others from a valued resource 
usually also are given other rights regarding the resource e.g., the rights to consume it, to convert it, to 
transfer it, to devise it or to dispose of it by will, to pledge it as security interest, to subdivide it into 
smaller interests, and the like. See Thomas W. Merrill ‘Property and the Right to Exclude’ (Nebraska Law 
Review, Vol. 77, Issue 4, 1998) pp. 730-755.  
11
 As per the Quran (7:31): “O Children of Adam! Wear your beautiful apparel at every time … and eat 
and drink without going to waste and excess, for Allah does not like the wasters and those who go to 
excess”. See also Muhammad bin al-Hasan al-Hurr al-Amili ‘Wasaeel al-Shia’ (Tehran: Al-Maktaba al-
Islamiyyah, vol. 11/20, 6
th
 edition, 1403 Lunar Hijri Calendar) pp. 261, 520.   
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Islam encourages the people to donate and bestow the excess of their wealth to those 
who are in need and spend their surplus wealth on social needs, and public welfare.12 
These Islamic rules are very powerful tools for abolishing the social gap between the 
poor and rich and to provide a balance in society. 
Given the social responsibility required of an asset owner, his production and 
investment activity has to be prioritised and conducted according to the legitimate and 
essential needs of people in society (not necessarily according to the demand13 rule 
and the purchasing power of customers in the market). Any production of goods and 
also provision of services that is linked to dissipation, profligacy, extravagance, and 
wasteful behaviour is strongly discouraged and some may argue, possibly prohibited.  
 
                                                   
12
 See the Quran (2:219) “they ask what ought we to spend (in the way of Allah)? Say spend whatever 
you can spare”; the Quran (2:195) “spend your wealth in the Way of Allah and do not cast yourselves 
into ruin with your own hands. Do all things gracefully, for Allah loves those who do all things with 
excellence”; the Quran (17:29) “do not keep your hand fastened to your neck nor outspread it, 
altogether outspread, for you will be left sitting rebuked, destitute”.     
According to a Hadith (from the Shia school) reported by Abi Ismaeel and attributed to Imam Baqir “… 
Imam Baqir asked: do the rich people care for the poor? I said no. Then Imam Baqir said those rich 
people who do not care for the poor are not from us”. See Muhammad bin al-Hasan al-Hurr al-Amili 
‘Wasaeel al-Shia’ (Tehran: Al-Maktaba al-Islamiyyah, vol. 6/20, 6
th
 edition, 1403 Lunar Hijri Calendar) p. 
299.   
Also according to a Hadith attributed to Imam Ali (from the Shia school), the true giving of your wealth 
in the Way of Allah is that that is made voluntarily before the needy ask your help. If your giving is made 
after the request of the needy, your spending may be just to avoid disappointment and not made truly 
from your heart”. See Muhammad bin al-Hasan al-Hurr al-Amili ‘Wasaeel al-Shia’ (Tehran: Al-Maktaba 
al-Islamiyyah, vol. 6/20, 6
th
 edition, 1403 Lunar Hijri Calendar) p. 364.     
13
 It is well understood that the market demand usually goes beyond the necessary and legitimate 
needs of people in society and it is often inflated by way of using some wrongful marketing techniques.     
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3.3 The General Law of Transactions: A Comparative Approach 
One way of disposing of an asset is to transact with it.14 Transactions have 
historically been a social necessity. People in society are unable to be self-sufficient. To 
satisfy their different needs, people need to cooperate and help each other. They are 
neither able to produce all their needs nor to consume all they have produced. The 
excess of one’s own products and the need for the products of others has led people 
to transact with each other. That is why transactions have always played a very 
important role in distribution and transfer of products and wealth among the people in 
society.15 Historically, an early form of transaction was barter (mua’wada). In the very 
basic form of this transaction, both parties are necessarily producers and consumers at 
the same time. The transaction is not a way of producing wealth, rather it is a way of 
transferring wealth or products to those who need them. The invention of money as 
currency, however, broke the direct relationship between production and the creation 
of wealth and led to ever-increasing monetised trades and investments in which the 
creation of new wealth became possible with no need to necessarily produce anything. 
Unlike the very basic form of barter transactions where production is a precondition to 
the creation of wealth, money paved a new way to the creation of wealth regardless of 
a production activity and made the holders of money able to earn an excess income 
from their capital by way of using some transactional techniques. Prior to the rise of 
                                                   
14
 See the Quran (4:29) “do not devour one another's possessions/assets/properties wrongfully; rather 
than that, let there be trading by mutual consent/assent”.      
15
 Regarding the importance and the definition of trade and traders see Abu al-Hasan Muhammad al-
Radi bin al-Hasan al-Musawi (the collection of the sayings of Imam Ali) ‘Nahj al-Bala’ghah’ (Qom: Daar 
al-Hijrat) p. 438 al-Risalat no. 53. It seems that, as per the definition of trade and trader that is provided 
by Imam Ali in Nahj al-Balagha, the underlying rationale for the legitimacy of earning income through 
trade by traders is that the traders bear actual burdens in the provision and carrying the goods from the 
suppliers of goods to the customers, who really need the goods for some reasonable and legitimate 
purposes. It seems in any trade where this underlying rationale is missing, the legitimacy of the trade 
may be severely criticised according to Sharia.  
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Islam, a capital holder could earn an income from his capital in one of two ways: by 
doing a trade and investment, or by lending16 his capital at interest.17 The Quran18, at 
the time of the rise of Islam19, permitted the former transaction but prohibited the 
latter one for earning excess income. In the early Islamic period, trade and investment 
were in practise either performed individually or in participatory forms. At an 
individual level, the most practised form of transaction was bay (sale) transaction and 
the participatory arrangement used in practice was musharaka20 (partnership).  
                                                   
16
 In lending (loan) transactions, irrespective of the results of trades or investments in which the 
borrowed capital is spent or consumed, lenders receive an absolute excess on their loans from 
borrowers (as practiced in the present-day banking and finance world).  
17
 See A. L. M. Abdul Gafoor ‘Interest, Usury, Riba and the Operational Costs of a Bank’ (A.S. Noordeen, 
2005) pp. 51-52.    
18
 See the Quran (2:275) “they said, trade is just like riba, whereas Allah has made trade lawful and 
riba unlawful”. From the viewpoint of Sharia, the prohibition of riba does fall within the scope of public 
law and by no means, it can be circumvented.      
19
 For the purpose of fair distribution of wealth and due to the significant role of markets in this regard 
(as it is understood from a Hadith “the origin of the devastating behaviours go back to markets”), Islam 
made radical changes in the rules of business and economy. Introducing the rules governing the use of 
natural wealth resources especially lands and the prohibition of riba were the first two radical changes. 
However, these rules were ignored by the Arab businessmen and also markets operating in the early 
Islamic society. See Muhammad Ja’far Jafari Langroodi ‘Maktabhaye Huquqi dar Huqug-e Islam’ (Tehran: 
Ganj-e Danesh, 3rd edition) pp. 325-326.        
20
 Musharaka is a partnership arrangement between two partners or more to finance and run a 
business or an investment venture whereby any profit derived from the venture or loss (if any) incurred 
by the venture will be distributed among the participants. For more on the definition and different types 
of musharakas written by contemporary scholars see A. L. Udovitch ‘Partnership and Profit in Medieval 
Islam’ (Princeton University Press, 1970); I.A.K. Nyazee ‘Islamic Law of Business Organization: 
Partnerships (The Islamic Research Institute Press, 1998); and also M. Siddiqi ‘Partnership and Profit-
Sharing in Islamic Law’ (Islamic Foundation, 1985). Looking at the law of partnerships in Islam makes it 
clear how there are diverse opinions by different Islamic schools of thought in this regard and how it is 
important to standardise the law of partnerships in the Islamic business law. This research, having 
provided a foundational theory, tries to give a new approach with regard to the standardisation of 
partnerships in the framework of a new intellectual model provided by the thesis. This approach is 
provided in the discussion on musharakas in the following chapters.      
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3.3.1 The “Promise” Theory vis-à-vis the Theory of “Transfer of 
Ownership” 
In the legal sense, the essence of a transaction or contract is a “promise”. This is 
the original view of the majority of Shia scholars. They argue that no contract is 
imaginable without carrying a promise.21 In contrast, the Sunni school of thought has 
not discussed this (promise) theory and instead its scholars have considered “transfer 
of ownership” as the essence of a transaction or contract. According to this thought, 
the existence of a tangible asset is required for the validity of a contract (i.e., for the 
transfer of ownership from the transferor to the transferee). The following are the 
effects of this idea. The transfer of the ownership of a ma’dum i.e., non-existent, 
contingent or fantasy asset is impossible (according to Hanbali, Shafiee and Hanafi 
schools)22; however, if its existence is subject to another asset which exists in reality 
then the transfer of ownership of the non-existent asset will be valid due to its 
subordination and attachment to the asset that is in existence – although there are 
some Sunni scholars who have argued against the validity of this type of transaction as 
well. As per ibn Taymiyyah,23 some Sunni jurists have argued in favour of voiding 
transactions of non-existent (ma’dum) property/assets. As per this thought/theory, an 
ijara (leasing) contract, whereby the contingent future benefits resulting from the 
property of the lessor are leased to the lessee, has to be considered basically void. 
However, some other Sunni jurists have argued that it is a valid and legitimate contract 
                                                   
21
 According to a Hadith recorded by Abdullah bin Sanan “the essence of a contract or transaction is a 
promise” (al-aqd al-ahd). See Ahmad Naraqi ‘Awa’eed al-Ayyaam’ (chap-e sangi) p. 43; Muhammad 
Hussein Gharawi Isfahani ‘Hashiye-ye Kumpani a.k.a Hashiye bar Makasib’ pp. 5, 138-139.  
In contrast to the Islamic Shia school of thought, the essence of a contract is a bargain (bargained-for 
legal detriment/benefit) in the common law of contracts in the US. 
22
 See Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah (tashih-e Abd al-Rahman al-Wakil) ‘E’laam al-Muqe’een’ (Egypt, vol. 1, 
2
nd
 edition) p. 347.        
23
 See Ibn Taymiyyah ‘Al-Qiyas fi al-Shar’ al-Islami’ (Cairo: Al-Salafiyyah, 2
nd
 edition, 1375 Lunar Hijri 
Calendar) p. 23.   
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due to the public need (haajat al-aammah) rule.24 It is worth noting that some Shia 
scholars25 have been influenced by the transfer of ownership theory provided 
originally by the Sunni school of thought.26 For example, this group of Shia scholars 
have analysed ijara (leasing) contracts on the basis of transfer of ownership of the 
                                                   
24
 See Ibn Taymiyyah ‘Al-Qiyas fi al-Shar’ al-Islami’ (Cairo: Al-Salafiyyah, 2
nd
 edition, 1375 Lunar Hijri 
Calendar) p. 23. Shaatibi, a great Maliki jurist, has treated both promise and transfer of ownership as 
exact the same concepts, but without mentioning the term promise (ahd/ta’ahhud) or any other similar 
terms such as undertaking (iltizam). See Abi Ishaq Ibrahim Gharnati a.k.a. Shaatibi (tashih-e Muhammad 
Muhyi al-Din Abd al-Hamid) ‘Muwafiqat’ (Egypt, vol. 3) p. 114.  
25
See Ashrafi ‘Sha’aeer al-Islam’ (chap-e sangi) p. 277.  
26
Historically, the reaction of Shia scholars to the transfer of ownership (tamliki) theory of Sunni school 
has to be distinguished into two different periods of time: a) in the early stage, they (i.e., Shia jurists) 
knowingly distinguished the transfer of ownership concept from the concept of promise (ahdi) and 
argued that the promise and transfer of ownership cannot co-exist in a contract. As a result, they 
declared the sale of non-existent/contingent (ma’dum) assets void from the perspective of transfer of 
ownership theory but valid from the viewpoint of promise theory (e.g., they argued whether the 
essence of labour/employment contract is in fact transfer of ownership (tamlik mana’fe) or promise 
(iltizam amal))- see Zayn al-A’bidin Shahid Thani ‘Masalik al-Afham’ (chap-e sangi, vol. 2, 1310 Hijri) p. 
256); b) in the next stage, they developed the promise theory and then incorporated the transfer of 
ownership concept into the promise theory (on the basis of categorising contracts into: consensual and 
promissory). Interestingly, one of the leading Shia jurists has argued that under the concept of transfer 
of ownership, the existence of the asset (as the subject of ownership) at the time of the execution of the 
contract is not necessary at all (e.g., as it is the case in the contract of salam i.e., commodity based spot 
payment /deferred delivery contract). In other words, he believes that the purpose of the transfer of 
ownership is not to deliver the sold asset at the time of the execution of the contract but to make it 
under the control of the transferee to take it legally in possession. Furthermore, he has pointed out that 
it is not necessary that the transferor to be in possession of the sold property/asset, at the time of the 
contract. For example, a worker is not in possession of the labour force he has not yet released to 
perform a requested work under an employment contract but he can however, make a promise in 
favour of his employer to transfer the benefits of his labour force for a specific period of time in the 
future. As per this interpretation by some Shia scholars, unlike the Sunni school, the sale of non-existent 
assets at the time of a contract can be a valid transaction under certain conditions - see Muhammad 
Kazim Tabatabaee (bi-khate Zayn al-A’bidin) ‘Hashiye bar Makasib’ (chap-e sangi, 1326 Lunar Hijri 
Calendar) pp. 25, 52, 58. It should be noted that as per this view by Kazim Tabataba’ee, in a contract, the 
transfer of ownership is considered a necessary consequence (effect) of the promise. Looking at the 
historical roots of promise theory, some may argue that the roots of the promise theory in Civil Law as it 
is understood today refers to the above mentioned promise theory introduced originally by the Shia 
school of thought (but with one big difference: the focus of the promise theory of the Shia school is on 
the positive aspects of promise i.e., claims/rights of the transferee unlike the Roman law where the 
focus is on the negative aspects of the promise i.e., debt/obligations of the transferor.     
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usufructs of the property, which is leased under an ijara contract. Some others27 have 
criticised the sale of non-existent assets (similar to the Hanbali, Shafiee, and Hanafi 
schools), however, they have argued for the sale of, for example, the fruits of trees - 
though they are contingent and not-yet-realised assets. Furthermore, following the 
transfer of ownership theory of the Sunni school, some Shia scholars have divided 
transactions/contracts (e.g., wills28) into two categories: promissory (ahdi) and transfer 
of ownership (tamliki). Some Shia scholars29 have criticised this approach and believe 
that this distinction is not a true idea according to the original thought of the Shia 
school in this regard (i.e., al-aqd al-ahd). They have, however, argued for another 
categorisation of the contracts: consensual (idhni) and promissory (ahdi). The former 
category contracts are dependent solely on the consent and permission of the owner 
or possessor of the asset and it is not binding on the parties (e.g., wadi’a30 and a’riya31) 
but the latter category contracts depend on the mutual promise/assent of the 
transferor and the transferee (e.g., bay’,32 ijara,33 and hiba34).35 As it has become clear, 
the adoption of the transfer of ownership theory may largely limit and affect the scope 
of contemporary Islamic business and financial transactions, while, in contrast, the 
application of promise theory may significantly expand the scope of Islamic business 
                                                   
27
 See Ashrafi ‘Sha’aeer al-Islam’ (chap-e sangi) p. 385. 
28
 According to Iran Civil Code article 825 “Wills (wasiyyat) are divided into two categories: promissory 
and transfer of ownership”.   
29
 See Muhammad Ja’far Jafari Langroodi ‘Maktabhaye Huquqi dar Huqug-e Islam’ (Tehran: Ganj-e 
Danesh, 3
rd
 edition) pp. 204-205. 
30
 Safe-keeping deposit  
31
 Use-free contract 
32




 Voluntary gift 
35
 Surprisingly, Iran Civil Code (which is dominated by the Shia school of thought) in articles 338, 466 
and 795 categorise these latter contracts i.e., bay, ijara, and hiba under the transfer of ownership 
(tamliki) contracts (similar to the Sunni school of thought) rather than promissory (ahdi) contracts.   
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and finance. Following the transfer of ownership theory, its advocates36 argue that a 
seller cannot transact on an asset until he takes it in his possession and owns it in the 
first place.37 As per these scholars, an object must be in existence in order to be 
capable of being transacted. However, it seems, to be transactionable, the cause of an 
asset has to be in existence at the time of the contract but not necessarily the asset 
itself. If the prospective asset is reasonably within the control of the transferor and 
seller at the time of the contract, and it is capable of being described sufficiently in 
terms of quantity and quality at the time of transaction, it is promissable to exchange 
or sell it.38 For example, in employment contracts and also in forward contracts, it is 
likely and reasonable that the employee and also the seller will be able to undertake 
work or acquire the object of sale respectively.39 In other words, the cause of these 
undertakings is in existence at the time of the transaction; the realisation of which are 
reasonably under the control of the employee or forward seller at the time of the 
contract; and they are capable of being described in terms of quantity and quality at 
the time of contract. However, the reasonableness condition might no longer exist in 
further transactions on (i.e., the assignments of) the previously exchanged prospective 
asset until after it rests and comes into existence under the first transaction. It is worth 
                                                   
36
 For example, as per Taqi Usmani, in a sale contract, the commodity has to be under the ownership 
of the seller (i.e., seller should have physical or constructive possession over the asset that is subject to 
sale) at the time of sale contract, because short selling in which a person sells an asset before he takes 
ownership of the asset is not permitted in Islamic law. He believes that forward sales are not permitted 
with the exception of salam and istisna contracts (these contracts will be dealt with in a great detail 
later). See Muhammad Taqi Usmani ‘An Introduction to Islamic Finance’ (Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2002) p. 148.  
37
 They refer largely to this hadith “do not sell an asset which is not with you” (la-tabi-maa-laysa-laka-
indak).  
38
 This shows how it can affect the business and financial transactions and consequently the circulation 
of wealth if there is a choice to select the promise theory or instead the transfer of ownership theory.           
39
 However, it should be noted that the obligee would be unable to resell or exchange the receivable 
asset until after it came into existence and was ready for full possession by the obligee.    
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noting that in cases where the prospective asset is a debt receivable40 (which it is often 
documented as one in a certificate e.g., a bond certificate) and the creditor wants to 
assign or sell it with an increase or a decrease, as happens nowadays in the bills of 
exchange or letters of credit, it is not allowed in Sharia.41 This ruling is in fact a logical 
consequence of the riba prohibition in Islam. The exchange or assignment of debt 
which only represents a monetary liquid asset is possible only if it is exchanged for the 
same amount of money at its par value. However, unlike the debt receivable, an equity 
receivable which is often documented in a certificate42 representing a proportionate 
share in the total assets of a collective scheme such as investment portfolio, fund, 
partnership, or company, can be traded free from the mentioned constraints. Neither 
is it problematic if the total assets of the collective scheme consist of both liquid 
(monetary) and illiquid (non-monetary) assets.43  
                                                   
40
 It does not matter whether the origin of debt is contract, or tort, or something else.   
41
 The Islamic Fiqh Academy of Jeddah, which is the largest representative body of the Sharia jurists 
from all the Muslim countries, has confirmed the prohibition of bay dayn unanimously without a single 
opponent. For more on bay dayn see Nasser Katouzian ‘Huquq Madani: Darshayi az Uqud Mu’ayyan’ 
(Tehran: Ganj-e Danesh Publication, vol. 1, 2008) p.80; Mohammad Reza Azizullahi ‘Qarardad-e Bay’-e 
Mutaqabil (in Qarardadhaye Tijari Beynal Milali eds’ (Qom: Zeitoon Publication, Fasl Nameye Elmi 
Takhassosi-ye Ulum Insani-Ijtima’ee, vol. 44. 1384 Solar Hijri Calendar) p.30. As per these Islamic 
scholars, it is certain to say that the sale of a debt receivable in exchange of new debt with extra cost 
and an extended period of time is riba and it is null and void.     
42
 Different names may be given to these certificates such as “share”, “unit”, “sukuk”, and any other 
similar name.  
43
 The threshold proportion of illiquid assets represented by the certificate or security (i.e., sukuk) for 
warranting the negotiability of the certificate has been hotly debated.  Some Islamic jurists argue that 
the ratio of illiquid assets has to be at least 51%, because they believe that if this ratio is less than 50%, 
then, all the assets have to be treated as liquid for the purposes of negotiability on the basis of the 
juristic rule, which submits that “the majority deserves to be treated as the whole of a thing”. Some 
other jurists argue for at least 33% ratio in this regard. And as per the Hanafi school of thought 
whenever the underlying asset is the combination of both illiquid and liquid assets, the certificate is 
negotiable regardless of the ratio of the liquid portion in the entire asset provided that the illiquid part 
of the underlying asset must be a considerable proportion, and the exchange value of the combination 
(i.e., the consideration, which has to be in return paid) must be more than (i.e., neither less nor equal 
to) the value of the liquid amount contained therein. For more in this regard see Muhammad Taqi 
Usmani ‘An Introduction to Islamic Finance’ (Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002) p.141.   
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Comparing to the theories of promise and the transfer of ownership in Islamic 
law, in common law, especially in the US and UK, the essence of contract is considered 
to be consideration or bargained-for promise and it is not possible to have a contract 
without consideration. On this basis, in a bilateral contract, the contract arises when 
the counter promise is given. As per Ashley, unlike the view of some other scholars, if 
this counter promise is not the consideration, but its performance is i.e., in a unilateral 
contract, then the contract arises before the promised performance i.e., before 
consideration is furnished. In other words, in either event, the contract comes into 
existence upon acceptrance of the offered promise and it is not delayed until 
performance/consideration is furnished.44 
 
3.3.2 Nominate Contracts (Uqud Mu’ayyan)  
The majority of Islamic Shia scholars (unlike the Sunni scholars whose majority 
argue for a close system in contracts) believe that the legitimate contractual forms in 
Islam are not limited to those specific contracts (uqud mu’ayyan) introduced in the 
early Islamic period,45 and new transactional forms can be made under the terms of 
                                                   
44
 See Clarence D Ashley ‘Doctrine of Consideration’ (Harvard Law Review, Vol. 26, Issue 5, 1912-1913) 
p. 430.  
45
 Some Western scholars think that the law of contracts in Islam is a closed system similar to that of 
Roman law where there is a list of specific contracts. See Nicholas H. D.  Foster ‘Islamic Perspectives on 
the Law of Business Organisations I: An Overview of the Classical Sharia and a Brief Comparison of the 
Sharia Regimes with Western-Style Law’ (European Business Organization Law Review, vol. 11, issue 1, 
2010) p.10. However, although this thought is also advocated by some other Islamic jurists, it seems to 
me that the law of contracts in Islam is open and there is a general law of contract in Islamic law (for 
supporting this claim see the discussions about the theory of “promise” and also the freedom of 
contract provided before, and also Iran Civil Code articles 10, 183-230).     
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sulh46 (compromise/settlement) facility if they are necessary to fulfill the necessary 
needs of humanity.47 For example, two or more of the Islamic specific contracts can be 
combined in order to create new contractual products. However, to conduct a 
legitimate hybridisation initiative, the combined concepts or tools must not have 
inherent conflicts and contradictions, and also the aim and final hybrid product must 
be legitimate and consistent with Sharia.48 In contrast, the Sunni school has limited the 
scope of sulh to the realm of settlement of disputes, and excludes the possibility of 
making any contract and transaction under the terms of sulh. The Sunni school, 
however, has eventually used a different basis to cover any new necessary transaction, 
with its own terms and conditions, according to the concept of nadhr49 (vow or 
oblation) instead of sulh. 
                                                   
46
 As per Iran Civil Code article 752 “sulh (settlement) can be made either in the case of the adjustment 
of an existing dispute, or for avoidance of a potential dispute in the case of a transaction and the like”. 
As per article 758 “any sulh whose result is equivalent of the content of a specific contract/transaction, 
will not be governed by the specific terms and conditions relating to that specific contract; but rather, 
the terms and conditions of sulh will be applied in this regard. Therefore, for instance, if the subject of 
sulh is a definite object given in return for a consideration, its results will be equivalent to a sale, but the 
special conditions and rules appertaining to the sale will not be applied”. For the legitimacy and the 
importance of sulh in the Hadith literature and also for some other supporting evidence in this regard 
see Abi al-Hasan Ali bin Khalil Turablisi ‘Mu’een al-Ahkaam’ p. 153; Muhammad Jafar Jafari Langroodi 
‘Huquq Madani: Sulh wa Rahn’ (Ibn Sina, vol. 1, 1
st
 edition) pp. 139-140.        
47
 That is why sulh is called the father of contracts (sayyed al-uqud) and the father of rules (sayyed al-
ahkaam) in the Islamic Shia School of thought.  
48
 As per Thomas, the majority of Islamic schools of thought do not allow combining contracts. See 
Abdulkader Thomas ‘Methods of Islamic Home Finance in the United States- beneficial breakthroughs’ 
(The American Journal of Islamic Finance, 2001) p.2. For example, as per Thomas, it is not allowed to 
integrate a lease contract into a contract of sale.   
49
 To see the concept of nadhr in the Quran see (2:270): “Surely Allah knows … whatever vow you may 
have made, and the wrong-doers shall have no helpers”. It is the concept of “nadhr tabarrur” that has 
been used by the Sunni school of thought to justify the legitimacy of any necessary new transaction. 
Nadhr tabarrur means making a vow voluntarily without the expectation of any award in return from 
Allah (God). If it is made for the expectation of an award from Allah (God), it is called “nadhr mujazaat”. 
It seems nadhr cannot be a proper basis for the mentioned purpose because nadhr is made unilaterally 
while a transaction/contract is a kind of mutual arrangement and requires at least two wills to conclude. 
See Muhammad Jafar Jafari Langroodi ‘Huquq Madani: Sulh wa Rahn’ (Ibn Sina, vol. 1, 1
st
 edition) p. 145; 
and Allameh Hilli ‘Tadhkirat al-Fuqahaa’ (chap-e sangi-ye marghub) p. 758.   
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3.3.3 Form versus Substance 
The last general point about transactions is the issue of form versus substance. It 
is not enough that the mere form of a transaction (any product or institution) is within 
the framework of Sharia. To be valid, the substance of the instrument or institution 
also has to be in accordance with the rules and objectives of Sharia50. In other words, 
the consequential outcome of a transaction as well as its structural form must meet 
the rules and objectives of Sharia. A for-profit transaction must include, at least 
partially, a non-monetary asset,51 and the function and also the aim of the institution 
must match the objectives of Sharia.52 Two different transactions may have similar 
substance (i.e., the consequential outcome) but one may be considered valid and the 
other invalid. This is because the instrumentality or form which is used to achieve a 
legitimate outcome must also be legitimate from the viewpoint of Sharia. For example, 
an installment contract to sell goods is allowed, but one to sell money or credit is not 
permissible. Both transactions are very similar in substance to a loan but they are in 
                                                   
50
 In other words, substance is determined by the Maqasid al-Sharia. 
51
 The reason for this is that a (for-profit) financial transaction involving monetary assets in both sides 
of the exchange is not a valid sale contract but it is riba.  For supporting evidence in this regard see the 
Quran (2:275): “they said that sale is like riba; but, they do not understand that (they are different and), 
God has allowed the sale but prohibited riba”.   
52
 As per the Quran (2:177) “true piety does not consist in turning your faces towards the east or the 
west ... but truly pious is he who believes in God, and the Last Day, and the angels, and revelation, and 
the prophets, and spends his wealth - however much he himself may cherish it- upon his near of kin, and 
the orphans, and the needy, and the wayfarer, and the beggars, and for the freeing of human beings 
from bondage … and renders the purifying dues; and truly pious are they who keep their promises 
whenever they promise”. Piety (birr/taqwa) is that obedience to God which is well established in the 
heart, or as the sum of acts of obedience and devotion conducting one closer to God, as similar to such 
acts when one speaks of filial piety.  
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distinct forms.53 As another example, consider a prospective buyer who wants to buy a 
house. Owning the house is considered the outcome or substance of the transaction 
and how to achieve this outcome is considered to be the form or instrumentality of the 
transaction. The conventional way for the prospective buyer to buy the house is to get 
a loan from a bank and repay the loan with additional interest. Obviously, the loan 
transaction, which is a for-profit financial transaction and involves monetary assets in 
both sides of it (getting the loan in return for repaying the loan with some additions) is 
riba and prohibited according to Sharia. In other words, though the 
substance/outcome of the transaction i.e., owning the house is legitimate, the 
form/instrumentality i.e., loan structure used to achieve the outcome is illegitimate. A 
true Islamic way to achieve the same outcome/substance would be by way of using 
murabaha (cost-plus sale) facility, which is a type of sale contract. According to the 
murabaha structure, a financier buys the house from the seller and then resells it to 
the prospective buyer in installments with some profit. In this example, the 
form/instrumentality that is used to achieve the aim is a legitimate murabaha 
structure. This structure involves the exchange of a non-monetary asset (house) with a 
monetary asset (installment payments) and hence it is not considered to be riba from a 
Sharia viewpoint.54  
                                                   
53
 See Abdulkader Thomas ‘Methods of Islamic Home Finance in the United States- beneficial 
breakthroughs’ (The American Journal of Islamic Finance, 2001) p. 2. 
However, it should be noted that the contemporary murabaha, in the case of a mortgage, functions 
like a conventional secured loan. Worse is that the contemporary murabahas in the case of a mortgage 
are not, not only true Islamic murabahas (i.e., types of sales contracts), they are often more expensive 
as they impose further costs from the extra administrative expenses, and usually have less legal 
protections than the conventional mortgages. See Caner K. Dagli ‘Islamic Law, Shariah-based Finance, 
and Economics’ (College of the Holy Cross, Pre-publication draft) pp. 12-13.  
54
 Some scholars argue that the murabaha structure, if examined very carefully, is in essence 
functionally equivalent to modern mortgage structures, involving almost identical allocations of risk and 
capital. See Caner K. Dagli ‘Islamic Law, Shariah-based Finance, and Economics’ (College of the Holy 
Cross, Pre-publication draft) pp. 9-10.  
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A very recently developed financial trick in the modern Sharia-compliant banking 
and finance industry is the “Sharia conversion” technique. According to this trick, a 
two-tier deal arrangement is made between the Islamic financial institution and the 
Islamic investor: the outer level arrangement which is a Sharia compliant transaction 
and the inner level arrangement which is usually not Sharia compliant investment. The 
Islamic financial institution buys the commodity (which normally has been acquired 
immediately before by the Islamic investor from the market) from the Islamic investor 
on a deferred payment basis with a mark-up which is usually benchmarked to the 
prevalent rate of interest in the monetary market and then the bank immediately sells 
the exact same commodity in the market to use the acquired cash in its intended 
profit-making investments. Simultaneously, the Islamic bank makes a promise (wa’d) 
to the Islamic investor to swap the returns of the investor from the outer level 
transaction (i.e., the mark-up) with the returns arising out of the inner level 
transaction/investment, which is not necessarily Sharia compliant.55 The reason for the 
promise to swap is that there is a strong presumption that the non-Sharia compliant 
inner level investment will outperform the Sharia compliant outer level transaction.56 
It is obvious that the Sharia conversion technique is a trick to circumvent the 
application of Sharia rules and objectives as to the substance of the transaction. As 
said before, to be Islamic, the given transaction not only has to fall within the 
                                                   
55
 For example, the bank may invest the money in buying bonds which are not Sharia compliant.     
56
 For more in this regard see Yusuf Talal DeLorenzo ‘The Total Returns Swap and the Sharia 




requirements of Sharia in its structural form, but also in its substantive outcome.57 In 
the case of any conflict, the substance requirement prevails over the form. The reason 
is simple: purpose matters more than form.           
According to Dagli, it is not true to say that there could not be “substance-over-
form” successful practices, which comply with both the spirit/substance and 
letter/form of Sharia. For example, there could be mutual savings schemes58 running in 
accordance with both the spirit and letter of Sharia where the profits belong to the 
depositors and also mutual insurance plans in which the participants have no 
incentives for earning interest. 
                                                   
57
 As per Asutay, an important part of the social failure of contemporary Islamic banking and financial 
institutions is ignoring the “substance” and instead giving priority to the “form”. As per him, in the form-
oriented approach the focus is made on the structure of a product, while the emphasis of substance is 
on the consequences and outcome of the product. To support his argument, he refers to Ibn Qayyim’s 
opinion stated centuries ago, when he warned of the detrimental harm of alternative riba-free products 
if the true substantive and moral objectives were overlooked in the alternative products. See Mehmet 
Asutay ‘Conceptualising and Locating the Social Failure of Islamic Finance: Aspirations of Islamic Moral 
Economy vs. the Realities of Islamic Finance’ (Asian and African Area Studies, vol. 11, issue 2, 2012) pp. 
107-108  
58
 The very purpose of the mutual savings scheme is to make conservative investments. Seeking 
greater returns is only subject to taking greater risk, which is essentially in contradiction of the very 
purpose of the mutual savings scheme in the first place. It was perverse incentives for making greater 
interest and profits which, to a large extent, drove the financial institutions as well as markets to 
collapse in 2008. See Caner K. Dagli ‘Islamic Law, Shariah-based Finance, and Economics’ (College of the 







Part Two of the Second Tier of 
the Model (2): For-Profit 






The economic needs of humanity, whether they are for the supply of or demand 
for assets, have to be fulfilled insofar as they are reasonable and legitimate and 
contribute to achieving social justice.  
Economic rights are essential to the maintenance of basic human and civil rights. 
They are recognised by economic rights conventions such as the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). As per khan1, the first 
thought of economic rights in global thinking context was give by President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt. He considered economic rights to be as the “freedom from want”: “[t]he 
right to a useful remunerative job... [t]he right to earn enough to provide adequate 
food and clothing and recreation... [t]he right of every family to a decent home... [t]he 
right to adequate medical care... [t]he right to adequate protection from the economic 
fears of old age, sickness, accident, and unemployment; [and] the right to a good 
education.”2 The ICESCR developed these ideas to include “economic self-
determination”, “favorable working conditions”, and the “right to a trade union”.3  
A need is not recognised based only on its apparent current need in the society 
unless it meets social justice criteria.4 On the basis of this view, as long as the current 
customary practices do not violate the implications of social justice they will be 
recognised and enforced by the economic system.  
                                                   
1
 See Zeshan Khan ‘International Economic Rights’ (Gonzaga Journal of International Law, Vol. 4) pp. 2 
and 4-5. 
2
 See Eleventh Annual Message to Congress (Jan. 11, 1944) in 3 The State Of The Union Messages Of 
The Presidents, 1790-1966, 2875, 2881 (Fred L. Israel ed., 1966)  
3
 See ICESCR, Jan. 3, 1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. See also G. A. Res. 2200, UN GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, 
at 49, UN Doc. A/6316 (1976) (UN Resolution adopting the Covenant); also see Articles 7 and 8.  
4
 For a similar approach taken by the great Islamic scholar al-Ghazali in this regard see (cited by) Murat 
Cizakca ‘Islamic Capitalism and Finance: Origins, Evolution, and the Future’ (Edward Elgar: Studies in 
Islamic Finance, Accounting, and Governance, 2011) p. 277.    
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A given supply of or demand for an asset may be made either for profit, to be 
profit-free or for a philanthropic purpose, regardless of whether it is supplied or 
demanded by individuals, businesses, not-for-profit organisations, state-run entities or 
governments. In order to offer products and services to fulfil needs, the major issue is 
whether or not and to what extent the offered product or service reflects the balance 
of interests and risk among the different participants and also reflects the themes of 
ethical investment, benevolence, fairness, and social justice.5  
This chapter deals with the different facilities and techniques to cater for the 
recognised profit-making purposes in their different manifestations, to be followed by 









                                                   
5
 The major facilities and their main characteristics will be covered in this thesis; however, explaining 
all the varieties of products and services is beyond the confines of the thesis.  
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4.2 Products and Collective Schemes 
Inspired by Islamic business and financial law, the following are the main legal 
products and facilities to respond to the necessary and legitimate needs in different 
circumstances for basic profit-making purposes.6  
4.2.1 Sale (Bay) 
Bay7 is an agreement between two parties whereby one of the parties transfers 
the ownership of some specified assets in return for a known consideration by the 
other party. Essential elements to a valid sale contract in Sharia are: mutual assent 
that has been verbalized between the parties; an asset (the object of the sale); and an 
offer and an acceptance. The essential ‘external’ conditions to a valid sale contract in 
Sharia are: adulthood, sanity and discernment of the parties; correlation between the 
offer and acceptance and immediate agreement; unity of the contract session; the 
asset should be owned by the seller, be saleable, and also deliverable; and the price8 
as well as the asset should be clearly described. A bay contract may be used for trade 
and exchange purposes.  
                                                   
6
 It should be noted that some of the following products may also be used in a not-for-profit context. 
Although this is the case, they are often used in a profit-making context. That is why they are dealt with 
in this part.   
7
 See Iran Civil Code articles 338-395.  
8
 The price must be certain and known to both parties. Any price which is not fixed or is linked to an 
uncertain event would render the bay contract void.  
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4.2.2 Exchange of Gold and Silver (Sarf) 
Sarf (exchange of gold and silver) is a type of bay contract for buying and selling 
gold or silver assets whether they are coined or not coined.9 The opinions of Islamic 
scholars are divided as to whether this facility can be used for the exchange of foreign 
currencies with each other and also the exchange of gold or silver with a currency 
(especially if the value of the currency is not linked to gold or silver). To be a valid sarf 
contract, most Islamic scholars10 (in contrast to a minority group of scholars11) believe 
that the delivery of the subject matter of a sarf contract must happen at the time of 
the sarf contract; otherwise it would be null and void.    
4.2.3 Forward Contract (Salam) 
Salam (forward) is another type of bay (sale) contract according to Sharia. Salam 
is in fact a prepaid forward contract that was initially practised prior to the advent of 
Islam for the sale of agricultural crops. This contract was recognised and legitimised by 
the Prophet Muhammad subject to minimal regulation ordering that the buyer and 
seller have to specify the sale asset, delivery time and price in each case as precisely as 
possible. This facility may be used to finance agriculture, livestock, and production 
activities. 
                                                   
9
 See Abulqasim Najm al-Din Jafar bin Hasan Hilli a.k.a. Muhaqqeq Hilli ‘Sharaye al-Ahkam: Kitab al-
Matajir-Bay’ (chap-e sangi, Ofset Kitabchi); Shahid Thani ‘Sharh Lum’a’ (vol. 2) p.374; and Shahid Thani 
‘Masalik al-Afham: Sharh bar Sharaye Muhaqqiq’ (vol.1/2), p. 201.  
10
 See Hasan Imami ‘Huquq Madani’ (Tehran: Islamiyya, vol. 1, 4
th
 edition, 1352 Solar Hijri Calendar) 
p.447 and also Muhammad Ja’far Ja’fari Langhroudi ‘Da’eerat al-Ma’arif Huquq’ (vol.1) p.574.   
11
 See Nasser Katouzian’Huquq Madani: Uqud Mu’ayyan’ (Tehran: Sahami Intishar, vol.1, 10
th
 Edition) 
pp. 162-163. Katouzian argues for the validity of a sarf mu’ajjal contract in which a specific time in the 
future may be agreed for the delivery of the subject matter (gold or silver) of the contract. However, in 
this case he believes that the transfer of ownership will happen at the time of delivery and not the time 
of the sarf contract. For this reasoning, he invokes the Iran Civil Code article 364.  
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4.2.4 Sale-with-Repurchase-Option (Bay Shart)  
Bay shart or bay wafa (sale-with-a-repurchase-option) is another type of bay 
contract in which the transacting parties stipulate that should ever the seller, within a 
specified period, give back to the purchaser the whole of the equivalent of the 
consideration, the seller may exercise his option of cancelling the transaction in regard 
to the whole of the asset. Similarly, they may stipulate that if ever the seller gives back 
a portion of the equivalent of the consideration, the seller may also exercise the option 
of cancelling the transaction in regard to all or part of the asset. In any case, the scope 
of the option depends on the mutual agreement of the parties and if there is no special 
mention of whether the whole or whether a part of the consideration has to be 
returned, the option will not be effected unless the whole of the equivalent of the 
price is returned.12 In bay al-shart, upon the execution of the contract, the purchaser 
obtains the ownership of the asset. All the benefits pertaining to or arising out of the 
asset (up until the exercise of the option by the seller) belong to the purchaser and he 
may lease it out and earn income (rental fees) up until the exercise of the repurchase-
option by the seller.13 This facility may be used for liquidity purposes.   
4.2.5 Deferred Payment Sale (Bay Nasiya) 
Bay nasiya14 is another type of bay contract in which the payment of the sale 
price is deferred but the delivery of the asset is immediate. This type of sale contract is 
                                                   
12
 See Iran Civil Code article 458. See also Nasser Katouzian ‘Qanun Madani dar Nazm Huquq Kununi-
ye Iran’ (Tehran: Mizan publication, 18
th
 edition, 1387 Solar Hijri Calendar) pp. 334-336, articles 458-463.       
13
 See Iran Civil Code article 500.  
14
 This is also called bay bi-thaman mu’ajjal.  
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different from murabaha (cost plus mark-up sale) contract. In the latter, the original 
cost of the asset has to be disclosed to the buyer upon the execution of the contract.15   
4.2.6 Cost plus Mark-up Sale (Murabaha) 
Murabaha is also another type of bay contract whereby a vendor resells an 
asset16 to the purchaser with a mutually agreed addition (also called mark-up)17 to the 
original cost paid to a third party supplier to acquire the asset in the first place. The 
mark-up may be either in a form of a percentage of the original cost of the asset or a 
lump sum amount.18 The original cost of the asset must be precisely disclosed to the 
purchaser before the execution of the murabaha contract. That is why bargaining over 
the original cost of the asset in a murabaha contract is not allowed. The vendor may 
resell the asset for immediate cash19 or on a deferred payment basis20 i.e., on a credit 
basis. In the latter case, the vendor may ask for some assurance from the purchaser for 
the payment of the purchase price. Murabaha may be used in financing the acquisition 
of necessary goods whether it is for essential consumption needs or for construction 
and production purposes. It may also be used for microfinance purposes. The latest 
                                                   
15
 See Zamir Iqbal and Abbas Mirakhor ‘An Introduction to Islamic Finance: Theory and Practice’ 
(Wiley, 2
nd
 edition, 2011) p. 91.  
16
 The asset (object) must have been acquired by the vendor from a party other than the purchaser.  
17
 Taqi Usmani has issued a fatwa that this mark-up can be benchmarked to a conventional interest 
rate. See Mahmoud A. El-Gamal ‘Islamic Finance: Law, Economics and Practice’ (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007, reprint) p.67. El-Gamal, however, does not mention a valid source of this 
fatwa/ruling by Taqi Usmani. This should be of concern because when it comes to sukuk, Taqi Usmani 
has clearly rejected the benchmarking of the expected rate of return to the prevalent rate of interest.  
18
 For a similar definition see Adnan Bulent Baloglu ‘Law of Sales in the Works of Marwazi, Quduri, and 
Sarakhsi’ (University of Manchester PhD Thesis, 1991) pp.78, 83, 86. Baloglu argues that, as per Qudri 
who bases his reasoning on the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad, especially the issue of gharar in 
Sharia, the vendor is not permitted to resell the moveable object (unlike the immoveable object which is 
permitted as per both Abu Hanifa and Abu Yusuf due to the much lower risk of loss of the immovable 
object) to the new purchaser prior to the complete possession (whether it be actual or constructive 
possession) of the object bought from the third party supplier. 
19
 Thaman hall   
20
 Thaman mu’ajjal 
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developed derivative of murabaha is commodity murabaha or organised tawarruq, 
which has been justly criticised by the Mecca Fiqh Academy. Commodity murabaha is 
grounded on commodities which are traded on the London Metal Exchange (LME).21 As 
per this type of murabaha, party A, who is facing a liquidity concern approaches party 
B, who furnishes a commodity on spot price and sells the commodity to party A with a 
mark-up on a deferred payment basis. Thereafter, party A sells the purchased 
commodity to a third party, or possibly back to party B, on a cash basis in order to 
acquire the needed liquidity. It is due to the first part of the transaction that it is called 
commodity murabaha and it is for the second part of the transaction that it is labelled 
organised murabaha. As can be seen, both these concepts are combined in the same 
transaction.22 Although tawarruq masquerades as a sale contract, it is in fact a loan 
contract benchmarked to the prevalent market interest rate.23 The Fiqh Academy of 
the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in Jeddah ruled tawarruq illegitimate 
in its session in December 2003 as it stands, in its current use in the modern Islamic 
finance industry.24 Following the form versus substance rule discussed earlier, the 
purpose of the organised tawarruq is the same as a loan with interest and hence it has 
to be treated as an illegitimate transaction. As said before, purpose or substance 
matters more than form.    
                                                   
21
 In Malaysia, the underlying commodity which is used as the basis of commodity murabaha is crude 
palm oil. The commodity murabaha in Malaysia gained the official endorsement of the Sharia Advisory 
Council of the Central Bank of Malaysia on 28 July 2005. See Asyraf Wajdi Dato Dusuki ‘Islamic Finance: 
An Old Skeleton in a Modern Dress’ (Kuala Lumpur: ISRA/INCEIF, 2008) p. 228.   
22
 For the definition and applications of organised (munazzam) tawarruq see AAOIFI Sharia Standard 
No. 30.         
23
 See Murat Cizakca ‘Islamic Capitalism and Finance: Origins, Evolution, and the Future’ (Edward Elgar: 
Studies in Islamic Finance, Accounting, and Governance, 2011) p. 242. 
24
 For details in this regard see Mahmoud A. El-Gamal ‘Islamic Finance: Law, Economics and Practice’ 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, reprint) p. 72.    
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4.2.7 Sale-Repurchase of the Same Asset (Bay Ina) 
Bay ina is another type of bay contract in which the same commodity is sold to a 
customer on a credit price and bought back from the customer in cash at a price lower 
than its credit price in order to finance the customer. Clearly, such a sale contract 
disguises riba and if it does not violate the ‘letter’ of Sharia, it likely violates the ‘spirit’ 
of Sharia. This was explained before, in case of conflict the ‘purpose’ or ‘substance’ of 
the transaction prevails over the ‘form’ of the transaction.25  
4.2.8 Construction Finance (Istisna)  
Istisna is a purchase order contract of goods whereby a purchaser places an 
order to buy goods that will be manufactured and delivered in the future, that is to 
say, a purchaser will ask a manufacturer to construct and deliver the goods that will be 
made in the future in accordance with the specifications agreed in the purchase order. 
The parties to the contract will mutually agree on the purchase price as they intend 
and the payment of price can be delayed or arranged according to the schedule of the 
work progress. This facility may be used in construction and project finance.26 
4.2.9 Purchase Option (Bay Urbun) 
Bay urbun27 is a purchase option whereby a person who wants to purchase a 
commodity in the future, will pay part of the known price at the inception of the 
contract and the remaining at the time of settlement when he purchases the agreed 
asset. If he fails to purchase the asset, the prepayment will be forfeited. It is said that 
                                                   
25
 For a similar argument see Bank Negara Malaysia ‘Shari’ah Parameter Reference 1”, p. 1.  
26
 See International Organisation of Securities Commission (IOSCO) ‘Analysis of the Application 
of IOSCO's Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation for Islamic Securities Products’ (2008) p. 35. 
27
 Urbun means a deposit that is considered to constitute partial payment of the price of goods or 
services paid in advance and it will be retained by the seller in the event that the transaction is cancelled 
by the buyer. For legal purposes, the confiscated money is considered a hiba.  
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Imam Ali permitted this kind of transaction. In modern terminology, this is similar to 
the concept of the call option.  
4.2.10 Exchange (Mua’wada) 
Mua’wada28 (barter) is a transaction whereby the parties to the transaction 
trade one asset for another without being subject to the requirements of a bay 
contract.29 In a mua’wada contract, one or both of the assets subject to exchange may 
be tangible or intangible, e.g., benefits, usufructs, services or any other type of 
financial right. Mua’wada may be used in the provision of basic essentials or urgent 
needs. This facility may also be used in the redistribution of surplus assets to balance 
the supply and demand in the economy.    
4.2.11 Leasing (Ijara) 
Ijara30 is an aqd (contract) whereby a lessor (an owner or possessor) leases out a 
property or equipment to a lessee at an agreed rental fee31 (subject to an immediate 
payment or an agreed payment schedule in instalments) for a specified period. The 
ownership of the leased property or equipment remains with the lessor. The lessor will 
have to bear all the risks associated with the ownership of these assets. On the other 
hand, the lessee will be considered as the owner of the usufructs and profits arising 
out of the leased assets and may re-lease the property to another lessee because the 
lessee holds an interest in the leasehold that entitles him to exclusive possession of 
                                                   
28
 See Iran Civil Code articles 464-465. 
29
 Mua’wada means to exchange goods or services without the exchange of money.  
30
 See Iran Civil Code articles 466-517. For more detail see Nasser Katouzian ‘Qanun Madani dar Nazm 
Huquq Kununi-ye Iran’ (Tehran: Mizan publication, 18th Edition, 1387 Solar Hijri Calendar) pp. 337-382, 
articles 466- 517.        
31




the leased property. Only the assets or equipment whose existence would not usually 
disappear as a result of using or benefiting from them could be subject to an ijara 
contract. To be a valid ijara, the lessor must deliver the leased property, which is 
capable of being used properly, to the lessee at the beginning of the ijara period. The 
lessor may ask for any proper security from the lessee for the payment of rental fees. 
However, the lessee is not liable for any losses or destruction of the leased property 
unless it has resulted from the lessee’s actions. The important applications of ijara are 
in its use in housing, transportation and project finance, e.g., the provision of supplies 
and equipment for the performance of economic and investment projects. This facility 
may also be used for microfinance purposes. 
4.2.12 Leasing-with-Purchase-Option (Ijara wa Iqtina)   
Ijara wa iqtina32 is a type of ijara (leasing) contract that allows for the transfer of 
the ownership of the leased property to the lessee at the end of the leasing period. It 
begins with the operation of an ijara contract for the purpose of leasing the lessor’s 
property to the lessee. Parties stipulate in the ijara contract that the lessee, at the end 
of the lease period, has an option to buy/retain the leased property at an agreed price 
from the lessor in compliance with the requirements of execution of a sale contract. 
This facility may be used for the acquisition of necessary equipment and properties, 
e.g., house purchase finance. This facility may also be used for microfinance purposes.  
                                                   
32
 Also called ijara thumma bay/ijara bi-shart tamlik/ /ijara muntahi bi-tamlik. 
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4.2.13 Reward Contract (Ji’ala)  
Ji’ala33 is a unilateral contract which is defined as the promise of a person (ja’eel) 
to pay a known recompense (jo’l), in return for performance (e.g., searching for a lost 
asset) by the other party (a’mil), whether the other party is specified by the ja’eel or 
not. The recompense may be a fixed amount of value or a portion of the result of 
performance (such as from the discovery of a new oil field) or a percentage of its total 
market value. Ji’ala is a permissive contract in that up until the requested act being 
completed, either of the parties can withdraw; but if the ja’eel withdraws during the 
course of the act of ji’ala, he has to pay the a’mil reasonable compensation for his acts 
and efforts. The a’mil will become entitled to the reward when he has performed his 
part of the contract. The subject matter of ji’ala must be capable of being owned and it 
must also embody some reasonable and legitimate advantage, otherwise a ji’ala 
contract would be null and void. This facility may be used in financing the exploration 
of minerals, for exploration and discovery activities or for innovation and R&D finance. 
This facility may also be used for microfinance purposes.     
 
4.2.14 Partnership (Musharaka) 
Musharaka is a kind of joint venture scheme. In the early Islamic period, there 
were two different types of participatory arrangements: sharkat inan34 and sharkat 
                                                   
33
 See Iran Civil Code articles 561-570. Also, see Hasan Imami ‘Huquq Madani’ (Tehran: Islamiyya, 4
th
 
edition, 1352 Solar Hijri Calendar) p.123. Furthermore, see Mustafa Adl “Huquq Madani’ (Qazwin: Bahr 
al-Ulum, 1
st
 edition, 1373 Solar Hijri Calendar) p. 300.      
34
 It was called a capital providers’ partnership: an active partnership. The nearest definition for 
sharkat inan in modern terminology is partnership.  
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mudaraba35. Sharkat inan36 is a partnership arrangement between two partners or 
more to finance and run a business venture whereby all participants contribute capital 
either in the form of cash or in kind. According to the traditional understanding, any 
profits derived from the venture will be distributed based on a pre-agreed ratio, and 
losses are distributed according to the proportionate contribution of the partners to 
the sharkat inan.37 As to sharkat mudaraba,38 it is a type of musharaka (partnership) 
contract which is made between two parties to finance a business venture.39 The 
parties are a rabb al-mal or an investor who provides all the necessary capital40 and a 
mudarib or an entrepreneur who manages or provides the necessary labour and 
expertise for the project or business venture. The entrepreneur is not required to 
provide security or collateral but all the initial seed assets within the scope and time of 
the mudaraba agreement remain under the ownership of the rabb al-mal 
(financier/investor). If the venture is profitable, as per the traditional understanding, 
                                                   
35
 It was called a capital & labour providers’ partnership: a passive partnership. It was also called qirad.  
The nearest modern concept for mudaraba is entrepreneurship joint venture or venture capital. Some 
Islamic scholars wrongly believe that the nearest modern concept for mudaraba is shareholder 
company.  See A. L. M. Abdul Gafoor ‘Interest, Usury, Riba and the Operational Costs of a Bank’ (A.S. 
Noordeen, 2005) pp 51-52.  
36
 See Iran Civil Code articles 571- 606. For detail see Nasser Katouzian ‘Qanun Madani dar Nazm 
Huquq Kununi-ye Iran’ (Tehran: Mizan publication, 18
th
 edition, 1387 Solar Hijri Calendar) pp. 401-413.        
37
 In case of any dispute as to the rate of distribution (even if it is mutually pre-agreed), the profit ratio 
is determined on an equity basis, i.e., according to the proportionate contribution of the participants to 
the partnership. As per some Islamic scholars, any profit derived from the venture will (always) be 
distributed based on a pre-agreed profit sharing ratio, but the resulting loss will be shared on the basis 
of equal participation. For this see A. L. M. Abdul Gafoor ‘Interest, Usury, Riba and the Operational Costs 
of a Bank’ (A.S. Noordeen, 2005) PP 51-52.   
38
 See Iran Civil Code articles 546-560. 
39
 As per Islamic law and as it is reflected in Iran Civil Code articles 546-560, mudaraba is for trade 
purposes. However, it seems to me that the meaning of trade in this context is quite general and it 
includes investment activities as well. So, mudaraba could be used in both trade and investment 
contexts.   
40
 It is believed that the provided capital must be a liquid asset, i.e., cash. For supporting evidence in 
this regard, see Iran Civil Code article 547. However, in line with the theory in this thesis, the 
contribution may be in any tangible (hardware).   
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the profits will be distributed based on a pre-agreed ratio.41 In the event of an 
unsuccessful business venture, the loss will be shouldered and absorbed entirely and 
exclusively by the provider of the capital (barring misconduct or negligence of the 
entrepreneur). The loss to the entrepreneur is that he earns nothing. As can be seen, 
in sharkat inan and sharkat mudaraba, similar to partnership and entrepreneurship 
joint ventures in modern terminology, the participants/investors share in the profit 
and loss. This is in contrast to the borrowing and lending technique (as it is practised in 
the present-day banking and finance world) where, irrespective of the results of 
investment or trade, lenders receive absolute interest incomes from borrowers. 
Sharkat inan and sharkat mudaraba are generally applied to investment, trade, and 
project financing whether on a large, medium or small (i.e., microfinance business) 
scale.42      
In brief, in any economy, collective profit-making activities may occur either 
actively (where numerous investors pool their own hardware/tangible assets and 
software/intangible assets in an enterprise, manage it and utilise the fruits of their 
own contributions) or passively (where an investor or numerous investors provide 
their hardware/tangible contributions to an entrepreneur and receive a contingent 
return, but take no further part in the conduct of business). In general, a passive asset 
holder may have three investment options: a) purchase shares in a 
                                                   
41
 For more in this regard see Undovitch, Abraham ‘Partnership and Profit in Medieval Islam 
(Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1970) p. 170. As per the research theory, as with musharaka, in 
case of any dispute as to the distribution of profit (even if the rate of profit is mutually pre-agreed), the 
distribution is determined on an equity basis, i.e., it has to be determined according to the 
proportionate contribution of the parties.   
42
 One of proposed applications of a mudaraba contract is to cater to small capital-owners who would 
otherwise go through the bank deposits or bonds, by the introduction of a unit-trust/unit-share type of 
investment through the operation of investment companies and investment banks. This investment 
company or investment bank will finance businesses that are currently financed by bank loans. See A. L. 




company/partnership and receive a dividend; b) purchase securities such as bonds and 
receive interest; c) deposit in a bank account and receive interest. In Islamic setting, 
the first passive investment option is permitted while the other two techniques are 
considered as riba (interest) income and therefore forbidden. On the other side, an 
entrepreneur may finance his venture by using his own assets or selling shares in his 
business venture but not receiving loan at interest from a financial institution or by 
issuing debt securities such as bonds.43     
There are different types of musharaka (partnerships).44 In an Islamic setting, 
holders of diverse factors of production, i.e., labour, entrepreneurship, capital, 
material, and the like may set up a partnership45 on a fixed or flexible term through 
which to finance a business venture, thereby transacting with third parties as well as 
among themselves without recourse to riba.46 The contribution of members of a 
                                                   
43
 See A. L. M. Abdul Gafoor ‘Mudaraba-based Investment and Finance’ (New Horizon, Journal of the 
Institute of Islamic Banking & Insurance, 2001). 
44
 In contemporary practice, from one perspective, there are three types of musharaka: a) permanent 
musharaka in which a partner’s interest is an ongoing equity and it is entitled to enjoy its share of the 
profits as long as the partnership or joint venture continues to exist; b) diminishing musharaka in which 
a partner’s equity share is reduced over time as the other partner buys out that partner’s share; c) 
temporary musharaka in which a partner provides required working capital of a project for a specified 
period and receives its share of profit and its principal capital at the end of the project. In this regard 
consult www.practicallaw.com   
45
 As per Foster, musharakas can be used widely to include all forms of participatory schemes, for 
many of which the modern law partnership as practised in the West would not be suitable. See Nicholas 
H. D.  Foster ‘Islamic Perspectives on the Law of Business Organisations I: An Overview of the Classical 
Sharia and a Brief Comparison of the Sharia Regimes with Western-Style Law’ (European Business 
Organization Law Review, vol. 11, issue 1, 2010) p. 14.  
46
 Through the establishment of a partnership, an entrepreneur (or a labour provider) shares in the 
benefits of the capital contribution of the other partner without becoming involved in a usurious 
relationship. That is why the establishment of a partnership is a very effective way to substitute interest 
(riba) in many transactions. 
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partnership may either be in the form of software/intangible assets47 (e.g. labour, 
entrepreneurship, know-how, and reputation) or hardware/tangible ones (e.g., capital 
and materials) or a mix of both. The ownership of the contributions to the partnership 
will not belong to the partnership as a separate legal entity but to the partners in 
proportion to their contributions jointly and in an undivided manner. Each partner will 
remain the owner of his contribution (if distinguishable) or the owner of the total input 
                                                   
47
 A commonly heard criticism of the contribution of intangible/software is whether it is acceptable, 
from the viewpoint of Sharia, to consider these intangibles as contributions in partnerships and if they 
are so, how then can their value be measured. The answer depends on the definition of “maal” (asset) in 
Sharia. Some Islamic scholars in particular in the Shia school of thought argue that the intangibles are 
not considered “maal” until after they are released or realised. However, it is worth mentioning here 
that some Islamic scholars believe that the labour of a partner may be considered as his contribution to 
the partnership. This approach may also be supported by the implications of Iran Civil Code article 546 
concerning mudaraba, in particular concerning the contribution of mudarib. See Nasser Katouzian 
‘Huquq Madani: Uqud Mu’ayyan’ (Tehran: Sahami Intishar, vol.5, no.14). For example, some scholars 
believe that the labour of a worker is not maal until after it is released and proved by external effects. 
The expertise, skills, and know-how of an entrepreneur are not maal until after they are actually 
realised. However, it is fair to say that intangibles, in the same way as tangibles, can be considered maal 
and can be considered contributions in partnerships. What is important in partnerships is the 
performance and effectiveness of the contribution throughout the time period of the partnership and its 
status/condition at the time of making the contribution is irrelevant. Therefore, what differentiates the 
tangibles from intangibles is the time that the contribution was made to the partnership. The former is 
made immediately but the latter takes time and it comes into effect throughout the duration of the 
partnership. Considering these facts, when it comes to the measurement of intangible contributions 
there are different possibilities. One solution is the mutual agreement of the partners as to the value of 
the relevant intangible contribution at the time of the contribution. This solution is workable if the other 
partner knows roughly the value of the relevant intangible contribution. This mutual agreement may be 
on the basis of sulh (compromise) under Sharia. It is well understood that the use of sulh is permitted 
whenever all the characteristics of the subject matter of the agreement are not known to the parties 
and the underlying subject of their agreement is not illegitimate. However, if the mutual agreement is 
based on sulh, the mutual agreement will be binding and irrevocable with no right of termination unless 
in exceptional circumstances. The other solution is to measure the value of the intangible contribution 
periodically (e.g., semi-annually or annually) during the time of the partnership. In this solution, since 
the intangible contribution has already come into effect the measurement of the contribution will be 
more fair and reliable. These frequent measurements may be accomplished by mutual agreement 
between the partners. However, both in the above mentioned first and second solutions, the 
measurement may be managed by an authorised, specialised entity either in the form of a committee of 
the partnership or a separate third party entity set up by the House of Market Control (HMC).     
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in proportion to his contribution (if not distinguishable).48 In any type of partnership, 
the division of profits49 among the partners has to be in proportion (i.e., as a 
percentage) and not as an absolute amount. In terms of liability towards third party 
creditors, should the total liquidated capital (hardware values) of the partnership not 
suffice to satisfy all the debt obligations, the partners will be liable to pay the debts in 
proportion to their contributions made to the partnership.50 Therefore, the notion of 
                                                   
48
This view is, albeit, in contrast to the modern view where the ownership of the total input belongs to 
the partnership itself. For practical considerations, however, it is not problematic to consider a separate 
legal entity for the partnership but without the same exact effects accrued to it in modern practices.  
As per Islamic jurisprudence, every shareek (partner) of the musharaka is an agent for the other 
partners in matters of the joint business. See Muhammad Taqi Usmani ‘An Introduction to Islamic 
Finance’ (Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002) p. 141 
49
 These profits have to be actually accrued by the partnership and cannot be contingent profits.  
50
For practical considerations, it is possible that the partners (especially active partners) be considered 
jointly and severally liable towards the third party creditors. However, eventually the partners 
themselves will be liable in proportion to their total contributions to the partnership. 
There are some Islamic scholars who have also argued for unlimited liability towards third parties in all 
partnerships (this is consistent with the approach taken in this research in all types of partnerships 
involved in a business venture). They have also correctly distinguished the way a demand (called 
mutaliba) can be made by the creditors against each partner for the satisfaction of their debt 
receivables. In a general (i.e., catch-all) partnership like mufawada the demand can be made against 
each of the partners at the creditor’s choosing because partners in this partnership are jointly and 
severally liable (however a partner will not be liable for a debt obligation incurred by his partner if that 
partner went beyond his authority), but not in the case of a lack of joint and several liability (i.e., where 
there is only several liability but not joint liability such as in an inan partnership) where the creditor can 
only have recourse to the partner with whom he had contracted. See Abraham Undovitch ‘Partnership 
and Profit in Medieval Islam (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1970) pp. 100, 239. See also I.A.K. 
Nyazee ‘Islamic Law of Business Organization: Partnerships (The Islamic Research Institute Press, 1998) 
Ch. 9 particularly § 9.1.2., p. 105 and also § 17.2.1.2., p. 278.  
It is worth noting that “unlimited liability” and “joint and several liability” has to be distinguished. For 
example, in mudaraba, rabb al-maal has unlimited (proportionate) liability, however he is not liable 
towards and cannot be sued by the creditors of the partnership (unless under exceptionally certain 
circumstances) simply because he has no contractual relationship with the creditors. It is the mudarib 
(the entrepreneur) who is liable towards the creditors and can be sued by and can sue the creditors who 
had contracted with him. Clearly, liability of partnership members is one of the most controversial areas 
in Islamic business and finance.  
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separate entity may be practised only for practical considerations but not for the 
purpose of ownership and liability effects.51 
In terms of the contribution structure, so-called capital structure in modern 
terms, musharakas/partnerships may be categorised into several forms: tangible-plus-
intangible partnership, tangible-plus-tangible partnership, intangible-plus-intangible 
partnership, and catch-all intangible-and-tangible partnership. 
4.2.14.1 Tangible-plus-Intangible Partnership 
Mudaraba, Muzara’a, and Musaqat are discussed under this type of partnership.   
4.2.14.1.1 Silent Partnership for Profit-Sharing (Mudaraba) 
It is argued that the tangible-plus-intangible partnership (mudaraba52 or 
muqarada or girad53) was the very first type of musharaka practised by Muslims, 
including the Prophet himself, and the other types that emerged throughout history 
are different variants and derivatives of the basic structure of mudaraba (qirad).54 As a 
general rule in mudaraba, any profits or losses derived from the business have to be 
                                                   
51
 As can be seen, this view is in contrast to the dominant view in this regard in modern commercial 
law.     
52
 For the Quranic support of the concept of mudaraba see (73:20) “there are among you those … who 
are journeying in the land in quest of Allah's bounty”.  
53
 As per available evidence, the very first mudarabas were practised for trade purposes and not for 
investment. For supporting evidence, see Iran Civil Code articles 546 and 555.  
It has been hotly debated that the origins of Medieval European partnerships i.e., commenda go back 
to Islamic mudaraba. For more details in this regard see an article by Abraham Undovitch ‘At the Origins 
of the Western Commenda: Islam, Israel, Byzantium’ (Princeton: Princeton University Press, Princeton 
Near East papers no.9, 1969). For a brief discussion of the debate see Murat Cizakca ‘A Comparative 
Evolution of Business Partnerships, Islamic World and Europe with Specific Reference to the Ottoman 
Archives’ (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996) pp. 10-12. Cizakca claims that there are many Sharia concepts that 
were borrowed and internalised by Western legal systems and the origins of many concepts of 
Capitalism go back to classical Islamic law.  
54




shared in proportion to the input of each partner in the mudaraba partnership.55 
However, for practical purposes, it may be argued that any derived profit or loss will be 
shared as per the mutual pre-agreement of partners. However, despite the mutual 
pre-agreement, in case of any disagreement or dispute between the partners their 
shares have to be determined in an equitable manner, i.e., in proportion to their 
contributions made to the mudaraba partnership. In terms of the liability of the 
mudaraba partners, the entire pecuniary loss up to the total hardware/tangible 
contribution to the mudaraba scheme will accrue solely to the hardware/tangible 
providers and the loss to intangible providers is that they do not suffer any pecuniary 
loss, but go unpaid in return for their time, effort, and knowledge (i.e., software or 
entrepreneurial input) devoted to the mudaraba business venture. The excess loss that 
is going beyond the total hardware/tangible input made to the mudaraba will be borne 
by all the partners in proportion to their share in the partnership. However, it should 
be noted that some Islamic scholars have different ideas in this regard. Some argue 
that mudaraba is a limited liability partnership and the maximum loss/liability of 
tangible/capital providers is limited to their capital contributions made to the 
mudaraba and it does not go beyond their capital invested in the mudaraba 
partnership. As to intangible providers (entrepreneurs), it is said that they enjoy 
absolute freedom from any loss and liability for the capital/tangible input of the 
mudaraba and also are not liable towards third party creditors for their claims against 
                                                   
55
 In this regard, different Islamic schools of thought have adopted different views. As per Hanafi’s 
view, profit follows mutual agreement and loss follows the amount of contribution (capital) made to the 
mudaraba. As a result, profits may be distributed differently from losses. In other words, according to 
Hanafi’s thought, the partners in a mudaraba scheme are absolutely free to agree how to divide the 
profits of the mudaraba partnership among themselves. As per Ibn Rushd, according to both Maliki and 
Shafi’ee, profits like losses have to be distributed in proportion to the contribution of each partner 
(according to their capital input) made to the mudaraba. See Phillip Issac Ackerman-Lieberman ’A 
Partnership Culture: Jewish Economic and Social Life Seen Through the Legal Documents of the Cairo 
Geniza’ (Princeton University PhD Thesis, 2007) p. 87.  
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the mudaraba if these claims go beyond the total tangibles/capital of mudaraba. 
However, they are responsible for all the contracts they made with third parties within 
the scope of mudaraba.56     
The basic structure of mudaraba can be considerably enhanced through an 
arrangement which is called ‘multiple mudaraba’. Numerous holders of tangible assets 
may entrust their assets to a single entrepreneur to enjoy more benefits through 
economies of scale and also minimisation of transaction costs as a result of entrusting 
many more assets to the entrepreneur. Conversely, a holder of tangible asset may 
provide some portion of his assets to different entrepreneurs to diversify his risk.57       
A few very critical issues regarding mudaraba are: the type and nature of the 
input, which has to be provided to the mudarib; the scope of investment activities that 
may be performed under mudaraba; and the legitimacy of the guarantee of tangible 
input by the mudarib. Since rabb al-mal is a passive and sleeping partner, his 
contribution has to be in the form of a tangible asset,58 though it is not necessary for 
                                                   
56
 See Abraham Undovitch ‘Partnership and Profit in Medieval Islam’ (Princeton, Princeton University 
Press, 1970) pp. 100, 171, 239, 242. However, Undovitch himself considers unlimited liability for all 
forms of partnerships (this view is in accordance with the idea espoused by this research project as to all 
types of business partnerships). 
57
 For some expanded cases in this regard see Murat Cizakca ‘A Comparative Evolution of Business 
Partnerships, Islamic World and Europe with Specific Reference to the Ottoman Archives (Leiden: E. J. 
Brill, 1996) ch. 3.  
58
 The ownership of tangible contributions remains with the rabb al-mal and it does not pass to the 
mudarib. The mudarib has no right of ownership over the tangible contributions and shares only a 
contingent right in the profits, which is to be generated from the use of tangible contributed assets. 
Therefore, the mudaraba is categorised under ahdi (promissory) contracts rather than tamliki (transfer 
of ownership) contracts. See Nasser Katouzian ’Huquq Madani: Uqud Mu’ayyan, Musharakatha-Sulh’ 
(Tehran, Ganj-e-Danesh, 7
th
 edition, 2007) pp. 108-109 no. 58. 
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this to be in cash capital.59 As to the scope of mudaraba, unless a mudaraba contract 
or the common industry practices require otherwise, the mudarib can perform any60 
type of trade or investment; however, it has to be legitimate, reasonable and 
customarily appropriate.61 As to the guarantee of mudaraba tangible assets by the 
mudarib, the mudarib has to be in the exact same position as a trustee (amin) in the 
same circumstances. In other words, the mudarib is not liable towards rabb al-mal for 
any loss in the mudaraba tangible input unless the resulting loss is attributable to gross 
negligence (ta’addi) or reckless indifference (tafrit) by the mudarib.62 Moreover, the 
mudarib is not required to guarantee a positive return in mudaraba investments. The 
duty of the mudarib is to perform to his best but not to secure a good return.63  
In addition to mudaraba, two other very important classic forms of tangible-plus-
intangible partnerships are muzara’a64 and musaqat65. 
                                                   
59
 This is in contrast to Iran Civil Code article 547 which requires the contribution of the rabb al-maal to 
be in cash. On the interpretation of this article, some Islamic scholars have argued that the contribution 
of the rabb al-maal may be in the form of any foreign currency (for a supporting idea in this regard see 
Muhammad Broujerdi Abduh ‘Huqug Madani’ (Tehran, vol.1, 1950) p.312 and for the opposing idea see 
Hasan Imami ‘Huqug Madani’ (Tehran, vol. 2, 3
rd
 edition) p. 99), however, not in the form of receivables. 
It is said that rabb al-mal has to hand over the mudaraba capital contribution to the mudarib in a certain 
manner and receivables lack this certainty. See Nasser Katouzian ‘Huquq Madani: Uqud Mu’ayyan, 
Musharakatha-Sulh’ (Tehran: Ganj-e-Danesh , 7
th
 edition, 2007) pp. 111-114 no. 61; Allame Hilli 
‘Tadhkirat al-Fuqaha’ (chap-e sangi vol. 2/2) pp. 2 and 22; Allame Hilli ‘Qawa’eed al-Ahkam: Kitab al-
Qirad’ (chap-e sangi); Muhammad Jawad Hussaini A’mili ‘Miftah al-Kirama’ (Egypt, vol.7, 1947) p.441; 
Muhammad Kazim Tabatabaee ‘Urwah al-Wusqa’ (Sida, vol. 2/2, 1349 Lunar Hijri Calendar) p.243.            
60
 Some Islamic scholars believe that if the mudarib combines the mudaraba capital contribution with 
the capital of third parties to make a partnership or for some other similar purpose, the mudarib’s legal 
position as amin (trustee) in respect of the capital contributions made by the rabb al-mal is converted to 
the legal status of damin (guarantor) unless such a use has already been authorised by the rabb al-mal. 
See Muhammad Kazim Tabatabaee ‘Urwah al-Wusqa’ (Sida, vol. 2/2, 1349 Lunar Hijri Calendar) p.247.      
61
 See Iran Civil Code articles 553 and 555. For more see also Muhammad Jawad Hussaini A’mili ‘Miftah 
al-Kirama’ (Egypt, vol.7, 1947) p.447.  
62
 For similar approach see Iran Civil Code articles 556 and 558.  
63
 See Nasser Katouzian ‘Huquq Madani: Uqud Mu’ayyan, Musharakatha-Sulh’ (Tehran: Ganj-e-
Danesh, 7
th
 Edition, 2007) pp. 133-134 no. 70. 
64
 See Iran Civil Code articles 518-542.  
65
 See Iran Civil Code articles 543-545. 
 135 
 
4.2.14.1.2 Crop-Sharing Partnership (Muzara’a) 
Muzara’a is an arrangement set up between two parties for crop-sharing. The 
parties are a muzare, who provides the land and an amil, who plants the agreed crops. 
The muzare’, the House of Wealth, will act on behalf of the public in muzara’a 
contracts. As it was discussed earlier, as per the research theory, the ownership of all 
natural resources including lands always remains with the public as a whole. Therefore, 
there could be no private muzara’a contracts. A muzare and an amil will share the 
crops based on a pre-agreed ratio, which has to be an equitable ratio. The main 
responsibilities of a muzare are the supply of required water and also payment of all 
duties levied on the land. The responsibility of an amil is to plant, irrigate, grow and 
harvest the crops. This facility may be used for farming and agricultural business 
financing and also for microbusiness purposes.   
 
4.2.14.1.3 Fruit-Sharing Partnership (Musaqat) 
Musaqat is an arrangement made between two parties for produce-sharing. The 
parties are an owner of trees or similar who provides these trees and an amil who 
maintains and grows them. The owner and amil will share the produce, including; 
fruits, leaves, flowers and similar products based on a pre-agreed ratio, which has to 
be an equitable ratio. In the same way as the muzara’a, this facility may be used in 
financing of farming and agricultural business and also for microbusiness purposes. 
 
4.2.14.2 Tangible-plus-Tangible Partnership 




4.2.14.2.1 Active Partnership for Profit-Sharing (Inan) 
In terms of a tangible-plus-tangible partnership, there is one called an inan 
(active partnership). In an inan partnership, the contribution of partners is usually 
unequal.66 Once they made their contributions to the partnership, the total combined 
input of the partnership would then belong to all partners67 in an undivided share, in 
proportion to their contributions made to the partnership. As a general rule, the 
partners in an inan partnership will share the profits and losses in proportion to their 
tangible contributions. However, the share of one or some of the partners may be 
more than their tangible contributions in return for some additional contributions 
made to the partnership such as management services or some other form of tangible 
contributions.68 As to the excess losses going beyond the total liquidated tangible 
                                                   
66
 However, the contributions may be made in equal amounts.  
67
 This idea is in contrast to the modern view which argues for the ownership of the joint capital (total 
input) by the partnership/company itself as a separate entity and not the members of the partnership. 
Islamic scholars have also adopted the modern view. 
68
 Different Islamic schools of thought hold different ideas in this respect. As per Hanafi’s, the general 
rule is that profit follows the mutual agreement of partnership members and the loss follows the 
amount of capital contribution. However, the active partners who are involved in the management of 
the partnership may share in the profits more than their capital/tangible contribution on the basis of a 
mutual/multilateral agreement between themselves. However, in any case, the share of these partners 
as regards the loss will be in proportion to their capital/tangible contribution. For a somewhat similar 
discussion see Vahbah Al-Zuhaily (translated by Mahmoud El-Gamal) ‘Financial Transactions in Islamic 
Jurisprudence’ (Damascus: Dar al-Fikr, vol. 1, 2003) pp. 455-456. In contrast, Maliki’s and Shafi’ee’s 
argue for the sharing of both profit and loss of the partnership in proportion to the capital contribution 
of the partners no matter whether they are active or passive partners. See Besir Guzubenli ‘Turkiye 
Diyanet Vakfi Islam Ansiklopedisi’ (Istanbul: ISAM, 2007).     
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assets of the partnership, the partners will share the liability towards third party 
creditors in proportion to their total shares in the partnership.69 
The basic structure of inan may be expanded by granting each member of the 
partnership full trust and power to do with the total assets of the partnership 
whatever he sees fit. Inan may be managed by the partners themselves collectively or 
individually. One or more of the partnership members may be appointed as managers 
of the partnership business venture,70 or the members of the partnership may ask an 
expert/professional third party to manage the partnership. In this case, the 
professional manager will be included in the circle of partners and will be considered a 
member of the partnership whose contribution is his management skills and 
knowledge, i.e., his intangible contribution. He will be compensated in proportion to 
his intangible contribution to the partnership rather than given a fixed management 
fee. This is in contrast to the modern notion of hiring professional managers, who are 
                                                   
69
 Islamic scholars are divided on this issue. Some believe in unlimited liability (as for any other types 
of partnership). For example see Abraham Undovitch ‘Partnership and Profit in Medieval Islam’ 
(Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1970) pp. 100, 121-122, 135. There are, however, some scholars 
who argue for limited liability in the inan partnership structure. For example see Vahbah Al-Zuhaily 
(translated by Mahmoud El-Gamal) ‘Financial Transactions in Islamic Jurisprudence’ (Damascus: Dar al-
Fikr vol. 1, 2003) pp. 451-452. Al-Zuhaily argues for several liability (but not joint liability) i.e., each 
partner in an inan partnership is only responsible for the transactions he himself (in his capacity as a 
partner of the partnership) did with third parties. In other words, as per Al-Zuhaily, in an inan 
partnership, the third party creditors will be compensated for their debt receivables only by the partner 
with whom they transacted.    
70
 In this case the active/manager partners may ask for a greater share in the distribution of the 
partnership profits in return for their management services. In this case their share in losses will also be 
adjusted up accordingly. However, while Hanafi and Hanbali schools allow an increase in the share of 
the active managers in return for their management services, Shafi’ee and Maliki do not permit any 
extra share for this purpose. See Ismail Buyukcelebi ‘Islam Hukukunda Inan Sirketi va Nevileri (Erzurum: 
Ataturk Universitesi Doktora Tezi, 1981) p. 69. 
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usually compensated with a fixed salary. Some scholars have argued that this practice 
i.e., fixed compensation scheme is allowed in Islamic law on the basis of wakala.71  
4.2.14.2.2 Fund (Sanduq Maliya) 
Sanduq maliya is the most common form of inan partnership. It is an 
arrangement in which the contribution of every single participant is made only in 
monetary form. All partners make a financial contribution into a single fund (sanduq 
wahid).72 In other words, sanduq maliya is a collective financial investment scheme 
whereby a joint cash pool is created by participants who seek to earn legitimate profits 
or other benefits by collective business or investment activities in strict conformity 
with the precepts of Sharia. Sanduq maliya must operate according to Sharia rules and 
objectives, not only in its relations with participants but also in its investment 
operations and portfolios.73 Every single participant may be issued a document 
evidencing his pro rata share in the fund. This document is called “share”, “unit”, 
“certificate”, “sukuk” or may be given any other similar name. Similar to any other type 
of partnership/musharaka, neither the principal contribution nor the rate/amount of 
profit can be guaranteed in a financial investment fund. Subscribers of the fund will 
enjoy, pro rata, any actual profit derived from the business or investment activities of 
the fund as well as shoulder pro rata losses in the principal contributions made to the 
                                                   
71
 See Ismail Buyukcelebi ‘Islam Hukukunda Inan Sirketi va Nevileri (Erzurum: Ataturk Universitesi 
Doktora Tezi, 1981) pp. 67-69.  
72
 See Phillip Issac Ackerman-Lieberman ‘A Partnership Culture: Jewish Economic and Social Life Seen 
Through the Legal Documents of the Cairo Geniza’ (Princeton University PhD Thesis, 2007) p. 82, 
footnote. 19. 
73
 See International Organisation of Securities Commission (IOSCO) ‘Analysis of the Application 
of IOSCO's Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation for Islamic Securities Products’ (2008) p.11. 
International Organisation of Securities Commission (IOSCO) ‘Islamic Capital Market Task Force Report’ 
(2004) p. 33.  
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fund. Furthermore, like any other form of partnership, any business or investment 
activities conducted by the fund has to conform to the rules and objectives of Sharia.74  
In terms of the type of business or investment activities75 conducted by the 
financial fund, sanduq maliya are categorised into the following:76realty & property or 
                                                   
74
 For a similar view see Muhammad Taqi Usmani ‘An Introduction to Islamic Finance’ (Hague: Kluwer 
Law International, 2002) pp. 139-151.  
75
 Any business and investment activities of the fund have to be in strict conformity with the precepts 
of Sharia. No (Islamic or Sharia-compliant) collective investment scheme (CIS/fund) can invest in socially 
detrimental e.g., highly systemically-risky activities or unethical activities e.g. those involving alcohol, 
pornography or gambling. It can also not invest in institutions or enterprises which are heavily engaged 
in riba-bearing business or investment activities. The criteria to determine whether a given business or 
investment activity including the capital structure of the fund, tradability of the business or investment 
product, and the income of the fund is permissible under Sharia, is by means of various screening 
methods which have been developed and introduced in this regard in recent years by Dow Jones Islamic 
Market Index, AAOIFI, FTSE, S&P 500, MSCI, SEC, and Proprietary (various mutual funds). Typically, 
Sharia advisory boards are involved in Islamic mutual funds or Islamic unit trust funds to ensure that 
investment and trading activities and portfolios of the fund are conducted according to Sharia rules and 
objectives. See International Organisation of Securities Commission (IOSCO) ‘Analysis of the Application 
of IOSCO’s Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation for Islamic Securities Products’ (2008) pp. 
11-13. For more details in this respect see the following online resources: 
http://www.djindexes.com/mdsidx/?event=showIslamic and furthermore, see also 
http://www.ftse.com/japanese/Indices/FTSE_Global_Islamic_Index_Series/index.jsp. For different 
screening methodologies see 
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/index/Shariah_Methodology.pdf 
76
 Any form of fund may be managed either by one or several third party professionals who have not 
contributed money to the fund or by one or several participants of the fund (or a mixture of both).  
In the former case, a mudaraba model will be used in dealing with all the rights and duties of the third 
party managers.  According to Taqi Usmani, the majority of the Muslim scholars are of the opinion that a 
fund cannot be set up on the basis of mudaraba if the purpose of the fund is to do transactions on 
services and leases, because the scope of mudaraba is limited to the trade in commodities. However, as 
per Taqi Usmani, in the Hanbali school of thought, which is followed by a number of contemporary 
scholars, mudaraba can also be used in services and leases. See Muhammad Taqi Usmani ‘An 
Introduction to Islamic Finance’ (Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002) pp. 139-151. It should be noted 
that, some scholars have wrongfully argued for a wakala model in which the management will act as an 
agent for the fund participants in return for a pre-agreed fixed lump sum fee or a monthly or annual 
remuneration for its services. Some contemporary jurists (e.g., Taqi Usmani at pp. 139-151) have also 
wrongly argued that the fee can also be on the basis of a ratio of the net asset value of the fund at the 
end of every financial year.  
In the latter case, the share of the participant managers will be adjusted up in order to claim additional 
participation in profits to reflect their provision of management services. 
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real estate investment trusts fund, leasing fund, commodity fund, murabaha fund, 
equity fund, and hybrid fund. These will be discussed below. 
Realty & Property Fund 
Realty & Property or Real Estate Investment Trusts (REIT) sanduq is set up to 
acquire and manage a portfolio in real estate properties, such as: commercial 
buildings, hotels, warehouses and garages.77 
Leasing Fund 
An ijara (leasing) fund78 is created by participants whose contributions are 
pooled jointly in the fund and are invested in buying assets such as commercial 
buildings, machinery or other equipment for the purpose of leasing them out to 
prospective users in return for earning rental fees. The ownership of the leased assets 
remains with the participants/subscribers of the fund.79 The earned rentals are 
distributed to the subscribers proportionally. Every single subscriber of the fund will be 
issued a certificate called a sukuk, showing his proportionate entitlement in the fund 
(sanduq). These sukuk, representing the pro rata share of the sukuk holders in the 
underlying assets of the fund, are fully negotiable by their holders.80   
                                                   
77
 For more see International Organisation of Securities Commission (IOSCO) ‘Islamic Capital Market 
Task Force Report’ (2004) p. 32. 
78
 For more detail see Muhammad Taqi Usmani ‘An Introduction to Islamic Finance’ (Hague: Kluwer 
Law International, 2002) pp. 139-151.  
79
 This view is clearly in contrast to the modern view, which advocates the ownership of assets by the 
fund itself.  
80
 From the viewpoint of Sharia, it would be problematic if the underlying assets of the sukuk were 




A commodity fund is created for commodity trading purposes. In this fund the 
subscription amounts received from the participants are invested in purchasing a 
variety of halal goods81 for the purpose of their resale and for profit-making. The 
profits produced by the trade of goods, mostly metals, such as: copper, iron, 
aluminium, or nickel is distributed pro rata among the participants. Similar to other 
funds, participants of the commodity fund may be issued sukuk, representing the pro 
rata share of the sukuk holders in the underlying assets of the fund. These sukuk are 
negotiable.82 
Cost-plus Sale (Murabaha) Fund 
A murabaha fund is created for trade financing purposes. In this fund the pooled 
money is used to procure the goods and commodities from third party suppliers 
requested by prospective clients. Having acquired the requested goods and 
commodities, a murabaha fund then immediately resells the procured items to the 
prospective clients on a deferred payment basis at an agreed margin of profit added to 
the original cost of the commodities. As per some Islamic scholars, this fund, unlike 
many other funds, is a closed-end fund and its units (sukuk) are not negotiable (in a 
secondary market). The reason provided in this regard is that in the murabaha fund 
the payment of the resale price is being deferred and it becomes payable by the client 
in regular instalments in the future. In other words, the portfolio of a murabaha fund 
does not often include tangible assets but comprises either cash or the receivable 
debts, which are not negotiable according to Sharia rules. If the receivables are 
                                                   
81
 For example dealing in alcohol and haram meat (like pork). These are prohibited according to Sharia. 
82
 As per Taqi Usmani, most transactions carried out in the modern commodity markets, especially in 
the futures commodity markets, are not in compliance with the rules of Sharia. See Muhammad Taqi 
Usmani ‘An Introduction to Islamic Finance’ (Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002)  p. 148. 
 142 
 
exchanged for money, they must be traded at par value to avoid riba.83 However, it 
should be added that the sale and purchase activities by a murabaha fund have to be 
reflected in its balance sheet and so it is hard to say that its portfolio does not include 
any tangible assets although these are often sold immediately. In other words, one 
may argue for the negotiability of the murabaha fund sukuk.  
Equity Fund 
An equity fund is created to invest the pooled contributions of money in the 
acquisition of the shares of halal-oriented84 business associations. In this respect, the 
profits of the fund participants are basically derived from the capital gains and also the 
distribution of dividends by the relevant ventures on the basis of pro rata profit-
sharing.85 The participatory nature of this fund in terms of sharing profits and losses of 
the relevant business ventures on a pro rata basis, has contributed significantly to its 
                                                   
83
 See Muhamad Taqi Usmani ‘Principles of Shariah Governing Islamic Investment Funds’ Available via 
the Internet at http://www.albalagh.net/Islamic_economics/finance.shtml 
84
 From the Sharia viewpoint, in determining whether a given business action of the business venture 
in which the funds are invested is attributable to the fund participants, some scholars argue that since 
all the actions and policy decisions of musharakas (business partnerships) have to be taken on the basis 
of consensus of all the partners and every single partner holds a veto power as to the business policy of 
the partnership, so, all the transactions of the business partnership are basically attributable to every 
single participant. Clearly, this is in contrast to the modern policy decisions practised by conventional 
business companies in which the decisions are taken on the basis of majority vote of the equity holders. 
So, each and every business action conducted by the modern business company is not necessarily 
attributed to every single equity holder. See Muhammad Taqi Usmani ‘An Introduction to Islamic 
Finance’ (Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002) p. 139-151.   
85
 However, as per some Islamic scholars, to the extent that the profits of such business associations 
are earned from non-halal activities, a “purification” process will have to be followed by the investor 
participant. Islamic jurists hold diverse views about the necessity of ‘purification’ where the profits are 
derived through capital gains. Some jurists argue for the necessity of ‘purification’ because they believe 
that the market price of the shares of a business association may reflect an element of interest in the 
value of assets of the business association. The other view argues for unnecessary purification in the 
case of capital gain, due to the reason that no specific part of the value of shares of the business 
association can be allocated for the interest that is arguably reflected in the value. See Muhammad Taqi 
Usmani ‘An Introduction to Islamic Finance’ (Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002) p. 139-151.   
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popularity and also attractiveness for many investors especially those who are looking 
for an Islamic investment. 
Hybrid Fund 
A hybrid fund may be set up if the purpose is to invest the contributions of the 
fund received from the participants in different types of business and investments, 
such as: equities, commodities, leasing, and real estate. In order for the units, shares, 
or sukuk of the fund to be tradable, non-monetary assets of the fund must be worth a 
considerable amount. However, according to the majority of contemporary Sharia 
scholars, according to Taqi Usmani,86 for sukuk to be negotiable, the tangible assets of 
the fund have to account for more than 51% of the total assets of the fund, i.e., the 
liquid and monetary portion of the assets of the fund must not exceed 50%. 
 
4.2.14.3 Intangible-plus-Intangible Partnership (Credit Partnership) 
A further type of partnership that will be discussed is the intangible-plus-
intangible partnership. This is known as wujuh/mafaalis (credit partnership) and 
involves sometimes two or more persons who have good credit, good reputations, 
expertise, and knowledge who establish a partnership without contributing any 
finances. For example, two or more lawyers may set up partnership to provide legal 
services; investment advisors to provide investment advisory services; and, merchants 
to buy merchandise on credit and sell it for an immediate financial return.87 The 
                                                   
86
 See Muhamad Taqi Usmani ‘Principles of Shariah Governing Islamic Investment Funds’ Available via 
the Internet at http://www.albalagh.net/Islamic_economics/finance.shtml. See also Muhammad Taqi 
Usmani ‘An Introduction to Islamic Finance’ (Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002) p. 151 
87
 Ibn Taymiyya and his student Ibn Qayyim have rejected wujuh due to the reason that it circumvents 
riba. See Murat Cizakca ‘Islamic Capitalism and Finance: Origins, Evolution, and the Future’ (Edward 
Elgar, Studies in Islamic Finance, Accounting, and Governance, 2011) pp. 145, 159 no. 49.  
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partnership members will share the profits and also losses in proportion to their 
contributions.88    
 
4.2.14.4 Catch-all Intangible-plus-Tangible Partnership (General 
Association) 
The final type of partnership that will be examined is the catch-all intangible-
plus-tangible partnership89 (general association).90 This is where two or more persons 
create a general association to share all their acquisitions (and losses if any) for a 
limited period of time or for their whole lives, in exactly equal (often) or in unequal 
                                                   
88
 This type of partnership is rejected by Shafiee and Maliki from Sunni schools of thought as well as 
the Shi’a school of thought (some Islamic scholars have wrongly argued that Shi’a school accepts this 
partnership; see Murat Cizakca ‘Islamic Capitalism and Finance: Origins, Evolution, and the Future’ 
(Edward Elgar, Studies in Islamic Finance, Accounting, and Governance, 2011) p. 33). For the true 
position of Shi’a (i.e., rejection of wujuh partnership) see Murtaza Mutahhari ‘Barrasiye Ijmaliye 
Mabaniye Iqtisade Islami’ (Tehran: Hikmat Publications, 1
st
 Edition, 1403 Lunar Hijri Calendar) p. 259. In 
contrast, wujuh partnership is accepted by Hanafi and Hanbali schools of thought. For a critique of the 
position of Shafi’ee by the Hanafi school see Abraham Undovitch ‘Partnership and Profit in Medieval 
Islam’ (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1970) pp. 81-83. For more see also Osman Sekerci ‘Islam 
Sirketler Hukuku’ (Istanbul: Marifet Yayinlari, 1981) p. 238. As per the school of Hanafi, wujuh 
partnership is the only partnership in which the profits have to be strictly divided in proportion to the 
contributions of the partners made to the partnership but not according to the mutual/multilateral 
agreement of the partners.    
89
 It is also called mufawada/abdan/a’mal partnewrship. It is a kind of communality that comprehends 
all tangible and intangible belongings of the partners. Likewise all other types of partnerships, this 
partnership is also an unlimited (proportionate) liability partnership.      
90
 The Shi’a school of thought rejects all these types of partnerships mainly because of the existence of 
gharar and also the spread of the spirit of dependence among people in society. See Murtaza Mutahhari 
‘Barrasiye Ijmaliye Mabaniye Iqtisade Islami’ (Tehran: Hikmat Publications, 1
st
 edition, 1403 Lunar Hijri 
Calendar) pp. 259-260. 
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proportions (rarely).91 In these cases, if it does not matter whether the source of 
acquisition is business, inheritance, a gift or in fact any other source, it is called 
mufawada; but, if it is limited to the acquisitions acquired only by an effort and act of 
the partner and not from inheritance, gift or similar sources, it is called abdan or 
a’mal.92 In this partnership, it does not matter whether the devotion of time and effort 
of the partners is equal or not. Some may argue that this type of partnership has to be 
declared void on the basis of the concept of gharar simply because the contribution of 
each partner is not specified and is uncertain.93 At the same time, others may argue it 
is valid on the basis of the concept of sulh (simply because any type of compromise is 
permitted unless it is a compromise on an illegitimate issue). It seems the former 
argument is solid enough to declare this type of partnership null and void. The other 
argument for rejecting this musharaka/partnership could be the implications of one of 
the general policies shaping the alternative intellectual model provided in the thesis, as 
it encourages the fostering and the strengthening of the spirit of independence and 
                                                   
91
 Some Islamic scholars have provided a different definition. As per Cizakca, in a mufawada 
partnership “partners contribute capital in exactly equal amounts to the venture and share profits, as 
well as losses, in exactly equal proportions”. See Murat Cizakca ‘Islamic Capitalism and Finance: Origins, 
Evolution, and the Future’ (Edward Elgar, Studies in Islamic Finance, Accounting, and Governance, 2011) 
p. 33. It seems if this is considered to be the definition of mufawada, it would in fact be a type of inan 
partnership structure but not a new separate type of partnership as it is discussed here.    
It can be said that the essence of mufawada is the mutual agency (on the basis of wakala) and mutual 
guarantee (on the basis of aqd daman and also kafala). Each partner is considered to be the other 
partner’s wakil (agent) and also damin/kafil (guarantor). In other words, in mufawada, the partners are 
jointly and severally liable for all the debts of partnership and indeed for each other. Each partner 
confers upon his partner full power to dispose of their joint capital in any reasonable manner for the 
best interests and benefit of their partnership. From this perspective, as per Foster, mufawada is similar 
to an English partnership. See Nicholas H. D.  Foster ‘Islamic Perspectives on the Law of Business 
Organisations I: An Overview of the Classical Sharia and a Brief Comparison of the Sharia Regimes with 
Western-Style Law’ (European Business Organization Law Review, vol. 11, issue 1, 2010) p.17 
92
 As to losses, however, it would not matter whether the cause of loss is business or natural disaster 
or any other cause. 
93
 It may be argued that if the purpose of these partnerships is to make profit at the expense of other 
partners, it has to be declared void; but, however, if the purpose is merely a kind of security or 
insurance it would be a legitimate, valid partnership.  
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self-reliance among individuals rather than encouraging them to be dependent on 
each other and be enriched unjustly. 
 
4.2.14.5 Conclusion 
From the viewpoint of a contribution structure (a so-called capital structure in 
modern terms), the legitimacy of different types of partnerships in different Islamic 
schools of thought is as follows: Shia, Shafi’ee, and Maliki94 reject wujuh and 
mufawada but allow mudaraba and inan; Hanbali rejects mufawada but allows all 
other types; and Hanafi95 allows all the types of partnerships mentioned above. 
Regarding the problem of profit and loss sharing in each type of musharaka, as per the 
Hanafi school of thought, profit in all types of partnerships (except in a mufawada 
partnership) must be divided according to the pre-mutual-or-multilateral agreement of 
the partners in which loss follows (capital) contributions of the partners (except in the 
case of a mufawada partnership in which profit and loss must be divided equally); as 
per all other Islamic schools of thought, profit and also loss has to be divided in 
proportion to the (capital) contribution of the partners made to the joint venture.96  
It can also be concluded from the above that both conventional and Islamic 
finance allow and foster active investment, which rewards intangible and tangible 
contributions from realised revenues. Both also allow and encourage passive 
                                                   
94
 It seems Shia, Shafi’ee, and Maliki have adopted a very narrow definition of maal (asset) and so have 
strictly limited the type of contributions which may possibly be made to a partnership (i.e., they have 
limited the contribution to only capital or at most the tangible assets). However, I would argue for a very 
wide definition of maal (asset) that may be contributed to a partnership and that is why I use the term 
contribution or input for any type of economically valuable software/intangible and hardware/tangible 
assets.     
95
 For a standardised (codified) view of the Hanafi school on different musharakas see Majallat al-
Ahkam al-Arabiyyah articles 1329-1448.   
96
 For support for the Shia view see Iran Civil Code article 575.  
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investment in shareholder companies which reward tangible contributors, e.g., capital 
providers from realised income in the form of dividends.  In both cases, according to 
Islam, any realised pecuniary loss is solely burdened by the tangible 
contributors.97 Unlike conventional financial practices, any investment that brings in a 
guaranteed return or any financing that involves the payment of a guaranteed interest 
is forbidden in an Islamic financial system.98  
 
4.3 Applications of Alternative For-Profit Products and Collective 
Schemes 
The following are the major financing alternatives for for-profit activities.   
4.3.1 The Government/Public Income-Creating Projects  
Since riba is prohibited in Islam, the Islamic government cannot issue interest-
bearing treasury bills, treasury bonds and/or borrow interest-based sovereign debt.99 
To carry out income-creating public and infrastructure projects, governments today 
often issue bonds to the public which are essentially long-term loans. Their face 
                                                   
97
 However, as it has been discussed earlier, in bankruptcies where the total liquidated assets of the 
partnership is not sufficient to satisfy all debts, the intangible contributors will be liable towards the 
third party creditors of the partnership in proportion to their share in the partnership.      
98
 For similar views see A. L. M. Abdul Gafoor ‘Participatory Financing through Investment Banks and 
Commercial Banks’ (The Netherlands: Aptec publications, 1996; also published in Malaysia by A. S. 
Noordeen, KL; also a shorter version of it has been published in New Horizon, July 2001).   
99
 See Salman Ahmed Shaikh ‘Sources of Public Finance in an Islamic Economy’ (Islamic Economics 
Project, 17 April 2010) p. 1. 
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value100 is guaranteed on maturity and they are sold at less than their face value. This 
deduction in payment on issue is a return or in fact interest for their holders. This 
makes it problematic from a Sharia point of view. Moreover, in addition to the concern 
over monetizing its deficit (i.e., public debt) by an Islamic government,101 some studies 
have shown concern over the operation of Islamic finance rules in the pricing of loan 
products between countries and Islamic financial institutions.102 Furthermore, some 
argue that since the funds raised by governments through issuing bonds are not 
invested in profitable enough projects or they are invested in long-term projects, they 
are unattractive for investors and they will not have enough incentives to participate in 
funding such projects.103 To address these concerns, different solutions have been 
suggested or applied in practice. Some Islamic states have designed and issued 
government bonds on the basis of profit and loss sharing schemes. Another solution 
has suggested avoiding the problem of riba in issuing government bonds by 
denominating and issuing these bonds using a gold-units basis in which the fund 
providers will acquire no return on their capital, but will not shoulder any losses 
                                                   
100
 Face value is what is written on the face of the bond and it is determined by the issuer of the bond 
(in the case of paper currencies the face value is determined by the power of the state which makes 
them legal tender). This is different from the intrinsic value which is linked to the market value of the 
underlying asset, which is demonstrated by the bond (in the case of coins, the intrinsic value is the cost 
of the production of the coin plus the value of the metal that it contains. For example, if it contains gold, 
the value of the gold is its equilibrium price determined by the global commodity market). Under normal 
conditions, the face value is always greater than (or at least equivalent to) the intrinsic value; however, 
this is not always the case. See Zubair Hasan, ‘Ensuring Exchange Rate Stability: Is return to gold (Dinar) 
possible?’ (JKAU: Islamic Economics, vol. 21, no. 1, 2008) pp. 1-21. 
101
 See Ali F. Darrat and Abdel-Hameed M. Bashir ‘Modeling Monetary Control in an Interest-Free 
Economy’ (JKAU: Islamic Economics, vol. 12, 1420 Lunar Hijri Calendar) pp. 3-19. Monetizing means 
transforming public debt (deficit) from securities into legal tender i.e., currency that can be used to buy 
goods and services.      
102
 See B. Muralidhar Reddy ‘Of Religion and Economics’ (Frontline. vol. 18, issue 11, 2001).    
103
 It seems this argument is not strong enough simply because governments may invest the raised 
funds in attractive profit-making projects. The Iranian government has used this scheme (Islamic bonds) 
to finance some large-scale and profit-making oil, gas, and petrochemical projects.    
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caused by inflation.104 Some Islamic scholars105 have proposed the issuance of GDP 
growth linked instruments (‘nominal GDP growth rate as the benchmark for pricing’ 
the products) to finance government domestic/foreign loans. Another more suitable 
and practical alternative method for sovereign borrowing (foreign debts) is to use a 
middle way of guaranteed and contingent return on borrowings. In today’s world, it is 
not fair to impose all the burdens on the debtor government. The world financial 
markets are too interconnected and a risky event in one part of the world may create a 
lot of negative externalities on the debtor government which made no contribution to 
the creation of these externalities. Therefore, it is not fair that governments are 
penalised for all these externalities which are often out of their control and which they 
had no hand in creating. The inherent problem of the current prevailing sovereign 
bonds is that the return for bondholders is guaranteed regardless of the likely 
occurrence of these externalities. This is an irresponsible and disproportionate way of 
sharing risk and is akin to gambling. In practice, however, the capital providers look for 
guaranteed returns and they may be less likely to provide their capital to foreign 
governments on a contingent return basis. So, one possible option is the establishment 
of an internationally (at least, regionally) supported mega-financial institution which 
will take the capital of money providers on the fixed return basis (which can in turn be 
benchmarked to the growth rate of the world economy or the debtor government’s), 
                                                   
104
 In these cases, investors do in fact provide their funds with no return on their capital and only with 
a patriotic (fi-sabilillah) motive. However, from an Islamic viewpoint, in these cases a moral burden is 
transferred to the government. The funds should be used properly and only for good causes. See A. L. 
M. Abdul Gafoor ‘Islamic Banking & Finance: Another Approach’ (A.S. Noordeen, Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia, 2000) pp 24-25.  
105
 See Salman Ahmed Shaikh ‘Sources of Public Finance in an Islamic Economy’ (Islamic Economics 
Project, 17 April 2010) p.5. See also Salman Ahmed Shaikh ‘Role and Functions of Central Bank in Islamic 
Finance’ Available via the Internet at http://mpra.ub.uni-




but its lendings to the fund applicant governments will be on a contingent basis, e.g., 
using some kind of musharaka model.    
Public income-creating projects such as the development of oil and gas fields, 
and telecommunication infrastructure can be funded using equity modes of financing 
or issuing investment securities (i.e., sukuk instruments).106 The combination of 
musharaka (in particular declining balance shared equity) with mudaraba and ijara (or 
ijara-wa-iqtina) or the combination of istisna with ijara or ijara-wa-iqtina 
arrangements can be used whereby financing will be conducted using the issuance of 
appropriate sukuk securities.107 In the case of a combination of musharaka (in 
particular declining balance shared equity) with mudaraba and ijara-wa-iqtina (or bay 
nasiya), the state108 (or a state enterprise) by way of engagement of a financial 
intermediary (wakil) would issue musharaka sukuk to investors. The state and 
investors would establish a musharaka (partnership) arrangement. The collected 
capital from the investors (which constitutes a large portion of the musharaka capital) 
and the contributed capital by the state itself (which is a very small part of the total 
capital) will be placed with a mudarib (a contractor or an entrepreneur), who would 
use them to complete the project on the basis of a mudaraba agreement with the 
musharaka. The income or profits arising out of the project as a result of bay nasiya or 
ijara-wa-iqtina to the state would be shared between the mudarib and musharaka. 
The investors (musharaka sukuk holders) together with the state are considered the 
                                                   
106
 See Nadeem Ul Haque & Abbas Mirakhor ‘The Design of Instruments for Government Finance in an 
Islamic Economy’ (International Monetary Fund, IMF Working Papers 98/54, 1998).  
BOT (Build, Operate, and Transfer) and BOO (Build, Own, and Operate) are the most popular modern 
modes of financing in public utility projects such as power plants and transportation infrastructure. 
107
 For a similar idea see Nadeem Ul Haque & Abbas Mirakhor ‘The Design of Instruments for 
Government Finance in an Islamic Economy’ (International Monetary Fund, IMF Working Papers 98/54, 
1998). 
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owners of the project. Using declining balance shared equity (musharaka) the state 
would gradually (in the case of using bay) or at the end of the lease (in the case of 
using ijara-wa-iqtina) buy out the share of the investors. In this arrangement, 
musharaka sukuk holders would be able to exchange or trade their sukuk. These 
musharaka sukuk are suitable for investors who are looking for tradable and liquid 
sukuk and also for investors who are looking for a medium risk, long term investment.  
Very similar modes of financing to the above model are used in practice in public 
infrastructure development projects, such as bridges, highways and dams through a 
quasi-equity finance or public-private participation scheme. The quasi-equity finance 
sukuk called Revenue Participation Scheme instruments were introduced by the 
Turkish government in 1984 and used for construction of the First Bosphorus Bridge in 
Istanbul in December 1984 as well as the Keban dam in January 1985.109 According to 
the quasi-equity finance scheme, the prospective revenues generated from the project 
are sold to members of the public who are issued with certain shares (sukuk)110 
according to their contribution of equity capital to the project. The reason for calling it 
quasi-equity finance rather than typical equity finance is simply because the ownership 
of the constructed building is to be retained by the state and the investors receive only 
the annual revenues generated by the project. To follow a true musharaka 
arrangement, the transmission of ownership from the public investors to the state may 
also be accomplished using a declining-partnership arrangement whereby the 
investors together with the state would in the first stage share the ownership of the 
                                                   
109
 It was the Public Housing and Partnership Directory (one of the governmental agencies) who 
initiated this arrangement and handled the issuance of relevant shares/sukuk. See Murat Cizakca 
‘Islamic Capitalism and Finance: Origins, Evolution, and the Future’ (Edward Elgar, Studies in Islamic 
Finance, Accounting, and Governance, 2011) pp. 165, 172-173.  
110
 It is worth noting that sukuk are securities-like instruments in modern Islamic finance. Sukuk may 
be used in a very wide context, from private business finance to public finance. In public finance, sukuk 
are used for public borrowing or public investment purposes.   
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project but their ownership share will be gradually reduced as a result of annual 
payments to the investors.        
Other interesting Islamic finance instruments are sukuk used for public 
borrowing, such as the First Malaysian Global Sovereign Sukuk.111 These sukuk, which 
were structured on the basis of murabaha and bay al-dayn concepts were issued in 
1997 by the Malaysian government’s investment agent called Khazanah Nasional 
Berhad.112 Later, in 2006, Khazanah issued a new series of sukuk based on the concept 
of musharaka (which is more respectable from the viewpoint of Sharia), linked to the 
performance of the telecommunication industry in Malaysia.113  
In 2001, the Central Bank of Bahrain issued sukuk for public borrowing known as 
salam sukuk. For this purpose, the Government of Bahrain sold a specified commodity 
of aluminium to the investors i.e., sukuk holders for delivery in 3 months for a certain 
price at the time of the issuance of sukuk (at the time of the sale contract). These 
sukuk issued on the basis of salam are considered fixed income instruments. That is 
why they soon became popular tools for liquidity management purposes.114   
The other global sovereign sukuk, after the Malaysian one, was issued by the 
Department of Civil Aviation of Dubai in October 2004. These sukuk have been 
considered the greatest sukuk issued so far.115 The next largest series of sukuk 
structured as convertible sukuk (convertible into equity upon an IPO) and also known 
as musharaka sukuk was launched in January 2006 by the Dubai Ports, Customs and 
                                                   
111
 For detail in this regard see Saiful Azhar Rosly ‘Critical Issues on Islamic Banking and Financial 
Markets’ (Kuala Lumpur: Dinamas, 3
rd
 print, 2008). 
112
 See Mohamad Akram Laldin ’Islamic Financial System’ (Humanomics, vol. 24, no. 3, 2008) p. 230.  
113
 See Securities Commission Malaysia ‘Sukuk’ (Kuala Lumpur: Sweet and Maxwell Asia, ICM Series, 
2009). 
114
 See Sayd Farook ‘Salam Based Capital Market Instruments (in Securities Commission Malaysia, 
Sukuk)’ (Kuala Lumpur: SCM, 2009) pp. 163-168.   
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Free Zone Corporation (PCFC) to transform the PCFC into one of the world’s greatest 
port operators.116    
Interestingly, in 2004, it was a European country, Germany, that launched sukuk. 
The sukuk were issued by one of the states of Germany, namely Saxony Anhalt, and it 
raised €100 million from both Middle Eastern and European investors through the 
issuance of triple A rated and five-year Islamic bonds. The issued sukuk were secured 
by real estate assets held in a trust, an SPV or foundation or Islamic waqf-like 
institution, which was established in the Netherlands for tax advantages as well as due 
to a more favourable securitisation law.117     
In conclusion, the most important advantage of asset-based public borrowing is 
that they allow states as well as large businesses to profit from their otherwise idle 
properties by securitising them. Also, the idle savings of the members of the public are 
channelled to the infrastructure development projects and they receive good returns 
without containing any riba element.   
 
4.3.2 The Wholesale and Retail Shopping 
In the area of wholesale and retail shopping, a prospective retailer who lacks 
sufficient funds to buy the necessary goods and supplies may purchase these from a 
relevant wholesaler on the basis of bay nasiya (deferred sale) or murabaha (payment 
in instalments with a certain mark-up). For day-to-day shopping transactions, the 
retailer can in turn issue credit cards on the basis of murabaha (or bay nasiya) to the 
                                                   
116
 See Mohamed Ridza Abdullah ‘Regulatory Issues: Innovations and Application in Sukuk- in 
Securities Commission Malaysia, Sukuk)’ (Kuala Lumpur: SCM, 2009) pp. 80-82. 
117
 These sukuk received double A rating by S&P and triple A by Fitch. See Mahmoud A. El-Gamal 
‘Islamic Finance: Law, Economics, and Practice’ (Cambridge University Press, 2006) p. 113. See also 
Ayman H. Abdel-Khaleq and Christipher F. Richardson ‘New Horizons for Islamic Securities: Emerging 
Trends in Sukuk Offerings’ (Chicago Journal of International Law, Vol. 7, Issue 2, Winter 2007) p. 413.   
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prospective consumers/customers, who will pay the purchase price using the issued 
credit cards by the retailer.  
 
4.3.3 Converting Illiquid Assets into Cash  
In some circumstances a person may need immediate access to cash to discharge 
his current debt obligations or to run his business. In these circumstances, the owner 
of illiquid asset may use a bay shart (also called bay wafa) facility to sell his illiquid118 
properties to a cash buyer and then lease (ijara) them back from the buyer to continue 
his normal use of the assets in return for the payment of agreed rental fees to the 
buyer. In case the seller can pay the agreed price in the agreed time to exercise his 
option of cancellation of the sale contract, he will regain the ownership of his 
previously-sold assets.       
 
4.3.4 The Commercial Construction and Infrastructure Projects 
For the commercial housing and construction business, the combination of 
musharaka/mudaraba with murabaha/ijara, and the combination of istisna with salam 
could be very suitable in this regard. Using a musharaka arrangement, partners may 
agree to contribute their capital, labour, expertise, supplies and equipment for the 
purposes of construction of houses or any other types of buildings: such as a lodging, a 
warehouse, a plant or factory to share the profits of the business pro rata of their 
contribution. All contributions of the partners will be mobilised in a musharaka 
scheme. In this case, musharaka partners (investors) are issued with certificates, i.e., 
                                                   
118
 Not only can it be illiquid properties but also those properties, e.g., a living residence, that the seller 
is unwilling to dispose of or to alienate the title in an absolute manner and wants to buy it back at his 
earliest convenient time.  
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sukuk indicating their pro rata ownership in musharaka. Musharaka sukuk holders will 
be able to exchange or trade their sukuk in financial exchange markets. These sukuk 
are suitable for investors who are looking for tradable and liquid sukuk and also 
suitable for investors who are looking for a less-risky and medium term investment. In 
mudaraba, a type of musharaka, an owner of capital, supplies and equipment may 
agree with a contractor where the latter undertakes to construct buildings at the 
expense of the former and share the profits of the construction business. In both 
above mentioned types of musharaka, after construction projects are completed, 
profits can be made from mark-up sales as per murabaha or rental fees by using ijara 
and also rental fees plus sale price in the end in accordance with ijara-wa-iqtina. 
Another suitable scheme for commercial construction is istisna. As per istisna, the 
contractor would have to construct houses or any other type of building in accordance 
with the specifications set out in the construction/purchase order of buyers who agree 
to purchase and pay the price of the house or similar building in advance (using a 
salam contract facility) or gradually in accordance with construction progress. The 
contractor will issue certificates (i.e., salam sukuk) to the customers, who would in 
turn be able to trade and exchange these certificates in financial exchange markets. 
A modern mode of financing which is regularly used in construction and also in 
energy and infrastructure sectors is project finance. Project finance has been attractive 
for many reasons; however, different projects require different financing structures. 
The most common characteristics of modern project finance are: a) the existence of a 
Special Purpose Entity or Vehicle (SPE or SPV); b) high leverage; c) a long term capital 
structure; d) non-recourse debt; e) extensive and complex contracts; f) attempts at risk 
allocation; g) security for lenders through protective covenants (such as provisions 
requiring new debt to be junior and subordinated to senior debt). Although this 
structure seems to be very similar to the mudaraba scheme in Islamic finance; 
however, it is not for the following reasons: a) in mudaraba, the return for the 
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financier is not guaranteed but the financier shares in the realised profits of the 
project, if any at all; b) in mudaraba, the financier remains the owner of its own 
provided capital to the scheme and the ownership of the funds neither transfers to the 
project (SPV) nor the entrepreneur/contractor; c) as per Sharia, the creation of a 
separate legal entity as an SPV in order to transfer some assets to limit the liability of 
the creator of SPV is not allowed;119 d) the payment of a guaranteed interest on the 
loans provided by the financier is prohibited according to Sharia.   
 
4.3.5 The Agriculture and Farming Projects 
Suitable financing schemes for agriculture and farming business are muzara’a 
(crop-sharing), musaqat (produce-sharing), salam (forward sale), bay nasiya (deferred 
payment sale), ijara (leasing) and a’riya (using other peoples’ property free of charge). 
As per a muzara’a agreement, a land owner120 provides a farmer with the required 
land where the latter plants and shares the crops with the former. In musaqat, an 
owner of trees and similar plants provides trees for a farmer, who then maintains and 
grows the trees and shares its produce (fruits, leaves, flowers and similar products) 
with the owner of the trees. In case the land owner and farmer are in desperate need 
of funds, they can sell their prospective crops and produce in advance on the basis of a 
salam contract (forward sale). Bay nasiya (deferred payment sale of agricultural and 
farming equipment, supplies and machinery), a’ariya (a permission to use agriculture 
and farming equipment, supplies, and machinery free of charge temporarily) and ijara 
(leasing temporarily the agricultural and farming equipment, supplies, and machinery 
                                                   
119
 In contemporary Islamic finance practices, the concept of limited liability and also the 
establishment of a separate legal entity are used almost with no objection. However, as discussed in this 
thesis this practice is ly in sharp contradiction with Sharia. 
120
 As per the research theory, the ownership of natural resources including lands always remains with 
the public as a whole (which is administered by the House of Wealth on behalf of the public as a whole).   
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in return for payment of certain rental fees) may be used for the procurement of 
supplies and equipment required in agriculture and farming, such as: seeds, water, 
tractors, and combine harvester machinery. Both in muzara’a and musaqat, a pool of 
investors may set up musharaka with the land owner and provide farmer with the 
required capital and other necessary materials and then share the crops, timbers or 
produce. In this case, the investors (musharaka partners) will be issued with 
certificates, i.e., sukuk, indicating their pro rata ownership in musharaka. They will be 
able to exchange or trade these sukuk in financial exchange markets. These sukuk are 
suitable for investors who are looking for tradable and liquid sukuk and also those 
investors who are looking for a less-risky and short term investment.  
 
4.3.6 The Livestock-Raising Activities 
A livestock owner and grazier may agree that the former provides livestock and 
the latter breeds, guards and tends the livestock to share the meat, milk, dairy 
products or similar produce from the livestock based on a mutually pre-agreed 
equitable ratio. It is clear that this arrangement is similar to muzara’a and musaqat in 
agriculture and farming business and also the use of mudaraba in investment business. 
A musharaka can also be established to acquire livestock. In this case, musharaka 
partners (investors), as the stock owners will be issued with certificates, i.e., sukuk, 
indicating their pro rata ownership in musharaka. The sukuk holders will be able to 
exchange or trade these sukuk. Therefore, these sukuk are suitable for investors who 
are looking for tradable and liquid sukuk and also suitable for investors who are 
looking for a less-risky, short term investment. 
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4.3.7 The Procurement and Manufacturing 
In the field of procurement and manufacturing, a manufacturer may sometimes 
need to acquire raw materials or other goods and equipment. For this purpose, a 
supplier may sell the necessary materials and equipment with deferred payments 
(using murabaha or bay nasiya facilities) to the manufacturer. Another way is by the 
engagement of a third party mudarib, who will initiate a mudaraba arrangement. The 
mudarib (on the basis of a mudaraba facility) will issue (murabaha) sukuk to the 
prospective investors (multiple rabb al-mal), who would like to engage in financing the 
supply of goods and equipment to the manufacturer through murabaha or bay nasiya 
arrangements. The murabaha sukuk holders will receive fixed regular payments in the 
short or medium term and will share with the mudarib the mark-up or profits arising 
out of the sales as per their pre-agreed equitable ratio. In principle, the sukuk holders 
will not be able to trade or exchange the sukuk against the cash or fixed receivables or 
cash flow with an excess or a discount. Therefore, as far as the issue of tradability or 
liquidity is concerned, murabaha sukuk are not suitable for investors who are looking 
for tradable and liquid sukuk but they are suitable for investors who are interested in a 
less-risky investment. To be tradable, the underlying asset of the sukuk must be non-
monetary (i.e., neither cash nor fixed receivables). Another suitable financing facility 
for manufacturers or producers is istisna. As per istisna, the manufacturer makes 
goods or any type of machinery according to the specifications set out in the 
manufacture or purchase order of the customers (buyers), who agree to purchase and 
pay the price of the goods or machinery in a lump sum in advance or gradually 
according to manufacturing progress (on the basis of a salam contract). The 
manufacturer will issue certificates (salam/istisna sukuk) to the customers (buyers), 
who will be able to trade and exchange them.     
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4.3.8 The Exploration and Research Projects 
In cases where a person (ja’eel) needs to engage someone else (a’mil) for doing 
exploration or a research project in return for some compensation (jo’l) the 
arrangement is called ji’ala. The recompense may be a known consideration (if the 
engagement has a not-for-profit purpose) or a portion of the explored or discovered 
product (if it is done for the purposes of profit). For example, an owner of land (i.e., 
the House of Wealth on behalf of the public) may engage a contractor to conduct an 
exploration for oil or any other mineral resources. The engagement would be in return 
for a known recompense or a portion of the produced oil or any other mineral. The 
explored or discovered product would belong to the ja’eel and an a’mil would hold the 
explored or discovered product in trust, under custody, until its delivery to the ja’eel. 
The a’mil will become entitled to the recompense when he delivers the product to 
ja’eel. In a ji’ala arrangement, a dealer can purchase the contingent properties of the 
ja’eel or the agreed portion of a’mil in the contingent properties (when it is agreed 
that the recompense of a’mil will be a portion of the discovered or explored 
properties). The a’mil may in turn act as a mudarib and issue ji’ala sukuk to prospective 
investors who would like to engage in financing the project. The ji’ala sukuk holders 
are considered the owners of the contingent portion of the product. As per this 
arrangement, the sukuk holders are able to exchange or trade the ji’ala sukuk. 
Therefore, ji’ala sukuk are suitable for investors who are looking for tradable and liquid 
sukuk and also suitable for investors who are looking for a high risk but profitable 





4.4 Best Western For-Profit Practices 
There are some Western modes of financing which are good enough to be 
adopted in the new alternative model with only some marginal changes in their 
structure or characteristics. Not only are these successful and widely used, but they 
are also largely consistent with the theory of balancism and also Sharia rules and 
objectives. These widely used best customary practices are: partnerships, joint stock 
companies, venture capital, mutual funds (open-end and closed-end), and private 
equity (funds).   
 
4.4.1 Partnership 
A partnership121 is an association of two or more persons who enter into an 
agreement to carry on a business (as co-owners of the business) in which they promise 
to make contributions (either in the form of capital or services) in return for a share of 
profits including the surplus and also a share of losses.122 In a prima facie partnership, 
in the absence of an agreement, partners receive neither salary,123 nor commission, 
                                                   
121
 Here, the discussion about partnership is based on the New York State “Uniform Partnership Act” 
(NY Partnership Law), which governs partnerships. A partnership may be set up in one of these forms: 
General Partnership, Limited Partnership, Registered Limited Liability Partnership (RLLP), and Limited 
Liability Company (LLC). Aside from general partnerships, all other partnerships also referred to as 
alternative unincorporated business organisations.     
122
 The share of profit is liquid, transferrable, and the personal property of the partners. However, 
limited partners as with their limited right of control have limited right of liquidity i.e., their interests in 
the partnership are not freely transferable without the unanimous consent of all partners.  
123
 In other words, partnership is not employment setting i.e., not about salary. This is exactly 
consistent with the implications of the theory applied in the thesis i.e., contribution-based distribution 
or balancism.  
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nor fixed interest124 nor similar compensation. Furthermore, in a prima facie 
partnership, all partners will be entitled to equal control,125 through a vote, over the 
partnership. The partners are categorised into either general partners or limited 
partners. General partners, who exercise managerial control of the business, are 
personally liable for all debts and obligations of the partnership. In contrast, limited 
partners, who may not exercise substantial managerial control of the business without 
forfeiting their limited liability status, have limited liability. In the case of the 
dissolution of the partnership, priority is given as follows: to all outside creditors, to all 
internal creditors, to all capital contributors, and finally if any profits remain, these are 
to be shared equally/proportionally among partners. In terms of the distribution rule, 
each partner receives their loans and capital contributions, plus their share of profits 
minus their share of losses (if any). Obviously, the prima facie modern partnership is 
the most similar collective investment scheme to the musharaka facility in Islamic law. 
It is well understood in Islamic finance that that the return on an investment has to be 
linked to the performance of the venture being invested in, and that the capital 
contributed must be liable to the financial risks of the venture. As such, Islamic 
financing has a tendency toward a “partnership” model (rather than the Western 
debtor-creditor model), with the capital provider and receiver sharing any profit or loss 
                                                   
124
 In other words, the contribution of every single partner is treated as an equity interest, which is 
contingent, rather than an advancement of a loan with a fixed interest. This is in exact conformity with 
the implications of the theory applied in the thesis i.e., the interest accruing to a given contribution has 
to be contingent and linked to real economic activities.   
125
 According to NY Partnership Act, with regard to share in management, it is an asset that is owned 
by the partnership itself, and not by the individual partners. Individual partners may not transfer their 
share of management/control to some third parties (e.g., a partner cannot sell his right to vote). 
Partnership members may control the partnership themselves, but may also delegate to third party 
professional managers. As per the research theory, if it is managed by one or some of the partners 
themselves their share has to be adjusted up to compensate it and if it is managed by third party 
professionals they are treated just like other partners and will be given a proportionate share according 
to their contribution of professional services.    
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in a preagreed arrangement.126 That is why, it can be said that that Islamic finance is 
much more similar to the Uniform Partnership Act in the US than it is the UCC Article 9 
provisions as to secured transactions.127  
Some important adjustments to the Western partnership model are necessary in 
order to make it suitable as per the research theory. Every single partner has to have 
(unlimited) proportionate liability. The partnership, in and of itself, holds no legal 
personality and consequently no ownership right over the contributions of the 
partners.  
 
4.4.2 Joint Stock Company (JSC) 
In considering the modern practices of a joint stock company, it seems it is a 
hybrid of (sharkat) inan and (sharkat) mudaraba concepts as they are found in 
Sharia.128 All the participants that contribute equity capital are considered 
shareholders (partners). In some cases, one or more of the shareholders may assume 
the management of the joint-stock company. The shareholders who contribute capital 
                                                   
126
 See Frank E. Vogel and Samuel L. Hayes ‘Islamic Law and Finance: Religion, Risk, and Return’ 
(Leiden: Boston, Mass. :Brill, 2006) p. 130.   
127
  See McKean James Evans ‘The Future of Conflict between Islamic and Western Financial Systems: 
Profit, Principle and Pragmatism’ (University of Pittsburgh Law Review, Vol. 71, Issue 4, Summer 2010) p. 
824.  
128
 Some scholars have argued that the structure of a modern joint stock company is very similar to the 
concept of mudaraba in Islamic law. They have further argued that the concept of separation of 
ownership and control is also found in the structure of Islamic mudaraba. See A. R. Abdul Rahman 
‘Issues in Corporate Accountability and Governance: An Islamic Perspective’ (American Journal of Islamic 
Social Sciences, vol. 15, 1998) pp. 60-61; see also, S. W. Hasanuzzaman ‘Limited Liability of Shareholders: 
An Islamic Perspective’ (Islamic Studies, vol. 28, 1989) pp. 355-358. As per Wormser, a joint stock 
company is a type of business association which is considered midway between the partnership and the 
corporation. The truth is, however, that the modern joint stock organisation, as a result of statutory 
developments, includes the most of the key features of the private corporation that nowadays it is too 
difficult in many situations to determine precisely where the legal domain occupied by joint stock 
organisations begins and ends. See I. Maurice Wormser ‘Legal Status of Joint Stock Associations’ 
(Fordham Law Review, Vol. 3, Issue 1, pp. 1-10) pp. 1 and 9.   
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and also assume the responsibility of the management of the company play two roles: 
partner (rabb al-maal/sharik) and manager (mudarib).129 Therefore, their contributions 
are in the form of both tangible (capital contribution) and also intangible 
(management skills). Their proportionate shares in the company are adjusted up to 
compensate for their intangible contribution. However, the manager of the company 
does not have to be a member of the tangible contributors to the company and he 
may be invited solely to contribute his management skills without having to contribute 
any tangible assets such as capital. In such situations, the third party invitee will be 
treated either as one of the shareholders of the company or will act merely as a 
mudarib of the company on the basis of a mudaraba arrangement. In general, the 
modern joint-stock company does not contradict the rules of Sharia provided that, like 
any other type of partnership, contributions made to the company as well as all 
transactions of the company dealing with third parties and also activities in which the 
company involved in, should be consistent with the rules and objectives of Sharia.   
 
4.4.3 Venture Capital (VC) 
A venture capital firm is an investment and entrepreneurship firm that is most 
commonly identified with Californian Silicon Valley start-ups.130 They have been very 
                                                   
129
 For more see Mahmood Mohamed Sanusi ‘Critical Issues on Islamic Banking, Finance and Takaful’ 
(Kuala Lumpur, INCEIF/2010) p. 186.  
130
 These start-up (investment or entrepreneurship) firms have a “high risk-high reward” (i.e., a larger 
probability of small loss against a smaller probability of large gains) nature. Empirical research has 
revealed that about seven percent of such start-ups in the US (between 1969-1985) yielded returns of 
more than ten times the invested seed capital compared to more than sixty percent of them that either 
lost the invested capital or generated returns less than savings account rates of return in the same 
period. See W. D. Bygrave and J. A. Timmons ‘Venture Capital at the Crossroads’ (Boston Harvard 
Business school, 1992) pp. 1-2, 9  
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successful131 in introducing the most advanced technologies by investing in new 
research and development projects while creating a massive job market, additional tax 
revenue and export potential in the US and increasingly in Europe and South East Asia 
especially in emerging economies.132 Moreover, venture capital firms respond to a 
great need of entrepreneurs, who are hungry for capital and are unable to raise funds 
from the conventional banking system or from family members or close friends. To 
advance loans, the conventional banks demand heavy guarantees, which are not 
affordable for entrepreneurs to meet and are too burdensome for family members or 
friends to finance the financial needs of entrepreneurs. Venture capitalists fill this 
vacuum (known as the MacMillan gap)133 by providing the financial needs of young 
entrepreneurs without demanding collateral and without imposing other burdensome 
conditions.  
According to Cronson134, a venture capital usually involves a business association, 
a project, or an idea which is not “bankable”. It is said that a business enterprise, 
whether it be a proprietorship, or corporation, or partnership or trust, has arrived at a 
development phase when it is “bankable”, i.e., it can receive funding through some 
intermediary financial agencies and tools such as banks and public offerings. This type 
of commercial financing facility is usually available to an enterprise with a performance 
                                                   
131
 Very successful products of venture capital initiatives are Apple Computer, Fed Ex, and Kleiner & 
Perkins. The first classic venture capital, the American Research and Development Company was 
established in1946 by General Doriot, who was teaching at Harvard at the time. See Murat Cizakca 
‘Islamic Capitalism and Finance: Origins, Evolution, and the Future’ (Edward Elgar, Studies in Islamic 
Finance, Accounting, and Governance, 2011) pp. 249-250. 
132
 For more detail in this regard see Matt Richtel ‘Silicon Valley Investors Lobby for Clean Fuel’ 
(International Herald Tribune, 30 January 2007; John Tagliabue ‘Start-ups Become Old Hat for 
Europeans’ (International Herald Tribune, 2006; Rebecca Buckman ‘Venture to Nowhere’ (Forbes Asia, 
12 January 2009).  
133
 See Murat Cizakca ‘Islamic Capitalism and Finance: Origins, Evolution, and the Future’ (Edward 
Elgar, Studies in Islamic Finance, Accounting, and Governance, 2011) p. 251. 
134
 See Robert G. Cronson ‘Venture Capital Financing- Legal and Financial Considerations’ (Notre Dame 
Lawyer, Vol. 48, Issue 3, February 1973) pp. 614-622) p. 614.  
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record which signifies enough incomes or assets to attract a commercial loan and 
present reasonable assurance of repayment.   
A classic venture capital firm, which functions as a partnership in the US, is made 
up of investors who are usually institutional investors, such as: pension funds,135 
banks, and insurance companies, and they provide capital (as limited partners) to a 
venture capital firm, which is operated by general partners,136 in return for the 
acquisition of certain equity shares in the venture capital firm.137 General partners of 
the venture capital firm use the funds in equity financing of different, diversified138 and 
often young entrepreneurs, who have very promising and potentially lucrative 
business plans. The selected entrepreneur sets up a joint stock corporation (i.e., an 
entrepreneurial company), whose majority shares139 are acquired by the venture 
capital firm in return for its equity finance. The profits generated from the investment 
cycle are shared among the limited partners and general partners of the VC according 
                                                   
135
 In the US, the participation of pension funds in the venture capital industry was made possible in 
1974, when the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) was introduced. The Act made it 
possible for pension funds to invest in VCs up to 2.5 percent of their portfolio. A few years later the 
introduction of two more Acts i.e., Bayh-Dole Act in 1980 as well as the reduction of the Capital Gains 
Tax to a maximum of 28 percent caused a significant growth in the VC industry in the US. The Bayh-Dole 
Act made it possible for companies to have access to government-owned patents, which had been 
created in laboratories of the public-financed universities throughout the country. The US government 
or the relevant government agency transferred the ownership of the patents to the universities where 
the research had resulted in inventions and the universities made their contribution to the VCs by 
transferring (licensing) patents to entrepreneurial researchers. This regulation led to impressive results 
around the country. 
136
 The contribution of the general partners to the venture capital is their professional knowledge and 
expertise. In return for such a contribution, the general partners get a 20-25 percent share of the 
venture capital. 
137
 In other words, a venture capital transaction is neither a loan transaction nor a credit transaction 
but an equity finance transaction.  
138
 The reason for forming a portfolio of entrepreneurs by the venture capital enterprise is to reduce 
the risk of loss. It is expected that the losses made by one entrepreneur will be off-set by the profits 
made by another.    
139
 Normally, nobody other than the venture capital firm will be interested in buying the shares of this 
newly established enterprise. That is why the shares are bought by the VC at a very low price (because 




to a mutually pre-agreed ratio.140 These profits are, in fact, reflected in the enhanced 
share value of the entrepreneurial company and the participants (venture capitalists) 
earn their profits and exit from the investment cycle by selling their shares at an OTC 
market like NASDAQ by way of an initial public offering (IPO) process or, alternatively, 
selling their shares to a conglomerate through an M&A process. The entire pecuniary 
loss141 made by the entrepreneurs accrues to the venture capital enterprise and is 
ultimately shouldered by the participants (i.e., the venture capitalists/financiers). The 
loss of the entrepreneurs and the general partners of the venture capital enterprise 
are reflected in them being unpaid for their professional efforts and management 
services.142    
Venture capital143 can be looked at as a developed version of a mudaraba144 
scheme. As a default rule, under a mudaraba145 contract, a mudarib (entrepreneur) 
                                                   
140
 The venture capital and the relevant entrepreneurs will share the profits according to their 
mutually pre-agreed (equitable) ratio in their relevant mudaraba contracts.   
141
 The pecuniary loss is in fact reflected in the form of worthless shares of the relevant 
entrepreneurial company.  
142
 See Murat Cizakca ‘Islamic Capitalism and Finance: Origins, Evolution, and the Future’ (Edward 
Elgar, Studies in Islamic Finance, Accounting, and Governance, 2011) pp. 251-253, 256.  
143
 Venture capital is set up just like an Islamic-based sharkat (partnership).  
144
 A partnership that is set up as a result of a mudaraba contract does not hold a separate legal entity. 
All dealings with third parties will be made by the mudarib in his name even though the mudarib will 
have to share the results of the dealings with the capital provider (rabb al-maal) on a pre-agreed 
(equitable) ratio basis. As per Iran Commerce Code articles 116 and 220, rabb al-maal and mudarib will 
be jointly and severally liable to third parties. For an analysis in this regard see Nasser Katouzian ‘Huquq 
Madani: Uqud Mu’ayyan” (Tehran: Sharkat Sahami Intishar, vol. 5) no. 56. Mudaraba (which is also 
called qirad) is, in fact, one type of musharaka in the Sharia. For somewhat similar but different views in 
this regard see Omar Shaikh ‘Private Equity- Modern day Musharaka?’ (Islamic Finance News, vol. 4, 
issue 45, 2 January 2010).         
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cannot assign the mudaraba contract to another mudarib, unless a rabb al-maal 
(capital provider/principal) has agreed with the assignment of a mudariba contract. In 
the case of assignment of the mudaraba contract (which includes a delegation of 
duties as well), the first mudarib is replaced by the new (second) mudarib and the first 
mudarib is released from his obligations under the mudaraba contract and also loses 
all his rights (a novation occurs). The new (second) mudarib will have to take all the 
rights and duties (of the first mudarib) under the original mudaraba arrangement. 
However, as a default rule, a mudarib may assign his rights as well as his duties (if they 
are impersonal) under the mudaraba contract to a third party (e.g., he may contract 
with another mudarib)146. In this case, the mudarib remains liable to the rabb al-maal 
even after delegating his duties under the (original) mudaraba contract.147  
In an Islamic venture capital scheme, the participants i.e., equity capital 
providers to the venture capital enterprise cannot be the same as their classical 
counterparts because of the limitations imposed by Sharia. Even in the Islamic setting, 
whether an Islamic waqf or a takaful institution could be a venture capital participant 
remains under serious doubt. However, any business association that is consistent 
                                                                                                                                                             
145
 Some Islamic scholars believe that mudaraba is a combination of wakala, wadi’a and sharkat 
contracts. They argue that mudarib is considered as wakil (agent) of rabb al-maal in order for doing 
transactions with his capital. To do transactions, rabb al-maal entrusts the required capital under a 
wadi’a contract to a mudarib. If there are any positive returns, they will both share the profits in a pre-
agreed ratio under the mudaraba contract. See Nasser Katouzian ‘Huquq Madani: Uqud Mu’ayyan, 
Musharakatha-Sulh’ (Tehran: Ganj-e-Danesh, vol. 2, 7
th
 Edition, 2007) pp. 108-109 no. 58. See also 
Shahid Thani ‘Masalik al-Afham: Sharh bar Sharaye-e-Muhaqqiq’ chap-e sangi, vol. 1/2) p.281; 
Muhammad Hasan Najafi a.k.a. Sahib Jawahir ‘Jawahir al-Kalam: Matajir’ (Najaf: chap-e surbi in 43 
volumes) p. 458.    
146
 In this case, the second mudaraba is considered a new independent mudaraba contract by and 
between the first mudarib (now a new rabb al-maal) and the second mudarib. However, it will have no 
effect on the original mudaraba contract made between the (original) rabb al-mal and the (first) 
mudarib.  
147
 For some supporting evidence in this regard see Iran Civil Code articles 553-556 (especially article 
554). See also Nasser Katouzian ‘Huquq Madani: Uqud Mu’ayyan, Musharakatha-Sulh’ (Tehran: Ganj-e-
Danesh, 7
th
 edition, vol. 2, 2007) pp. 133-134 no. 73.  
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with the rules of Sharia as well as high-net-worth private investors, who will be issued 
certain mudaraba or muqarada securities (sukuk) in return for their equity capital 
contributions, can participate in the equity finance of venture capital enterprise.148 
Another important point is that the manager (mudarib) of an Islamic venture capital 
cannot assign the mudaraba contract (i.e., venture capital enterprise) to 
entrepreneurs, unless participants (rabb al-maals) have agreed with the assignment. 
However, what can happen in an Islamic venture capital, as practised in classic venture 
capital projects, is not the assignment of the venture capital enterprise but only the 
assignment of the rights including the delegation of duties (if they are impersonal) of 
the mudarib of the venture capital to the entrepreneurs. In this case, the 
entrepreneur/s will be liable to the venture capital mudarib, who remains liable to the 
participants (equity capital providers). In other words, there would be no contractual 
relationship between the participants and entrepreneurs. Consequently, the pre-
agreed profit and loss sharing ratio in each of the mudariba contracts (one between 
the participants and the mudarib of venture capital and the others between the 
                                                   
148
 A very critical issue in Islamic mudaraba-based venture capital is the guarantee of initial equity 
capital of the participants especially if the participants are members of the public. In Jordan and also 
Malaysia this guarantee is provided by the state (the state- but neither the venture capitalist mudarib 
nor the entrepreneur/s- promises that it will redeem the mudaraba/muqarada securities at a certain 
time in the future). See Mahmood M. Sanusi ‘Muqarada Islamic Bonds as an Alternative to Bay’ al-Inah 
and Bay’ al-Dayn Bonds: A Critical Analysis’ (International Journal of Islamic Financial Services, no.2, 
1999) pp. 49-52; Wan Abdul Rahim Kamil ‘Introduction to Sukuk (in Ram Ratings, Malaysian Sukuk 
Market Handbook)’ (Kuala Lumpur: Tijanimas, 2008) p.27. Despite serious Sharia concerns, this practice 
of (an independent) third party guarantee (which is often provided by the state) has been approved by 
the AAOIFI with its Shari’ah standards no.17. See Muhammad al-Bashir Muhammad Al-Amine ‘Sukuk 
Market: Innovations and Challenges’ (paper submitted at the International Conference on Islamic 
Capital Markets, 2008). For more on guarantees see also AAOIFI Shari’ah Standards no.5 on Guarantees.  
The major criticism against the state-financed third party guarantee is why the risk of loss of the 
investments of participants in venture capital enterprises has to be shouldered by the public i.e., tax-
payers, who do not share in the profits generated by the venture capital enterprises. This practice is 
certainly in conflict with well established Sharia rules, such as man-lahul-qunm-alayhil-qurm and also la-
darara-wa-la-dirar.     
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mudarib of the venture capital and the entrepreneurs) will not necessarily be the same 
and they may be in different ratios and under different terms.      
Regarding the practice of venture capital in Islamic countries, it was first done in 
Turkey in 1993, when the “Turkish Capital Market Board” imposed a minimum capital 
requirement for the establishment of venture capital in Turkey. The imposed high 
capital adequacy standard prevented the viability of the venture capital industry in 
Turkey.149 In January 2005, the government of Malaysia established the “Malaysian 
Venture Capital Development Council” to facilitate the development of the industry in 
Malaysia with the support of the government itself.150 Despite the fact that venture 
capital is traditionally a private sector enterprise, the state of Malaysia itself has 
established some venture capital firms, such as; the Malaysia Venture Capital 
Management (MAVCAP), and the Malaysian Technology Development Corporation 
(MTDC).151 
 
4.4.4 Mutual Fund (Open-end and Closed-end)  
A mutual fund is a kind of professionally managed collective investment 
scheme that pools money from different types of participants to invest in variety of 
securities such as bonds, stocks and money-market instruments. Mutual funds, which 
are sometimes referred to as “investment companies” or “registered investment 
companies” and found in many varieties including index funds, stock funds, bond 
funds, and money-market funds, are normally applied only to those collective 
                                                   
149
 See Tansu Ciller and Murat Cizakca ‘Turk Finans Kesiminde Sorunlar ve Reform Onerileri’ (Istanbul: 
ISO, 1989).  
150
 In May 2008, the Malaysian Securities Commission issued “The Guidelines and Best Practices on 
Islamic Finance Venture Capital”. 
151
 See Murat Cizakca ‘Islamic Capitalism and Finance: Origins, Evolution, and the Future’ (Edward 
Elgar, Studies in Islamic Finance, Accounting, and Governance, 2011) pp. 261-262. 
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investment vehicles that are regulated and sold to the general public. From one 
perspective, mutual funds are divided into two broad categories: open-end and closed-
end.152           
An open-end mutual fund is an investment vehicle153 that continually sells new 
shares and redeems its shares at the request of the shareholders and invests its capital 
in a diversified portfolio of assets, e.g., in a diversified portfolio of securities issued by 
different companies. An open-end mutual fund is the predominant form of pooled 
investment vehicles in the US154 (more assets in open-end mutual funds alone than in 
the depository banking system), designed for public offering to retail, i.e., non-
sophisticated investors, allowing them to share economies of scale and reduce 
transaction costs. Equal participation in a diversified pool, daily redemptions, daily 
                                                   
152
 For more on Mutual Funds see U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) ‘U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission Information on Mutual Funds’ (Available at 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/mutfund.htm) Retrieved 28 March, 2013.  
153
 In the UK, funds are known as collective investment schemes (CISs) governed by the Financial 
Services and Markets Act (FSMA) 2000. As per FSMA (section 235) “any arrangement with respect to 
property of any description, including money, the purpose or effect of which is to enable persons taking 
part in the arrangements (whether by becoming owners of the property or any part of it or otherwise) 
to participate in or receive profits or income arising from the acquisition, holding, management or 
disposal of the property or sums paid out of such profits or income”. CISs can be set up either as open or 
closed forms and they come in numerous legal schemes. Basically, CISs are organised either in the form 
of a “unit trust”, an “investment company”, or a “limited partnership”. For more on the definition and 
structure of these CISs, and also governing regulations in the UK and also the EU see Jan H. Dalhuisen 
‘Dalhuisen on Transnational Comparative, Commercial, Financial and Trade Law’ (Hart Publishing, vol. 3, 
4
th
 edition, 2010) pp. 302-304. Dalhuisen points out the differences between a “unit” in a unit trust and 
a “share” in a company referring to Charles v Federal Commission of Taxation [1954] 90 CLR 598. He also 
mentions the differences between limited partnership and limited liability partnership in the UK.   
154
 For more on mutual funds in the US see Investment Company Institute (ICI) ‘A Guide to 
Understanding Mutual Funds’ Available via the Internet at www.ici.org. See also Investment Company 
Institute (ICI) ‘Investment Company Fact Book 49
th
 Edition (A Review of Trends and Activity in the 
Investment Company Industry)’ (2009) Available via the Internet at www.icifactbook.org. For some 
reforming suggestions as to mutual funds see John C. Coates IV ‘Reforming the Taxation and Regulation 
of Mutual Funds: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis’ Electronic copy available via the Internet 
at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1311945, Revised December 30, 2008. In the US, mutual funds are 
regulated under the Investment Company Act of 1940.  The primary purpose of the Act is to protect 
investors. Investment companies and investment managers are also regulated by the Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940.   
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valuation of fund assets, and liquid portfolio (>85%) are the key features of the open-
end mutual fund. The open-end mutual fund is an open-ended investment company, 
because it is continuously selling shares and by law it must redeem those shares, i.e., 
buy back its issued stocks for their net asset value (NAV) from the relevant investors. 
NAV changes every day and a fair market valuation is a critically important part of the 
open-end mutual fund.155 The open-end mutual funds industry is a very big complex 
industry and is available in a wide variety of investment styles (stock funds, bond 
funds, and alternative strategies), both domestic and international.   
On a basic level, an open-end mutual fund is more compliant with the rules and 
objectives of Sharia as compared to a banking institution. Investors in open-end 
mutual funds, unlike depositors in the banking system, remain the owners of their 
contributions pro rata, and consequently, although the open-end mutual funds are 
professionally managed, the investors still have the right to control the professional 
managers. However, two major Sharia concerns with regard to open-end mutual 
funds, as with almost all other modern business associations are the issues 
surrounding limited liability and investment activities.    
A closed-end mutual fund is a regulated investment company that issues a fixed 
number of shares.156 The shares of a closed-end fund (CEF) are offered through 
underwritten initial public offerings (IPOs).157 In CEFs, unlike open-end mutual funds, 
there are no daily redemption rights (i.e., CEFs do not have an obligation to redeem 
the shares). CEFs, unlike open-end mutual funds, can hold illiquid assets beyond the 
                                                   
155
 Many mutual funds usually contract third party professionals to provide pricing (NAV) services. In 
the US, mutual funds have to send their NAV from 4 pm (end of the market of the NYSE) to 6 pm. 
156
 For more on Closed-End Funds in the US see Investment Company Institute (ICI) ‘A Guide to Closed-
End Funds’ Available via the Internet at www.ici.org. See also Investment Company Institute (ICI) 
‘Investment Company Fact Book 49
th
 Edition (A Review of Trends and Activity in the Investment 
Company Industry)’ (2009) Available via the Internet at www.icifactbook.org. 
157
 A closed-end fund does not have the stabilization features that an open-end mutual fund has.  
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15% limit of open-end mutual funds. The shares of CEFs are generally listed on a stock 
exchange (or traded in the OTC market), which is where investors are supposed to get 
liquidity from. However, CEFs frequently trade at a discount to their NAV.  
Limited liability and investment activities are the two major Sharia concerns with 
regard to CEFs. If the limited liability rule were to be substituted with a proportionate 
liability standard and if they were to follow halal investment activities, these funds, like 
other types of (mutual) funds, would in principle be in conformity with Sharia rules and 
objectives.   
 
4.4.5 Private Equity (Fund) 
A private equity fund158 is an asset class or equity capital (fund) consisting of 
equity securities in operating companies which is not listed on an official market and 
whose stocks/shares are not traded on a stock exchange. A private equity fund is 
initiated by entrepreneurs, and funded by retail and institutional investors who intend 
to engage in long term investments and can commit large sums of money for long 
periods of time. They take the exchange-listed distressed public companies, also 
suffering from poor management, take them private (i.e., delist them) and make a 
profit by way of the provision of better management in a relatively long period and 
                                                   
158
 Mostly, private equities employ a fund structure to attract more investors to raise capital. However, 
private equity firms and also investment banks may make investments directly. Thus, similar to hedge 
fund practices, the activity itself and the conduct of it by way of funds should be distinguished. See Jan 
H. Dalhuisen ‘Dalhuisen on Transnational Comparative, Commercial, Financial and Trade Law’ (Hart 
Publishing, vol. 3, 4
th
 edition, 2010) p. 313. 
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thereafter liquidating the companies typically through an IPO or reselling to another 
private firm.159    
These are the essential features of a private equity. A private equity is created 
where its financial sponsors intend to acquire companies with a view toward 
improvement and eventual sale of such companies. The next essential characteristic of 
a private equity is “earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortisation” 
(“EBITDA”). For this purpose, investors of a private equity usually acquire target 
companies using leveraged buyouts160. Financial sponsors of a private equity also seek 
for a particular type of a founder or principal of the target company who will be willing 
of continuing to operate the company and remaining with the business and 
establishing a partnership with the financial sponsors of the private equity to 
implement its business strategy for improvement and eventual sale or public offering 
of the company.161     
From a Sharia point of view, the major concern about private equities is 
leveraged buyout (LBO) that is conducted by many of these types of firms. By way of 
an LBO facility, the private equity makes use of its small assets, and those of the large 
                                                   
159
 For an extensive and useful discussion on the law and practice of private equity in the UK and EU 
see Jan H. Dalhuisen “Dalhuisen on Transnational Comparative, Commercial, Financial and Trade Law’ 
(Hart Publishing, vol. 3, 4
th
 edition, 2010) pp. 313-314. As per Dalhuisen, private equity should be 
distinguished from venture capital. The major difference between venture capital and private equity is 
that the former is used for start-ups but the latter is to take large poor-functioning, exchange-listed 
companies private. He points out some true concerns in private equities especially the protection of 
private investors against the excessive risk-taking and compensation of their investment managers. 
Dalhuisen calls for a carefully-focused regulation of private equity industry.    
160
 In order to increase returns and also the number of purchased companies, private equity firms seek 
to borrow as much debt as possible and provide as little equity as feasible onto the capital structure of 
their acquisitions. That is why a private equity is heavily dependent on the nature of debt financing and 
also the availability of credit. See Steven M. Davidoff ‘The Failure of Private Equity’ (Southern California 
Law Review, Vol. 82, 2008-2009, pp. 481-545) p. 489. For more detail see also Robert P. Bartlett III 
‘Taking Finance Seriously: How Debt Financing Distorts Bidding Outcomes in Corporate Takeovers’ 
(Fordham Law Review, Vol. 76,  2008).   
161
 See Jeffrey A. Blomberg ‘Private Equity Transactions: Understanding Some Fundamental Principles’ 
(Business Law Today, Vol. 17, Issue 3, January/February 2008) pp. 51-52.    
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public target company, to raise the loans required to fund a large purchase i.e., a 
takeover deal. These loans are indeed interest-bearing debts that render the practice 
to be rabawi (usurious). Broadly speaking, where a private equity entrepreneur 
intends to subscribe an Islamic investor into its fund, it will have to consider Sharia-
compliant investment restrictions. The important restrictions that have to be 
incorporated into the fund documentation are: a) no investments will be made in 
haram industries; b) no investments will be made in risk-trading or riba-bearing162 
instruments such as convertible debt securities; and, c) no participation will happen in 
bridge financings. The use of riba-based debt at both the level of portfolio company 
and also at the level of any financing SPV in the process of acquisition is of special 
concern to Islamic investors, because of the prohibition of riba in Sharia. Also, as 
mentioned before, investment in leverage buyout funds is evidently problematic for 
Islamic investors mainly due to the use of debt financing for acquisition purpose in 
most typical buyout arrangements. It is, though, possible to solve these problems 
through the creation of “Islamic debt” by employing, among other facilities, a lease 
financing arrangement, i.e., ijara wa iqtina163 with regard to the assets of the portfolio 
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 In Islamic finance, the return is only acceptable if the investor shoulders a risk in the financed 
enterprise beyond the credit risk of borrower. Riba prohibition will preclude the private equity fund 
lending or borrowing at interest, or investing in interest-based securities. In Islam, profit signifies 
successful entrepreneurship as well as the creation of additional wealth through the productive 
activities, whereas interest or usury is considered as a cost that is accrued without regarding the result 
of investments and may not create any wealth if there are investment losses. Social justice obliges 
capital providers and receivers to share rewards as well as losses proportionally and that the process of 
wealth creation and its distribution in the economy results in a fair, just and real economy. 
163
 It is also called ijara-thumma-bay or ijara-bisharte-tamlik, or ijara-wa-iqtina, or ijara-montahi-bi-
tamlik. It is a contract which begins with an ijara contract for the purpose of leasing the lessor’s asset to 
the lessee. Consequently, at the end of the lease period, the lessee will have an option to purchase the 
asset at an agreed price from the lessor by executing a sale/purchase (bay) contract.  
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company. Given these concerns, there have been attempts to pool Islamic investors in 
a separate Sharia-compliant vehicle in parallel with the main fund.164    
  
 
                                                   
164
 For more detail see Marwan Al-Turki ‘Sharia-Compliant Private Equity Funds: What Private Equity 







Parts Three, Four and Five of 
the Second Tier of the Model 
(3, 4, 5): Not-For-Profit and 





5.1 An Introduction to Not-For-Profit Facilities  
According to article 11, paragraph 1 of the ICESCR1, “The States Parties to the 
present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for 
himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing, and housing, and to the 
continuous improvement of living conditions”.2 Some scholars have read this article 
very narrowly and limited their focus on basic material goods and essential economic 
rights to promote a “rudimentary degree of dignity and care for human life”. As per 
Khan, the reason for this limited focus is both “pragmatic” and “ideological”. 
Pragmatically, furnishing a certain welfare-like conditions and a particular amount of 
material goods require a lot of cost e.g., the “right to work” and the “right to adequate 
health care”. And ideologically, the purpose of limited interpretation of the article was 
to avoid supporting a Soviet-like socialism model in the midst of the Cold War by 
capitalist, First World countries like the US and UK.3    
As it is suggested in the thesis, it is the responsibility of the “House of Wealth” to 
secure a minimum standard of living for every member of the public, rather than the 
state, through a just distribution of the proceeds of natural wealth resources.  
 
                                                   
1
 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
2
 See ICESCR, Jan. 3, 1976, 993U. N. T. S. 3. See also G.A. Res. 2200, UN GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, 
at 49, UN Doc. A/6316 (1976) (UN Resolution adopting the Covenant).  
3
 See Zeshan Khan ‘International Economic Rights’ (Gonzaga Journal of International Law, Vol. 4) p. 5. 
See generally also Jurgen Habermas ‘The Theory of Communicative Action (translated by T. McCarthy, 
1984) discussing the alienating effects of bureaucratization on people and their links to their 
surrounding community.       
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5.2 Part Three of the Second Tier of the Model (3): Profit-Free 
Facilities 
To help the poor and financially weak to improve their situation, they have to be 
supported by granting and conferring on them some appropriate privileges (imtiyazat). 
In the Islamic finance context, suitable facilities that may be used for empowering 
them are a qard hasana (interest-free loan), an a’riya (use-free contract), and a haq 
intifa (enjoyment privilege). In a qard hasana, the ownership of the property subject to 
qard hasana transfers from the giver to the receiver. In a’riya, the property subject to 
a’riya will remain under the ownership of the giver. As for a’riya, in haq intifa, the 
property subject to haq intifa will remain under the ownership of the granting party or 
the public as the case may be.  
 
5.2.1 Use-Free Contract (A’riya) 
A’riya4 is a facility whereby a person called a mu’eer gives a musta’eer permission 
to derive profits free of charge from a property, which is capable of generating a profit 
while continuing its own existence unconverted, still belonging to the former. The 
ownership of the a’riya property remains with the mu’eer and the musta’eer would 
only enjoy the profits arising out of the a’riya property during the a’riya contract. A 
musta’eer is, in principle, not responsible for the depreciation in value or destruction 
of the a’riya property unless the defect is due to the negligence, or the excessive or 
unreasonable use of the musta’eer. If it is stipulated in the terms of an a’riya contract 
that a musta’eer assumes the responsibility for the depreciation in value or destruction 
of the a’riya property, a musta’eer will be held liable for all losses and damages in this 
                                                   
4
 See Iran Civil Code articles 635-647.      
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regard though the defect is not attributed to the default of a musta’eer.5 A musta’eer 
is obliged to return an a’riya property to a mu’eer upon the request of a mu’eer. This 
facility may be used for microfinance purposes, in order to empower the needy and 
also for the provision of working equipment and supplies for small and medium-sized 
enterprises.            
 
5.2.2 Enjoyment Privilege (Haq Intifa) 
Haq intifa (enjoyment privilege)6 is used when a person is granted a privilege by 
the owner of a property to enjoy or derive profit from a property free of charge or to 
exploit a property which has no specific owner but belongs to the public as a whole. 
 
5.2.3 Interest-Free Loan (Qard Hasana) 
Qard hasana7 is a facility whereby a person called a muqrid (lender) surrenders a 
specific portion of his property8 to somebody else called a muqtarid (borrower). The 
borrower undertakes to return to the lender what is equivalent thereto with regard to 
quantity, kind and description, and if any difficulty occurs to give back the equivalent. 
The borrower will have to pay the price of the same on the day of satisfaction. All the 
risks associated with the ownership of the qard hasana property will be shouldered by 
the borrower simply because he becomes the owner of a qard hasana property upon 
                                                   
5
 This is an exception to the general rule governing a’riya in Sharia. Another important exception 
according to Sharia is that if an a’riya property is either gold or silver whether coined or not coined, the 
musta’eer would be absolutely liable as to all losses and damages occurring to these a’riya properties 
though these are not attributed to the default of the musta’eer.  
6
 See Iran Civil Code articles 40-54, 92.  
7
 It means interest-free financing on the basis of mutual help. See Iran Civil Code articles 648-653.     
8
 The property subject to qard hasana can be a monetary or a non-monetary asset. This is one of the 
major differences between qard hasana and modern loan structures.   
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taking delivery of the property. On the mutually-agreed date, a borrower must return9 
the equivalent of the qard hasana property he has received, even though the value of 
it may have appreciated or depreciated by the time of satisfaction. A major dilemma 
regarding qard hasana is the protection of its purchasing power against inflation, 
considering the ruling “la darara wa la dirar”10 in the Sharia and also “hifz al-maal” 
(protection of property), which is one of the essentials of the objectives of Sharia, 
whilst at the same time avoiding riba. It is obvious that if the value of a qard hasana 
property (if it is money currency) is not protected against inflation its purchasing 
power will diminish during the passage of time. The answer to this paradox is simple. 
The prohibition of riba, which is expressly mentioned in the Quran, prevails over the 
mentioned Sharia rules, which are found in the Sunnah. A lender is never permitted to 
ask for any excess payments from the borrower in addition to the principal or the 
equivalent value of the qard hasana property.11 A qard hasana facility may be used to 
finance the payments of overdue debts and also for the provision of the basic needs of 
the needy. This may also be used for microfinance purposes, to empower individuals 
or entrepreneurs of small or medium-sized enterprises. 
                                                   
9
 The return of the equivalent value of a qard hasana property may be guaranteed by a borrower or a 
third party.   
10
 Harming the rights of others (including the abusive exercise of one’s own right) is not allowed, and 
any losses and damages incurred by the victim because of the offence against the injured party will have 
to be cured.  
11
 For other supporting evidence see Iran Civil Code article 650. 
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5.3 Part Four of the Second Tier of the Model (4): Philanthropic 
Facilities   
Undoubtedly, in any society, there are people who are poor12 or unemployed 
who simply cannot meet their financial needs and pay their debts because they do not 
have enough income and are unable to borrow money. These circumstances may 
require an act of charity.13 Society as a whole should help these poor people through 
charitable giving.14 According to Asutay15, an institutional framework on the basis of 
Islamic axioms and values such as adalah (justice), tawhid (oneness of God), ihsan 
(beneficence), waqf (trust-like concept), and zakat (tax-like notion) has to be set up in 
order to pursue social well-being and respond to the social and developmental needs 
of humanity.16 His research concludes that although Islamic banks and financial 
institutions have unexpectedly performed very well and have even had financial 
success compared to their counterparts - especially during the recent financial crisis - 
the fact remains that this success has been at the cost of ‘social and economic 
developmentalist’ aspirations of the Islamic moral economy.17 They have offered 
                                                   
12
 The Quran recognises two types of poor people: a miskeen, who has no assets and a faqeer, who 
does not have enough to enjoy a decent standard of living.  
13
 As per the Quran (2:280), in circumstances where the debtor is in a difficult situation and needs 
some time to repay his debts, it is strongly recommended that there be a postponement of his 
obligations until his situation improves and that if the creditor voluntarily discharges the debtor and 
writes off the debt (as almsgiving) it would be beneficial for the creditor himself.    
14
 Some believe that, like personal lending, charity should be left to individuals. However, considering 
the modern world where people know each other very little, it is generally agreed that there is a need 
for organised charities to be set up and run across the entire society. For more discussions in this regard 
see A. L. M. Abdul Gafoor ‘Interest, Usury, Riba and the Operational Costs of a Bank’ (A.S. Noordeen, 
2005) pp 50, 60-62. In the Islamic economic order, there are two major concepts in this regard. One is 
sadaqa which is an optional charity and the other is zakat which is an obligatory alms-giving.   
15
 See Mehmet Asutay ‘Conceptualising and Locating the Social Failure of Islamic Finance: Aspirations 
of Islamic Moral Economy vs. the Realities of Islamic Finance’ (Asian and African Area Studies vol. 11, 
issue 2, 2012) pp. 93-97, 110.  
16
 I would add daman ijtima’ee (social responsibility) to the mentioned Islamic values.  
17
 According to Asutay, the Islamic moral economy is the foundation of Islamic finance.  
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products focusing more on their “constructing process” and “form” rather than 
“substance” and “consequence”, the latter two being more important and valuable 
from a social development perspective.18 
In an Islamic setting, an understanding of how to spend wealth19 is very 
important. There are two ways for redistribution20 of wealth to help the promotion of 
the public good or to help the needy: voluntary and obligatory. The former may be 
made in the form of a waqf (a voluntary endowment), a sadaqa (a voluntary 
almsgiving), an ibra (a voluntary waiver of debt receivables) or a hiba (a voluntary 
gift).21 The latter may be performed in the form of zakat (obligatory tax-like duty) or 
kharaj (certain portions of the proceeds of natural wealth resources).22 These two 
ways can play very significant roles in the alleviation of poverty in society. However, it 
seems there should be a kind of hierarchy in the implementation of these two ways. In 
other words, the obligatory institutions should only play their role if the voluntary 
                                                   
18
 See N. Zaman and M. Asutay ‘Divergence between Aspirations and Realities of Islamic Economics: A 
Political Economy Approach to Bridging the Divide’ (IIUM Journal of Economics and Management, vol. 
17, issue 1, 2009) pp.73-96.    
19
 Unlike the Quran which imposes no maximum limit on wealth but strongly encourages a moderate 
and voluntary redistribution of the accumulated wealth preferably through voluntary means, the Bible is 
much harsher on wealthy Christians. For the view of Islam see the Quran (47: 36-37), and also Ibrahim 
Canan ‘Hadis Kulliyati Kutub-i Sitte Tercume ve Serhi’ (Ankara: Akcag, 1995) pp.176-177, 261. For the 
view of Christianity see Luke (6: 24) and Matthew (19: 24 and 26: 24)  
20
 As per the Quran (59:7), the circulation of wealth among only a few rich people is strongly 
condemned: “Whatever (from the possessions of the people of the townships) Allah has bestowed on 
His Messenger i.e., the Prophet, belongs to Allah, and to the Messenger, and to his kinsfolk, and to the 
orphans, and to the needy, and to the wayfarer so that it may not (merely) make a circuit between the 
wealthy among you. So accept whatever the Prophet gives you, and refrain from whatever he forbids 
you, and fear Allah, for Allah is strict in punishment”. 
21
 These four tools are the main channels for the voluntary redistribution of accumulated surplus 
wealth by wealthy people.   
22
 These two instruments are the main sources of tax revenue in an Islamic state which have to be paid 
to the House of Wealth (and to some extent to the Treasury of State). These instruments are in fact 
direct taxes.  It seems, there is no indirect taxation e.g., based on consumption, in the Sharia.      
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institutions fail to achieve their goal.23 If a voluntary means for the redistribution of 
wealth in society by individuals themselves does not lead to a proper circulation of 
wealth and fails to alleviate poverty, the state should be drafted in to eradicate 
poverty by way of the imposition of an obligatory means. It can be said that this 
approach is a middle-way solution because while the private generation of wealth with 
no upper level is possible in this model, at the same time the involvement of the state 
(i.e., the House of Wealth or the House of Market Control) to alleviate poverty in 
society is permitted if the people fail to achieve a just and balanced circulation of 
wealth among themselves. 
In western world, e.g., in England, charities and their modern legal forms have 
been developed to a large degree due to a blatantly political atmosphere. For example, 
the Preamble to the Statute of Charitable Uses 1601 in England was allegedly enacted 
to control possible social riots and constituted part of “a systematic and tight 
programme of Elizabethan social reform” plan. According to Dunn, charitable purposes 
may well date back to the 17th century, but they have not gone much beyond this 
lineage. Modern society, with its ever-increasing recognition and support of the rights 
and needs of its people, and the responsibility and accountability of institutions and 
those in influential situations, is based upon a history of legal and political change 
pushed, to some extent, by philanthropic fantacism. Undeniably, some parts of English 
social welfare reform acts exist without willingful actions. From the famous 
philanthropists of the Victorian era to the modern supporters and reformers of the 
20th century, charities have been active in evaluation of needs and responding to those 
                                                   
23
 For a similar approach see Mabid Ali Al-jarhi and Muhammad Anas Zarqa ‘Redistributive Justice in a 
Developed Economy: An Islamic Perspective (Jakarta: Proceedings of the Sixth International Conference 
on Islamic Economics, Banking and Finance held on 21-24 November 2005, vol.1, 2006) pp.44 and 46. 
They argue that voluntary institutions are given a primary role and are favoured over those that are 
obligatory. However, as per the Quran (17-29), in making voluntary distributions the people should be 
neither extravagant nor miserly.      
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needs. In the age of completely free market, where charity began in the home and 
then developed to include the church and also the community, charitable acts could be 
viewed as political tools.24    
To implement the redistribution of wealth in a more efficient way and also on a 
wider scale across society, appropriate philanthropic foundations with different 
sources of funding as well as different functions have to be set up. These foundations 
are those that would provide funds for: health, education, science, art or religion and 
the basic essential living needs of people. The philosophy of these foundations should 
be to promote the public good and also ad hoc assistance to any individual who is in 
need. 
 
5.3.1 Voluntary Almsgiving (Sadaqa) 
Sadaqa is often given for personal reasons to good causes, to whomever the 
giver thinks suitable. Giving sadaqa is done regardless of the obligatory zakat or tax 
and does not count as zakat or part of zakat, which must be paid irrespective of the 
amount paid for the purposes of sadaqa. A specific organisation may be established for 
the collection and distribution of sadaqa funds.25 This facility may also be used to 
finance the basic essential needs of newly married poor couples.    
                                                   
24
 See Alison Dunn ‘Demanding Service or Service Demand- Charities, Regulation and the Policy 
Process’ (Modern Law Review, Vol. 71, Issue 2, March 2008) p. 247.   
25
 In Iran, there is an organization which is responsible for collecting sadaqa from sadaqa givers and 
distributing it to the poor (this organization is called Comite-ye Imdad-e Imam Khomeini).  
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5.3.2 Voluntary Gift (Hiba) 
Hiba26 is a contract designed for when the owner of a property hands over his 
property at no cost to another. The donor is called a wahib and the recipient is a 
muttahib. The ‘free’ property is called a mawhuba (gifted asset). Hiba is not legally 
binding until after the delivery of the mawhuba. Sometimes, a hiba may be in return 
for some consideration by the muttahib. This kind of hiba is called a hiba muawwada 
(exchanged gift). Hiba is a permissive contract and may, unlike sadaqa, be terminated 
by a wahib if the mawhuba is still in the possession of the muttahib. A mawhuba can 
be any kind of property including financial assets. This facility may be used for the 
purpose of donations to relatives and close friends. This may also be used for the 
discharge of debt, and for settlement and compromise (sulh) purposes.    
 
5.3.3 Waiver of Receivables (Ibra’) 
Ibra’27 occurs when a creditor voluntarily writes off his receivables from a debtor. 
The release of a bankrupt from a debt obligation is also valid. The waiving of a debt 
differs from waiving an asset or a property, which is called e’rad. The purpose of ibra’ 
is for the generous disposal of assets, concession and leniency. 
                                                   
26
 See Iran Civil Code articles 795-807.      
27
 For more detail see Nasser Katouzian ‘Qanun Madani dar Nazm Huquq Kununi-ye Iran’ (Tehran: 
Mizan publication, 18
th
 edition, 1387 Solar Hijri Calendar) pp. 245-247, articles 289-291.        
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5.3.4 Voluntary Endowment (Waqf) 
Waqf28 or habs (voluntary endowment/trust-like product) is a perpetual29 
endowment, which occurs in the surrender or detention of a privately owned 
property30 (mawqufa) in order to devote its profits to some specific good31 cause, e.g., 
for charitable or religious purposes. In cases where the beneficiaries or the purpose of 
the waqf are specifically limited (e.g., to family members32) it is termed a “special”33 
                                                   
28
 Waqf literally means to cause a thing to stop while still standing. See Iran Civil Code articles 55-91. 
For more detail see also Nasser Katouzian ‘Qanun Madani dar Nazm Huquq Kununi-ye Iran’ (Tehran: 
Mizan publication, 18
th
 edition, 1387 Solar Hijri Calendar) pp. 60-77, articles 55-91. The closest word for 
waqf in modern finance is “trust”. A fundamental distinction between waqf and modern charities is that 
the ownership of the corpus of waqf property is retained forever for the waqf estate as a separate legal 
entity and never transfers to beneficiaries or anybody else. A further difference is that unlike trust 
instruments in common law, no type of Islamic waqf can be created in a revocable form. It is the 
resulting profits and benefits (i.e., proceeds) of the corpus of waqf property which are used for the 
designated purposes mentioned in the waqf deed. A beneficiary’s interest in a trust in modern 
terminology is considered an equitable interest and the trustee holds a legal title with regard to the 
trust assets. See Nasser Katouzian ‘Qanun Madani dar Nazm Huquq Kununi-ye Iran’ (Tehran: Mizan 
publication, 18
th
 edition, 1387 Solar Hijri Calendar) p. 61 article 56.         
29
 Some jurists especially from the Maliki School recognise a temporary waqf. They also allow the 
usufruct waqf or waqf al-manafi (i.e., benefits) like the waqf of a leased property for the term of the 
lease agreement. See Murat Cizakca ‘Islamic Capitalism and Finance: Origins, Evolution, and the Future’ 
(Edward Elgar: Studies in Islamic Finance, Accounting, and Governance, 2011) p. 81. However, by 
definition, perpetuity is an inherent feature of waqf, its form can never be a temporary one. Considering 
this, the usufruct waqf or waqf al-manafi is not valid for the following reasons: a) in waqf, the corpus 
(i.e., seed property) of the waqf from which the income is generated has to be separate from the 
creator of the waqf and transferred to a separate entity (a waqf estate); b) this purpose may be satisfied 
using another well-known concept in the Sharia i.e., “haq intifa” (enjoyment privilege: a privilege of 
exploitation whereby a person derives profit or benefit from a property whose ownership belongs to 
somebody else); c) as per Iran Civil Code articles 55 and 58, a waqf of benefits (manfa’a) and a waqf of 
claims (receivables) is void.   
30
 To be a valid waqf, both the corpus of the waqf property and its benefits should undisputedly be, 
before the execution of waqf, under the possession and legal control of the creator of the waqf.   
31
 A waqf created for an unlawful purpose is null and void.  
32
 To preserve and avoid the fragmentation of wealth and ensure the future welfare of his family and 
also to alleviate poverty at the familial level, a wealthy person may set up a family waqf (according to 
Sharia) or a trust as per the modern legal system. The founder of a waqf may appoint himself, his 
offspring, or any other trustworthy person called a mutawalli to be in charge of managing the waqf.    
33
 In case of a special waqf (also called a waqf ahli or khass), if all the beneficiaries of the waqf die it 




waqf but if they are unlimited the waqf is considered a “public”34 waqf.35 In cases 
where the beneficiaries directly utilise the endowed asset, such as a school or books, it 
is called a “direct” waqf and if the beneficiaries enjoy the benefits and revenue 
generated from the endowed property it is called an “indirect” waqf.       
It is only allowed to endow an asset that can be used without detriment to its 
existence, and it can be movable, held in undivided shares or divided up.36 The 
ownership of the mawqufa, after execution of the waqf deed, belongs to neither the 
founder of the waqf (waqif) nor the beneficiaries (mawquf alayhim). Its ownership 
remains with the mawqufa (waqf estate)37 itself or with God38 alone. The benefits of 
the corpus of the mawqufa (endowed property) would go to the specified beneficiaries 
or purposes mentioned in the endowment (waqf) deed.39 If the waqf is for the interest 
                                                   
34
 It seems that in public waqfs the income generated by the mawqufa (waqf property) should be 
placed in the treasury of the House of Wealth rather than the Treasury of State.  
35
 This distinction between specific and public waqfs matters for the purpose of managing the waqf 
and also for payment of tax and zakat and any other applicable fees and duties. There are no accepted 
rules on whether any tax (zakat) should be imposed on the revenues generated by the waqf properties 
i.e., mawqufat (especially public waqfs) and if applicable, whether the collected tax/zakat will go to the 
treasury of the House of Wealth or the Treasury of State. Historically, this issue has been largely 
dependent on the fiscal status of the relevant states and waqf-state relations. For example, as per 
Cizakca, Hanafi Ottoman waqfs and Maliki Andalous Spain waqfs paid no tax/zakat duties. See Murat 
Cizakca ‘Islamic Capitalism and Finance: Origins, Evolution, and the Future’ (Edward Elgar: Studies in 
Islamic Finance, Accounting, and Governance, 2011) p. 80. 
36
 It is believed that endowment of debt receivables, usufructs, benefits, or financial rights are void. 
See Iran Civil Code articles 55 and 58.  
37
 Relying on this fact i.e., the separate legal entity of the waqf estate, some Islamic scholars have 
argued for the recognition of a juridical person or legal personality in Islamic law. See Nasser Katouzian 
‘Qanun Madani dar Nazm Huquq Kununi-ye Iran’ (Tehran: Mizan publication, 18
th
 edition, 1387 Solar 
Hijri Calendar) pp. 60 and 62.  
38
 Some Islamic jurists like Abu Yusuf and Imam Muhammad from the Hanafi School believe that the 
ownership of the property subject to waqf becomes Allah’s property. See Murat Cizakca ‘Islamic 
Capitalism and Finance: Origins, Evolution, and the Future’ (Edward Elgar: Studies in Islamic Finance, 
Accounting, and Governance, 2011) p. 80.  
39
 See Mirza Hussein Nouri a.k.a. Muhaddith Nouri ‘Mustadrak al-Wasa’eel’ (Qom, Mu’assaseye A’l-
Albayt li Ihya’ al-Turath, vol. 2/18, 1408 Lunar Hijri Calendar) p.511. See also Iran Civil Code article 61.      
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of the waqif himself,40 that is to say, where waqif designates himself the sole 
beneficiary or one of the beneficiaries or where the waqif stipulates the payment of 
his debt obligations out of the income of the waqf estate, it becomes null and void.41 
However, in the case of a waqf for the public use, if the waqif happens to become one 
of the beneficiaries of the waqf estate he is permitted to benefit and the waqf is valid.     
A waqf is managed according to the instructions of the waqf deed. A trustee 
(mutawalli)42 has to surrender the net profit to the beneficiaries of a waqf according to 
the terms of the waqf deed. Essentially, the waqf instrument instructs the trustee how 
to distribute the net profit to the beneficiaries. The trustee (mutawalli) has a custodial 
but not a possession interest with regard to the waqf estate. He has mere custody of 
the waqf property and an authority to use the waqf for the benefit of the beneficiaries. 
He has no possession interest, which gives a much greater scope of authority for 
dealing with the property than a custodial one does. It is possible that the waqf deed 
                                                   
40
 Some Islamic scholars e.g., Imam Hanafi, believe that a waqif i.e., the creator of a waqf can revoke 
his waqf and he may also sell his right in the waqf. However, the prevalent thought, at least as per Imam 
Shafi’ee as well as the Shia school of thought, is that a waqf, once executed, is not revocable. For more 
details in this regard see Murat Cizakca ‘Islamic Capitalism and Finance: Origins, Evolution, and the 
Future’ (Edward Elgar: Studies in Islamic Finance, Accounting, and Governance, 2011) p. 273. Given the 
primary purpose and the salient features of a waqf, the correct idea would be that the waqf is neither 
revocable by the waqif nor can the waqif sell his endowed property. Once created, a waqif loses his right 
in the endowed property in an absolute manner.     
41
 The validity of a waqf which is detrimental to the waqif’s creditors is subject to the consent of the 
creditors. The insolvent or bankrupt is not allowed to execute a waqf on its estate.    
42
 Whoever is appointed to manage the waqf estate is called a mutawalli. Note the difference between 
a wakil (agent) and a mutawalli (a concept similar to a trustee). In the former, a wakil acts under the 
control and authority of the principal (muwakkil), but in the latter case all powers and authority of the 
waqif (the founder of waqf) concerning the management of a waqf estate shifts to a mutawalli upon the 
execution of a waqf deed. That is to say, a waqif will lose his control over the mutawalli in the 
administration of the waqf estate. However, administration (including the maintenance of the estate) of 
the waqf by the mutawalli will be subject strictly to the terms and conditions set out by the waqif in the 
waqf deed called a waqf name/deed. For example, a waqif may appoint a supervisor called a na’zir to 
monitor the administration of a waqf estate by the mutawalli. After the administration authority 
(mutawalli) of the waqf estate is appointed by a waqif, thereafter a mutawalli will be deemed 
representative of the waqf estate but not the waqif. Therefore, the waqif would be unable to remove a 
mutawalli unilaterally after his proper appointment in the waqf deed.   
 189 
 
may grant to the mutawalli (trustee) the power to appoint beneficiaries. These 
prospective beneficiaries, who are considered the objects of the power of 
appointment, will have contingent benefits in the estate of the waqf. A waqif43 may 
reserve to himself the management of the affairs of the waqf estate, either for his 
lifetime or for some limited time period, and he may also appoint somebody else who 
either independently or in conjunction with the waqif (in strict compliance with the 
management terms and conditions laid down in the waqf deed) manages the waqf 
estate. In the case of a waqf for public purposes, if a waqif does not appoint an 
administrator or a trustee, the management of the affairs of the waqf estate are 
carried out in accordance with the views of the state (i.e., the House of Wealth). In a 
waqf for public use, the waqf estate may be used to finance public welfare expenses, 
e.g., free provision of health and education facilities, and also the provision of social 
security benefits. The priority in expending for public purposes is very important. The 
first priority is to provide the public with essential needs before spending on anything 
else, e.g., the expansion of nuclear power or military bases. In the case of a waqf for 
limited persons or purposes, the resulting benefits of a waqf will be distributed to the 
beneficiaries according to the terms of the deed of the waqf (waqf name).    
                                                   
43
 A critical issue in a waqf is whether the state (or the House of Wealth) itself can be a creator of one. 
Some Islamic scholars argue for its legitimacy from the Sharia viewpoint and they mention examples of 
Diyanet Vakfi in Turkey, Bunyad-e Mustaz’afan in Iran. For more in this regard see Murat Cizakca ‘A 
History of Philanthropic Foundations: The Islamic World from the Seventh Century to the Present’ 
(Bogazici University, 2000) pp. 95, 101-102 and 158-159. It should, however, be noted that Bunyad-e-
Mustaz’afan in Iran is not officially considered either an agency of the state or a waqf institution. All 
waqf foundations in Iran are controlled by Sazman-e- Awqaf wa Umur-e Kheyriyye and Bunyad-e 
Mustaz’afan is out of the reach of this system. Also, although Bunyad-e-Mustaz’afan in Iran was 
primarily established to help the alleviation of poverty, it has deviated from its primary goal and instead 
has been converted into a giant business conglomerate forgetting its founding philosophy. However, for 
the purpose of the well-organised practice for the alleviation of poverty on a very large scale, some 
philanthropic foundations such as public waqfs may be established in such a way in which a state agency 
or non-governmental reputable organization is appointed as the mutawalli by the donors/founders of 
the waqf (waqifs).     
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In a waqf, a waqf deed automatically and absolutely imposes restrictions on 
usage and alienation of the estate of the waqf by the beneficiaries as well as the 
mutawalli. The corpus of the endowed property may not be disposed of or consumed 
but only the revenue generated either in the form of profit or rent is paid to the 
beneficiaries or used for the mentioned purposes.44 To put it another way, waqf 
foundations should not get involved in business and investment activities, otherwise, 
they may fail to achieve their primary goal which is the eradication or alleviation of 
poverty and the build-up of human capital in society. The other reason why the waqf 
estate must not be utilised for commercial and investment purposes is that the 
manager of the waqf is, to some extent, in the position of an agent (a wakil) or a 
trustee rather than a mudarib (entrepreneur). The duty of the mutawalli is to perform 
the legal and administrative affairs of the waqf estate rather than using the waqf 
estate for the purpose of making profits. Moreover, from the viewpoint of Sharia, the 
disposal of a waqf estate is strictly prohibited except for very limited purposes and the 
disposition of the waqf estate for investment purposes is certainly not one of these. 
The disposal of a waqf estate in the event of it suffering damage, or the likelihood of it 
suffering damage, is allowed on condition that the maintenance of it is impossible, or 
that no one can be found to undertake the maintaining of it. It goes without saying 
that if the use of a waqf estate for investment is permitted it may result in investing 
without paying attention to the primary goal of the waqf which is to help the 
beneficiaries. Moreover, the loss of the estate may result through the course of 
business in cases where the corpus was allowed to be invested wholly. This possibility 
                                                   
44
 In other words, a waqf recurs on an ongoing basis and it is a self-sufficient and perpetual entity that 
can provide very significant social services. There are some waqfs which have survived for longer than a 
thousand years financing works of architecture and providing important social services such as: health, 
research and education. See Marshall G. S. Hodgson ‘The Venture of Islam’ (Chicago University Press, 
vol. II, 1974) p.124. For more in this regard see also Daniel Crecelious ‘Introduction’ (Journal of the 
Economic and Social History of the Orient, vol. 38, no.3, 1995).    
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can never fall within the desires of the founder of the waqf. Last but not least, as per 
the definition of a waqf (i.e., the detention of the corpus of an asset and releasing its 
benefits),45 it is very clear that “detention” (tahbis) means detaining the corpus of the 
waqf estate while distributing its benefits in favour of the specific purposes or for the 
benefit of the specified beneficiaries.     
In terms of the type of endowed property, waqfs are created in the form of 
either moveable properties or immoveable properties. The essential point regarding 
the type of endowed property is that that the corpus (i.e., original status) of the 
property, while generating profits, should be capable of enduring subject to the 
preservation and non-consumption of the corpus.46 Consequently, a waqf of 
                                                   
45
 tahbis al-ayn wa tasbil al-manfa’a 
46
 This view is generally accepted by Imam shafi’ee as well as Abu Yusuf and Imam Muhammad 
(Shafi’ee school), Imam Malik (Maliki school), Imam Ahmed ibn Hanbal (Hanbali school), and by the Shia 
school. As per the Hanafi school (which was followed by the Ottomans), following the ruling of Imam 
Muhammad al-Shaybani, waqfs of movables are valid subject to a “generously interpreted custom”. See 
Murat Cizakca ‘Islamic Capitalism and Finance: Origins, Evolution, and the Future’ (Edward Elgar: Studies 
in Islamic Finance, Accounting, and Governance, 2011) pp. 83-85.    
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consumables as well as cash47 waqfs are void but the validity of a waqf of stocks48 is 
arguable. A waqf of stocks is in fact a synthetic outcome of the modern joint-stock 
                                                   
47
 This is in contrast to the opinion of some Islamic scholars, who argue for the legitimacy of cash 
(naqd) waqfs (cash endowment where corpus-cash is invested and the returns from the investment 
channeled to the beneficiaries). The origin of this idea (i.e., validity of a cash waqf) goes back to a fatwa 
issued by Imam Zufar in the 8
th
 century which was later used by the Ottomans from the 14
th
 century on. 
See Hamid Donduren ‘Gunumuzde Wakif Meseleleri’ (Istanbul: Erkam 1998) p.95. Also, invoking hifz al-
nasl (protection of generations) which is considered to be one of the essentials of Maqasid al-Sharia, 
they believe that a wealthy person may establish a familial cash waqf for the benefit of his children or 
his other relatives. They further argue that the cash amounts of cash waqf may be deposited with an 
Islamic bank. As per their other argument (invoking hifz al-mal - protection of property which is 
considered to be another essential of Maqasid al-Sharia), the Islamic bank must not only guarantee the 
deposits but it must also guarantee the inflation premium because the purchasing power of the cash 
diminishes in the long run. See Murat Cizakca ‘Islamic Capitalism and Finance: Origins, Evolution, and 
the Future’ (Edward Elgar: Studies in Islamic Finance, Accounting, and Governance, 2011) p. 243. 
However, it seems this argument is not valid for a number of reasons: a) assets that are deposited with a 
bank on the basis of wadi’a cannot be guaranteed by the bank, otherwise it will no longer be a valid 
wadi’a (for a similar argument see Nasser Katouzian ‘Qanun Madani dar Nazm Huquq Kununi-ye Iran’ 
(Tehran: Mizan publication, 18
th
 edition, 1387 Solar Hijri Calendar) pp. 413-414 & 417, articles 607 & 
614); b) any payment in addition to the deposit amount is riba; and c) the endowed property in waqfs 
cannot be in cash because it is not capable of being endured while benefiting it. For a supporting 
evidence with regard to the invalidity of cash waqfs see Nasser Katouzian ‘Qanun Madani dar Nazm 
Huquq Kununi-ye Iran’ (Tehran: Mizan publication, 18
th
 edition, 1387 Solar Hijri Calendar) pp. 60 and 62, 
articles 55 and 58.  
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corporations and cash waqfs. Having reformed their waqf laws, some jurisdictions 
have adopted both cash waqfs and waqf of stocks.49  
The use of a waqf in early Islamic society, where religious ethics were highly 
respected by Muslims, brought about a lot of facilities for social life, in particular for 
those who were in need of charity or funds to cover their education costs.50  
                                                                                                                                                             
48
 Regarding the validity of waqf of stocks, it is said that the validity of waqf of stocks is deduced from 
the following fatwas. As per the Sunni’s position: a) at the beginning of 20
th
 century, Suhrawardy, a 
leading Muslim jurist asked for a fatwa by the Mufti of Egypt, who answered that “specific recognised 
practice” (urf khass) can be validly taken into consideration and can be enforced. A specific recognised 
practice at the time was the medieval European Permanently Funded Public Debt, which was used by 
Muslims as a tool (i.e., corpus) of waqf capital; b) the fatwa (answer) of the Mufti of Alexandria, 
Muhammad Bakhit al-Muti’i, to the same question referred to the “Imam Muhammad’s permission 
regarding the waqf of movables in an unrestricted way”; and also relying on the opinion of Sarakhsi in 
his book Mabsut who gives custom an important consideration. Regarding the Shia’s position, it is 
referred to a fatwa given by Sheikh Abdullah al-Mazandarani in 1907 and on this basis it is argued for 
the validity of the waqf of stocks even through using the shares of a joint-stock company. It seems like 
the Mufti of Egypt, Mazandarani considered stocks in a joint-stock company as a musha’ – “an undivided 
up” property, which can be endowed (as it is also permitted according to Iran Civil Code article 58). 
Musha’ is used for an undivided property, which is shared among the various owners. However, some 
may argue that since the endowed property must be privately owned before a waqf, therefore the waqf 
of a musha’ property is not valid. Furthermore, they may argue that the true scope and boundaries of a 
musha’ property are not known and to avoid these problems the musha’ property must first be divided 
up before it being endowed in the form of a waqf. For a somewhat similar discussion see Murat Cizakca 
‘Islamic Capitalism and Finance: Origins, Evolution, and the Future’ (Edward Elgar: Studies in Islamic 
Finance, Accounting, and Governance, 2011) in his discussion on the institution of waqf. Since the non-
negotiability of the endowed stock may cause hardship to other stockholders, I would argue for the 
validity of the waqf of stocks provided that the relevant company or business partnership is an open-end 
entity and is also established in perpetuity but not for a limited time period.    
49
 A considerable development in the waqf legal system is the Turkish 13 July 1967 Law, which has 
been amended several times. One of the important improvements in this waqf Law was the tax 
exemption of the waqfs where at least 80 percent of the waqf revenues were spent for public purposes 
(this grant, albeit, was subject to the approval of the Council of Ministers). Other significant 
developments in waqf institutions are those established by the Johor Corporation in Malaysia (a quasi-
waqf of stocks in 2005) and also the Mannan model of waqfs, which was established in Bangladesh by 
the Social Investment Bank (a three-sector banking institution and in fact a synthesis of the Western 
corporation with microfinance as well as cash waqfs) in 1995 where the Bank introduced the cash waqf 
certificate as a financial tool in 1997. See Murat Cizakca ‘Islamic Capitalism and Finance: Origins, 
Evolution, and the Future’ (Edward Elgar: Studies in Islamic Finance, Accounting, and Governance, 2011) 
pp. 101-102, 108, 109, and 114.   
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5.3.5 Obligatory Tax-Like Duty (Zakat) 
Zakat51 is an obligatory payment should the total wealth of a person go above a 
certain threshold called a nisab, i.e., a surplus of his basic needs that have stayed in his 
possession for a whole year.52 In other words, zakat is applied only to people with a 
certain enough wealth53 and it has a ‘permanent and stable nature’.54 In terms of the 
legal importance of zakat, some scholars believe that property rights are only valid in a 
post-zakat environment, i.e., one acquires the protection of law to enforce a property 
right only after payment of zakat.55 Surprisingly, in practice, in most Islamic countries 
zakat is not collected by the state and is not treated as a compulsory payment.56   
                                                                                                                                                             
50
 See Muhammad Ja’far Jafari Langroodi ‘Maktabhaye Huquqi dar Huqug-e Islam’ (Tehran: Ganj-e 
Danesh, 3
rd
 edition) p. 326.  
51
 Zakat is known as the third pillar of Islam and it is believed that it purifies wealth and souls. 
52
 See http://islam1.org/iar/imam/archives/2004/12/30/zakatulmal_zakat.php. As per zakat rules, if a 
person cannot spend his accumulated wealth within a year he would have to pay the due zakat. To avoid 
paying zakat, he cannot keep his assets idle and he would have to consume them to the extent of his 
needs and then (considering the diminishing marginal utility of the consumption) circulate the excess for 
charity and philanthropy purposes or to increase his wealth even further using a legitimate manner of 
generating income e.g., investing in a business partnership but not purchasing fixed income yielding 
financial products like bonds due to the prohibition of riba.         
53
 As per the Quran (13:26) “every single human being should know that he has accumulated wealth 
not only by his own efforts but also as a result of the Creator’s blessings. Allah does enlarge the 
livelihood and gives sustenance to whomsoever He wills abundantly and grants others in strict 
measure”.  
54
 See http://islam1.org/iar/imam/archives/2004/12/30/zakatulmal_zakat.php 
55
 See Murphy Liam and Thomas Nagel “The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice’ (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002). See also Salman Ahmed Shaikh ‘Sources of Public Finance in an Islamic Economy’ 
(Islamic Economics Project, 2010) Available via the Internet at MPRA http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/22998 
56
 See Russell Powell ‘Zakat: Drawing Insights for Legal Theory and Economic Policy from Islamic 
Jurisprudence’ (February 28, 2009) Available via the Internet at SSRN 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1351024. See also Salman Ahmed Shaikh ‘Sources of Public Finance in an 




The objective of the zakat system is to take away a part of the wealth of the rich 
and redistribute it among the eight categories mentioned in the Quran.57 Zakat 
collected funds may be used for the purposes of public finance, e.g., the payment of 
the salary of civil servants responsible for the collection of zakat, and public defence 
and security purposes and also public welfare, e.g., the construction of infrastructure 
and provision of education, healthcare and religious facilities.58 This may also be used 
for the payment of overdue debts of people who are unable to clear their debts. It may 
also be used for the provision of the basic needs of poor people. Furthermore, this 
may be used for the payment of holiday and transport costs of poor people.      
In terms of the rate of zakat, it is generally 2.5 percent of wealth over a 
particular threshold (nisab). The threshold is 200 dirham59 of silver or 20 dinar60 of 
gold.61 Despite the fact that the rate of zakat is in general 2.5 percent, especially in the 
commercial industry, this rate may vary in different sectors. It is believed that the rate 
in the agricultural industry is ushr (i.e., 10 percent) if the land is irrigated naturally and 
5 percent if it is irrigated using the farmer’s labour.62 For its economic implications, 
there have been strong criticisms about the heavy rate imposed on the agriculture 
section compared to the much smaller rate for commercial industry. This criticism can 
be countered by stating that the rate applied as zakat in the agriculture industry is not 
                                                   
57
 As discussed in the research theory, the underlying rationale for the imposition of zakat could be 
that that the society as a whole is almost always one of the contributors to any economic and business 
activities and the society should therefore benefit from the outcome of these activities. The share of the 
society is indeed compensated in the form of zakat.  
58
 That is why a certain portion of the collected zakat should go to the House of Wealth to spend for 
the public welfare and the other portion go to the Treasury of State to cover the expenditures e.g., for 
the salary payments of the civil servants, protection of borders, international foreign affairs, public 
defence and public security purposes.   
59
 In terms of silver, with one dirham equal to 2.975 grams, the nisab is 595 grams of silver.  
60
 In terms of gold, with one dinar equal to 4.25 grams, the nisab is 85 grams of gold. 
61
 Since, at the present time, the pure content of silver and gold coins is not certain, the calculations 
should be conducted in a very careful manner.  
62
 As per the research theory, the owner of the natural wealth, including land, is the public as a whole. 
The House of Wealth acts on behalf of the public.   
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zakat but is in fact kharaj (a certain portion of the proceeds of the land) levied on the 
land.63 This will be discussed later. With regard to the mining industry, the zakat rate 
(which is again kharaj not zakat) is not specifically known in Sharia64and it seems the 
rate is determined by the state (i.e., the House of Wealth) and may vary for different 
mines considering their different conditions. As per the Hanafi school of thought, the 
zakat rate on mines is 20 percent,65 while for the Hanbali, Maliki, and Shafiee this rate 
is the standard 2.5 percent. However, it is said that some Maliki jurists, likewise the 
Hanafi school, have argued for the rate of 20 percent on mines whose exploitation 
requires little effort, and the standard rate of 2.5 percent on mines that require a lot 
more work.66 Again, it seems that the rate applied as zakat on mines is not zakat but is 
indeed kharaj duty levied on the land under which the minerals are found.    
                                                   
63
 As per the research theory, as discussed earlier, an absent owner of the property disposes his 
ownership right voluntarily or by his consent in return for some value or free of charge; sa’y 
(contribution) is the only cause and underlying rationale for the acquisition of ownership. Since no 
human being has made a sa’y (contribution) to the creation of the land (just as with other natural 
resources), no private land ownership is allowed. The Creator has bestowed the ownership of lands to 
all human beings as a whole. So, any human being using any part of land privately or exclusively has to 
pay some value (or to make some contribution) called kharaj to the public (the House of Wealth) in 
return for the (subordinated) ownership interest of the public as a whole in the land. The primary 
ownership of the lands (similar to any other natural resources) remains always with the Creator (God).      
64
 As per the Quran (2:267) “O Believers, expend in Allah's Way the best portion of the wealth you 
have earned and of that We have (i.e., Allah has) produced for you from the earth” 
65
 It is said that the reason given by the Hanafi School for this very high rate on mines is by way of qiyas 
reasoning (i.e., a juristic analogy method). They have considered mining as similar to a buried treasury 
(i.e., rikaz), where it is argued that the Prophet imposed khums (i.e., one-fifth).  See H. Inalcik ‘Cizya 
(Islam Ansiklopedisi)’ (Istanbul: ISAM, 1993).  
66
 See Mehmet Erkal ‘Islam’in Erken Doneminde Uygulamalari’ (Istanbul: ISAM, 2009) p. 162. 
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Muslim scholars are divided on the issue of whether any tax beyond zakat67 can 
be levied. There are some Muslim scholars who have argued that taxes other than 
zakat can be levied for running the operations of the state and it is not the function of 
zakat to fulfil that fiscal purpose. They have provided that zakat is a religious duty and 
is not a substitute for tax. As per these scholars, taxes other than zakat can be applied 
in an Islamic economy if these taxes are determined by the legislative council and used 
for public welfare.68 As per Yousri,69 in the contemporary Islamic economy zakat 
continues to be a fundamental tax and other taxes that are levied should be guided by 
the principles of zakat system. However, in contrast, there are some other Islamic 
experts who believe that zakat is, in principle, a substitute for tax in an Islamic 
economy and is the only tax that can be levied, albeit other than some casual fees, 
                                                   
67
 As per the Quran (9:29) “Those who do not believe in Allah and the Last Day … and who do not 
follow the true religion … (have to) pay tribute [called jizya] out of their hand”. Some may argue that 
jizya duty is a substitute for zakat imposed on non-Muslims in an Islamic state for the protection of their 
lives and property rights. It may be further argued that the philosophy of this duty is different from that 
of zakat, which is imposed on Muslims mainly because of the rights of the poor and needy over each 
Muslim’s wealth. It is said that jizya was imposed for the first time by the Prophet at the rate of one gold 
dinar weighed roughly 4.25 grams of gold per annum. For more on jizya see H. Inalcik ‘Cizya (Islam 
Ansiklopedisi)’ (Istanbul: ISAM, 1993). See also Mehmet Erkal ‘Islam’in Erken Doneminde Uygulamalari’ 
(Istanbul: ISAM, 2009) p.132. However, in addition to practical considerations and the rule of equal 
treatment which is an essential part of social justice, it would be just and fair if the exact same rate of 
zakat as a substitute of jizya (under the title of zakat/tax) were imposed on non-Muslims.   
68
 See Sayyid Abul A'la Maududi ‘Ma’ashiyat-e Islam [Economic System of Islam]’ (Lahore: Islamic 
Publications, 1970) Cited by Salman Ahmed Shaikh ‘Sources of Public Finance in an Islamic Economy’ 
(Islamic Economics Project, 2010) Available via the Internet at MPRA http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/22998  
69
 See Abdel-Rahman Yousri ‘Public Finance: The role of taxation, expenditure and debt in an Islamic 
economy’ (The World Bank Group: The series “Introduction to Islamic Economics” held and sponsored 
by the Islamic Development Bank’s Islamic Research and Training Institute (IRTI), 2007).  
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charges, and duties in return for the provision of some public services and goods.70 
Following this line, some scholars tracing the history of Islamic public finance have 
opined that early Islamic rulers levied no tax other than zakat even when they were 
aware of the taxes collecetd by neighbouring non-Muslim states on their citizens. 
Some scholars have pointed to a number of compelling reasons why the government 
cannot levy any tax other than zakat.71 It seems the levy of any tax-like duty beyond 
zakat should be strictly limited to circumstances where the state has a budget deficit 
or for the purpose of satisfying sovereign debts approved by the elected 
representatives of the public.   
 
                                                   
70
 See Salman Ahmed Shaikh ‘Sources of Public Finance in an Islamic Economy’ (Islamic Economics 
Project, 2010) Available via the Internet at MPRA: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/22998. The 
following could be, more or less, substantial non-zakat revenues for an Islamic economy: a) charging 
“service or performance based fees or duties” on the provision of public services and goods such as 
utilities (because voluntary payments in this regard are economically inefficient); b) levying “stamp 
duty” on documents so that they become legally enforceable; c) levying “toll tax” on using the 
development and infrastructure projects like roads and bridges; d) charging a “licensing fee” on 
industrialists, being active in specifically-tailored zones for some special industries and export activities; 
e) levying “excise tax” on activities and operations creating negative externalities to the natural 
environment; f) earning a “tax increment”, which is a tool to use future gains in taxes to finance current 
public improvement projects such as bridges, recreational facilities, or toxic waste cleanup which often 
causes an increase in the value of surrounding real estate and new investment. This tool is widely used 
in Europe and the U.S. For more in this regard see Craig L. Johnson and Joyce Y. Man ‘Tax Increment 
Financing and Economic Development: Uses, Structures, and Impacts’ (New York: State University of 
New York Press, SUNY Series in Public Administration, 2001); g) revenues derived from some income-
creating activities of government (i.e., the House of Wealth) owned enterprises (GOEs) such as the 
telecommunications industry, postal services industry, aviation industry which they likely face “inelastic 
demand” and also have considerable effect for “economies of scale and economies of scope”. Running 
these types of GOEs may significantly help to reduce the budget deficit of a government; h) fines and 
penalties imposed by the House of Market Control for the enforcement of laws and regulations.  
71
 See Monzer Kahf ‘The Early Islamic Public Revenue System (Lessons and Implications)’ (Jeddah: IRTI, 
1987). See also Shehzad Saleem ‘Islamic Concept of Taxation’ (Renaissance, vol. 2, Issue 10, 1992). 
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5.3.6 Levy in Return for the Use of Natural Resources (Kharaj) 
Kharaj is determined and imposed by the House of Wealth on the use of natural 
resources (i.e., primary wealth) especially the use of land, which belongs to the public 
as a whole. The amount of kharaj, unlike zakat, is not permanently fixed and its 
amount depends on the productivity, size, and location of the natural resource. 
Usually, in cases where the amount of kharaj is a portion or percentage of the 
proceeds generated out of the natural resource (especially land) it is called kharaj al-
muqasama and if it is a fixed amount of value not linked to the proceeds of the 
resource it is called kharaj al-muwazzafa.72 The collected kharaj, like a certain portion 
of zakat, is placed in the treasury of the House of Wealth (not the Treasury of State) 
and is used for the public good, such as: public utilities, hospitals, and schools.   
 
5.4 Part Five of the Second Tier of the Model (5): Microfinance 
Facilities 
The alleviation of poverty through helping the poor to obtain their economic 
independence and taking care of themselves is an integral part of any successful 
economic development programme aiming to achieve a social balance target. The 
provision of basic needs such as: housing, healthcare, education, and basic 
infrastructure has to be met in principle by profit-free and philanthropic facilities but 
the transmission from the not-for-profit stage (i.e., bondage and dependence) to for-
profit (i.e., self-reliance and independence) requires some other powerful 
mechanisms.  
                                                   
72
 See the Quran (23: 72), (18: 94), and (2:67). For more detail see Mehmet Erkal “Islam’in Erken 
Doneminde Uygulamalari’ (Istanbul: ISAM, 2009) pp. 195-227. 
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The phenomenon of microfinance is not only concerned with giving capital to the 
poor, but also follows the objective of increasing their human capabilities in ways that 
are consistent with a new thinking and ever-increasing focus on improved 
development objectives. The rational for establishment of microfinance institutions73 
is not only to provide capital to the poor, but also is to change the very cultural 
practices that are damaging to their development.74 In other words, these 
microfinance organizations adopt complementary initiatives and are not purely 
standalone finance institutions with a single focus on credit, financial efficiency, and 
financial performance.75 
Microbusiness cooperatives (ta’awun) are the best and most efficient way to 
empower the poor. They are established for microfinance and microentrepreneurship 
purposes at a collective level, though individual microbusinesses should also be 
supported by the system. Poor individuals have to get together and engage in different 
cooperative schemes with different fields of activity considering the potential 
capabilities and talents of the cooperative members. These cooperatives will be run by 
small communities where the members are known to each other and trustworthy. The 
cooperatives are basically considered to be not-for-profit organisations and therefore 
the loans provided to the cooperative members will be interest-free loans (qard 
                                                   
73
 For different types of microfinance institutions see generally Roy Mersland et al. ‘The Effect of 
Religion in Development Efforts- Evidence from the Microfinance Industry and a Research Agenda’ 
(2011) p. 6, available at http://www.rug.nl/gsg/Research/Conferences/EUmicrofinconf20ll/Papersl 
(under “Panel 9 Microfinance and NGOs” click on “Roy Mersland [Doc]”) (addressing different 
microfinance institutions).  
74
  See Lan Cao ‘Rethinking Microfinance’ (University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, Vol. 
33, Issue 4, Summer 2012) pp. 972-973. 
75
 See Norman MacIsaac ‘The Role of Microcredit in Poverty Reduction and Promoting Gender Equity’ 
(Strategic Policy and Planning Division, Asia Branch, Canadian International Development Agency 
“CIDA”, 1997) p. 19 (“Pressures to emphasize financial performance may lead to further exclusion of the 
poorest. Smaller loans are preferred by the poorest borrowers, but are also more costly to administer. 
Ultimately, the push for financial performance creates incentives for programs to increasingly filter out 
those at greatest risk of default and delinquency”).  
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hasana). The purpose is to serve the economic needs of the community members in a 
collective and mutual manner. If a member has to borrow, he has to do so with the 
intention of paying it back at the agreed time. Some scholars76 have argued that these 
cooperatives are kinds of mutual funds where a lender at one time may become a 
borrower at another. As it is clear, the establishment of small communities as 
described above can greatly help to foster a spirit of cooperation (ta’awun)77 in the 
society and also enhance human well-being and social welfare.  
 
5.5 Applications of Alternative Profit-Free, Philanthropic, and 
Microfinance Facilities 
The following are the major financing alternatives for not-for-profit and 
microbusiness activities.   
5.5.1 The Government/Public Expenditure and Non-Income-Creating 
Activities 
Zakat, kharaj,78 waqf a’mm (public endowments), and hiba a’mm (public 
donations or gifted contributions) are the main sources of funding state/public 
                                                   
76
 See A. L. M. Abdul Gafoor ‘Interest, Usury, Riba and the Operational Costs of a Bank’ (A.S. Noordeen, 
2005) p. 46.  
77
 See the Quran (5:2).  
78
 Interestingly, very similar to the effect of the implementation of the kharaj system, as per Yu-Hung, 
by way of implementation of public land leasehold system, the Hong Kong government successfully 
gained about 39 percent of the increments of land value occurring in the 1970s and 1980s. More 
importantly, this captured value plus other land-related earnings constituted on average 79 percent of 
the required infrastructure investment per annum in the same period of time. These findings indicate 
how a public land-leasing system can be an important source of public funds. See Yu-Hung Hong and 
Alven H.S. Lam ‘Opportunities and Risks of Capturing Land Values under Hong Kong's Leasehold System’ 
(MA: Cambridge, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, Working Paper, November 1998).  
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expenditure and non-income creating projects,79 such as: schools, universities, 
hospitals, and religious centres.80 Very significant government expenditures include 
paying government debts and providing for public defence and security. For this 
purpose, the government may borrow from the House of Wealth. The government 
may also (together with the approval of the House of Wealth or the House of Market 
Control) impose and collect taxes, imposts and excises. Despite these usual revenues, 
any state at any time may still suffer a budget deficit and consequently need extra 
funds to finance its expenses. The conventional means used to address this budget 
problem is to impose extra taxes, reduce the public expenditure, or borrow from the 
domestic or international debt markets. The problem linked to extra taxation is that, at 
                                                   
79
 As per Haque and Mirakhor, public (government) expenditures are classified into: asset-creating and 
non-asset-creating. Non-asset-creating activities can be financed through tax revenues i.e., zakat; but, in 
asset-creating activities, equity modes of financing by way of issuing securities (i.e., sukuk instruments) 
can be used. See Nadeem Ul Haque and Abbas Mirakhor ‘The Design of Instruments for Government 
Finance in an Islamic Economy’ (IMF Working Papers 98/54, International Monetary Fund, 1998).  
80
 For more in this regard see Salman Ahmed Shaikh “Sources of Public Finance in an Islamic Economy’ 
(Islamic Economics Project, 17 April, 2010) p. 6. An inherent problem concerning zakat (wealth tax) is 
that some may argue that the imposition of zakat would usually cause capital flight and the departure of 
the wealthiest taxpayers to more wealth-friendly jurisdictions. This concern may be addressed by the 
fact that, in case of any conflict, just and fair distribution of wealth prevails over efficiency rules in the 
Islamic economy. In modern terms, as per the research theory, the rules of public welfare economics are 
preferred over the implications of a growth economics approach.  
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least in an Islamic state, legitimate tax sources are limited81 and they are generally 
limited to zakat and kharaj. The concern linked to the budget cut is that any state is in 
principle obliged to provide essential public services, e.g., public security and the 
payment of the salary of civil servants and may not avoid these basic needs. The 
problem for public borrowing is the prohibition of usury (riba) according to Sharia. 
With regard to borrowing from international debt markets, regardless of the problem 
of prohibition of interest (riba), it could weaken or even destroy the independence of 
the state. As said above, it seems the best and most proper scenario is to borrow from 
the House of Wealth using a qard hasana facility. The other way is by collecting duties 
in advance, especially kharaj and zakat (albeit, with the approval of the House of 
Wealth) and also using some sort of mua’wada (tax swap/exchange) or other similar 
facility.  
Regarding the collection of tax (mainly zakat, kharaj or other similar public or 
state duties), they may be collected either directly by state tax officials or indirectly 
                                                   
81
 Any extra taxation going beyond the legitimate tax sources and also the legitimate limits is 
considered forbidden due to the appropriation of the property of others in an illegitimate and unjust 
manner. See Monzer Kahf ‘Taxation Policy in an Islamic Economy (in M. A. Gulaid and M. A. Abdullah 
(eds)-Readings in Public Finance in Islam’ (Jeddah: IDB/IRTI, 1995) p.118. The extra taxation by the state 
(or the House of Wealth) may also be in sharp contrast to the state duty of “hifz al-mal” (protection of 
the property), which is one of the essential objectives of the Sharia (Maqasid al-Sharia). However, the 
performance fees, service charges, and indirect taxes on trade such as tolls and market fees are 
considered legitimate. For some discussions concerning indirect taxes see Wantje Fritschy ‘Indirect 
Taxes and Public Debt in the World of Islam Before 1800 (in S. Cavaciocchi (ed.), XXXIX Settimana di 
Studi, La Fiscalita nell’economia europea secc. XIII-XVIII)’ (Florence: University of Florence Press, 2008) 
pp. 51-75. The Maliki school has permitted the imposition of extra taxes in some circumstances e.g., in 
the time of war to meet the inevitable needs of defense and security. They should be, however, 
imposed temporarily and levied only on the rich. In any case, these extra taxes cannot go beyond the 
genuine and legitimate needs of the state and the society as whole. See Monzer Kahf ‘Taxation Policy in 
an Islamic Economy (in M. A. Gulaid and M. A. Abdullah (eds)-Readings in Public Finance in Islam’ 
(Jeddah: IDB/IRTI, 1995) p.119-122. As per Kahf, there are seven legitimate tax sources: “kharaj, jizya, 
revenue of public enterprises, fees and voluntary contributions, equity finance, and public debt”. To 
legitimise the extra taxes in an Islamic economy, some may base their reasons on maslaha (public 
interest) and darurah/necessity (al-darurat tubih al-mahdurat) according to the Quran (6:145- 2:173- 
6:119- 5:3).    
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through non-governmental/non-public intermediary institutions. Indirect collection of 
tax by non-state institutions may be carried out using ji’ala (in the form of some 
reward for tax collection service), ijara (in the form of a certain fee for tax collection 
service), wakala (in the form of an agency arrangement), bay (sale), hiwala 
(assignment) or mua’wada (in the form of the exchange of a certain tax source in 
return for a cash payment or some other liquid asset).  
Historic practices of indirect tax collection are iqta’, iltizam, malikane, and 
esham. Under the iqta’ system, which was practised in several different forms, an 
individual or partnership was delegated or granted a privilege or right to collect 
tax/zakat from the specific tax sources (called muqata’a) in return for a specific reward 
or against a specific cash payment to the state. The basic form of this system was 
invented and practised first in the Sassanid and Roman empires.82 A variant of this 
system was one that was widely practised in Egypt. This system was known as a 
“system of auctioning” or iqta’ al-qabala. The individual or partnership that made a 
successful bid in a very competitive auction was awarded a right to collect taxes from 
specific tax sources for a certain time period in return for cash payments to the state.83 
The medieval Egyptian iqt’ al-qabala practice was followed by one used by the 
Ottomans with further improvements under the label of the iltizam system. As for its 
precedent, the risk-taking highest bidder called a multazim was awarded a right or 
privilege to collect taxes from specific tax sources called “tax farms”84. Under the 
iltizam system the multazim (a non-state enterprise) collected taxes from the specific 
                                                   
82
 See Murat Cizakca ‘Islamic Capitalism and Finance: Origins, Evolution, and the Future’ (Edward Elgar: 
Studies in Islamic Finance, Accounting, and Governance, 2011) pp. 57-58. In his book, Cizakca discusses 
Iqta’, Iltizam, Malikane, and Esham in great detail.  
83
 For more in this regard see Kosei Morimoto ‘Fiscal Administration of Egypt in the Early Islamic 
Period’ (Kyoto: Dohosha, 1981) p. 232. 
84
 Each tax farm was divided into 24 shares, which was called qirat. A share (qirat) or a number of 
shares (qirats) could be obtained by a single multazim or a partnership of several multazims.  
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sources on behalf of the Ottoman state with the result that no public borrowing was 
necessary there. Whatever was collected by the multazim transferred to the state in 
return for a certain award to the multazim. The first step towards public borrowing 
occurred from the use of the malikane system where the state sold a specific tax 
source to the highest bidder who controlled the entire tax income of that tax source 
for their lifetime in return for a lump sum payment at the time of auction and also 
annual payments for its duration. The private enterprise was entitled to transfer his 
malikane rights in the tax farm to third parties but only during their lifetime. This 
public borrowing was further improved through the use of the esham system whereby 
the entire contingent tax revenues of a tax farm were divided into a number of shares 
(sehm) and they were sold to investors who continued to receive annual payments for 
their lifetime. In other words, in the esham system, the annual revenues yielded by a 
tax source were divided into esham/shares and were sold to private investors who 
received annuities for their lifetime in return for a lump sum payment to the state.85  
An important question that may come to the mind of an Islamic scholar is 
whether public borrowing securitisation where the underlying asset is tax income 
profits from a specific tax source is usurious or not. A transaction is considered a 
usurious transaction (i.e., an interest-bearing transaction) where there is a stipulation 
in the loan agreement made for a certain time period that a certain surplus over the 
loan capital will be returned to the lender.86 It may be argued that some of these 
elements are missing in the above mentioned tax collection and public borrowing 
arrangements. The iltizam system could be implemented based on a ji’ala (reward) 
contract and therefore cannot be considered a usurious transaction. Indeed, the 
                                                   
85
 This is to some extent similar to the modern retirement pension plan whereby after having paid all 
due contributions to the pension fund and also having retired the person continues to receive 
guaranteed annuities for the rest of his life.    
86
 For another definition see Abd al Mun’im Mahmud Al Qusi ‘Riba, Islamic Law and Interest’ (Temple 
University PhD Dissertation, 1981-1982) p. 122.  
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malikane and esham systems were privatised entrepreneurial activities rather than 
not-for-profit practices. The auction price that had to be paid to the state was 
determined at the time of agreement but the amount of consideration for the 
investors, that is, tax income generated from the specific tax sources, was not certain 
but contingent at the time of agreement and it could go beyond the auction price or 
below it. In case the tax farms generated more tax income the investors made a profit, 
but if they did not yield enough income the investors made a loss. Also, the agreement 
was made for the lifespan of the investors and thus the duration of the contract was 
not fixed. It seems the arguments here may go both ways as to the legitimacy of the 
systems. However, it seems true to say that these systems are not usurious. The first 
reason is that contingent revenue (arising out of specific tax sources) is exchanged on 
the basis of a mua’wada against specific cash and this dealing is not usurious in the 
least. Also, considering the Sharia rule, “originality of the validity of every 
transaction”87, the conclusion may go in favour of the legitimacy of the above systems. 
Furthermore, these systems are absolutely legitimate if the scope of auction includes 
not only the income generated from zakat/tax sources but also the natural resources 
whose utilisation is subject to kharaj. Moreover, some may argue for the legitimacy of 
both the malikane and esham arrangements on the basis of a sulh (compromise) 
scheme.          
Another concern that may be raised over public borrowing is the negotiability88 
of public finance instruments, in other words, the liquidity concern. From the 
viewpoint of Sharia, the underlying asset of the instrument (security or sukuk) and the 
consent of the obligor/debtor are the two main concerns in the negotiability of an 
                                                   
87
 Asalat al-sehhat 
88
 For another definition of negotiability see John Murno ‘The Medieval Origins of the Financial 




instrument. Regarding the former, it cannot be a fixed amount of cash, debt 
receivable, or credit (i.e., a fixed return or receivable instrument), but it has to be a 
non-monetary asset or contingent profit originating from real (non-monetary) assets. 
As to the latter, the default rule is that the consent of the obligor/debtor is required 
but it may be agreed otherwise by the parties to the contract. The nearest Sharia 
concept for this purpose is hiwala. This is a contract whereby a creditor may transfer 
his claim (debt receivable) against the debtor, who accepts to pay a third party 
designated by the creditor. To be a valid hiwala, this acceptance is required. Hiwala, in 
and of itself, cannot be used for trade and profit-making purposes but it is an 
intermediary instrument used for debt-relief purposes. Therefore, if negotiability is 
essentially made for trade and profit purposes, hiwala would not be a useful facility for 
this purpose. After all, the key issue in determining the negotiability of public finance 
instruments, e.g., those used in malikane and esham systems, depends on whether the 
underlying asset in these instruments, i.e., the tax income stream, is considered a fixed 
receivable or a contingent profit originating from real (non-monetary) assets. In the 
former case, unlike the latter case, they will not be acceptable negotiable instruments. 
Regardless of the concern over whether the underlying asset in these instruments is a 
fixed receivable or a contingent revenue, if it is assumed that the essence of a 
transaction is “transfer of ownership”, according to the Sunni school of thought unlike 
the view of the Shia school who argue that the essence of a transaction is “promise”, 
these instruments would not be negotiable. This is due to the redeemability89 option 
that is often stipulated (as in the malikane and esham systems) in favour of the issuer 
                                                   
89
 Note the difference between redemption (forced sale to the issuer at the price set in the 
certificate/security) and repurchase. For example as per NY laws, redemptions are set in the certificate, 
and must be done proportionally within each class of stock. In contrast, as to the repurchase, the 
general rule is that repurchases are individually negotiated, and the issuer can discriminate among the 
shareholders/security-holders (with one exception: in a closely held corporation, the corporation must 
give equal opportunity to all shareholders to sell back their stock to the corporation).     
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of instruments (i.e., the Treasury of State or the House of Wealth). According to the 
“transfer of ownership” theory, assuming that the legal essence of the negotiation of 
an instrument is a bay (sale), in order for an owner to sell his assets or property right, 
he has to own it first in an absolute manner. In other words, for exchangeability or 
negotiability of receivable instruments of public finance by their private holders (such 
as annuities in malikane and esham arrangements) these should not be subject to a 
revocability or redeemability option of the issuer (i.e., the Treasury of State or the 
House of Wealth). If the “promise” theory applies instead of the theory of “transfer of 
ownership”, the redeemability option will be less problematic and perhaps not 
problematic at all.           
 
5.5.2 Personal Housing and Construction Projects 
Housing is a very important basic necessity.90 According to some scholars, in 
order to fund these types of projects the government can simply deposit a certain 
amount of money with a public financial institution, giving the specifications as to who 
qualifies and let the institution do the rest, i.e., lend the deposited funds to the 
qualified applicants. The government and the institution will not ask for any interest on 
the loans to the qualified people but the institution, by ensuring an appropriate loan 
repayment plan, has to take care that the original capital remains intact and is used 
continuously to give fresh loans.91 Qard hasana (interest-free loan), ijara including 
ijara-wa-iqtina (leasing with a purchase option), a’riya (permission to use a house or 
construction equipment and tools free of charge temporarily), and haq intifa 
(enjoyment privilege) can be very proper methods in funding the acquisition, 
                                                   
90
 See the Constitution of Iran article 43 (section 1). 
91
 See A. L. M. Abdul Gafoor ‘Interest, Usury, Riba and the Operational Costs of a Bank’ (A.S. Noordeen, 
2005) pp. 45-46.  
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construction, or use of housing. In respect of personal (non-commercial) housing or 
construction concerns, in case the borrower (in the acquisition of the ownership of a 
dwelling house) or lessee (in the acquisition of the usufructs of a dwelling house) 
defaults in the repayment of the loan (qard hasana) or payment of rental fees (maal 
al-ijara), the unpaid amount can be recovered from sources like sadaqat (almsgiving 
funds), mawhubat (gifted funds), zakat (wealth taxes) and kharaj (natural resource use 
premiums). Notably, the qard hasana facility is suitable only for individual housing and 
construction needs, but not for commercial use purposes.   
 
5.5.3 The Education, Healthcare, and Academic (Scientific) Research 
In terms of education, healthcare, and academic (scientific) research,92 a one-off 
donation (hiba) can be a suitable option to help needy students to finance their 
education costs. The other way to fund education is to grant loans to needy students 
(interest-free long-term lending on the basis of qard hasana), and require them to 
repay exactly the granted amount of loan (qard) at the earliest convenient time. 
Another proposal may be to ask the students to repay the lent amount with some 
additional amount of money to cover the usual and necessary costs of borrowing, such 
as administration costs and the reduced value of the currency as a consequence of 
inflation (i.e., qard plus administrative costs plus depreciated value of cash).93 As per 
the last option, it may be said that since the original fund remains intact, this would be 
a sustainable continuing operation with no need to provide fresh funds to keep the 
operation running. However, since access to education and also healthcare facilities 
are an essential public need and are also necessary for public welfare, the costs and 
                                                   
92
 See the Constitution of Iran article 43 (section 1). 
93
 See A. L. M. Abdul Gafoor ‘Interest, Usury, Riba and the Operational Costs of a Bank’ (A.S. Noordeen, 
2005) pp. 43-45. 
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expenses have to be paid from the source of public funds, specifically: public 
mawqufat, public mawhubat, zakat and possibly kharaj. An important means of 
supporting research and development projects94 in academic and professional 
institutions is through the endowment of public or private properties in the form of 
waqf to specific research and development projects. These waqfs are called R&D 
waqfs and are managed by academic or professional institutions (as 
mutawallis/trustees of the waqf), who will pool together and pay a qualified group of 
researchers from the source of the waqf in return for carrying out certain research and 
development projects specified in the deed of the waqf.      
 
5.5.4 Micro-Business Activities 
A suitable method for providing micro-business95 financing is through 
cooperative financing. Individuals with common capabilities can establish a 
cooperative in order to run micro-entrepreneurship projects for their own interests.96 
The contribution of the cooperative members and also a long-term qard hasana 
(interest-free loan) provided by the House of Wealth are the two main sources for 
funding the cooperative. The cooperative is obliged to return the qard hasana (only 
                                                   
94
 These not-for-profit R&D projects are those that are carried out for public welfare purposes.   
95
 See the Constitution of Iran article 43 (section 2). 
96
 Some micro-business enterprises can be initiated with the governments (the House of Wealth) or 
highly respected private sector institutions (who will act as trustee or manager of these 
microenterprises) by way of pooling public funds or the funds coming from not-for-profit or benevolent 
sources dedicated to micro-businesses as beneficiaries.  Very similar schemes to these enterprises in the 
US are government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (albeit, only in 
housing construction and business industry). There are some projects which are unattractive enterprises 
for investors but have to be implemented because they are socially the most necessary ones especially 
at the grass roots and micro levels. These are projects that actually bring direct benefit to the poor in 
small towns and villages, and those living in the slums of large cities. These kinds of projects have to be 
financed by the government (the House of Wealth)-sponsored enterprises. For a similar approach see A. 
L. M. Abdul Gafoor ‘Islamic Banking & Finance: Another Approach’ (A. S. Noordeen, Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia, 2000) p. 18.    
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the principal amount without any interest) to the House of Wealth within an agreed 
time. Public-private musharaka (especially public-private mudaraba and public-private 
inan) can be another way to finance micro-business. On the basis of public-private 
musharaka, the House of Wealth provides a given cooperative with a sufficient 
amount of assets in order to run specific projects. The profits derived from these 
projects will be shared between the House of Wealth and the cooperative’s members 
as per their contributions (or through a mutually pre-agreed equitable ratio). On the 
basis of public-private musharaka, the House of Wealth may provide a given 
cooperative with non-monetary contributions, such as: equipment, raw materials, 
land, water, and machinery using muzara’a (crop-sharing), musaqat (produce-sharing), 
or similar97 arrangements. The produce generated as a result of muzara’a or musaqat 
will be shared between the House of Wealth and the cooperative as per their 
contributions (or mutually pre-agreed equitable ratio). Istisna can also be used for 
microfinance purposes if a given cooperative is interested and has specialised in the 
field of manufacturing and construction projects. The House of Wealth, the state and 
any member of the public may order a given cooperative to construct or produce 
certain buildings, machinery, or any other products as per the specific specifications. 
The cost/price of the building, machinery, or any other ordered product is paid at the 
time of the order (salam contract). Bay nasiya (deferred payment sale) and also ijara-
wa-iqtina (leasing with a purchase option) may also be used for ownership 
empowerment purposes i.e., selling specific goods and commodities in installments or 
at the end of a lease contract respectively. 
                                                   
97
 For example, the state (the House of Wealth) may provide a given cooperative with necessary raw 
materials to produce carpets or some specific machinery. I will call this arrangement musana’a i.e., 
product-sharing (derived from istisna).   
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A tool that has been successfully used to combat poverty and also for 
microfinance purposes is the Grameen La Riba model98 also called a “group lending 
methodology”.99 This model is based on a “human portfolio approach”, which is in fact 
a variant of the financial portfolio theory.100 This model is considered to be very 
effective because it significantly reduces default rates in repayment of loans, and also 
leads to lower-interest-rate loans.101 In a group lending method, a microfinance 
institution (MFI) will provide funds to self-selected groups of borrowers together 
where no physical collateral to guarantee the loan (i.e., a rahn) is needed. However 
every single member will have to share collective risks and responsibilities with all the 
other group members (“social collateral”).102 Besides the group lending model, some 
scholars103 have found that “dynamic incentives” (e.g., further lending eligibility 
provided upon the punctual repayment of an existing loan), recurrent repayment 
schedule, and communal repayment plan can significantly lead to a lower rate of 
repayment defaults.  
Other interesting proposals in respect of micro-business finance are using 
murabaha and musharaka schemes. As per the former scheme which is applied prior 
to the application of the latter one, a group of borrowers who approach a given MFI 
                                                   
98
 This model was created by the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh founded by Muhammad Yunus, who 
was awarded (jointly with the Grameen Bank) the Nobel Peace Prize 2006, for its efforts to create 
economic and social development.   
99
 For more detail see Ehsan Habib Feroz and Blake Goud ‘Grameen La Riba Model: A Strategy for 
Global Poverty Alleviation’ (Journal of Islamic Economics, Banking and Finance. vol. 5, no. 2) pp. 83-85. 
100
 In other words, a group of risky borrowers is pooled instead of pooling risky debt securities (sukuk) 
as it is practised in modern finance.      
101
 See Ehsan Habib Feroz ‘The Halal Way to Social Change: Is There a Way to Pursue Grameen's Social 
Agenda without Using Interest?’ (Islamic Horizons, January/February 2007) p. 42. 
102
 It may be said that people in society have a kind of joint and several responsibility towards each 
other. The destiny of people in society is dependent on one another. For a similar idea see Murtaza 
Mutahhari ‘Barrasi-ye Ijmali-ye Mabani-ye Iqtisad-e Islami’ (Tehran, Hikmat publications, 1
st
 edition, 
1403 Lunar Hijri Calendar) pp. 175-177.   
103
 See Beatriz Armendáriz and Jonathan Morduch ‘The economics of Microfinance’ (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 2005).  
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for financing will be offered for sale items needed to run a given micro-business on the 
basis of a murabaha facility (cost-plus resale with deferred payment). Having 
successfully completed a business cycle on the basis of a murabaha, then the MFI will 
determine whether to offer further financing to the borrowers on the basis of a 
musharaka facility, in which the MFI and the group members will have to share profits 
and losses of the micro-business as per a mutually pre-agreed ratio.104 
 
5.6 Best Western Not-For-Profit (Profit Free and Philanthropic) and 
Microfinance Practices 
There are some best modern practices for financing in the not-for-profit and 
microfinance context that are good enough to be adopted into the new alternative 
model with only some improvements to their structure and characteristics. These are 
not only successful and popular, but are also consistent with the fundamental 
principles of the model and Sharia rules and objectives. These best practices are: 
cooperatives, pension funds, and (charitable) trusts. 
 
5.6.1 Cooperative 
A cooperative is a kind of commercial enterprise or association jointly owned and 
operated for a common purpose or for the joint economic benefit of its members. It is 
usually set up by consumers or producers, particularly farmers, who produce and 
distribute goods and services. In general, individuals whose professions are similar may 
set up a cooperative together. The philosophy of the cooperative is to provide mutual 
                                                   
104
 See Ehsan Habib Feroz and Blake Goud ‘Grameen La Riba Model: A Strategy for Global Poverty 
Alleviation’ (Journal of Islamic Economics, Banking and Finance, vol. 5, no. 2) pp. 85-97. 
 214 
 
assistance and serve a useful function for the benefit of members of the cooperative. A 
good example of a cooperative is an apartment cooperative, where a corporation is 
established to build and operate apartment blocks.105 The shares of the corporation 
are owned by the occupiers of the apartments pro rata to the value of the particular 
apartment occupied by each of them. The contribution of the participants to a given 
cooperative can be made either in the form of cash or in kind, especially their expertise 
and professional services with regard to production and distribution of goods and the 
provision of certain services. 
The huge potential of cooperatives for social and economic development has 
already been extensively researched.106 It proves that a law (which is considered to be 
a powerful “social engineering” tool) conducive to the improvement and growth of 
cooperatives could have a very strong positive impact on socio-economic 
development. However, since cooperatives are essentially different from ordinary 
business schemes because they are socio-economic self-help associations which are 
“member-oriented”, that is to say member participation is of significant importance 
and control is not according to the amount of the each member’s contribution, a new 
type of law for cooperatives is required. As per Shah, cooperative law must be a law of 
people i.e., it must be written by and for the people who are most directly engaged in 
cooperatives at the grass roots.107  
                                                   
105
 The largest cooperative effort in the US known as “Co-op City” was developed by the United 
Housing Foundation (UHF) in New York which now accommodates over 15,000 families, or about 40,000 
people. The Co-op City has three shopping centres with co-op supermarkets, its own nursery schools, 
credit unions, and also a multitude of civic and social organizations, which has made it an integrated and 
well-rounded community. For more information in this regard see 
http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/library/kheel.  
106
 For example see Alfred Hanel ‘Basic Aspects of Co-operative Organizations and Co-operative Self 
Help Promotion in Developing Countries (Marburg, Marburg Consult for Self-Help Promotion, 1992).    
107
 See Ashish Shah ‘Cooperative Law: An Instrument for Development’ (International Labour Review, 
Vol. 131, Issues 4-5, 1992, pp. 513-524) pp. 513 and 523.   
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There is no concern over Sharia-compliance for cooperatives. In fact, the idea of 
a cooperative is well represented in Sharia. The most referred to one is the concept of 
ta’awun (mutual assistance).108 Cooperatives are widely used in Islamic countries such 
as Iran.109 Since the cooperatives are essentially not-for-profit organisations, the 
liability of the participants does not usually go beyond the total assets of the 
cooperative. Some scholars may argue for a limited liability standard in cooperatives 
(and also in any other not-for-profit organisations and philanthropic foundations) 
according to the concept of ihsan110 (acting for the benefit of others) in Sharia.        
 
5.6.2 Pension Fund 
A pension fund is a financial vehicle that regularly collects contributions from 
specific sponsors reserved to pay specific workers’ pensions when they retire. They are 
set up by private corporations and also governments to pool certain assets in an 
independent legal entity (usually a trust) in order to finance the benefits and 
obligations of a pension plan. In modern economies, especially in the US,111 pension 
funds have become very important institutional investors simply because they have 
made it possible for many members of the public to become participants of capital 
markets. For example, factory floor workers have become participants of capital 
                                                   
108
 As per the Quran (5:2) “help one another in acts of righteousness”. 
109
 Cooperatives are strongly encouraged and widely used in Iran. They are governed under the 
Constitution of Iran articles 43 (section 2) and article 44; Iran Commerce Code articles 190-194; 
Cooperatives Act (with subsequent amendments) 1971 and Act on Cooperative Sector of Economy of 
Islamic Republic of Iran 1991 (especially article 1 sections 1-2).   
110
 As per the Quran (55:60) “can the reward of goodness be any other than goodness?” Also as per 
the Quran (16:90) “surely Allah enjoins justice, kindness and the doing of good?”. 
111
 In the US, pension funds are regulated by the Department of Labor under an Act of Congress called 
ERISA (Employment Retirement Income Security Act) enacted in 1974 primarily to protect against 
inadequate funding, to establish benefits and also to impose fiduciary duties on the part of those 
(trustees) who manage the pension funds. 
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markets through their relevant pension funds. In the past, in particular in the US, 
pension funds were only funded and guaranteed by employers. Now however, private 
industries, but not governments,112 have converted their pension funds from the 
original “defined guaranteed pension” model (also referred to as “defined benefit 
plan”) to a “defined contribution plan” model, in which the employer only guarantees 
that it will contribute when employees also contribute. The contributions that are 
                                                   
112
 The Bush administration tried to convert social security to a contribution plan instead of a defined 
guaranteed plan. Republicans are still trying to get this done.   
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made to the pension fund are usually invested in the stock markets and the generated 
proceeds are distributed to the pension fund beneficiaries.113 
Considering the implications of the research theory as well as the suggested 
alternative model, there would be no employment structure, as it is understood today, 
in the profit-making industry section although it would still be in operation in the not-
for-profit and public-function spheres. Therefore, only governments, public entities, 
and not-for-profit organisations may set up pension funds. Other challenging issues 
surrounding pension funds are the legal nature of pension funds and also the disposal 
                                                   
113
 For more on the most common types of pension funds and the difference between “defined 
contribution” plan and “defined benefit” plan see Gregory L. Prescott and Jeanne Sylvestre ‘Pension 
Underfunding: How Big is the Problem’ (Commercial Lending Review, Vol. 18, Issue 3, May 2003, pp. 22-
31) pp. 22-23. As per Prescott and Sylvestre, pension schemes are basically set up by many employers in 
order to attract and retain highly-qualified employees, who do want to reach their retirement savings 
aims. Under “defined contribution” schemes, the employer promises to contribute to a pension fund a 
certain amount each period based on a specific formula. What the employer promises is in fact to 
contribute a certain defined sum; no guarantee is made regarding the ultimate benefits have to be 
made to the employees. But, under “defined benefit” plans, the employer specifically guarantees the 
benefits (typically, on the basis of an employee’s years of service and also the employee’s compensation  
level at the time of retirement) paid out to the employees at the time of their retirement. In the UK, 
there are two main routes a person can start saving for a pension- obtaining one through her job or 
joining a personal pension plan. It is possible to use both types of pension plan simultenously if a person 
wants to do so. In practice, there are many different kinds of pension plans but the most common types 
are: occupational pensions (also referred to as company pensions), personal pensions, and stakeholder 
pensions. Each pension scheme is made up of individual pension pots for each member- also known as 
pension arrangements. The two most common types of arrangements are: money purchase (also known 
as “defined contributions”) and “defined benefits”. Under the “defined contributions”, the person builds 
up a pension pot that will provide her with her pension. The value of the pension pot she will receive 
when she retires depends on how much money she contributes and how well the funds are invested i.e., 
how much pension her pension pot can “buy”. Under the “defined benefits”, the amount of pension she 
will receive when she retires does not depend on the size of her pension pot. She will be guaranteed a 
certain amount of pension at her retirement. The amount of her pension normally depends on her pay 
and length of service in her job. See UK Government HM Revenue & Customs website at 





of the assets of the pension fund. From an Islamic viewpoint, it may be argued that a 
pension fund is established on the basis of waqf rules. In this case, as per Sharia, the 
contributions cannot be made in cash and not by the beneficiaries themselves but 
must be made by persons other than the beneficiaries of the waqf. In respect of the 
disposal of the assets of the fund, they cannot be disposed of for investment purposes 
if the legal nature of the fund is deemed to be a waqf. Some may argue that a pension 
fund can be set up based on the concept of ta’awun (mutual assistance) in the Sharia. 
In this case, contributions to the fund should basically be made by the beneficiaries 
themselves and the contributions can be both in cash and in kind. Others may argue 
that the establishment of the pension fund can be made through the concept of sulh 
(compromise). This also makes sense from the viewpoint of Shia scholars but not to 
scholars of the Sunni school. 
 
5.6.3 Trust 
A trust is a legal facility that allows an owner of property called a settlor (the 
person who creates the trust, also called creator) makes a delivery114 of a legal title to 
the property115 (also called the corpus, res, or principal) to a trustee116 who holds117 
                                                   
114
 In a trust, titled assets e.g., deeds and stock certificates must be formally transferred to the trustee 
for delivery to be valid. 
115
 The property can be almost anything, but must be property that the settlor owns, not just a mere 
expectation of ownership in the future. The property must be specific and identifiable, not subject to 
future determination. In a trust that the corpus property of the trust is a bank account, it is called Totten 
Trust (or Bank Account Trust). The Totten Trust is a bank account in the depositor’s name “as trustee 
for” a named beneficiary. The depositor (the creator of the trust) can make deposits and also 
withdrawals as he wishes during the depositor’s lifetime. The beneficiary has no beneficial interest 
during the depositor’s lifetime, but gets whatever is in the account when the depositor dies.   
116
 The trustee can be the settlor himself. 
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the legal title for the benefit of a beneficiary118 with the intention of creating a trust for 
a lawful purpose in a validly executed119 document.120 An important point that should 
be noted is that in trust setting, the settlor or the person who manages the trust (i.e., 
trustee who takes control of the trust property under custody but not possession) has 
legal title to manage the trust but the equitable title belongs to the beneficiaries who 
receive the distributions from the trust.  
                                                                                                                                                             
117
 The trustee can sell, mortgage, or lease any real or personal property, but he cannot engage in self-
dealing, borrow money on behalf of the trust, or run/continue a business (the trustee is liable for losses 
incurred by the business unless a trustee has court approval to run/continue the business). However, 
with regard to the trustee’s investment power, the trustee must manage the property of the trust on 
behalf of the beneficiary, and this means the investment of the corpus of the trust. For example New 
York State in the US has adopted the Uniform Prudent Investor Act “UPIA” that gives broad latitude to 
trustees to choose investments. Trustee can pursue what UPIA calls the modern portfolio theory of 
investment, where the trustee creates a tailored investment strategy for this particular trust.  
118
 At least one beneficiary who is not the settlor is required. The settlor cannot be the sole beneficiary 
when also named the sole trustee (the merger of legal and equitable title in one person i.e., the settlor). 
But, the settlor can be the sole beneficiary when the trustee is somebody else other than the settlor 
himself. Furthermore, the settlor can be an income beneficiary for life. The settlor’s estate can be one of 
the beneficiaries of the principal so long as there is at least one other beneficiary.  
119
 The settlor can retain the power to revoke (terminate) or amend the trust. All trusts are presumed 
to be irrevocable, unless the trust explicitly authorises revocation. As to modifications, trust 
modification is appropriate only when the purpose and objectives of the trust would be defeated or 
substantially impaired if the trust were not modified.  
120
 For more on trusts in the US see New York EPTL (Estates, Powers, and Trusts Law), which governs 
substantive law relating to trusts and wills. Also for more on Trusts, especially in England see J E Penner 
‘The Law of Trusts’ (Oxford University Press, 6
th
 edition, 2008) pp. 14-18, 50-86, 230-300, and 440-466. 
According to Halsbury’s Laws of England, there is no universally understood definition of a trust but only 
a number of key features of a trust are often provided for this purpose. See Halsbury’s Laws of England 
(Vol. 48, 2007 Reissue) Trusts. As per many legal scholars and comparative jurists, trust is characterised 
as an English, or widely common law, concept and is traditionally exluded from civil law systems. For 
example see F. W. Maitland in ‘Selected Essays’ edited by H. D. Hazeltine, G. T. Lapsley and P. H. 
Winfield eds. (Cambridge University Press, 1936) p 129. According to Maitland, trust is England’s largets 
export to the world of legal theory. As per some scholars, the ostensible distaste civil law systems have 
for the common law trust can be traced back to each system’s respective approach to rights in property 
and at least some degree of mistranslation. This apparent gap in understanding can be bridged by 
examining the trust in the more ancient Roman law concept of the “patrimony”, thereby making the 
trust more acceptable to civil law jurisdictions. In filling the gap, however, this new appreciation for the 
trust can be challenging for common lawyers since they will have to reconsider “the traditional common 
law premise of the trust as being less about proprietary interest as it is about personal rights and 
obligations”. See James Sheedy ‘Civil Law Jurisdiction and the English Trust Idea: Lost in Translation’ 
(Denning Law Journal, Vol. 20, pp. 173-184) p. 173.   
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The closest concept to a trust121 in Sharia is a waqf122 (endowment) and a 
wasiyyat tamliki123 (possessory will). A waqf is similar to a lifetime (inter vivos) trust 
and a wasiyyat tamliki is similar to a testamentary trust. The main differences between 
trust law and waqf are that: a) in a waqf, unlike a trust, only such property that can be 
exploited without having a detrimental effect to its existence can be endowed; b) in a 
private waqf though not generally in a public124 waqf, unlike a trust, a waqif cannot be 
included as a beneficiary; c) a waqf, unlike a trust, after being duly executed, is not 
revocable by the creator; and d) a mutawalli in a waqf, unlike a trustee in a trust, 
cannot dispose of the waqf assets except in very rare circumstances. However, in 
contrast, in a wasiyyat tamliki, the asset that is transferred under the will can be any 
type of asset whether it is monetary or non-monetary, and it can even be a mere 
expectation of ownership. It is revocable until the musy (testator) dies, and it becomes 
complete when the beneficiary, if they are identified, but not if it is made for public 
purposes, accepts the will. In a wasiyyat tamliki, a musy cannot bestow more than one 
                                                   
121
 It should be noted that from a wide perspective, there are two types of trusts: lifetime (or inter 
vivos) trust and testamentary trust.      
122
 For more on waqf see Iran Civil Code articles 55-91. For more analysis see Nasser Katouzian “Huquq 
Madani: Uqud Mu’ayyan’ (Tehran: Ganje Danesh Publications, vol. 3, 6
th
 edition, 1387 Solar Hijri 
Calendar) pp. 115-272.    
123
 In Sharia, will is divided into two categories: possessory (tamliki) and promissory (ahdi). A 
possessory will occurs when a musy (testator) bestows on another person (called musa lah i.e., 
beneficiary), without charge, the property (called musa bih) in a thing or a benefit belonging to him to 
take effect from the date of his death. A promissory/contractual will occurs when a person (called a 
musy i.e., testator) appoints one or more other persons (called wasy) to carry out an affair, or to 
perform other legal acts after the musy dies. For more on wasiyyat tamliki see Iran Civil Code articles 
825-853. For an analysis see Nasser Katouzian “Huquq Madani: Uqud Mu’ayyan’ (Tehran: Ganje Danesh 
Publications, vol. 3, 6
th
 edition, 1387 Solar Hijri Calendar) pp. 273-447.    
124
 Public waqf in Sharia is similar to a charitable trust in common law. A trust where the beneficiaries 
are a reasonably large enough group to consider the number of beneficiaries indefinite is called a 
charitable trust. In other words, a charitable trust cannot have specific, named persons as beneficiaries. 
Charitable trusts must be for a charitable purpose such as health, education, and religion and they may 
be perpetual (i.e., last forever). In case the stated purpose of the charitable trust can no longer be 
pursued, or the designated charity ceases to exist, the court may order that the trust be as near as 
possible to what the settlor intended. The beneficiaries of the charitable trust are represented by the 
attorney general, who represents the public. 
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third of his total outstanding assets, unless the testator’s estate ratifies the excess. It 
can be concluded that modern trusts can be considered as best practice125 but require 
some adjustments to be implemented under the new suggested model. Among all 
types of trust in modern legal systems, charitable trusts are the closest type of trust to 











                                                   
125
 It is believed that the endowment deed of Merton Foundation which established Merton College of 
Oxford University in 1264 and later became a successful model in England as well as the Peterhouse 
Foundation which established Cambridge University were very similar to an Islamic waqf. See Monica 
Gaudiosi ‘The Influence of the Islamic Law of Waqf on the Development of the Trust in England: The 







Part Six of the Second Tier of 






Today, intermediary services are widely used in many areas from politics to 
capital markets, to the banking sector. A well-functioning economic and financial 
system has to facilitate the circulation of surplus assets, the performance of exchange 
transactions and provide facilities to cater for the proper transfer of funds and the 
settlement of debts in the economy.  
Intermediaries are the key players in any economy and this is easily recognisable 
by huge volumes of transactions carried out among anonymous participants that have 
limited knowledge and access to directly assess each other’s products and services. 
That is why it can be said that that, in modern world, few consumers or investors do 
transaction without relying directly or indirectly on the facilities that the 
intermediaries provide e.g., information that they gather and evaluate.1 
In this section, in order for necessarily proper functioning of the suggested new 
model, I propose to discuss some major and necessary intermediary tools and services 
as follows.        
 
6.2 Tools and Services 
The following are the major tools and facilities that can be used for the purpose of 
intermediary activities.    
                                                   
1
 See Jonathan M. Barnett ‘Intermediaries Revisited: Is Efficient Certification Consistent with Profit 
Maximization’ (Journal of Corporation Law, Vol. 37, Issue 3, Spring 2012) pp. 476-477.   
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6.2.1 Agency (Wakala) 
Wakala (agency)2 is a contract whereby a person (muwakkil) appoints an agent 
(wakil) as his representative to accomplish some legal or administrative matters on his 
behalf free of charge or in return for some fees. Wakala may be general and cover all 
legal and administrative affairs of the muwakkil or may only be for some specific legal 
and administrative concerns. A wakil has a duty to act in the best interests of a 
muwakkil. He cannot receive a benefit to the detriment and at the expense of the 
muwakkil (principal). If the muwakkil suffers losses due to the misconduct or 
negligence of the wakil, he will be liable to make good the losses suffered by the 
muwakkil. Wakala for specific legal and administrative affairs also implies wakala 
(agency) for necessary acts to accomplish those affairs, unless it is expressly excluded. 
A muwakkil is obliged to reimburse all costs and expenses incurred by the wakil for the 
accomplishment of wakala matters and also compensate the wakil as per the 
mutually-agreed terms. The due compensation of the wakil will usually be a fixed fee. 
However, there may also be a performance-based fee, but it will not be based on a 
profit-sharing arrangement.3 A wakala is a permissive contract and a muwakkil 
(principal) may terminate it with a prior notice to the wakil unless it is made obligatory 
as per the mutually-agreed terms in a legally binding contract. Wakala may be used for 
intermediary purposes, such as for the negotiation and execution of legal documents 
or the transfer and settlement of debts.   
Another intermediary service is mua’mala bi al-nafs i.e., self-dealing agency. 
According to the Islamic Sunni school of thought, if a person is appointed as an agent 
to do a transaction, his capacity as an agent has to be distinguished from his capacity 
                                                   
2
 Agency is the closest modern concept to wakala. See Nasser Katouzian ‘Qanun Madani dar Nazm 
Huquq Kununi-ye Iran’ (Tehran: Mizan publication, 18
th
 edition, 1387 Solar Hijri Calendar) pp. 431-444, 
articles 656-683.       
3
 The reason is that wakala is not used for profit-making business and investment purposes.  
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as a party to the transaction. For example, after buying shares on behalf of the 
principal and before selling the shares to himself, the agent must inform the principal 
that he has bought the shares and then in order for the shares to be sold to the agent 
himself (i.e., as a prospective buyer), a separate proper offer and acceptance has to 
have occurred between the principal and the agent. However, it seems there is no 
need for such separate offer and acceptance steps, at least from the viewpoint of the 
Shia school of thought. As per the view of Shia, in a transaction, one person may 
represent both parties to the transaction and he may also transact with himself as a 
party to a transaction while acting as an agent of the other party to the transaction. 
However, in these circumstances, the terms of the self-dealing contract should be 
reasonable and in strict conformity to the dominant conditions of the market.4 This 
difference becomes very important especially in the function of modern financial 
intermediaries in exchange markets and also clearing and settlement houses e.g., 
modern Central Counter Parties (CCPs).  On the basis of this concept, CCPs are able to 
act as agents of both parties to a transaction without getting involved in two separate 
contracts with each party to settle the debt obligations.    
 
6.2.2 Safe-Keeping Deposit (Wadi’a) 
Wadi’a or Amana5 is a contract whereby one party called a mude’ (depositor) 
entrusts a property belonging to him to another party called a mustawde’ or an amin 
(deposit-taker) in order that the latter retains and holds it for him free of charge or in 
return for some fee. The deposit taker is not liable for any loss or damage to the 
entrusted property unless it occurs as a result of his default. Islamic scholars are 
                                                   
4
 See Iran Civil Code articles 198 and 1072. See also Iran Commerce Code articles 358, 373, 374.  
5
 See Iran Civil Code articles 607-634.     
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divided on whether the parties in a wadi’a/amana contract may stipulate a condition 
whereby a deposit-taker would have to guarantee the return of the deposit to the 
depositor. Some believe that such a guarantee is in contradiction to the inherent 
characteristics of a wadi’a /amana contract but others argue for its validity. 
Considering the salient characteristics of wadi’a/amana, it seems that the former view 
is solid.6 The ownership of the deposit remains with the depositor, and that is why all 
the risks and benefits associated with the ownership of the deposit will be borne and 
utilised by the depositor. A deposit-taker is responsible for returning the exact same 
deposit entrusted to him upon the request of the depositor. The deposit-taker is not 
permitted to use the entrusted property for his own benefit unless permission is 
granted by the depositor. However, this use may be for very limited purposes, 
otherwise the rules of an a’riya (use-free permission) contract will apply. All costs and 
expenses required for maintenance of the entrusted property will be paid or 
reimbursed by the depositor. This facility may be used for depositary purposes in 
capital markets and also financial institutions, especially banks. 
 
6.2.3 Assignment of Debt Obligations/Receivables (Hiwala) 
Hiwala is a contract whereby a debtor called a muhil (assignor) transfers his debt 
obligation to a third party called a muhalun alayh (delegee), who agrees to pay the 
creditor, called a muhtal (assignee) designated by the muhil (assignor).7 Similarly, if the 
creditor called a muhil (assignor) transfers his debt receivable against the debtor called 
a muhalun alayh (delegee), who assumes to pay a third party beneficiary called a 
                                                   
6
 For more about different ideas in this regard see Nasser Katouzian ‘Qanun Madani dar Nazm Huquq 
Kununi-ye Iran’ (Tehran: Mizan publication, 18
th
 Edition, 1387 Solar Hijri Calendar) p. 417, article 614.        
7
 For more see Nasser Katouzian ‘Qanun Madani dar Nazm Huquq Kununi-ye Iran’ (Tehran: Mizan 
publication, 18
th
 Edition, 1387 Solar Hijri Calendar) pp. 459-463, articles 724-733.  
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muhtal (assignee). For the validity of the hiwala, which is initiated by the debtor or 
creditor (muhil/assignor), the consent of the muhtal (assignee) and also the 
acceptance of the muhalun alayh (delegee) are required. Furthermore, for the validity 
of hiwala, a solid legal or contractual cause of the debt receivable/obligation is 
necessary, though it might not be still realised and it is contingent. If the assignor 
(muhil) is not indebted to the assignee (muhtal), hiwala rules will not be applicable. In 
this case, the reason for assignment of a debt receivable/obligation may be a hiba (gift) 
or a qard (loan) or merely the appointment of the assignee by the assignor to collect 
his debt claims. However, for the validity of hiwala, it is not necessary that a delegee 
(muhalun alayh) be indebted to the assignor (muhil). In this case, the delegee 
(muhalun alayh) will be treated as a guarantor (damin). After all, when hiwala is validly 
concluded, muhil (assignor) is discharged of the incumbent debt obligation towards 
the assignee, and the payment obligation attaches to the delegee (mulahun alayh). 
This is the default rule as per the Shia school of thought. In contrast, the relevant 
default rule in the Sunni school of thought is that a muhil (assignor) is not discharged 
of the debt obligation, but his obligation attaches to the obligation of the delegee 
(mulahun alayh) which is created as a result of hiwala. That is why, from the viewpoint 
of the Shia school of thought, the closest concept to hiwala in modern terminology is 
novation. If, in a sale or any other contract, the seller/creditor executes a hiwala 
(assignment) arrangement providing that the buyer/debtor has to pay the price (i.e., 
satisfy the debt obligation) to some other person (muhtal); or, similarly, if the 
buyer/debtor executes a hiwala (assignment) arrangement authorising the 
seller/creditor to receive the price (i.e., collect the debt receivable) from someone else 
(muhalun alayh), and the nullity of the sale or the other underlying contract is 
established, hiwala would be null. If the muhtal (assignee) has received the price he 
must give it back; but if the sale or the other underlying contract gets revoked as a 
result of the exercise of a contract termination option by one party (called faskh) or by 
 228 
 
mutual consent of the parties to the contract (called iqala or tafasukh), the hiwala 
would not be null, but the muhalun alayh (delegee) is discharged, and the 
seller/creditor or the buyer/debtor may have recourse against one another. As per 
Islamic law, in contrast to civil law, in the assignment/transfer of debt or claim 
(hiwala), all guarantees, collaterals and securities attached to the debt or claim are 
automatically wiped out.8 A hiwala facility may be used for payment, transfer of funds, 
and the settlement of monetary debt obligations and receivables.         
 
6.2.4 Bond-Like Securities (Sukuk9)   
Sak (singular of sukuk) is a document or certificate, which represents the 
undivided pro rata ownership of an underlying contract or asset, which may be a 
building or any other asset or project. In other words, sukuk are financial instruments 
which evidence a beneficial entitlement to an underlying asset, and can be structured 
in and achieved through the use of assets and various contractual techniques to 
conform to Sharia principles.10 According to Moody’s11, sukuk are defined as “trust 
certificates or participation certificates that grant the investor a share of the asset 
along with the cash flows and risk commensurate with such an ownership”. According 
to IOSCO’s report,12 sukuk is a generic term used to cover a wide range of financial 
                                                   
8
 See Muhammad Jafar Jafari Langroodi ‘Huquq Madani: Aqd Daman’ (vol. 4) Numbers. 49-56.  
9
 As per Zeti Akhtar Aziz, 11.7 percent of the total global Sharia compliant assets are constituted by 
sukuk (see Zeti Akhtar Aziz ‘Enhancing the Resilience and Stability of the Islamic Financial System’ (Kuala 
Lumpur: Islamic Financial Services Board and Institute of International Finance Conference, 20 Nov. 
2008)). 
10
 See IOSCO ‘Analysis of the Application of IOSCO's Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation 
for Islamic Securities Products’ (2008) pp. 7-8 and 13.   
11
 See Moody's ‘Special Report on Sukuk’ (25 February, 2008).    
12
 See IOSCO ‘Analysis of the Application of IOSCO's Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation 
for Islamic Securities Products’ (2008) pp. 8, 13. 
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products designed to match different purposes.13 There is, thus, an array of different 
sukuk. As per AAOIFI, there are fourteen different underlying Sharia contracts (or their 
combinations) on the basis of which the sukuk certificates may be structured. In 
practice, however, often musharaka, mudaraba, murabaha, salam (forward sale), 
istisna (construction finance), ijara (leasing)14 and manfa’a (the sale of the usufruct of 
assets and properties) are used. As per IOSCO’s report, from an economic perspective, 
there are three common types of sukuk: a) fixed-income sukuk, b) asset-backed sukuk 
(ABS), and c) hybrid sukuk. In the first type of sukuk which tends to be asset-based 
rather than asset-backed, the risk is related to the credit risk of the originator and in 
the second one, the risk is related to the “performance of the underlying asset”. 
Where the credit risk of the originator and the underlying asset risk are combined, the 
sukuk will be a hybrid sukuk. The first type of sukuk may have underlying assets, but in 
essence “they require some form of guarantee or purchase undertaking from the 
issuer”. This is similar to “a conventional debt security in terms of risk characteristics 
and performance”. The second types of sukuk are “instruments which are more akin to 
conventional asset-backed securities”. Hybrid sukuk which have also emerged, 
comprise both the risk of “performance of the underlying asset and the credit risk of 
the issuer”.15   
                                                   
13
 A sukuk instrument could potentially become a powerful financing tool for corporations and 
governments as well as a refinancing tool for housing and commercial Sharia-compliant mortgages. See 
Rodney Wilson ‘Islamic Finance in Europe’ (European University Institute, December 2007) p. 4.    
14
 As per the Deutsche Bank Global Markets Research, due to decrees from Sharia experts on ‘the 
permissibility of certain contractual stipulations within some structures’, it is possible that the practice 
of the ijara instrument will become more persuasive. See Deutsche Bank ‘Global Markets Research’ 
(August, 2007). 
15
 See IOSCO ‘Analysis of the Application of IOSCO's Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation 
for Islamic Securities Products’ (2008) p. 13.  
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Modern sukuk are better described as Islamic investment or financing 
certificates. According to Wilson,16 sukuk should not simply be deemed a substitute for 
secular interest-bearing securities. The intent is not simply to engineer financial 
instruments that replicate “fixed-rate bills and bonds and floating-rate notes” as 
practised in the West, but rather to introduce new types of assets that comply with 
Sharia rules. Sukuk bonds collect an income stream from underlying assets instead of 
bearing interest, which is banned in Islam. According to Sharia principles, securities 
including sukuk must be backed by real underlying assets, rather than being merely 
paper derivatives. Also, returns from securities must be connected to the purpose for 
which the funding is used, and not simply comprise of interest. The Fiqh Academy of 
the OIC has ruled17 that any pool of assets can be embodied in a written18 note or 
bond and such a bond or note can be exchanged at a market price provided that the 
pool of assets represented by the security, consists of a majority19 of tangible assets 
and financial rights, with only a minority being “cash and interpersonal debts”.   
According to the recommendation of AAOIFI, the return of the invested capital at 
maturity must not be guaranteed. However, in practice, in almost all of the sukuk 
issued, the return of the principal capital at maturity (i.e., the par value of the sukuk) is 
guaranteed in favour of the sukuk holders by way of an obligation of the sukuk issuer 
to repurchase the underlying assets represented by the sukuk at the original price that 
they were bought by the sukuk holders (this is called redemption). This is exactly what 
                                                   
16
 See Rodney Wilson ‘Islamic Bonds: Your Guide to Issuing, Structuring and Investing  in Sukuk 
(Overview of the Sukuk Market)’ (University of Durham: Institute for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies) 
p. 3.  
17
 It was in its decision number 5 of 1988.  
18
 Sharia encourages the documentation of contracts as stipulated in the Quran (2:282): “When you 
deal with each other, in transactions involving future obligations in a fixed period of time, reduce them 
to writing … It is more just in the sight of God, more suitable as evidence and more convenient to 
prevent doubts among yourselves.” 
19
 However, as it has been discussed earlier it is not necessary that the pool of assets consists of a 
majority of tangible assets. A considerable amount is enough in this regard.  
 231 
 
is practised in conventional bonds today (a conventionalisation problem in modern 
Islamic finance). However, even if it is not possible to stipulate in the sukuk certificates 
that the issuer of the sukuk is obliged to buy back the sukuk (i.e., to guarantee) for a 
nominal price (at par value), it seems it is completely possible to stipulate that the 
issuer will have an option (but not an obligation) to repurchase the sukuk at the 
prevailing market price or a mutually agreed price on the basis of bay shart or bay 
wafa (sale-with-repurchase-option) arrangement according to the Shia school of 
thought. Also, the revenue or profit to be generated from the underlying asset 
(principal capital) may not be guaranteed (it should be noted however that this is not a 
problem in the sukuk where the underlying contracts/assets are salam, murabaha or 
ijara or other similar Sharia contracts in which the price or rent is a fixed amount at 
the time of the contract). However, in practice, almost a fixed return of the principal 
benchmarked to the prevalent interest rate is guaranteed (again, another 
conventionalization concern in modern Islamic finance). Therefore, what is an essential 
characteristic of the sukuk is that the profit or revenue of the invested capital must be 
linked to the performance of the relevant underlying assets or projects and the 
principal capital of the investors (sukuk holders) may not be guaranteed.20   
 
6.3 Applications of Alternative Intermediary Tools and Services  
The following are the major alternatives for performing intermediary activities.   
 
                                                   
20 For some similar discussion in this regard see S. Mohamad, M. F. Yusoff and A. A. Al-Qassar ‘Ground 
Rules for Sukuk Issuance (in Thomas A. (Ed.), Sukuk)’ (Selangor: Sweet & Maxwell Asia) p. 42. Also see 
Muhammad Taqi Usmani ‘Sukuk and Their Contemporary Applications’ (5 October 2008) p.4. Available 
via the Internet at http://www.muftitaqiusmani.com/ArticlePublication.aspx   
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6.3.1 Payment and Deposit Intermediaries (PDIs) 
Payment and deposit intermediaries (PDIs) need to be set up to facilitate the 
circulation of funds and the provision of some financial services. These are financial 
institutions to provide services such as safe-keeping of deposits of the capital holders, 
transferring funds, settling the debt obligations and also providing other services like 
the provision of contractual guarantees using an aqd daman facility. 
Taking deposits by PDIs will be done on the basis of wadi’a/amana. These 
deposits can neither be utilised for the profit-making activities of PDI nor in its money 
creation purposes on the basis of a fractional reserves facility, which is now practised 
in the modern banking system. The title of deposits will remain with the depositors 
and they will have a right to control capital, including determining how it is used, who 
uses it, whether to lend or exchange or do another transaction on it, and the right to 
the revenue generated by the use of the capital. PDIs will act merely as a trustee 
(amin) or a wakil (agent) of the depositors and will keep the deposits safe free of 
charge or in return for a service fee and will return the funds to the depositors at the 
end of the wadi’a/amana contract or at the demand of the depositors.21 PDIs will issue 
debit cards to the account-holders who have deposited their capital with them. The 
account-holders/consumers may then use the debit cards to pay retailers for their day-
to-day shopping transactions. PDIs will not be permitted to use the deposits at their 
discretion, i.e., neither lend them out to others nor use them for investment 
                                                   
21
 With regard to the legal nature of the bank account (or, the bank balance), Dalhuisen argues for a 
particular (sui generis) proprietary right in this regard and he calls for some necessary adjustments to 
the traditional view that considers a balance in a bank account merely a contractual right against a bank. 
See Jan H. Dalhuisen ‘Dalhuisen on Transnational Comparative, Commercial, Financial and Trade Law’ 
(Hart Publishing, vol. 3, 4
th
 edition, 2010) p. 331. 
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purposes.22 Investment and trade activities under the schemes, such as; mudaraba, 
musharaka, and murabaha require a totally different management structure with 
different expertise and skills than modern conventional banking management styles. In 
the former management style, the management team cannot detach itself from the 
underlying real investment or entrepreneurial activities that they finance, while in the 
latter style the management team does not want to engage in the underlying business 
activities. These two distinct approaches demand two different institutions. The 
second activity can be responded to through the establishment of PDIs, but the first 
activity should be responded to by different arrangements such as mudaraba 
partnerships, musharaka partnerships, and venture capitals.23 
In addition to deposit taking and debit card services, PDIs may provide payment 
or transfer of fund services (e.g., bill of exchange or letter of credit services which are 
called suftaja24 in Islamic finance). “Funds transfer” is a generic name that is used for 
non-cash payments carried out through the banking system following the instructions 
of a bank customer. As a result of “funds transfer”, a credit balance is being 
transferred from one bank account to another bank account, regardless of whether 
the two bank accounts are both in the same bank or two banks, and irrespective of 
                                                   
22
 For a detail analysis on the legal nature of deposits before banks see Nasser Katouzian ‘Huquq 
Madani: Uqud Mu’ayyan’ (Tehran, Intishar Company, vol. 4, 5
th
 edition, 1385 Solar Hijri Calendar) pp. 72-
76. He believes that deposits before banks are governed by public law contracts but not by mudaraba, 
wakala, or wadi’a. As per Sharia and also the research theory, I would argue for wadi’a/amana as the 





 For somewhat similar but very limited and arguable proposals in this regard see Zubair Hasan 
‘Mudaraba as a Mode of Finance in Islamic Banking: Theory, Practice and Problems’ (MPRA, no. 2951, 
2007) p.50. He suggests that the function of responding to short-term credit needs of trade has to be 
left to the conventional sort of banking, but for the long-term purpose of the finance industry, separate 
Islamic investment banks have to be set up. He also suggests the setting up of special schemes for the 
purpose of the development of entrepreneurial business between credit seekers and credit providers on 
the basis of Sharia principles.  
24
 For more on the practice of suftaja (bill of exchange, letter of credit, etc) in Islamic finance see Subhi 
Y. Labib ‘Capitalism in Medieval Islam’ (Journal of Economic History, vol. 29, no.1, 1969) p. 89.  
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whether the two bank accounts belong to the same or two different customers.25 In 
the modern world, undoubtedly, a debtor often needs an intermediary service to pay 
his debts to a creditor especially if his creditor is situated in a foreign jurisdiction. The 
most suitable instruments for the payment of debts or transfer of funds are hiwala 
(assignment/delegation), aqd daman (debt payment guarantee), and wakala (agency) 
arrangements. For example, consider that an investor (debtor) in London wants to pay 
his debt to another investor (his creditor) in New York. To arrange this payment, two 
PDI institutions (one in London and the other in New York) may get involved and 
different facilities may be used. 
On the basis of hiwala, which would be a contract between the debtor in London 
and the PDI in New York, the debtor/investor in London transfers and delegates his 
debt payment obligation to the PDI in New York (to facilitate the process, a PDI in 
London will act as wakil/agent of the PDI in New York) and the PDI in New York agrees 
to pay the creditor/investor in New York. In other words, the creditor in New York 
agrees to receive his debt receivable from a third party payer i.e., a PDI in New York 
(also called muhalun alayh; delegee) instead of the original debtor in London. If it is 
presumed that upon the occurrence of hiwala (assignment) the debtor is discharged 
from his debt payment obligation towards the creditor and the creditor would only 
have a right of recourse to the third party payer i.e., the PDI in New York (as per the 
default rule in the Shia school of thought), to be a valid hiwala the consent of the 
creditor in New York is required. However, if it is presumed that the debtor is not 
discharged from his debt obligation towards the creditor (as per the Sunni school of 
thought), to be a valid hiwala, the consent of the creditor in New York is not required. 
                                                   
25
 See Royal Product Ltd. v. Midland Bank Ltd. [1981] 2 Lloyd’s L. Rep. 194 (QB) p. 198 and also 
Benjamin Geva ‘Legal Aspects Relating to Payment by E-Money: Review of Retail Payment System 
Fundamentals’ (Yearbook of International Financial and Economic Law, Vol. 5, pp. 255-272) p. 264.   
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In hiwala, in cases where a delegee, i.e., the PDI in New York, is not indebted to a 
muhil, then the debtor in London, the delegee, would have - after the payment- a right 
of recourse to the debtor over the amount of payment to the creditor. In cases where 
the debtor in London and the third party payer in New York (i.e., the delegee) become 
indebted to one another at the same time, a set-off would be effected and their debts 
would be annulled by tahatur/muqassa26 (set-off) to the extent of the amount owed 
by the parties. Also, in cases where the creditor and the third party payer PDI in New 
York (i.e., the delegee) are indebted to one another at the same time, a set-off would 
be effected and their debts annulled by tahatur/muqassa (set-off) to the extent of the 
amount owed by the parties. 
On the basis of an aqd daman arrangement, which is a contract made between 
the PDI in New York and the creditor in New York, the PDI in New York promises to the 
creditor in New York to satisfy the debt obligation of the debtor (i.e., the investor in 
London). In other words, in aqd daman, as in hiwala, the creditor in New York accepts 
receipt of his debt receivable from a third party payer i.e., the PDI in New York (also 
called damin; debt payment guarantor) instead of the original debtor in London. As per 
                                                   
26
 Tahatur or Muqassa (set-off) is a debt settlement by a contra transaction. When two parties are 
indebted to one another, a set-off (tahatur or muqassa) will be effected regarding their mutual debts. 
Tahatur can only take place when the object of the debts are of the same nature and when their place 
and date of payment coincide, no matter what may be the cause of the debts (e.g., the cause of one 
debt may be a contract and the other a tort). For the purpose of tahatur, it is not necessary that the 
debts (from the outset) be created and receivable at the same time, but the requirement is that they 
have to be matured and duly receivable at the time of settlement. Tahatur is an automatic process 
which is effected without the necessity of the parties giving their consent. Thus when the parties are 
indebted to one another at the same time, their debts are annulled by tahatur to the extent of the 
amount owed by the parties and the parties to that extent are released and discharged of their debt 
obligations. Tahatur is not valid should it affect the indisputable rights and interests of third parties. 
Thus if an asset, which is owed by a debtor to a certain creditor, is legally seized in favour of a third 
party, and the debtor becomes a creditor against his original creditor, the debtor cannot invoke tahatur 
(automatic set-off) and refuse to pay the legally seized asset to the interested third party. Tahatur may 





the default rule in the Shia school of thought, unlike the Sunni school of thought, upon 
the occurrence of an aqd daman the debtor in London is discharged of his debt 
obligation towards the creditor in New York and the creditor would only have a right of 
recourse to the third party payer i.e., the PDI in New York. In an aqd daman, a damin 
would have a right of recourse to the debtor after the payment, to the extent of the 
amount of payment to the creditor. In case the debtor in London and the third party 
payer PDI in New York (i.e., the guarantor) become indebted to one another at the 
same time, a set-off would be effected and their debts would be annulled by 
tahatur/muqassa (set-off) to the extent of the amount owed by the parties. Also, in 
case the creditor and the third party payer i.e., the PDI in New York are indebted to 
one another at the same time, a set-off would be effected and their debts would be 
annulled by tahatur/muqassa (set-off) to the extent of the amount owed by the 
parties. 
On the basis of wakala, the PDI assumes no responsibility to pay the debt of the 
debtor (payer) and merely acts as a wakil/an intermediary (in return for a certain 
service fee, i.e., haq al-wakala paid by the payer), assuming the burden of transfer of 
the payment from the debtor/payer in London to the creditor/payee in New York. In 
this scenario, a wakil never takes the ownership of the funds while transferring them 
from the payer to the payee at any point of the clearing and settlement.    
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Moreover, PDIs may provide clearing, settlement, and netting services on the 
basis of tahatur/muqassa (set-off-like structure), tabdil ta’ahhud27 (novation-like 
structure). PDIs may be appointed as the wakil (agent) of their account-holders or 
participants in exchange markets to automatically clear, settle, and net their debt 
receivables and obligations against each other using the principles of muqassa, tabdil 
ta’ahhud and also sulh (compromise).28   
PDIs may also provide guarantee and suretyship facilities to their account-
holders on the basis of an aqd daman (debt payment guarantee) or a kifala (personal 
sutery arrangement). For example, in the case of credit sale transactions called bay 
nasiya, the supplier may ask for some proper assurances from the buyer. The PDI in 
which the buyer holds his accounts may provide the required assurances requested by 
the seller using aqd daman and kifala facilities. 
 
                                                   
27
 Tabdil Ta’ahhud means conversion of a debt obligation to another obligation (novation-like 
structure). See Iran Civil Code articles 292-293. For more see also Nasser Katouzian ‘Qanun Madani dar 
Nazm Huquq Kununi-ye Iran’ (Tehran: Mizan publication, 18
th
 edition, 1387 Solar Hijri Calendar) pp. 247-
249, articles 292-293. Note that as per the laws of NY State, a novation requires the consent of the 
obligee and occurs when the parties (both the creditor and debtor) agree to change the original 
obligation by way of its replacement by a new obligation as substitute; thus releasing each other from 
the original obligations. They may agree to change the subject matter of the debt obligation (e.g., 
changing the obligation to deliver a commodity to a monetary obligation or replacing the immediate 
debt obligation by an obligation to deliver a certain amount of asset as substitute) or change the cause 
of the debt obligation (e.g., conversion of the obligation to pay the sales price or rental fees to a loan). 
By definition, it seems that an aqd daman (debt payment guarantee), kifala (personal surety) and hiwala 
(debt or credit assignment) are somewhat variants of tabdil ta’ahhud. Upon the occurrence of tabdil 
ta’ahhud, any securities attached to the original obligations of the parties will terminate, unless the 
parties agree on the survival of these securities. Tabdil ta’ahhud may be used for debt settlement and 
risk hedging purposes.     
28
 It is worth mentioning that, like a sulh contract, muqassa and tabdil ta’ahhud may also be 
considered kinds of risk hedging tools.    
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6.3.2 Sukuk Intermediaries 
Sukuk intermediaries are required to get involved in the process of sukuk 
issuance and also after their issuance. A sukuk intermediary, acting on the basis of 
wakala (agency), will handle the sukuk issuance between the issuer of sukuk and 
investors. For example, consider a farming company which expects to have some 
produce from its farms or livestock in the future but is struggling with some immediate 
debt obligations. The company can sell the produce in advance in cash using a salam 
facility to satisfy its current liabilities. For this purpose, the sukuk intermediary will 
purchase in cash the expected produce of the farming company (issuer) on behalf of 
the pool of investors, who will pay the purchase price. In this arrangement the sukuk 
intermediary can act as an agent (wakil) of both the issuer and prospective investors or 
there may be two intermediaries acting separately on behalf of the issuer and 
investors. The salam sukuk holders who will then be considered upon the completion 
of the issuance the owner of the expected crops, cattle, meat or dairies can exchange 
or trade salam sukuk in exchange markets. A further example would be: consider an 
owner of illiquid but valuable properties (such as a house or a storage facility) who 
wants to use them to discharge his current debt obligations whilst ensuring he has the 
opportunity to buy them back when good times return. The owner may sell these 
properties using bay shart or bay wafa (sale-with-repurchase-option) facility to a sukuk 
intermediary, who is acting on behalf of a pool of investors interested in the deal and 
willing to pay the purchase price. These properties, the ownership of which then 
belongs to the investors, will be leased for the time period of the bay shart contract to 
third party customers/lessees or the seller/issuer himself and the regular rental fees 
originating out of the leasing (ijara) transaction will be paid to the ijara (or bay shart) 
sukuk holders. This whole process (including issuance, payment, debt settlement, and 
execution of any legal documents) can be administered by sukuk intermediaries. The 
sukuk intermediary, like any other type of intermediary, is compensated with a certain 
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service fee and his compensation is not linked to the performance of underlying 
transactions which are administratively handled by the intermediary.     
 
6.3.3 Liquidity Markets 
Sukuk exchange markets need to be established in order to manage liquidity 
concerns by way of selling or exchanging (bay or mua’wada) any tradable sukuk, e.g., 
musharaka sukuk and salam sukuk. 
The financial process in which the ownership value of underlying assets and 
property rights are transformed into and evidenced in the form of a document, which 
may then be exchanged in financial markets is called “securitisation”. It is argued that, 
in the Islamic world, the idea of securitisation can be traced back to the 7th century, 
when agricultural produce (crops) could be transformed into IOU documents (sukuk), 
resaleable by their holders (usually merchants) to third party investors. However, it is 
believed that the crops, which were the underlying assets of the sukuk, were to be 
harvested prior to the circulation and exchange of the sukuk to third party investors.29 
Some argue for more restriction on the negotiability of the sukuk and believe that the 
crops should first be actually possessed by the sukuk holders before they could 
transfer the sukuk to third parties.30 
As per Sharia, those sukuk whose underlying assets are the fixed certain 
monetary assets such as fixed payments, debt receivables and cash flows cannot be 
traded against the fixed certain monetary assets denominated in the same currency 
                                                   
29
 These scholars refer to the approval (indeed, non-objection/silence) of the Said ibn al-Musayyab in 
712 (Solar Hijri Calendar) in this regard. See Murat Cizakca ‘Islamic Capitalism and Finance: Origins, 
Evolution, and the Future’ (Edward Elgar: Studies in Islamic Finance, Accounting, and Governance, 2011) 
p. 65. 
30
 See Servet Bayindir ‘Menkul Kiymetlestirme Uygulamalari ve Fikihtaki Yeri’ (Istanbul Universitesi 
Ilahiyat Fakultesi Dergisi, XVI, 2007) pp. 260-261. 
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whether the trade occurs at a discount or a premium. However, they can be traded 
and exchanged against certain monetary assets denominated in different currencies31 
and also against non-monetary assets, including non-cash and non-fixed receivables 
whether they are tangibles, i.e., any types of goods and services or intangibles, i.e., 
unrealised non-fixed profits and intellectual property rights. 
Major securities, i.e., the sukuk which may be exchanged in exchange markets, 
are termed shares. There is no Sharia impediment to the liquidity of a musharaka 
(partnership) and any partner in a musharaka may liquidate his shares (albeit, subject 
to the consent32 of other partners). They may be exchanged in either regulated (stock- 
or securities-like) exchange markets or unregulated (OTC-like) markets. For example, 
participants (capital providers) in a venture capital enterprise may sell their shares at 
an OTC market, such as NASDAQ.33   
 
6.4 Best Western Intermediary Practices 
There are some best intermediary practices that are necessary to be adopted in 
the new alternative model with only minor changes in their structure and 
characteristics. These are not only successful and popular, but they are also largely 
consistent with the ultimate objective and theory of the model and Islamic law. These 
best practices are: commercial papers, documentary letters of credit, debit and credit 
cards, and agency. 
                                                   
31
 As per some Islamic scholars, different currencies are treated as different assets and so their trade 
or exchange is permitted. See Nasser Katouzian ‘Huquq Madani: Uqud Mu’ayyan’ (Tehran: Sahami 
Intishar, vol. 1, 1387 Solar Hijri Calendar) pp. 341-342.  
32
 This consent may, however, be granted in the Articles of Association of a musharaka/partnership.  
33
 For the shares of a company to be tradable on NASDAQ, they must first be registered/listed with 
NASDAQ. Similar to NASDAQ, in the Islamic world, Malaysia launched the Malaysian Exchange of 
Securities Dealing and Automated Quotation in 1997.        
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6.4.1 Commercial Paper 
A commercial paper is a document that calls for the payment of money (i.e., for 
satisfaction of a certain debt obligation).34 There are only two types of negotiable 
instruments: a promissory note and a draft. A promissory note contains an affirmative 
promise to pay, and not just a mere “I owe you” (IOU). The promisor is called the 
maker and the promisee is called the payee. A draft contains an order or command to 
pay. A cheque is a typical draft. The person who gives the order is called drawer, the 
individual who is ordered to pay is called a drawee (typically, this is a bank), and the 
beneficiary of the order is called a payee. In order for a document like a commercial 
paper to qualify as a negotiable instrument, some requirements have to be met. It 
should be: in writing, payable to order or bearer, signed by the maker or drawer, for a 
certain sum, an unconditional promise and no additional promises, payable on 
demand or at a definite time, and payable in currency. If a negotiable commercial 
                                                   
34
 This definition and also the explanation about commercial paper are provided according to Article 3 
of the UCC (Uniform Commercial Code) USA. As another definition, for example, as per Kenneth V. 
Handal ‘The Commercial Paper Market and the Securities Acts’ (University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 
39, Issue 2, Winter 1972, pp. 362-402) pp. 363-364 and also Evelyn M. Hurley ‘The Commercial Paper 
Market’ (Federal Reserve Bulletin, Vo. 63, June 1977, pp. 525-536), commercial paper is defined as 
follows “commercial paper consists of unsecured, short-term promissory notes issued by sales and 
personal finance companies; by manufacturing, transportation, trade, and utility companies; and by the 
affiliates and subsidiaries of commercial banks. The notes are payable to the bearer on a stated maturity 
date. Maturities range from one day to nine months, but most paper carries an original maturity 
between thirty and ninety days. When the paper becomes due, it is generally rolled over that is, 
reissued to the same or a different investor at the market rate at the time of maturity”. It should be 
noted that in the US, as per A.G. Becker Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 693 
F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1982), commercial paper is not considered a security under the Glass-Steagall Act.   
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paper is duly negotiated35 to a holder in due course,36 the holder in due course (and 
subsequent transferees who take “shelter” in that status) takes the instrument free of 
all claims to it, free of personal defences37 and subject only to real defences.38 
From a Sharia viewpoint, the legitimacy and legal nature of commercial paper 
can be analysed under the concept of iqa’ (a legally binding act created unilaterally by 
one person).39 Unlike a contract that requires a mutual asset, iqa’ is created 
unilaterally by the intent and will of only one person. Significant types of iqa’ in Sharia 
are hiyazat mubah (making an unusable public property usable such as rehabilitation 
of a public waste land), khiyar (an option of contract termination), e’raad (disregarding 
or leaving out a property or an interest), ibra’ (waiver of a valid claim or a debt 
receivable), tamalluk bi-Shuf’a (an exercise of a pre-emption right), and nadhr (a vow 
that a person i.e., an oblationer dedicates). Of all these types, only nadhr relates to 
making a promise (others either relate to exercising a right or waiving a right). 
Therefore, the most suitable Sharia evidence to support the legitimacy of commercial 
paper (in which a promise is unilaterally made) is the concept of nadhr. 
                                                   
35
 Due negotiation means there has been a proper transfer of the instrument. If the instrument has 
been properly transferred, the transferee is a holder and may be eligible to be a holder in due course. 
Otherwise, he cannot qualify as a holder in due course. When the instrument is payable to the order of a 
specific payee, it is negotiated by delivery of the instrument to that payee (named on the instrument). 
Any further negotiation requires that the payee endorses the instrument and delivers it to the 
transferee. The person who signs on the back of the commercial paper is called the endorser. Every 
endorsement must be either special or blank, and restrictive or unrestrictive. The special endorsement is 
one that names a particular person as “endorsee”. The endorsee must sign in order for the instrument 
to be further negotiated. The blank endorsement is one that does not name a specific endorsee. It may 
be negotiated by delivery alone. The restrictive endorsement contains a condition.  
36
 A holder in due course (HDC) is a holder who takes the instrument for value; and in good faith; and 
without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonoured or is subject to any defense or claim.  
37
 Personal defense equals every defense that is available in ordinary contract actions such as lack of 
consideration; unconscionability; waiver; estoppel; and fraud in the inducement.  
38
 These real defences are: material alteration in terms of the instrument; duress; fraud in the factum 
(i.e., misinterpretation or lies about the instrument); incapacity; illegality; infancy; and insolvency.    
39
 As per the Quran (17:34) “fulfill your promises/covenants”. Surely, the promise/covenant will be 
asked about (in the Hereafter)”. 
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6.4.2 Documentary Letter of Credit (LC)  
A documentary letter of credit (LC) is a legally-binding letter issued by a bank 
(called an opening or issuing bank) that guarantees independently the payment of the 
contract price to the seller/beneficiary (typically through instructing a corresponding 
bank, which can be its branches or other associated banks or agencies) or the 
acceptance of a bill of exchange on behalf of the buyer/applicant while assuring the 
buyer that the seller will not be paid until delivery of certain specified documents 
evidencing the proper shipment of relevant goods. A LC is an independent promise by 
the issuing bank and the payment obligation under the LC is not affected by any 
potential problems in the relationship between the buyer and seller as well as the 
buyer and issuing bank.40 Today, documentary letters of credit are widely used to 
reduce payment risk in international business transactions due to some inherent 
problems surrounding international trade environment especially the difficulty in 
knowing different foreign laws and also the difficulty in meeting each other (i.e., the 
parties to a given international transaction) personally. Expressd by English judges as 
“the life blood of international commerce”41, a documentary letter of credit allows a 
buyer in a business transaction to substitute its financial relationship with that of a 
reliable and stable credit source, normally a bank.42 Documentary Letters of credit is 
                                                   
40
 With regard to the legal essence of a letter of credit, as per Dalhuisen, a LC is indeed neither letter 
nor credit, but rather an unconditional and (a double) independent promise of payment by the issuing 
bank. The most important exception to the payment obligation of the issuer is fraud. Mistakes may also 
render the payment obligation of the issuer void.  See Jan H. Dalhuisen ‘Dalhuisen on Transnational 
Comparative, Commercial, Financial and Trade Law’ (Hart Publishing, vol. 3, 4
th
 edition, 2010) pp. 372-
390.  
41
 See for example Kerr in R. D. Harbottle (Mercantile) Ltd v National Westminster Bank Ltd [1978] Q. 
B. 146 p. 155; Hirst in Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation v Kloekner & Co AG [1989] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 323 p. 330; and also Griffiths in Power Curber International Ltd v National Bank of Kuwait S. A. K. 
[1981] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 394 p. 400.     
42
 See Banco General Runinahui Sa v Citibank International Na Rm, 97 F.3d 480 (l1th Cir. 1996) and also 
Alaska Textile Co., Inc v Chase Manhattan Bank, N. A., 982 F.2d 813, 815 (2d Cir. 1992).  
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governed by the Uniform Customs and Practices for Documentary Credits (last version 
is known as UCP 600), which is a set of rules drafted and published by the Paris-based 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). Ever-increasingly, the newest versions of 
UCP favor trade customers over banks, thus causing an ever-decreasingly use of the 
UCP rules by banks, comparing to previous versions.43 
The legitimacy of documentary letters of credit under Sharia, in particular 
according to the viewpoint of the Shia school of thought,44 may be supported by the 
concepts of aqd daman (debt payment guarantee) and hiwala (assignment of debt 
obligation).   
 
6.4.3 Debit and Credit Card 
A debit card is a withdrawing and payment card issued by the bank of a depositor 
that enables the holder of a deposit to withdraw money or to have the cost of his 
purchases and shopping charged directly to his bank account held with that bank. A 
credit card, in contrast, that is issued by a bank or a business enables the holder to 
purchase goods or services on credit while assuring a supplier that the person using 
the credit card has an adequate credit rating and that the supplier of goods or services 
will definitely receive payment for the goods or services provided to the credit card 
                                                   
43
  See William Banks Sutton ‘The Documentary Credit Phoenix: UCP 600 Boasts Fair Rules for Trade 
Customers, Hard Rules for Banks’ (DAJV Newsletter, Vol. 37, Issue 2, June 2012, pp. 62-65) p. 62.   
44
 According to the Shia school of thought, unlike the view of the Sunni school of thought, upon the 
execution of aqd daman or hiwala the original debtor is released from his debt obligation toward the 
creditor, and instead the guarantor (damin) or delegee (muhal alayh) becomes obligated to satisfy the 
relevant debt obligation.   
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holder. Traditionally, credit cards are either bipartite or tripartite.45 With respect to 
bipartite credit cards, there is basically a direct contractual relationship between the 
credit card issuer and the credit card holder.46 Regarding tripartite credit cards, there is 
generally a series of relationships among a credit card issuer, credit card holders, and 
suppliers.47Retail payment systems (i.e., payment by credit and debit cards) could 
operate either in the form of “credit-push” or “debit-pull” systems. In a credit transfer 
a message from the payor is communicated to the payor’s bank to “push” the funds 
from the payor’s account to the payee’s account. Conversely, in a debit transfer, 
instructions are given by the payee to the payee’s bank to “pull” the funds from the 
payor’s account. Therefore, in a credit transfer, the sender of the first message is the 
payor; in a debit transfer, conversely, it is the payee.48 From a commercial viewpoint, a 
distinction is made between debit cards and credit cards. Credit cards grant card 
holders a period over which payments regarding the expenses occurred as a result of 
using these cards can be settled. With respect to debit cards, which are the latest 
development to the range of “plastic money”, the debit card holder must have an 
enough positive balance on her debit card account to cover any expenses incurred as a 
result of using the card. Payment by debit card is processed in the same way as 
payment by credit card, with only exception that the credit card issuer debits the 
                                                   
45
 See Steve Cornelius ‘The Legal Nature of Payment by Credit Card’ (South African Mercantile Law 
Journal, Vol. 15, Issue 2, 2003, pp. 153-171) p. 153 (Citing RE de Rooy Betalingsverkeer (Gegarandeerde 
Betaalmiddelen) (1989) 6; Otto op cit note 1 at 217 et seq; JC Stassen ‘Betaling deur Middel van ‘n 
Driepartykredietkaart’(1978) 11 De Jure 134 at 135).    
46
 See Steve Cornelius ‘The Legal Nature of Payment by Credit Card’ (South African Mercantile Law 
Journal, Vol. 15, Issue 2, 2003, pp. 153-171) p. 153 (Citing SR van Jaarsveld & MJ Oosthuizen (eds) Suid-
Afrikaanse Handelsreg vol II 3 ed (1988) 141). 
47
 For more detail regarding these tripartite contractual relationships see Catherine Smith ‘Credit Cards 
and the Law’ (Journal for Contemporary Roman-Dutch Law known as THRHR, Vol. 52, 1976) p. 110.    
48
 See Benjamin Geva ‘The EFT Debit Card’ (Canadian Business Law Journal, Vol. 15, 1989) pp. 419-427 
and also Benjamin Geva ‘International Funds Transfers: Mechanisms and Law’ in Cross-Border Electronic 
Banking (2nd edition, London, Hong Kong: LLP, 2000)  p. 1.     
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credit card holder’s account with the relevant amount of expenses incurred.49Apart 
from its primary function as a mode of payment, credit cards can also be utilised to 
withdraw cash from ATMs. They also have a cheque guarantee function- that is to say 
the card holder can, complying with a set arrangement, guarantee payment of cheques 
up to a specific amount.50 
From a Sharia perspective, the legitimacy of debit card services is substantially 
supported by the wadi’a or amana (safe-keeping of a deposit) concept. As per Sharia, 
unlike debit cards which have to be issued by a deposit-taking body such as banking 
institutions in modern practices, credit cards can only be issued by the relevant 
suppliers or retailers using murabaha (cost plus mark-up sale) facility. The reason why 
the banks cannot issue credit cards is that banks do not want to or are not generally 
authorised to engage in real economic and business activities. However, credit cards 
may also be issued by banking institutions using the arrangements of aqd daman (debt 
payment guarantee) or hiwala (assignment of debt obligation) where no interest or 
mark-up can be charged on the credit card holder. 
 
6.4.4 Agency  
Agency is another very important intermediary concept and has been discussed 
earlier. In brief, agency is an informal agreement between two parties (i.e., principal 
and agent) whereby the agent undertakes to conduct certain affairs for the principal’s 
interest while the principal retains the right to control the agent, by having the 
                                                   
49
 See Tony Drury and Charles W. Ferrier ‘Credit Cards’ (Lexis Law Pub, 1984) pp. 6-7.      
50
 See Steve Cornelius ‘The Legal Nature of Payment by Credit Card’ (South African Mercantile Law 
Journal, Vol. 15, Issue 2, 2003, pp. 153-171) p. 155.   
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authority to supervise the manner of the agent’s performance.51 Today, agency is 
widely used in many areas from politics to international commerce and from the 
banking sector to capital markets. The practice of independent and professional 
intermediaries is a key element in running proper political, economic, business, and 
financial systems. As per Dalhuisen52, true agency happens when an intermediary 
merely initiates or fulfils a legal act or obtains discharge for someone else but does not 
act for his own account, that is to say, does not take risks or acquire benefits of his 
own. With regard to the legal essence of agency, according to him, “these 
intermediaries [i.e., agents] may act as mere service providers but also as true agents, 
which means that in the exercise of their function as intermediaries they fulfill legal 
acts for others, in this case for the contractual parties”. The source of the agency 
relationship may be consentual53or contractual54. In some situations, agency 
                                                   
51
 This definition is widely accepted in US law especially New York State Law. As per another definition, 
for example, provided by some scholars “commercial intermediation represents the activity that one 
person executes either in the name and on behalf of another person, or using its own name but on 
behalf of another person, or, finally, using its own name but on behalf of acting toward a common goal 
with the person who mandated her (the principal), in relation with who it is either a proxy or an 
independent intermediary, only negotiating or both negotiating and binding the principal.” See Dan-
Alexander Sitaru ‘Considerations regarding the Definition and Classification of Commercial 
Intermediation’ (Lex ET Scientia International Journal, Vol. 18, Issue 1, 2011) p. 97. As per Sitaru (citing 
R. Munteanu ‘Intermediation Contracts in Romanian Foreign Commerce’ - Contracte de Intermediere in 
Comerrul Exterior al Romaniei- (Printing House of the Academy of the Romanian Socialist Republic, 
1984, p. 138)), a common feature of all types of intermediation is the “object” of the intermediation, 
that is to say, by means of the performed activity under a specific commercial intermediation contract, 
the intermediary acts as an agent for specific commercial activities between certain partners or on 
behalf of another person (i.e., client), in return for certain payment.   
52
 See Jan H. Dalhuisen ‘Dalhuisen on Transnational Comparative, Commercial, Financial and Trade 
Law’ (Hart Publishing, vol. 2, 4
th
 edition, 2010) pp. 231-232.  
53
 See, e.g., Garnac Grain Co. Inc. v. H. M. F. Faure&Fairclough Ltd., [1968] A C.1130 at 1137, as per 
Lord Pearson (H. L.) 
54




relationship may emerge from the conduct of the party eventually held to be the 
principal as a result of his conduct.55  
The terms used instead of common law “agent” or “agency” concepts are 
“representative”, “power of representation”, and “authority” in civil law. The latter 
terms are used where an authorised person acts merely on behalf of the relevant 
authorising person without taking any risk and incurring an own liability. The 
authorised person plays a role of middleman who receives only a commission in return 
for the provision of some specific services. These terms must in turn be distinguished 
from some other terms, which purport to have exactly the same meanings but indeed 
do not, such as; licensees, sole distributors, and some franchising agents who all deal 
for their own benefit. There are other types of intermediaries who sometimes act 
merely on behalf of their authorising clients, but also in some cases for their own 
account such as securities brokers in exchange markets and also central counterparties 
(CCPs) in modern clearing systems. It is thus concluded that not every intermediary or 
so-called agent is a true agent in the sense of fulfilling legal acts or acquiring a release 
for someone else.56 
In Sharia, the legitimacy of agency is based on either wakala (legal or 
administrative agency) or mudaraba (commercial agency) concepts. If the purpose of 
the intermediary is to fulfil legal or administrative acts, or obtain discharge for others 
in return for a service fee (haq al-wakala), it is based on wakala (legal or 
administrative agency). The purpose in wakala is not to basically make profit by using 
the professional services of a wakil (agent). In contrast, in cases where the purpose is 
to make profit by using the expertise, talent, and professional services of an 
intermediary, it will be based on mudaraba (commercial agency). In mudaraba, the 
                                                   
55
 See Pole v. Leask (1863) 8 L.T. 645 at p. 648, as per Lord Cranworth.  
56
 See Jan H. Dalhuisen ‘Dalhuisen on Transnational Comparative, Commercial, Financial and Trade 
Law’ (Hart Publishing, vol. 2, 4
th
 edition, 2010) pp. 231-232.  
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intermediary (mudarib) shares in the profits earned pro rata in accordance with his 
contribution to the business. Due to conflict of interest concerns, these two roles (i.e., 
wakala and mudaraba) are not capable of being conducted by one intermediary at the 








Part Seven of the Second Tier of 





7.1 Introduction  
Historically, in the Islamic world, insurance was first developed for personal 
liabilities in the form of kafala/takaful or a’qila and later came to include loss and 
damage to property. Kafala was an insurance scheme on a tribal level and a’qila was 
on the familial level. In the pre-Islamic Arab world, when a member of a tribe was 
killed by a member of another tribe, the entire tribe to which the murderer belonged 
was put at risk of a revenge attack by any member of the tribe to which the victim was 
linked. To solve this problem, the concept of kafala was introduced. As per kafala, kafil 
(a surety) ensured the presence of the killer in the place designated by the tribe of the 
victim whenever summoned by them and, if the kafil was unable to meet his 
undertaking, he was obliged to compensate the loss of life of the victim by paying 
blood money known as diya1 to the tribe of the victim. For the purpose of this 
compensation, a fund was often established and the members of the defendant tribe 
contributed an asset to this fund. The collected fund could be used either to pay the 
diya (blood money) or to settle any other tribal dispute. It could even be used to 
release any member of the tribe who had been captured by another tribe. This support 
at the tribal level was later reduced to a familial level called a’qila. As per the a’qila 
facility, only paternal relatives of the culprit (but not all members of the tribe) shared 
liability to compensate the victim’s family.2 According to Hamidullah,3 the continued 
use of these pre-Islamic Arab customs was confirmed by the Prophet and they were 
included in the first constitution. It is clear that kafala and a’qila were introduced to 
                                                   
1
 This concept is also found in the Quran (2:178, 4:91, and 5:48).  
2
 For some details as to the practice of kifala and a’qila see Mohd Ma’sum Billah ‘Applied Takaful and 
Modern Insurance’ (Kuala Lumpur: Sweet and Maxwell Asia, 3
rd
 edition, 2007) p. 6. As per Billah (p.8), 
during the Government of Omar, Muslims were encouraged to practice a’qila at a national level.   
3
 See Muhammad Hamidullah ‘The First Written Constitution in the World’ (Lahore: Sheikh 
Muhammad Ashraf, 1981) p.55, article 3.  
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reduce the risk of insecurity, to transfer individual risk to a collective burden, and also 
to spread the spirit of cooperation among the members of the society (at least at the 
tribal and familial level). As far as the early practice of property insurance is concerned, 
Muslim sailors in the past maintained trade links between the large economies in the 
Indian Ocean and Mediterranean Sea through sailing the dangerous trade routes. 
There was a tradition of helping one another on the basis of ta’awun (mutual 
assistance)4. It is very likely that the ship owners established and contributed to 
mutual coverage of maritime insurance funds to jointly share the burden of any its 
members and compensate the member who incurred losses. Looking at the practice of 
insurance schemes in Islamic history makes it clear that the existence of hedging or 
insurance was there to minimize rather than take advantage of risk. That is why taking 
advantage of risk by trading it may be one of the main arguments against the 
legitimacy of conventional risk insurance products and institutions. 
The main concepts that support the recognition of insurance in Islam are: 
ta’awun (mutual assistance), tabrru (voluntary contribution), and kafala (personal 
surety).5 From the Islamic viewpoint, insurance is forbidden if it is used to cover risks in 
qimar (gambling)6, maysir (speculation/betting), and riba-bearing activities which are 
all clearly prohibited in the Sharia. Maysir (speculation/betting) and qimar (gambling) 
have two basic elements which prohibit them: gharar (excessive uncertainty) and 
khatar (disproportionate risk). In other words, the presence of khatar and gharar 
                                                   
4
 See the Quran (5:3). 
5
 See the Quran (5:2) “help one another in righteousness and also piety, but do not help one another 
in sin and rancour”.  
6
 See the Quran (5: 90 & 91): “O believers! … Gambling and games of chance … are all abominations, 
the handiwork of Satan. So turn wholly away from them in order that you may attain true success. By … 
games of chance and gambling…  Satan wants only to excite and create enmity and hatred between you. 
So, will you not then abstain?”   
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prohibit games of chance and speculative activities.7 Some scholars may argue that it is 
because of khatar and gharar that conventional insurance schemes should also be 
ruled illegitimate. However, it seems this argument is not solid enough to rule the 
conventional insurance practices illegitimate. The reason for this is that the salient 
feature of the insurance contract is the “provision of security”, which is a known 
consideration, by the insurer in return for a certain contribution by the insured which 
is also a known consideration called a “premium”.8 Neither of the considerations 
include the khatar or gharar elements. The purpose of the insured is to be secured 
against the potential risks and damages no matter how much the damages amount to 
(or whether the risk event will occur at all) and his basic purpose is not to gain profits 
from the insurance contract. Another concern that may be raised as to the legitimacy 
of modern insurance practices is that the insurance firms are often involved in lending 
or borrowing transactions at fixed interest, which is a prohibited riba dealing according 
to Sharia. However, this riba element is not in the insurance contract itself and it can 
                                                   
7
 For a definition of khatar and gharar (in an insurance context) see Muhammad Imran Usmani ‘Issues 
in Takaful’ (SECP Takaful Conference, March 14, 2007). Khatar means: a) to stipulate or conditionalise 
the ownership or profitability on an uncertain event, where a stake is involved for both sides. However, 
if a stake is not involved from both sides i.e. one party voluntarily (without any compensation) declares 
“I shall compensate you on a particular event of loss”, it would not be maysir; b) if in any transaction 
one party’s profit is dependent on the loss of the other then this is an indication that the transaction 
involves qimar and one party is being exploited by the other. In the permissible modes of business any 
profit or loss will be equitably shared and will be fair to every party. For example, in a partnership 
(musharaka) both parties share profit and loss (a win-win or lose-lose game). Similarly in other 
transactions like sale (bay), hiring or leasing (ijara) each party gains some specific consideration. Gharar 
literally means “uncertainty”. Forms of gharar are: a) any bilateral transaction in which the liability of 
the party to the transaction is either uncertain or contingent; b) consideration to either party is not 
known; c) delivery is not within the control of the obligor; d) payment (or satisfaction of any obligation) 
from one side is certain, but from the other side is contingent. As can be seen, gharar is generally a 
concern in contractual relationships.  
8
 For a similar idea see Murtaza Mutahhari ‘Mas’alaye Riba wa Bank (bi Dhamimeye Mas’alaye Bime)’ 
(Tehran: Sadra Publications, 14
th
 edition, 2005) pp. 129-133 and 145-147. Also, see Murtaza Mutahhari 
“Barrasiye Ijmaliye Mabaniye Iqtisade Islami’ (Tehran: Hikmat Publications, 1
st
 Edition, 1982) pp. 259 
and 300-302.  
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be avoided if the insurance firm’s funds are not used in riba-bearing investment 
activities and the firm does not borrow riba-bearing loans. 
Any risky aspect of a reasonable and legitimate business or financial transaction 
can be hedged using either a human collateral such as aqd daman (debt guarantee) 
and kifala (personal surety) or a capital collateral such as rahn (collateral), daman uhda 
(guaranteeing legal concerns pertaining to a given property) or daman darak 
(guaranteeing physical and economic concerns pertaining to a given property). It is 
worth adding that rahn (as per both Sunni and Shia schools of thought) and also aqd 
daman and kifala (as per the Sunni school of thought) are subordinate contracts and 
they are terminated automatically upon the fulfilment or termination of the original 
obligation, which has been the cause and underlying reason for aqd daman, kifala, or 
rahn. 
Last but not least, it may be argued that the purpose of the parties to the 
insurance contract, namely, the insurer and the insured is to make a compromise 
(sulh)9- the compensation of damages (if any) in return for a premium. As per Sharia, it 
is legitimate to make a compromise if the subject matter of the compromise (sulh) is a 
legitimate, reasonable, and beneficial act.10 
As far as the Western approach to risk and insurance concerned, according to 
some scholars e.g., Baker11, western society is “embracing risk” in two different senses. 
First, members of the public, to a greater extent, use notions of risk to explain and deal 
with social problems such as money management, social services and environmental 
problems. This feature of the idea of “embracing risk” is incontrovertible. Later 
experiences such as September 11 that raised the profile of the risk of terrorism and 
                                                   
9
 Sulh means a settlement of the existing or future differences in which each party to the (insurance) 
contract makes concessions.  
10
 See Iran Civil Code articles 754 and 215.  
11




justified the necessity to begin war in Iraq due to the risks created by weapons of mass 
destruction and also Hurricane Katrina that put catastrophic risk on the national 
agenda only reinforce the assertion. Second, Western world has not only embraced 
risk as a helpful conceptual framework, but has also considered taking of risk as a 
social policy tool. Across Western world, states, large corporations, and other big 
organisations that used to spread risks are inducing and sometimes exposing 
individuals to take more real risks and become more individually responsible- all 
allegedly for the sake of creating a more dynamic and innovative society. This second 
feature of embracing risk is more contentious. As per Baker, the main idea here is the 
acknowledgment that “too much protection against loss can produce too much loss. 
Not all risks should be spread. For their own and society’s good, individuals should 
embrace some risks”. In conclusion, Baker12argues for “embrace risk, but share 
responsibility” approach in the 21st century. “United we stand; divided we fall”. 
According to this vision, first, insurance providers should adapt to enhance the 
motivations for individuals and institutions to prevent damage from happening. That is 
the part of “embracing risk”. But simultaneously, regulatory policy should be 
conducted in a way to prevent the damaging competition and “depooling” that will 
otherwise happen. That is the “sharing responsibility” part. Second, insurance 
providers have to adapt to embrace or provide insurance for unforeseeable, 
catastrophic risk. That is the “embracing risk” part. Also, the capacity of overall 
insurance system has to be increased to make good assessments by a governmental 
support or in other new ways that lawyers and policymakers may introduce. That is the 
“sharing responsibility” part.   
                                                   
12
 See Tom Baker ‘Embracing Risk, Sharing Responsibility’ (Drake Law Review, Vol. 56, Issue 2, 2008) 




The following are the major instruments that can be used for risk hedging and 
insurance purposes. 
 
7.2.1 Collateral (Rahn) 
Rahn13 is a contract whereby a debtor (rahin) gives a property called marhuna 
whether it be movable or immovable (the collateral) to the creditor (murtahin) as 
security. The collateral will be utilised to settle the debt if the rahin defaults on the 
debt. No property or asset which is legally incapable of being alienated or transferred 
can be the subject of rahn. Collateral can be in any form of tangible or intangible assets 
which is capable of being exchanged or negotiated. There are some Islamic scholars14 
who argue that collateral has to be a specific tangible asset (i.e., an ascertained object; 
ayn) and if it is an intangible asset or yet-unrealised asset (e.g., usufruct of a property 
or debt receivables) rahn would be null and void; however, they believe that collateral 
can be in the form of bearer securities e.g., bearer shares or currencies. The ownership 
of collateral and the benefits arising out of collateral during a rahn contract would 
belong to the debtor. Debtor and creditor may agree in the rahn contract that the 
benefits arising out of collateral, instead of being returned to the debtor, would be 
retained by the creditor as additional collateral in addition to the original collateral. All 
the risks associated with the ownership of collateral will be borne by the debtor. The 
                                                   
13
 For more detail on rahn see Nasser Katouzian ‘Qanun Madani dar Nazm Huquq Kununi-ye Iran’ 
(Tehran: Mizan publication, 18
th
 Edition, 1387 Solar Hijri Calendar) pp. 477-491, articles 771-794.       
14
 For a detailed discussion in this regard from the viewpoint of Sharia see Nasser Katouzian ‘Huquq 
Madani: Uqud Mu’ayyan’ (Tehran: Sharkat Sahami Intishar, vol. 4, 5
th
 edition, 1385 Solar Hijri Calendar) 
pp. 539-547, no. 353. Also, see Hasan Imami ‘Huquq Madani’ (Tehran, vol. 2, 3
rd
 edition) p.338. For a 
regulatory supporting authority in this regard see Iran Civil Code article 774.   
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creditor would not be responsible for the decay or deterioration of collateral, unless it 
occurs as a result of the negligence of the creditor. Collateral may be pledged15 or 
mortgaged16 in respect of two or more debts that the debtor owes to two or more 
creditors. In that case the creditors have to agree among themselves as to who shall 
take the collateral in possession;17 similarly, it is possible for two or more debtors to 
give a property as joint collateral to a creditor to whom they owe debts. The creditor 
who holds collateral has a preference over every other creditor in the recovery of his 
claim from the value of the collateral. In a rahn contract, or by incorporation in a 
separate contract, a debtor may appoint a creditor or a third party as his agent (wakil) 
to ensure that if the debtor defaults in the payment of his debt, the appointed wakil 
(whether it is the creditor himself or the third party) will have the power to recover the 
debt from the collateral itself or from its sale price. In cases where the collateral is sold 
at a price greater than the amount of the claim of the creditor, the excess would 
belong to the owner thereof (i.e., rahin/the debtor). If, on the contrary, the proceeds 
of the sale are less, the creditor will have a right of recourse to the debtor for the 
balance. In this case, to recover the balance, if the debtor has become insolvent or 
bankrupt, the creditor (having no preferential right) will have to share it with the other 
creditors of the bankrupt debtor. The debtor may not engage in any legal (e.g., to 
transfer the ownership of collateral or to lease the collateral) or non-legal act with 
regards to the collateral, that could be contrary to the rights of the creditor, unless it is 
                                                   
15
 Pledge in this instance means a security interest in a movable property.  
16
 The term mortgage refers to a security interest in an immovable property. 
17
 Note that the continuity of possession of collateral by the creditor is not necessary. Collateral may 
be, after it is pledged or mortgaged, substituted with other collateral with the mutual agreement of the 
debtor and creditor. 
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done with the permission of the creditor.18 Obviously, rahn is used for risk hedging and 
security purposes.   
 
7.2.2 Debt Payment Guarantee (Aqd Daman) 
Aqd daman19 is a contract of guarantee whereby a third party guarantor called a 
damin assumes responsibility for the debt obligation of the debtor to a creditor 
(beneficiary) if the debtor fails to pay or fulfil his debt obligation.20 This concept is also 
applicable where a guarantor underwrites any claim and obligation (pertaining to an 
asset) that has to be fulfilled by an owner of the asset. Aqd daman is a legally-binding 
contract only between the guarantor and creditor and the consent of the debtor is not 
required. As per the Sunni school of thought, the default rule in aqd daman is that the 
debtor and guarantor will be jointly and severally responsible towards the creditor 
(beneficiary). In contrast, as per the Shia school of thought, the debtor will be 
discharged and released from his debt obligation and instead, the guarantor will be 
solely responsible towards the creditor.21 Therefore, for example, as per the latter 
school of thought but unlike the former, if after aqd daman, the beneficiary (creditor) 
becomes indebted to a debtor, this fact will not release the beneficiary from his debt 
                                                   
18
 In cases where the possession of collateral has been granted to the debtor by the creditor, the 
opinions of Islamic scholars are divided on whether the debtor is permitted to lease the collateral to a 
third party or not; that is to say, whether this act would be contrary to the rights of the creditor or not. 
It seems that the debtor can lease the collateral. Moreover, it seems it is not contrary to the rights of 
the creditor when the debtor re-pledges or re-mortgages the same collateral to another creditor; 
however, the first creditor will have a priority right over the collateral.   
19
 For more detail on aqd daman see Iran Civil Code articles 684-723.  
20
 It is worth noting that, since the capital collaterals i.e.,  the pledges, collaterals, property mortgage 
and also the sale-with-repurchase-option contracts were not customarily in practice in the early Islamic 
period, the human collaterals i.e., debt guarantee and personal surety contracts were very important 
and widely used in business transactions. See Muhammad Ja’far Jafari Langroodi ‘Maktabhaye Huquqi 
dar Huqug-e Islam’ (Tehran: Ganj-e Danesh, 3
rd
 edition) pp. 200-201.   
21
 That is why in the Sunni school, unlike the Shia school, joint and several responsibility is generally 
accepted in the realm of contractual guarantees.  
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against the debtor and so the mutual debts, if any, of the beneficiary and debtor will 
not be subject to tahatur and muqassa (automatic set-off). In short, Sunnis have taken 
a creditor-friendly and debtor unfriendly approach unlike the Shias, who have adopted 
the reverse approach. In aqd daman, a second guarantor may further guarantee the 
fulfilment of obligation of the (first) guarantor. Also, in aqd daman, for assurance 
purposes, the creditor (beneficiary) may ask for a provision of collateral from the 
guarantor, even though no security was attached to the original debt. A guarantee in 
respect of a debt whose legal or contractual cause has not yet arisen is null and void. In 
a matured or an overdue debt it is possible for the guarantor to guarantee its payment 
on a specific future date; and similarly for an immature debt he can assume its 
payment immediately. To make aqd daman, in and of itself, dependent upon certain 
factors is void: for example, I (the guarantor) shall stand as guarantor, if the debtor 
does not pay his debt. However, it is possible to make execution of the guarantee (i.e., 
fulfilment of debts) dependent upon certain factors. The guarantor has no right of 
recourse against the guaranteed debtor until after the payment of the debt; but he can 
have recourse if the guaranteed debtor has undertaken to obtain release for the 
guarantor within the specified time, and that time has elapsed. If the guarantor, with 
the consent of the beneficiary, transfers the obligation of payment of the debt to 
another, and if that person accepts to pay it, it is as though the guarantor has paid the 
debt, and he has a right of recourse against the guaranteed debtor. The same rule is 
applicable when the beneficiary (creditor) assigns his claim against a guarantor to 
another person and that person agrees to collect it from the guarantor. If the 
guarantor pays the beneficiary (creditor) less than the debt, he cannot claim from the 
guaranteed debtor more than what he has paid, even if he has compromised (sulh) for 
less than the amount of the debt. Similarly, if the guarantor pays the beneficiary more 
than the debt, he has no right to claim more, unless he has paid it with the permission 
of the guaranteed debtor. Furthermore, if the debt is payable at the end of a term, and 
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the guarantor pays it before the due date, he cannot claim it from the debtor as long 
as the period of the debt has not yet elapsed. The guarantor has no right of recourse 
against the guaranteed debtor under the following circumstances: a) the 
beneficiary/creditor discharges the guarantor to pay the guaranteed debt; b) a third 
party freely pays the guaranteed debt; and c) the guarantor guarantees the payment 
of debt for some spontaneous benevolent reason. If numerous guarantors guarantee a 
debt on a pro rata basis, the beneficiary (creditor) has the right of recourse against 
each one of them to the extent of their share only; and if one of the guarantors pays 
the whole of the debt he can then refer to other guarantors who agreed to the 
payment, to the extent of their share only. In cases where the share of each guarantor 
is not known, it is presumed that they have assured the payment of debt in equal 
shares. In such a guarantee-sharing arrangement, there would be no legal or 
contractual relationship between guarantors, and they are treated independently of 
each other and do not represent each other in respect of the payment of the 
guaranteed debt. A guarantor of a guarantor has no right of recourse against the 
original debtor, but must refer to the person whom he has guaranteed; and in the 
same manner every guarantor has recourse against his own guaranteed 
guarantor/debtor and so on up to the original debtor. As per the Shia school of 
thought, the default rule is that the creditor (beneficiary) would have a right of 
recourse only against the last guarantor and all guarantors before the last guarantor as 
well as the original (guaranteed) debtor are released upon each relevant aqd daman. 
In contrast, as per the default rule of the Sunni school of thought, the creditor 
(beneficiary) would have a right of recourse against all guarantors as well as the 




7.2.3 Guaranteeing Legal and Economic Risks of an Asset (Daman Uhda 
and Daman Darak) 
The subject matter of an aqd daman may be extended to cover an ayn (an 
ascertained asset e.g., a house) rather than a dayn (a debt receivable). In this 
circumstance, the insurer assures an owner against the physical and economic losses 
and also the legal risks pertaining to the ascertained asset.22 According to Islamic 
scholars, this guarantee over the legal risks pertaining to an asset is called a daman 
uhda, and the guarantee over the economic losses pertaining to an asset is called a 
daman darak.23 According to the former circumstance, i.e., daman uhda, the insurer 
ensures the owner regarding any legal problems pertaining to the given asset, e.g., 
ensures that the property purchased by the insured (buyer) was legally owned by the 
seller at the time of the sale. As per the latter, i.e., a daman darak, the insurer 
guarantees the quality and safety of the given property. Hence, it may be argued that 
the subject matter of an aqd daman could be any belongings of the insured whether 
they are tangible or intangible assets. Because of this it may also cover health, safety, 
and environmental concerns.  
 
7.2.4 Personal Surety (Kifala) 
Kifala (suretyship/personal surety)24 is a contract by virtue of which one person 
called a kafil (surety) ensures the presence of a third person called a makful (obligor) 
                                                   
22
 Supporting evidence for this argument can be found in the Iran Civil Code articles 390-393 which is 
grounded in Sharia rules and principles.  
23
 See Murtaza Mutahhari ‘Mas’alaye Riba wa Bank (bi Dhamimeye Mas’alaye Bime)’ (Tehran: Sadra 
Publications, 14
th
 edition, 1384 Solar Hijri Calendar) pp. 146-147. Also, see Murtaza Mutahhari 
“Barrasiye Ijmaliye Mabaniye Iqtisade Islami’ (Tehran: Hikmat Publications, 1
st
 edition, 1403 Lunar Hijri 
Calendar) pp. 301-302.  
24
 For more detail on kifala see Iran Civil Code articles 734-751.    
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before somebody else called a makfulun lah (obligee) when summoned by the 
makfulun lah (obligee). The difference between an aqd daman and a kifala is that in 
the former the given assurance is to ensure the payment of a debt receivable owed by 
the debtor to the creditor, but in the latter the given assurance is to ensure the 
presence of the debtor/obligor as per the request of the creditor/oblige for the 
satisfaction of his obligations. Another major difference is that a guarantor (damin) can 
only secure the realised debt, but a surety (kafil) is able to secure even a contingent 
claim.  To be a valid kifala it is not necessary for there to exist a lawful claim incumbent 
upon the obligor; the existence of a reasonable claim by the obligee against the obligor 
is sufficient, even if the obligor denies it. The surety must make the obligor be present 
at the time and the place where he has promised; otherwise he must incur the 
obligation which is incumbent on the obligor. However, if the surety has undertaken to 
pay a certain compensation if the obligor does not appear at the time and the place as 
he has promised, the surety must act in accordance with his undertaking.25 In the same 
way as aqd daman, it is possible for another person to become a surety of a surety. If a 
person is a surety of a surety, and another person in turn becomes his surety, and so 
on, each surety would be obliged to make the obligor (or surety) pertaining to him, to 
be present at the time and the place where he has promised to do so. Whichever of 
the suretys makes the original obligor present before the original obligee will be 
discharged together with all the other suretys; and whichever of suretys becomes 
discharged by any reason, the suretys who come after him are discharged too. If a 
kifala is done with the permission of the obligor, and the surety, not being able to 
make the obligor present pay or fulfil whatever penalty or obigations attach to him, or 
if he pays the penalty or fulfils the obligation with his permission, he will have a right 
                                                   
25
 It may be argued that a surety must fulfil its undertaking in addition to incurring the obligation 
which is proved to be incumbent on the obligor. 
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of recourse against the obligor and may recover from him whatever he has paid. 
However, if neither was with the consent of the obligor, he will have no right of 
recourse. Kifala can be used for risk hedging purposes especially for mitigating the risk 
of transacting with foreign investors and also the enforcement of foreign judgements 
or arbitration awards given in international tribunals. 
Takaful (mutual surety) is created where members of a community who are 
exposed to a common risk agree to cooperate among themselves for their common 
good by way of pooling their contributions (subscriptions) in a fund scheme to share 
and compensate the losses incurred by any of its members collectively. Takaful 
(mutual kifala) is a form of Islamic mutual or cooperative insurance the legitimacy of 
which is based on the Sharia concepts of ta’awun (mutual help) and tabarru’ 
(voluntary contribution) in which the risk is shared collectively by a group of 
participants voluntarily (i.e., the group members and participants agree to jointly 
assure one another against loss or damage to any of them as defined in their 
agreement). Hence, takaful provides mutual protection of properties and assets and 
grants joint risk-sharing in the event of a loss by one of its members. The essential 
characteristic of takaful is akin to mutual insurance in that members are the insurers 
and also the insured at the same time. The purpose of takaful is not to take advantage 
and benefit at the cost of others. It is basically established for risk hedging and risk 




7.2.5 Compromise (Sulh) 
Sulh26 is a contract made for the purpose of compromise and conciliation, 
whether it is aimed at settling an existing dispute (e.g., a dispute as to the amount of 
receivable debts), or to avoid a possible future dispute. Sulh on a matter may be in 
return for a consideration called a “settlement fee”27 or without any consideration at 
all. Sulh is valid on any matter, except where it relates to an unlawful matter. For 
example, sulh on a right which is an untransferrable right (e.g., the disposal or sale of 
the corpus of a waqf property) is not valid. Also, for instance, if sulh on a property or a 
property right removes it from the reach of creditors, it would not be a valid sulh. If, 
after sulh, it becomes known that the subject of sulh did not exist at all (i.e., if there 
has been no valid cause for settlement or compromise), the sulh is void. Also, if a 
mistake occurs in the identity of a party to a sulh transaction (albeit in circumstances 
where the identity of the party is an essential element of the sulh) or if there is a 
mistake in the subject matter of sulh (albeit in circumstances where that matter is 
considered to be an essential characteristic), the sulh would be void. A sulh which is 
made in place of a transaction, although it provides the exact same result as the 
transaction which it replaces,28 will not be governed by the special rules and conditions 
of that transaction. Therefore, for example, if the subject of sulh is to give an object in 
return for some consideration, its results will actually be the same result as a sale 
transaction (bay), but the special rules and conditions appertaining to a sale contract 
will not apply here. However, it seems to be legitimate and valid from the viewpoint of 
Sharia, although the reason and purpose of sulh in such circumstances has to be in line 
                                                   
26
 For more detail on sulh see Nasser Katouzian ‘Qanun Madani dar Nazm Huquq Kununi-ye Iran’ 
(Tehran: Mizan publication, 18
th
 Edition, 1387 Solar Hijri Calendar) pp. 470-476, articles 752-770.        
27
 mal al-sulh or wajh al-musalaha 
28
 For example, a sulh may be made in place of a tabdil ta’ahhud (novation-like concept) or 
tahatur/muqassa (set-off-like notion). Tabdil ta’ahhud and muqassa are also types of risk hedging tools 
(in addition to being tools for the purpose of satisfying debt obligations).    
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with its underlying philosophy - for conciliation and the avoidance of any potential 
future dispute. Otherwise of course, there would be no reason to disapply the special 
rules and conditions of the substituted transaction in the first place. A sulh which is 
aimed at settling a dispute or is based on clemency or leniency would be binding on 
the parties, and neither of them can cancel it even if there is a claim of gross loss. The 
exception here is if there is a breach of an essential condition of the sulh, or when an 
option of cancellation of sulh is incorporated in a sulh transaction. A sulh can be used 
for different purposes especially for the purpose of compromise on the amount of 
contribution, distribution of profits and losses and also for the settlement of disputes.   
 
7.2.6 Conclusion 
Takaful is the most popular risk hedging facility in the contemporary Islamic 
insurance industry. It was introduced as a result of legitimacy concerns of the 
conventional insurance practices, though it seems there is no compelling reason to 
prove the illegitimacy of the conventional insurance schemes except over problems 
linked to their riba-bearing investment activities and also the fact that it tries to take 
advantage of risk rather than reducing it. As per modern insurance policies, the insurer 
provides protection against specific risks for a certain time period in return for an 
upfront premium paid by the insured. When the specifically agreed risk occurs the 
insurer will have to compensate the insured, otherwise the insurer will retain the 
upfront paid premium. According to Sharia, if the underlying objective is legitimate 
(which it is the case here i.e., provision of security), the parties may make a 
compromise (sulh) in a reasonable manner. If the risks which are to be covered under 
the insurance contract and also the amount of the premium paid for this purpose is 
considered reasonable, the contract would be valid on the ground of the sulh concept. 
Therefore, although the conventional insurance has been declared forbidden by the 
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Fiqh Academy of the OIC,29 mainly due to gharar,30 maysir31 and riba32 concerns, 
modern insurance schemes can easily be practised under the concept and framework 
of sulh contracts with only some marginal amendments and improvements and none 
of the mentioned concerns as to the legitimacy of the conventional insurance are 
strong enough to endanger the legitimacy of the conventional insurance practices. 
 
7.3 Applications of Alternative Risk Insurance Facilities    
It is said that the two fatwas in 1900 and 1901, issued by Muhammad Abduh, 
legitimised the contemporary Islamic insurance practice for Muslims. In the first 
insurance arrangement, the relationship between the insurer and the insured was 
based on a mudaraba contract and the second one which was a life insurance scheme 
was established on the basis of waqf.33 The takaful industry, which is the most popular 
                                                   
29
 This was decided in the 9
th
 declaration of the 2
nd
 session of the Conference. 
30
 Gharar is construed as the presence of the element of chance or uncertainty taken by the insurer. 
However, it may be argued that the uncertainty taken under the insurance contract is reasonable and 
so, it is legitimate.  
31
 Maysir is construed as the presence of the element of betting or gambling (zero-sum games). The 
insured gambles in the following way: he knows that he may lose his upfront paid premium if the 
specific risk does not occur, however, he knows that if the risk happens he will be compensated with 
more than the premiums he has paid. This should also not be considered problematic because what is 
essentially intended by the insured is to be secured against the risk rather than to derive profit at the 
cost of the insurer. According to Mustafa al-Zarqa, in gambling, what the gambler seeks for is that he 
tries to defeat his competitors to obtain an advantage at their cost. Indeed, the loss of his fellow 
gamblers becomes his gain. In contrast, in the insurance contract what is essentially sought by the 
insured is to be secured against specific future losses. See Mohd Ma’sum Billah ‘Applied Takaful and 
Modern Insurance’ (Kuala Lumpur: Sweet and Maxwell Asia, 3
rd
 edition, 2007) pp. 74-77.   
32
 The concern is that the modern insurance companies invest the pooled premium amounts in 
interest-bearing instruments or other illegitimate ways. However, I would again argue that this is not an 
inherent problem of the conventional insurance and this concern may easily be addressed if the 
insurance company avoids investing the pooled contribution amounts in interest-based or other 
illegitimate activities.      
33
 See Mohd Ma’sum Billah ‘Applied Takaful and Modern Insurance’ (Kuala Lumpur: Sweet and 
Maxwell Asia, 3
rd
 edition, 2007) p. 10.  
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contemporary Islamic insurance practice, has experienced different models in its 
operation: mudaraba model, wakala model, a hybrid wakala and mudaraba model, 
and the hybrid waqf and mudaraba model.  
 
7.3.1 Entrepreneurship (Mudaraba) Model 
Mudaraba model, albeit, with some variants, was the earlier legal basis of takaful 
schemes established in the 1980s.34 According to mudaraba (indeed the multiple 
mudaraba) model: a) the people who face the same risk form a group (e.g., in a form 
of musharaka/partnership) and each member of the group contributes some amount 
of money (underwriting) on the basis of donations or tabarru; b) the contributions 
(also called underwritings or subscriptions) are pooled in a fund and entrusted to an 
operator called a mudarib/entrepreneur on the basis of a mudaraba contract; c) all the 
risks belong to the partnership and the losses are covered from the pooled funds 
provided by the participants (i.e., the members of the group). The mudarib (the 
operator of takaful) is fully indemnified against any risk and loss. In case of any deficit, 
the participants (or, some may argue the mudarib) are required to provide qard 
hasana (i.e., interest-free loans) to cover the shortage; d) the underwriting surplus 
(profits) is shared between the group as a whole (participants) and the takaful 
operator (mudarib) at a pre-agreed ratio; e) this model allows the takaful operator 
                                                   
34
 This was in 1979, when the first Islamic Insurance Company (Ltd) was formed in Sudan. Following 
the success of this insurance company, other Islamic insurance companies (takaful companies) were 
established in Saudi Arabia, Luxembourg, Bahrain (and many others) in 1979, 1983, and 1983 
respectively.  For more about the success rate of the takaful companies and also the growth of the total 
premium contributions attracted by the takaful companies see Angelo M. Venardos ‘Islamic Banking and 
Finance in South-East Asia’ (Singapore: Scientific Press, 2005) pp. 82-83; also Task Force on Islamic 
Finance and Global Financial Stability ‘Islamic Finance and Global Financial Stability’ (Kuala 
Lumpur/Jeddah: IFSB/IDB/IRTI, 2010) p. 32; and Syed Othman Alhabshi and Shaikh Hamzah Shaikh Abdul 
Razak ‘Takaful: Concept, History, Development and Future Challenges of its Industry’ (Islam and 
Civilisational Renewal, vol. 1, no. 2, December 2009) pp. 276-291.  
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(mudarib) to enjoy from the underwriting results from operations and also the 
favourable performance returns on the invested contributions. 
There are a number of Sharia concerns which may be raised regarding the above 
mudaraba model.35 The relationship among the participants in takaful is that of 
tabarru’ or ta’awun (i.e., mutual assistance) but not musharaka (i.e., business 
partnership). Consequently, a profit-sharing standard cannot be applied in a takaful 
arrangement. In other words, contributory donations made by the participants are for 
the purpose of compensation for specific losses and they cannot be used as mudaraba 
capital at the same time. Under the mudaraba contract, the purpose is to generate 
profits and distribute them between the rab al-maal (capital provider) and mudarib 
(entrepreneur). Profit is not the same as surplus (excess of contributions over claims, 
reserves and expenses). In the insurance (takaful) context no profit has to be 
generated by definition. In other words, takaful is used for mutual assistance and 
hedging purposes but not for the purpose of making profit. The provision of sharing in 
the underwriting surplus or the profits generated by the mudaraba is, in and of itself, 
something which makes this scheme similar to a commercial business venture but not 
a mutual contract for mutual assistance and protection. The requirement to provide 
qard hasana (in case of a deficit) in a mudaraba contract (whether by mudarib or rab 
al-maal) is by definition contrary to the concept of mudaraba, which is a profit-sharing 
contract. Furthermore, notably, a mudarib (entrepreneur) cannot be a guarantor in 
respect of the mudaraba capital.      
                                                   
35
 For a similar discussion see Muhammad Imran Usmani ‘Issues in Takaful’ (SECP Takaful Conference, 
March 14, 2007) 
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7.3.2 Agency (Wakala) Model  
A wakala model is another proposed model, which is the most popular and 
widely used scheme in the most recent Islamic insurance practices.36 This is largely 
because of the fact that the Sharia Committee of the Islamic Development Bank does 
not allow the takaful manager/operator to share in the underwriting surplus of the 
takaful. In other words, it is said that the takaful operator only has to be compensated 
in the form of service fees.37 As per this model, the participants who face a common 
danger contribute to a jointly established fund out of which the losses incurred by any 
member of the fund have to be compensated. The participants of the scheme appoint 
an operator to manage the required operations of the scheme (takaful). This 
appointment is based on the wakala (agency) concept in the Sharia. The operator acts 
as a custodian and agent of the participants and does not bear any risk or liability for 
any deficit of the fund. The takaful operator (wakil) earns a fee in return for the 
provision of his administrative management services. This fee is often an upfront pre-
agreed deductible fee38 i.e., a certain percentage of the total contributions made to 
the insurance scheme (takaful fund). As for the deficit, a wakil (agent) does not share 
any surplus of the takaful fund, and as for liability for any deficit which is borne by the 
fund, any underwriting surplus is retained by the fund which belongs exclusively to its 
                                                   
36
 See Syed Othman Alhabshi and Shaikh Hamzah Shaikh Abdul Razak ‘Takaful: Concept, History, 
Development and Future Challenges of Its Industry’ (Islam and Civilisational Renewal, vol. 1, no. 2 
December 2009) pp. 276‐291. 
37
 See Islamic Financial Services Board ‘Exposure Draft, Guiding Principles on Governance for Islamic 
Insurance (Takaful) Operations’ (Kuala Lumpur: IFSB, December 2008) p.3, fn. 7.  
38
 As per Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), the operator fee (haq al-wakala) must be an expressly 
pre-agreed fee at the time of his appointment contract. All the costs and expenses related to the 
management and distributions will have to be paid from the source of this fee and the operator is not 
entitled to claim for any extra fees to cover these types of costs and expenses. See Islamic Financial 
Services Board ‘Exposure Draft, Guiding Principles on Governance for Islamic Insurance (Takaful) 
Operations’ (Kuala Lumpur: IFSB, December 2008) p.4. However, as far as the reimbursement of these 
types of costs and expenses is concerned, it seems it can be agreed otherwise.     
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participants. There is no Sharia concern in the wakala model with the above 
characteristics.  
 
7.3.3 The Combination of Agency (Wakala) and Entrepreneurship 
(Mudaraba) Model 
The combination of wakala and mudaraba is another innovative model. As per 
this model, the operator of takaful plays two different roles: an agency role (wakil) and 
also an entrepreneurship role (mudarib). The operator of takaful earns a fixed service 
fee for his agency role as a wakil and also shares in the underwriting surplus as well as 
the proceeds arising out of the investment of the takaful fund as a mudarib. 
A major Sharia concern in the above model is hybridisation. The hybridisation, in 
and of itself, is not problematic from the viewpoint of Sharia, but it is a problem here. 
Hybridisation is valid if the combination of two or more concepts does not lead to a 
contradictory result. The inherent characteristic of a mudarib (entrepreneur) is to 
share in the loss and profit of the entrepreneurship scheme. In contrast, the salient 
feature of a wakil (agent) is to receive only a fixed fee in return for the provision of 
certain services to its principal. Consequently, unlike a mudarib, a wakil is neither liable 
for the loss of funds entrusted to him to carry out the required transactions nor liable 
toward the third parties with whom he acted on behalf of the principal. In cases where 
the compensation of the takaful operator is linked to the outcome of the business, he 
is no longer a wakil but a mudarib. Since the purpose of establishment of the takaful is 
not to carry out investment activities but only for the mutual assistance of its 
participants, the proper solution is that the takaful operator be treated as the wakil of 
the ta’awun (i.e., takaful) scheme to which the participants contribute voluntarily on 
the basis of tabarru’. It should be noted that, as per the Islamic Financial Services 
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Board (IFSB),39 in addition to his fixed service fee, a wakil is permitted to receive part 
of his remuneration on the basis of his performance i.e., to share in the underwriting 
surplus. The IFSB’s argument for this claim is that the participants of the takaful do not 
need the underwriting surplus. However, this argument is not strong enough and this 
practice should be disallowed for the conflict of interests of the participants and the 
wakil. It is highly likely that this practice will deviate the takaful from its main purpose. 
The wakil will try, as much as he can, to avoid compensating the incurred losses of the 
participants in order to increase his share in the underwriting surplus.  
 
7.3.4 The Combination of Trust (Waqf) and Entrepreneurship 
(Mudaraba) Model 
The combined waqf and mudaraba model is another one that has been 
introduced for takaful purposes.40 As per this model, in order to eliminate the 
elements of maysir and qimar, the concepts of waqf and tabarru are integrated. On 
this basis, participants relinquish as tabarru and waqf a certain amount of 
contributions to the takaful scheme called a waqf fund, and the contributions of the 
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 See Islamic Financial Services Board ‘Exposure Draft, Guiding Principles on Governance for Islamic 
Insurance (Takaful) Operations’ (Kuala Lumpur: IFSB, December 2008) p. 4.     
40
 This is to some extent similar to the structure of the Takaful Company of Malaysia. For more in this 
regard see Nik Ramlah Mahmood ‘Insurance Law in Malaysia’ (Butterworths: Utopia Press, 1992) pp. 
245-246. Participants contribute to two different accounts: the Participants’ Account (which is in fact a 
savings and investment account) and the Participants’ Special Account (which is conceived in the spirit 
of tabarru and is used to assist the fellow participants in times of hardship). The latter account is very 
similar to what is intended by the establishment of a cash waqf. The funds in the latter account are 
invested but unlike the profits of the former account which are shared between the takaful company 
and the participants, the profits generated from the latter account are ploughed back into the account 
to enhance its capital amount.   
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waqf fund paid as tabarru by the participants are invested by the takaful company41 in 
Sharia-compliant modes of investment and trade. The following are the basic features 
of the waqf and mudaraba model: a) a waqf fund is established by a takaful company 
(this may be a conventional insurance company) to pool the voluntarily contributed 
amounts of the (often Muslim) participants; b) these funds are invested by the takaful 
company; c) the waqf fund including any generated profits out of the waqf 
investments are used to compensate its members in the event of losses according to 
the rules of the waqf fund for distribution, extend benefits to its members according to 
the waqf deed, and also donate to charities approved by the Sharia Supervisory Board; 
d) the waqf fund is considered a separate legal entity and acts as per its establishment 
terms for investments, compensation and dealing with the surplus amounts of the 
fund; e) the waqf fund is deemed the owner of all contributions made to it by the 
subscribers; f) the takaful company maintains a portion of surplus amounts as reserve 
to mitigate future losses, a portion distributed among the participants to differentiate 
it from the conventional insurance schemes, and also a portion of surplus utilised for 
the charitable purposes every year; g) in cases where the waqf fund is liquidated, the 
outstanding balance, after paying all dues and payables, is utilised for charitable 
purposes; h) the takaful company, while managing the waqf fund, plays two different 
roles simultaneously: as operator or manager of the waqf fund (i.e., mutawalli of the 
waqf fund) and also as a mudarib in dealing with the investments of the waqf fund; i) 
as operator or manager, the takaful company performs all functions necessary for the 
operations of the waqf fund against a certain fixed operator (mutawalli) fee to be 
deducted from the contributions of the participants; j) as mudarib of the fund, the 
                                                   
41
 As an already established company, this is an entity like the Takaful Company of Malaysia just 
explained above. This Takaful Company, which may in fact be a conventional insurance company, sets 
up a waqf fund (as one of its arms or windows in parallel to its other conventional activities) in order to 
attract Muslim participants.  
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takaful company manages the investment of the excess funds of the waqf in a Sharia-
compliant manner and shares in the profits of the waqf fund’s investments at a fixed 
pre-agreed ratio.42 
A very serious Sharia concern over the above model which makes it to a large 
degree illegitimate is that the establishment of a waqf fund for the benefit of waqifs 
(participants/contributors) themselves, in such a way that they make themselves the 
sole beneficiaries or some of the beneficiaries or provide for the payment of their 
debts or other obligations out of the proceeds of the waqf estate, is considered null 
and void. It may be argued that, according to Sharia, in the case of a waqf for the 
public use, if a waqif becomes one of the beneficiaries of a waqf estate he is permitted 
to benefit. The answer to this depends on whether the above said waqf fund is actually 
for the public use or the benefit of waqifs themselves. It is less likely that the above 
said waqf fund is considered to be used for public good. It seems, however, this model 
may be modified to make it a legitimate model from the perspective of Sharia. This 
may happen through the combination of waqf with sulh. For this purpose, every single 
participant of the scheme will have to make his contribution (albeit, in the form of 
non-monetary and non-consumable assets) to the waqf fund for the benefit of other 
participants (not including himself). Then, the beneficiaries of the waqf, who are 
indeed the participants themselves, may compromise as to the condition and amount 
of compensation each may receive from the waqf. The hybridisation is another 
concern in the mentioned waqf and mudaraba model. As with the illegitimacy of the 
combination of wakala and mudaraba, the hybridisation of waqf with mudaraba leads 
to a contradictory result as well. While the mutawalli (the manager of waqf) does not 
share in the profits and deficits of the waqf (and he earns only his service fee like an 
                                                   
42
 For a similar explanation see Muhammad Imran Usmani ‘Issues in Takaful”, SECP Takaful 
Conference, March 14, 2007). 
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agent/wakil), a mudarib (the entrepreneur) does share in the profits and losses of the 
investments. Another major concern is the use of the funds of the waqf. According to 
Sharia, waqf assets may not be channelled into investment purposes.    
 
7.3.5 Conclusion  
Considering the above models, the proper solution for the takaful is the model 
combining sulh (compromise) with wakala (agency). In return for the provision of 
security, takaful participants make certain contributions to a ta’awun scheme 
(cooperative scheme) on the basis of a sulh arrangement (compromise). As said earlier, 
according to Sharia, it is legitimate to make a compromise if the subject matter of the 
compromise (sulh) is a beneficial act. This is exactly the case here. The takaful scheme 
participants will collectively appoint a wakil/agent (in return for payment of a certain 







The Third Tier of the Model: 
The Superstructure and Political 




8.1 The Economic Authority  
Under the “separation of powers” governance, which is ascribed to French 
Enlightenment political philosopher Baron de Motesquieu,1 the political power of a 
state is divided into three branches (a legislature, an executive, and a judiciary) each 
with separate and independent powers and scope of responsibility. In modern sense, 
the management of the economy is with the executive branch subject to its control 
and supervision by the legislature. This research project, however, suggests a new 
approach in which the management of the economy (i.e., the distribution of natural 
wealth resources and the control of the circulation of subordinate wealth) is taken 
away from the state (executive power) and it is assigned to and controlled by a new 
independent authority called the “Economic Authority”. The Economic Authority 
consists of a “House of Wealth” and a “House of Market Control”, the first to 
administer the system of distribution of primary wealth and the second to control the 









                                                   
1
 See ‘Baron de Montesquieu, Charles-Louis de Secondat’ (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy), 
Available at Plato.stanford.edu, Retrieved 14 April 2013.   
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8.2 The House of Wealth 
 
An authority, the House of Wealth2 as a Trustee (mutawalli) of the public (and as 
such of the natural wealth resources) is set up to administer these resources on behalf 
of the public.3 On this basis, it is in charge of securing basic essential needs of the 
people such as the provision of dwelling house, education and healthcare facilities and 
the supply of basic infrastructure utilities. The House of Wealth, as the representative 
of the public, may levy tax (kharaj) in return for the utilisation of natural wealth 
resources and the collected kharaj has to be spent on the needs and in the best 
interests of the public. The House of Wealth may consist of different departments 
(bayts) for the administration of different types of natural resources such the House of 
Land, House of Minerals, and House of Water Bodies. The House of Wealth is managed 
by a Board of Trustees (mutawallis)4 and they are elected and also supervised directly 
by members of the public themselves or indirectly through their representatives. The 
                                                   
2
 The closest Islamic terminology to the House of Wealth is bayt al-maal. A religious authority that can 
support the founding philosophy of this institution is the Quran (4:58) “deliver trusts to those worthy of 
them; and when you judge [distribute the wealth] between people, to judge [distribute] with justice”. 
Undoubtedly, universally, political governments have proved that they are not worthy of managing the 
distribution of natural wealth resources. That is why it seems there is an absolute need for a separate 
body responsible for the proper management of the natural wealth resources. These resources have to 
be utilised for the best interests of their true owners (the public as a whole) rather than the political 
ambitions of the governments and their leaders. Philosophically, any natural wealth in any part of the 
universe has to be enjoyed by any human being in any part of the world. Due to practical considerations 
it can be started domestically, then regionally and eventually rolled out globally.  
3
 This is the philosophy of the House of Wealth vis-à-vis the Treasury of State, in the modern sense. For 
a somewhat different view with regard to the distribution of primary wealth see the Constitution of Iran 
article 45 “public wealth and property such as uncultivated or abandoned lands, mineral deposits, seas, 
lakes, rivers and other natural public waters, mountains, valleys, jungles, marshlands, natural forests, 
unenclosed pastureland, legacies without heirs, property of unknown-owners, and public properties 
that were recovered from usurpers, shall be at the disposal of the Islamic government for it to utilise 
them in accordance with the public interests.” The research’s approach is that all these properties 
belong to the public but not the government and they have to be distributed among the members of the 
public according to their reasonable needs on the basis of equity. 
4
 This is similar to the role of a board of trustees in common law trusts and mutawalli in Islamic waqf.  
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House of Wealth will have to distribute the proceeds of the natural wealth resources 
according to the reasonable needs5 of every member of the public and for some of 
these resources the distribution can be done according to the contribution of each 
person involved in their exploitation. The distribution policy should be detailed in a 
deed and the House of Wealth should administer the natural wealth according to the 
terms of the distribution deed. The House of Wealth has a custody interest but not a 
possession one with regard to the wealth under its administration. The House of 
Wealth has no authority to dispose and surrender the ownership of the corpus (origin) 
of the natural wealth nor can it use the natural wealth resources for some business 
and investment purposes. It is only the proceeds that are generated either in the form 
of profit or rent that will be distributed among the beneficiaries, which are the 









                                                   
5
 Some may argue that it has to be distributed equally, otherwise it is unjust. However, as per the 
research theory, justice means balance and balance requires distribution of natural wealth resources on 
an equitable basis i.e., according to the reasonable and legitimate needs of people.  
6
 The House of Wealth is a new institution that has to be established according to the research model 
and it is introduced here in very general terms. It is a new subject altogether and is an issue for later 
research in great detail.  
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8.3 The House of Market Control (“HMC”)  
 
Another authority, the House of Market Control (HMC) should be set up to 
regulate and monitor the creation, use, accumulation and disposal of subordinate 
wealth, without involving itself with economic, business and financial activities.7 The 
need to set up such an authority is well established in the Sharia and, unquestionably, 
in the modern world. According to Sharia, people should circulate whatever is surplus 
to their reasonable needs and not hoard8 their savings. The necessary effect of this 
                                                   
7
 This is somewhat similar to an Islamic authority called a muhtasib. Muhtasib was an officer to inspect 
and assure that all market participants were performing their tasks correctly and morally, settling 
market-related disputes in marketplaces, and ensuring customers were not cheated in the market. The 
Muhtasib had the authority to annul market rules and orders which were unjust on religious reasons. It 
can be said that the nearest western concept to Muhtasib is Ombudsman. See Roberta Jamieson ‘The 
Ombudsman: Learning from other Cultures’ (Ottawa Law Review, Vol. 25, Issue 3, 1993, pp. 629-640) 
pp. 635-636. Some scholars may argue that why Muhtasib, as a historically used and developed 
authentic Islamic institution, is not used instead of “The House of Market Control”. This is mainly 
because the scope of power of “HMC” is considered to be much broder than Muhtasib. The HMC is 
indeed supposed to be an exclusive market policy-maker, market regulator and market supervisor. 
Furthermore, the head or the managing members of HMC have to be selected by the members of the 
public whether directly or indirectly, unlike Muhtasib who is appointed by the ruler of the state.        
8
 As per the Quran (59:7) “so that it may not merely circulate between the rich among you”. Also as 
per the Quran (9: 34&35): “and there are those who amass gold and silver … announce to them the 
severity of punishment that they should wait for… on a Day when they shall be heated up in the Fire of 
Hell … (and they shall be told) this is the treasure which you hoarded for yourselves. Taste, then, the 
punishment for what you have hoarded”. 
 280 
 
order is to inject savings9 into the circular flow of income generation in the economy in 
order to prevent and avoid the consequences of the concentration of wealth in the 
hands of a few rich people. In other words, the philosophy of the establishment of the 
HMC is to secure the proper circulation of wealth in the society in order to avoid the 
negative impacts of the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few people or 
groups. It is highly likely that the concentration of wealth results in corruption in the 
political system and also creates an unhealthy economy, simply because the wealthy 
will encourage the political system to run in such a way that mainly serves their 
interests and wishes while disregarding the main concerns of the society as a whole, 
namely, social welfare, prosperity and social justice. It is for these reasons that, for 
instance, deposit accounts as they are practised in modern banking should be avoided 
because they are to a very large extent controlled by multinational corporations and a 
                                                   
9
 In practice, modern Islamic banks take the savings of the surplus-capital holders in deposit and apply 
them in the liability side of their balance sheet in one of these forms: a) deposit accounts on the basis of 
wadi’a or amana with no interest given to the depositors (the account is only for the safekeeping of the 
deposits); b) investment accounts on the basis of mudaraba in which the profits generated from the 
investments will have to be shared between the bank and depositor/investor according to a pre-agreed 
ratio (however, in practice the return to the depositors/investors is benchmarked to the prevalent 
conventional rate of interest and it does not reflect the true contingent profit or loss originating from 
the investments); c) commodity murabaha or tawarrugs whereby the Islamic bank pays a fixed return to 
the capital holder (in practice, tawarrug has been invented to replicate the modern lending mechanism 
under the name of murabaha i.e., the purpose is not a true murabaha/sale  according to Sharia but 
rather only the circumvention of a riba prohibition). Of these three forms, it is only the first one that is 
acceptable (to be practised by the banks “PDIs”) according to Sharia but neither the second one (as it is 
in fact practised) nor the third one.      
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few so-called mega banks operating worldwide.10 Also, it is fair to say that the greater 
the concentration of wealth, the greater the probability of systemic risk. This systemic 
problem should be addressed by the HMC. The mission of the HMC is to ensure that 
the ultimate objective of the system, social justice11 prevails.12 In an economic and 
financial context, what is meant by social justice is a “justly balanced economic and 
financial system”. As per the Quran13, in the first place, people are free to make money 
as much as they can with no upper limit, however they should redistribute their 
accumulated wealth among themselves by way of using legitimate transactions and 
voluntary means. If they fail to achieve this, then the society as a whole (the HMC) has 
                                                   
10
 Referring to the Sharia concepts of hifz al-maal (protection of property), hifz al-nafs (protection of 
self), and hifz al-nasl (protection of the future generations) which are considered three essentials 
aspects in Sharia (i.e., Maqasid al-Sharia), some Islamic scholars argue for the necessity as well as 
legitimacy of deposit-guarantee/protection either by the state (such as Savings Accounts’ Insurance 
Fund established as a state financial institution in 1933 in Turkey) or by a national deposit insurance 
(takaful) scheme. They further argue for the payment of an annual inflation premium by Islamic banks to 
the deposit accounts. See Monzer Kahf ‘The Use of Assets, Ijara Bonds for Bridging the Budget Gap’ 
(Islamic Economic Studies, vol.4, no. 2, 1997) p.75. However, since annual inflation premiums as well as 
the guaranteed-deposit-protection plan by the government (i.e., the financial system as a whole) will 
encourage deposit accounts and also more savings by the people, it is clearly in contradiction with the 
discouragement (not to say the prohibition) of the deposit/savings by the Sharia. There is no legitimate 
reason to guarantee the bank deposit accounts from the public property sources e.g., guaranteed by the 
taxpayers (although the Task Force on Islamic Finance in their meeting on April 2010 considers the 
deposit insurance as a necessary part of the financial safety net). It is unfair that the deposit accounts 
are guaranteed by the central bank or any other public agency (the HMC) simply because every single 
member of the public does not have a savings account and if any, they do not have the savings in equal 
amounts. Another Sharia impediment in this respect is that deposits that are taken under the concept of 
wadi’a cannot be guaranteed, otherwise it will not in principle be a wadi’a contract at all. In addition to 
deposit insurance plans in modern banking, some may argue that the financial system has to be 
responsive as to the investors’ demand for the protection of their investment accounts. However, this is 
not only problematic due to the practical problems in the evaluation of the fair value and also riskiness 
of the underlying assets pertaining to these sorts of accounts but also the banks (PDIs), by definition, 
cannot engage in real investment activities.    
11
 Some scholars argue that “proto-quasi-Ottoman socialism” emerged on this perspective during the 
Ottoman Empire. See Murat Cizakca ‘Islamic Capitalism and Finance: Origins, Evolution, and the Future’ 
(Edward Elgar: Studies in Islamic Finance, Accounting, and Governance, 2011) p. 21.     
12
 See Abbas Mirakhor and Idris Samawi Hamid ‘Islam and Development, The Institutional Framework’ 
(Global Scholarly Publications, 2009).   
13
 The Quran (2:143 and 59:7) 
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to interfere to cause the proper circulation of wealth in the economy and also, if 
necessary, redistribute the wealth using the obligatory means, subject to protection of 
the property rights of the people (in Sharia it is called “hifz al-maal” which is one of 
“Maqasid al-Sharia” and one of the primary duties of the HMC). As can be seen, the 
approach taken by the Quran is a middle-way. This is somewhat in contrast to the view 
of some Islamic scholars who argue that the members of the society themselves, based 
on their personal and religious beliefs, should ensure that social justice is achieved. 
The HMC is run by a board with broad policymaking and regulatory powers over 
the entire economic, business, and financial system (except the distribution of natural 
wealth resources) including for-profit, not-for-profit, philanthropic, microbusiness, 
intermediary and risk hedging activities, and also with the power to issue rules with 
the force of rules and policies.14 The members of the board will have to be 
independent experts appointed by the representatives of the public or, it may be said, 
that they will be elected directly by the members of the public similar to the board of 
the House of Wealth. The HMC board is granted all regulatory, executive, and judiciary 
powers required to ensure the proper running of the whole system. The HMC is 
                                                   
14
 HMC will have to take “functional” approach in its rulemaking role. “Functional” approach is an 
alternative to an “entity” approach. Rather than introducing regulations based on the type of institution, 
rules and regulations are introduced and enforced according to the “function” performed (no matter 
which institution performs that specific function). For more, eg, see Jane E. Willis ‘Banks and Mutual 
Funds: A Functional Approach to Reform’ (Columbia Business Law Review, Vol. Issue 1, 1995, pp. 221-
280) p. 228.  
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essentially responsible for protecting, fostering, and advancing the proper creation and 
circulation of wealth in the entire economic, business, and financial system.15    
Market participants have to be free to trade their assets and property rights in 
exchange markets with fair prices,16 fair competition and equal access to markets. The 
price of the sukuk (securities) traded in stock (sukuk) exchange markets should reflect 
the real value of the underlying assets and not speculative prices.17 The House of 
Market Control should not interfere in the market operations except in extraordinary 
circumstances, e.g., when distortions occur in the market due to ihtikar18 (hoarding), 
de facto monopolies, abusive conduct, or information asymmetries. The general policy 
of the House of Market Control should be that there must be no imposition of tax on 
                                                   
15
 I would argue that the whole system of the circulation of secondary/subordinate wealth has to be 
controlled by the same authority (i.e., the House of Market Control).  
The recent financial crisis proved that problems in capital markets may have a huge impact on financial 
institutions, and vice-versa. The freezing of the securitization markets in the West (especially in the US) 
resulted in declines in the values of banks’ holdings of ABS (asset-backed securities), which in turn put at 
risk the solvency of many banks and the banking system as a whole. The most developed financial 
regulatory structures e.g., in the US were largely based on the premise, once true, that banking, 
securities and insurance were separate functions with separate tools, and thus could be treated 
separately for regulatory concerns (though financial innovation has blurred these lines for the following 
reasons: a) credit default swaps (which are one of the major types of sophisticated securities) are in fact 
insurance against default; b)  money market funds mimic many of the features of bank deposits; c) a 
range of debt securities have significantly reduced the importance of banks as the primary lenders to 
businesses; d) most notably, securitization became the main source of capital for bank lending until the 
recent financial crisis shut it down).      
16
 According to some Islamic scholars, like Ibn Taymiyya, what is meant by “fair price” is the prevalent 
price among the majority of merchants. It is, furthermore, argued that the interference of the state (the 
House of Market Control) in the price fixing mechanism (i.e., narkh or thaman) is mazlama i.e., an 
injustice, arbitrariness and usurpation of the property of others. See Yassine Essid ‘A Critique of Islamic 
Economic Thought (Leiden: Brill, 1995) pp. 151, 156, 159. See also Muhammad Akram Khan ‘Economic 
Teachings of Profit Muhammad’ (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1989) p. 126.     
17
 For a similar approach see Mahmmod Mohamed Sanusi ‘Critical Issues on Islamic Banking, Finance 
and Takaful’ (Kuala Lumpur, INCEIF, 2010) p. 188.  
18
In case of market distortions and hoarding, the House of Market Control may interfere and under 
some circumstances confiscate the hoarded goods and sell them in the market at a fair price. The sold 
revenues minus the profits generated from the sales will be returned to the hoarder and the earned 
profits are distributed to the affected consumers or the poor as alms.  
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market transactions and no restrictions on international transactions.19 There should 
be no barriers to enter and exit the market and also no barriers to move freely from 
one market to another.  
The enforcement of market rules and transactions has to be given full effect by 
the House of Market Control (or muhtasib20 according to Islamic finance) in order to 
ensure balance in the market and minimise the risk of default and uncertainty among 
market participants. Some important responsibilities of the House of Market Control 
are: to check fair competition of businesses and fair trading, correct weights and 
measures21, monitor pricing mechanisms, audit illegal transactions, prevent market 
fraud and abuses and hoarding of necessities and also to teach the market participants 
to regulate themselves according to the market rules and policies.22 As far as business 
associations and business collective schemes are concerned, the most important 
function of the House of Market Control (muhtasib) is to check the proper functioning 
                                                   
19
 See Huner Sencan ‘Is Hayatinda Islam Insani (Homo-Islamicus)’ (Istanbul: MUSIAD, 1994) p. 6.  
20
 It is indeed a market inspector. Muhtasib (similar to “Ombudsman” in modern market sense) is 
assigned with much less power than that of HMC in the suggested new model.   
21
 As per the Quran (55:9): “so establish weight with justice and fall not short in balance”.  
22
 For more details on the functions of muhtasibs see Z. Iqbal and M.K. Lewis ‘An Islamic Perspective 
on Governance’ (Edward Elgar, 2009) pp. 261-265. See also A. R. Abdul Rahman ‘Issues in Corporate 
Accountability and Governance: An Islamic Perspective’ (American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, vol. 
15, 1998) p. 55.  
 




of business forms and financial institutions in terms of their having good corporate 
governance and following the objectives of social responsibility.23          
The intervention and functioning of the HMC will be on the basis of clearly 
defined policies and rules.24 Some major policies and rules in this regard are given 
below.  
 
8.3.1 Equitable Distribution Prevails over Efficiency Rule 
The “equitable distribution prevails over efficiency”25 rule states that, in case 
there is any conflict between distribution and efficiency rules, the distribution policy 
will override the efficiency theory. This is because the social balance (i.e., the fair 
distribution of wealth among all human beings in the society) is given priority over the 
concentration and maximization of material wealth, which is controlled by a small 
                                                   
23
 The proper management and accountability of business associations are of concern to the 
stakeholders who have an interest in the business associations, as well as to the wider community and 
the public. Different jurisdictions have taken different approaches in the legal and regulatory 
frameworks for corporate governance and social responsibility of business associations. For some 
interesting discussions about corporate governance in the Islamic context see A.R. Abdul Rahman ‘Issues 
in Corporate Accountability and Governance: An Islamic Perspective’ (American Journal of Islamic Social 
Sciences, vol. 15, 1998) p. 55. Also, M. U. Chapra and H. Ahmed ‘Corporate Governance in Islamic 
Financial Institutions’ (Islamic Development Bank, Islamic Research and Training Institute, 2002) p. 26. 
They argue that, from an Islamic perspective, there is basically no difference between corporate 
governance and corporate social responsibity, unlike what is understood under the shareholder primacy 
model in Capitalism. They believe that, from an Islamic viewpoint, business ethics (akhlaq) is of vital 
importance.       
24
 From the perspective of Sharia, it may be argued that the entire rules and policies in this regard 
must be in conformity with the Objectives of Sharia known as Maqasid al-Sharia. However, it may also 
be argued that the HMC may sometimes take decisions on the basis of social maslaha i.e., for the good 
of the society.      
25
 Efficiency is in itself respected; but as far as it is linked to the concentration of wealth and limited 
liability shield and other similar notions it is overruled by the equitable distribution rule.  
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percentage of businessmen and corporations.26 There is some evidence in Sharia that 
strongly emphasises the importance of the redistribution of wealth either through 
voluntary instruments or by way of obligatory means. The concentration of wealth, on 
the other hand, which is basically a prerequisite of efficiency in the economy, is 
strongly discouraged. 
8.3.2 Using the Paper/Electronic Currency as a Medium of Payment and 
Not an Index of Value Measurement  
The invention of money27 and its position as the only means of transacting and 
pricing products and commodities has affected the use of barter28 (mua’wada) 
                                                   
26
 As per Chapra, “the very objective of Sharia is to promote the welfare of the people, which lies in 
safeguarding their faith, their life, their intellect, their posterity and their wealth. Whatever ensures the 
safeguarding of these five serves the public interest and is desirable.” See M. Umer Chapra ‘Islam and 
the Economic Challenge’ (Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 1992) p. 1.   
27
 According to Mann, money has a variety of different meanings in different contexts. To provide a 
legal definition of money, some account of its economic functions has to be reflected in the legal 
definition. Key definitions that have been provided by economists regarding money are “[money] as a 
medium of exchange” (see, eg, William Stanley Jevons ‘Money and the Mechanism of Exchange’ (Kegan 
Paul, 14
th
 edition, 2002) first published in 1875 and also see Graham Bannok and William Manser 
‘International Dictionary of Finance’ (S. Wiley & Sons, 2000) p. 181; “[money] as a measure of value or as 
a standard for contractual obligations” (see,eg, A. Crockett ‘Money, Theory, Policy and Institutions’ 
(Nelson, 2
nd
 edition, 1979) p. 6 and also see George Macesich ‘Issues in Money and Banking’ (Praeger, 
2000) chaper 3; “[money] as a source of value or wealth” (see,eg, Eamonn Butler ‘Milton Friedman: A 
Guide to His Economic Thought’ (Gower, 1985) p. 67 and also see Mervyn Lewis and Paul D. Mizen 
‘Monetary Economics’ (Oxford University Press, 2000) pp. 10-11; and “[money] as a unit of account” 
(see,eg, Georg Simmel ‘The Philosophy of Money’ (Routledge, 2
nd
 edition, 1990) chapter 2. According to 
Lewis and Mizen (p. 4), the focus of economists on each these functions of money has varied at different 
times but, according to Roberston (see D. H. Roberston ‘Money’ (London, 1927), it seems that the 
function of money as a medium of exchange (what is actually argued in the thesis) is today regarded as 
its key function and characteristic. Considering the abovementioned economic functions of money that 
have been provided by the economists, Mann adopts a functional approach in forumalting the legal 
definition of money. As per Mann “money is that which serves as a means of exchange- subject to the 
crucial proviso that its functions must have the formal and mandatory backing of the domestic legal 
system in the State or area in which it circulates”. In other words, a legal definition of money must 
provide both the economic functions of money and the legal context within which it must be created 
and implemented. See Charles Proctor ‘Mann on the Legal Aspect of Money’ (Oxford University Press, 
7th edition, 2012) pp. 9-15.      
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transactions. The invention of money made it possible for the producer of the goods to 
sell his excess products in return for a specific amount of money and allows him to 
delay the purchase of the products he desires to some future point. Thus, the 
emergence of money delinked the direct relationship between production and 
consumption. The storing of money was much easier than the storage of products and 
commodities. This development made the hoarding of wealth much easier than in the 
past.29 Unlike barter transactions, money paved a new way of creating wealth. A 
person with money was able to buy the products of others and hoard them in order to 
influence the price of products in the market. It seems this development in business 
and finance contributed significantly to the improper distribution of wealth and 
consequently an imbalance in the social distribution system and made it even more 
imbalanced throughout the passage of time.30 Money was gradually treated, in and of 
itself, as a very desirable asset in the economic life of the people and made it possible 
for people to compete in the acquisition and the concentration of their wealth in the 
form of money. To create more money and to increase their existing wealth from the 
                                                                                                                                                             
28
 Some scholars have defined barter as the “direct exchange of goods and services without any 
medium of exchange for settling payment”. See Pierre Siklos ‘Barter and Barter Economics (Oxford 
Encyclopaedia of Economic History)’ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) p.242. According to Sharia, 
in barter transactions, the exchange of the same goods in different quantities or quality is considered 
riba. As to the illegitimacy (i.e., riba) of the barter of lower quality goods for better ones of the same 
goods see Malik ‘Book 31 (Business Transactions)’ Hadith 31.12.21; see also Muslim ‘Book 10 (Book of 
Transactions)’ Hadith 3861. This type of riba is called riba al-mua’wadi or riba al-mua’mali, which is more 
relevant in commodity markets as well as currency and interest rate exchange markets. The other type 
of riba is called riba al-qardi, which is more challenging in modern Islamic banking and finance. As it is 
well known, historically barter transactions precede lending transactions. Therefore, logically, riba al-
mua’awadi should have come to light prior to the riba al-qardi.   
29
 One of the solutions introduced in Islam to prevent the deviation of money from its true function 
(i.e., using money only as a medium and facility of exchange of goods) and also to avoid the 
concentration and hoarding of money, has been the imposition of more zakat/tax on the cash part of 
wealth.    
30
 However, prior to the invention of money in the business and finance world, it seems the initial 
improper distribution of natural wealth resources was the starting point of an imbalance in the 
distribution system.      
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source of stored currency, a new, third31 facility was invented. This innovation was a 
new type of transaction. This transaction was neither the exchange of a commodity 
with another commodity (i.e., the barter transaction or mua’wada) nor the exchange 
of commodities with some amount of money (i.e., the sale contract or bay) but rather 
it was to transact some amount of money in spot against the same amount of money 
plus an addition in the future (i.e., interest-bearing lending transactions or qard 
rabawi). The additional amount that is stipulated in the lending transaction is called 
riba in Islam and it is expressly prohibited according to the Quran.32 Regarding the 
underlying rationale for the prohibition of riba, it may be said that the reason is to 
avoid the problem of exploitation in the economy. Some may argue it is to prevent an 
imbalance in the distribution of wealth, which is in fact an immediate result of the 
concentration of wealth and concentration of power in society. It may also be said that 
the prohibition of riba is an immediate implication of the prohibition of hoarding 
(whether it is ihtikar or kanz33) in Sharia. Moreover, some may argue that the 
prohibition of riba needs to be obeyed for religious reasons especially due to hifz al-din 
(protection of religion), which is considered to be one of the essentials of Maqasid al-
Sharia (objectives of Sharia). While all these arguments make sense, there is no 
consensus among Sharia scholars as to the true philosophy of the prohibition of riba.           
                                                   
31
 What is meant by the first facility is “barter” (mua’wada) and “sale” (bay) is the second one. At the 
time of its invention, some people thought that the third facility i.e., trading money against money was 
another type of bay. However, the Quran warned these people of their misunderstanding and expressly 
declared that this new facility is not a legitimate bay but indeed an illegitimate transaction of riba. As 
per the Quran (2:275): “they said that the lending transaction is in fact a true sort of bay contract while 
Allah legitimised bay transactions, but prohibited that type of bay that includes an excess amount (riba) 
therein”. 
32
 However, if no addition is stipulated in the lending transaction it will be a legitimate lending 
transaction known as qard hasana.  
33
 The hoarding of gold and silver is called kanz. Hoarding of any other types of commodities and 
products is called ihtikar.     
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Today, there are Islamic scholars34 who advocate the return to the Islamic gold 
dinar35 which they claim will not have as many drawbacks as modern paper currency, 
such as inflation. Some of these scholars also believe that since the Prophet himself 
used coins, it is then appropriate for Islam-ruling states to replace the modern paper 
currency and adopt the sunnah of the Prophet by the implementation of the coinage 
system (i.e., gold dinars).36 On the other hand, there are some scholars who argue for 
the legitimacy of the use of the modern paper currency. These scholars argue that 
well-known Islamic jurists Mohammad al-Shaybani, Ibn Taymiyyah, and Ibn Qayyim did 
not limit the acceptable forms of currency to gold and silver coinage (i.e., gold dinars). 
Also as per Ibn Hanbal, it is acceptable to adopt as currency anything that is used 
widely by the public. Furthermore, the most respected contemporary Islamic jurists 
Taqi Usmani and al-Qaradawi have also adopted the same approach.37 Some may 
argue that the de-linking of the currency-gold relationship has been a basic cause of 
inflation and re-linking all currencies directly to gold and firmly following the specified 
                                                   
34
 These are known as “dinarists”.  
35





centuries, Islam conquered the two great empires of the time, namely the Byzantine and Sassanid 
territories and confiscated huge amounts of Byzantine gold coins and Sassanid silver coins (known as 
booty/ghana’eem) hoarded in churches and temples. These coins (a bimetallic system) were then 
confirmed and used as legal tender in the Islamic world. This substantial amount of treasure increased 
the aggregate money supply and most likely led to a dominant monetised trade in the economic system. 
See Andre Wink ‘Al-Hind, The Making of the Indo-Islamic World’ (Leiden: Brill, vol. 1, 1991) p.34. See 
also Cengiz Kallek ‘Hz. Peygamber (S.A.S) Doneminde Devlet ve Piyasa’ (Istanbul: Bilim ve Sanat Vakfi, 
1992) pp. 82-83.     
36
 For more see Ahamed Kameel Mydin Meera ‘The Islamic Gold Dinar’ (Pelanduk Publications, Sdn 
Bhd, 2002) pp. 88-89. The claim is to transform the currencies as they are used today into gold dinars, 
which were historically practised in the Islamic world as well as the Prophet himself in the early Islamic 
period. It is believed that the Prophet used Byzantine and Persian coins, and the true Islamic coins came 
out later. At the time of the Prophet, paper currency had not yet been introduced. See Murat Cizakca 
‘Islamic Capitalism and Finance: Origins, Evolution, and the Future’ (Edward Elgar: Studies in Islamic 
Finance, Accounting, and Governance, 2011) p. 229. 
37
 For detail in this regard see Muhammad Aslam Haneef and Emad Rafiq Barakat “Must Money be 
Limited to Only Gold and Silver?” (Journal of King Abdulaziz University: Islamic Economics, vol. 19, no.1, 
2006) pp. 21-34. See also Muhammad Umer Chapra ‘Monetary Management in an Islamic Economy’ 
(Islamic Economic Studies, vol. 4, no.1, 1996) p. 5.  
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currency-gold ratio is the only proper solution. However, it seems the most 
appropriate solution is to link currency to the value of a basket of valuable assets 
(especially metals), and this could be a viable solution to get rid of the current problem 
of inflation. 
It seems that there is a need to distinguish between the use of currency as a 
medium of exchange or payment38 and the use of it as a pricing index. For practical 
considerations, it seems viable to adopt the former practice but there is no justifiable 
reason for the implementation of the latter one. As a solution, it seems the modern 
pricing index has to be changed and be linked to the average value of a pool/basket of 
products selected from a wider number of categories39 of the economic sector in such 
a way that the average value of the combination of their prices indicates as much as 
                                                   
38
 According to Good, usually, payment means the “transfer of money or of a money fund, or 
performance of some other act” offered and accepted in satisfaction of a “money obligation”, but 
usually the contracting parties employ the term to signify “some intermediate step”, such as a 
“conditional payment” (e.g., payment by cheque) or a “dispatch of funds”.  The definition of payment in 
law, as per Good, is “a gift or loan of money or any act offered and accepted in performance of a money 
obligation. So, an act cannot constitute payment unless money is involved”. See Charles Proctor ‘Good 
on Payment Obligations in Commercial and Financial Transactions’ (Sweet & Maxwell, 2
nd
 edition, 2009) 
pp. 8-9. However, some scholars do not believe that for an act to be considered as payment, the 
involvement of money is necessary. According to these commentators, for example as per Brindle and 
Cox, payment involves more than money in English law and the parties to a contract may treat any other 
act as payment “whilst payment often involves the performance of a money obligation, it does not 
necessarily involve the delivery of money. Money may not be delivered where another sum is set off, or 
an account settled. Money may not be involved where for instance goods are delivered in part exchange 
for new goods”. See Michael Brindle and Raymond Cox ‘Law of Bank Payments’ (Sweet & Maxwell, 4
th
 
edition, 2010) p. 1. It seems that the first definition is more precise than the latter one. What is argued 
by Brindle and Cox goes much beyond the definition of payment and it is actually the definition of 
settlement. So, the first view is more suitable as definition of payment.        
39
 An important factor that has to be taken into account in the selection of this basket is that it should 
cover different products with intrinsic values from different categories e.g., agriculture, minerals, 
metals, manufacturing, and real property. Second, for the purpose of maximum stability in market 
prices, the price movement of these products should normally be in an opposite direction, in such a way 
that they neutralise (net out) each other to a very large degree. On this basis, the practice of ‘face value’ 
(which is set by the power of the states in paper currencies) is eliminated from the financial system and 
the governments desperate to supply more liquidity to cover their current expenditures or pay their 
debts will not be able to solve the problem by printing more money (as they do nowadays times of 
financial crises) and consequently create catastrophic effects on the economy in the long run.   
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possible, the true functioning of the economy and market price movement as a 
whole.40    
 
8.3.3 Liquidity Management 
In modern financial systems, internal money market tools are used for the 
management of short-term liquidity needs. Financial institutions, especially banks that 
need short term liquidity, borrow from each other at a floating interbank rate. They 
may also, under some circumstances, borrow from the central bank. All the financial 
tools that are used for this purpose are, in essence, loans i.e., lending transactions. As 
far as the practice of the internal money market in contemporary Islamic banking and 
finance is concerned, in 1993 Bank Negara Malaysia established the first ever Islamic 
Interbank Money Market using commodity murabahas or (organised) tawarruq tools 
for the purpose of liquidity absorption as well as liquidity injection into the Islamic 
banking sector.41 Some Sharia authorities, namely, AAOIFI and the Mecca Fiqh 
                                                   
40
 This suggestion is merely based on a rational reasoning and to be firmly proved it needs further 
research by the economists. A detailed discussion in this regard is beyond the confines of this thesis.  
41
 In order to inject liquidity into an Islamic bank that is experiencing a liquidity shortage, Bank Negara 
buys a commodity from the commodities market on a cash basis at spot price and then sells the 
purchased commodity to the Islamic bank on a deferred payment basis (with a mark-up). The Islamic 
bank, then sells the purchased commodity in the commodities market on spot (often at the original 
purchase price paid by the Bank Negara) and pays the purchase instalments to Bank Negara at the 
specified times. Absorption of the excess liquidity of the Islamic bank by Bank Negara operates more or 
less in the same manner but in the reverse direction. In this mechanism, Bank Negara may appoint the 
Islamic bank as its agent to buy and sell the commodity. See Bank Negara Malaysia ‘Annual Report 2007’ 
(Kuala Lumpur, Bank Negara Malaysia, 2008) p.87. For somewhat different mechanisms see Asyraf 
Wajdi Dato Dusuki ‘Islamic Finance: An Old Skeleton in a Modern Dress’ (Kuala Lumpur: ISRA/INCEIF, 
2008) p.229. A similar mechanism was adopted by Bahrain in 2002 with the establishment of a Liquidity 
Management Centre. This was also followed in Pakistan but with the introduction of new Sharia-
compliant tools i.e., interbank musharaka (where the banks are invited to pool their 
contributions/assets in a musharaka scheme and share the generated profits on a pre-agreed ratio 
among themselves) and interbank wakala (where the investors, in order to invest and receive returns, 
provide their investable funds to Islamic banks in return for payment of a service fee to Islamic banks).     
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Academy have declared these liquidity tools illegitimate.42 However, there are some 
Sharia scholars who argue for the Sharia-compliance of the (organised) tawarruqs.43 
Also, there are some other scholars who advocate the legitimacy of (organised) 
tawarrugs on the basis of social maslaha (public interest) invoking the wide practice 
and use of these tools in the Islamic finance industry.44 Undoubtedly, because of the 
limitation of fixed return yielding instruments in Islamic finance, the Islamic financial 
institutions would likely face more liquidity concerns compared to their Western 
counterparts. It is also obvious that the more diversified the Islamic liquidity 
management tools are, the greater the degree of flexibility that the HMC will have to 
control the liquidity supply and also the more leeway the Islamic financial institutions 
especially Islamic banks (i.e., Payment and Deposit Intermediaries) will have to match 
and adjust the liability and asset side of their balance sheet. However, as per the Task 
Force on Islamic Finance,45 for the protection of financial stability it is necessary to set 
up a vigorous national and international liquidity management scheme, on the basis of 
which central banks will have to act as the lender of last resort and supply liquidity to 
the market.46  
 
                                                   
42
 As a result of the approach taken by AAOIFI and the Mecca Fiqh Academy, Bank Negara Malaysia has 
started developing new Islamic interbank money market tools with a particular focus on equity 
ownership instruments (i.e., an increasing attention on mudaraba/musharaka contracts both in the 
number and volume). See Jennifer Jacobs ‘Laughing All the Way to the Bank’ (Islamic Finance Asia, 27 
August 2009).  
43
 Akram Laldin, who is a member of Bank Negara’s Sharia Board is one of the scholars who advocate 
this. See Nikan Froozye ‘Tawarruq: Shari’ah Risk or Banking Conundrum?’ Available via the Internet at 
www.opalesque.com/OIFI12/Featured_Structure_Tawarruq_Shariah_Risk_or_... 
44
 In this regard see Mohammed Khnifer ‘Maslaha and the Permissibility of Organized Tawarruq’ 
Available via the Internet at  https://mail.inceif.org/exchange    
45
 The Task Force on Islamic Finance of the Islamic Financial Services Board made some proposals 
called “(Eight) Building Blocks”, in their meeting on April 2010, for the purpose of securing financial 
stability. These building blocks are largely borrowed from Western financial standards especially Basel II.  
46
 For this purpose, the IFSB has set up a High Level Taskforce on Liquidity Management. See Task 
Force on Islamic Finance (IFSB) ‘Islamic Finance and Global Financial Stability’ (2010) p. 43.  
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8.3.4 Individual and Collective Independence 
Individual and collective independence adds to national wealth and a feeling of 
well-being in the society as a whole. The modern practice in many developed countries 
seems to be at odds with this goal, where fiscal laws urge people to borrow more and 
discourage investment and capital acquisition activities through taxing the profits 
earned from these activities and allowing tax exemptions on the interest paid on loans. 
These laws facilitate attractive pricing of the products like; mortgages (housing 
financing) and student loans (education financing) by financial institutions. The 
external effects of such designed products especially mortgages have been devastating 
on borrowers and the nation as a whole. For example, a house-owner who acquires 
the house based on a mortgage arrangement remains a debtor for virtually the rest of 
his working life and ends up paying several times the original market price of the 
house. If for any reason he fails to pay the installments on time, he will lose his 
ownership rights on the house and at best will be treated as a tenant. A student who is 
forced to get a loan for his education leaves college or university with a heavy burden 
and obligation. It is well understood that bonded people (and a bonded society, as 
well) lose their independence in virtually all their decisions and acts, and remain under 
the dominance of their creditors throughout their lives.47 Economic independence is 
indeed a main precondition for independence in many other areas, e.g., social and 
political relationships. That is why a major economic policy, and one that the HMC 
should follow, has to be the empowerment of people to obtain their economic 
independence. A very suitable solution to pursue and achieve this goal is to foster 
microfinance and entrepreneurial practices in society. 
                                                   
47
 See A. L. M. Abdul Gafoor ‘Interest, Usury, Riba and the Operational Costs of a Bank’ (A. S. 
Noordeen, 2005) p. 9.  
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8.3.5 Transparency and Simplification of the Business and Financial 
Transactions 
Transparency and the simplification of business and financial dealings is another 
rule that the HMC should heed. In order to make transactions more transparent, some 
major changes need to be adopted in information disclosure standards and modern 
accounting and auditing standards (e.g., realised accounts practice should be 
implemented instead of the current practice of expected accounts). It may be argued 
that the need for transparency, which is required for a sound and informed business 
and financial decision, is the necessary implication of hifz al-aql (protection of the 
mind and intelligence48) in Sharia. Transparency in the economic and financial system 
is very important especially when it comes to Islamic finance, to see if any element of 
Sharia non-compliant, such as interest is used in the financial system. In other words, 
an important necessary reform in the structure of transactions in the financial system 
is to make them as simple as possible, in such a way that they are easily 
understandable by the system participants. This would reduce the transaction cost as 
well as the intermediary chain and would also create more confidence in the financial 
system. This goal may be achieved through the standardisation of contracts in the 
financial system.     
 
 
                                                   
48
 Hifz al-aql is thought to be one of the essentials of Maqasid al-Sharia (the objectives of Sharia). It 
may be said that the elimination of the information asymmetry and so, the necessity of knowledge-
sharing, is dictated by this essential concept according to Sharia. See Murat Cizakca ‘Islamic Capitalism 
and Finance: Origins, Evolution, and the Future’ (Edward Elgar: Studies in Islamic Finance, Accounting, 
and Governance, 2011) p. 241.  
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8.3.6 Disallowing Socially Detrimental Activities and the Activities 
Detrimental to the Entire Economy 
Disallowing activities that were socially and economically detrimental would be 
another way of improving society. Any economic, business, investment, and financial 
activity should be disallowed if it gives no individual or social benefit or if its harmful 
effects49 outweigh its benefits. Nobody will be allowed to exercise his right if it is 
detrimental to others especially if it is contrary to social interests and public order.50 In 
case of any conflict, the application of the latter would prevail over the former. One of 
the most devastating practices in the modern financial industry is risk-trading because 
it can destabilise the economy as a result of a higher systemic risk created by risk-
trading activities. Today, many tools and financial innovations are used in this regard. 
 
8.3.7 Cutting Short the Intermediary Chain in the Economic and 
Financial Activities 
For the proper allocation and reduction of the cost of access to products and also 
financial facilities, it is essential to eliminate the unnecessary activities of 
intermediaries in the chain of distribution and the allocation of products and funds. 
Islam discourages intermediary activities and, as far as possible, intermediary activity 
should be eliminated from the cycle of distribution. It is obvious that, the more 
intermediary activities there are, the greater the prices of products and services will 
                                                   
49
 Ibn Taymiyya has considered the “respect for the rights of one’s neighbour” as one of the very 
purposes of Sharia (Maqasid al-Sharia). See Jasser Auda ‘Maqasid al-Shari’ah as Philosophy of Islamic 
Law’ (Washington D.C.: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2008) pp. 5- 8. 
50
 See the Constitution of Iran article 40. Also, Murtaza Mutahhari ‘Barrasiye Ijmaaliye Mabaniye 
Iqtisade Islami’ (Tehran: Hikmat, 1403 Lunar Hijri Calendar) pp. 175-177. It may be said that people in 
society have a kind of joint and several responsibility towards each other. The destiny of people in 
society is dependent on one another. Also, see Muhammad Taqi Ja’afari ‘Manaabe Fiqh (a.k.a. Rasaaeel 
Fiqhi)’ (Tehran: Mu’assasa Nashr Karamat, 1
st
 edition, 1377 Solar Hijri Calendar) pp. 132-134.   
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be. Also, more intermediary activities mean less incentive for productive activities and 
will also cause more problems in the correct distribution of wealth in the economy.51      
 
8.3.8 Reliability and Credit Rating Standard 
In order to create equal access to financial facilities, especially small and 
medium-sized facilities, and also in considering an efficient cost of access to the 
facilities, it is necessary to replace the burdens of surety and guarantee with the 
credibility ratio of the facility receivers. Additionally, to ensure the proper functioning 
of the business and financial institutions especially their degree of compliance with the 
policies and rules of the HMC, they (including the products and services that they 
provide) will have to be rated by rating agencies, operating under the HMC. If the 
institutions and/or the relevant products and services that they provide do not meet a 
certain threshold of compliance,52 the license of the institutions and/or the supply of 
the relevant products or services have to be removed or disallowed respectively. The 
                                                   
51
 See Murtaza Mutahhari ‘Mas’alaye Riba wa Bank (bi Dhamimeye Mas’alaye Bime)’ (Tehran: Sadra 
Publications, 14
th
 edition, 2005) p. 98.   
52
 Concerns over Sharia-compliance can be one of the determining factors regarding the threshold of 
compliance. Currently, most Islamic financial institutions have created Religious or Sharia Supervisory 
Boards to annually review the operations of the financial institution and to see whether and to what 
extent the operations of the institution, especially its products and services, are according to Islamic law. 
They examine on a test basis each kind of transaction entered into by the financial institution and any 
evidence to show that the transaction and dealings entered into by the financial institution were in 
compliance with Sharia rules and principles, submitting an annual report to the shareholders in that 
respect. This is the case, in particular in the countries where there is no legal prescription as to what 
does and what does not constitute “Islamic” banking or finance. For more on this matter see Mohd. 
Daud Bakar and Sayd Farook ‘A Universal Platform for Shari’a Compliant Equity Screening’ (Oxford 
Islamic Finance and Dar Al Istithmar, White Paper 7/7/2009). Other criteria for rating financial 
institutions can be: the simplicity of their financial products, the lower cost of their financial services, 
the diversity of their customers, their involvement in microfinance and charity-based activities. The IFSB 
and the AAOIFI provide rating services for the Islamic finance industry. How far their services have 
contributed to the improvement of the Islamic finance industry remains under serious doubt. See Task 
Force on Islamic Finance and Global Financial Stability ‘Islamic Finance and Global Financial Stability’ 
(Kuala Lumpur/Jeddah: IFSB/IDB/IRTI, 2010) p. 33. 
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analysis of the rating outcome will provide management information that is very useful 
for effective control and also critical to the financial institution’s internal management 
as well as the purposes of the regulatory and supervisory authority.53 
  
                                                   
53
 For a similar approach see A. L. M. Abdul Gafoor ‘Islamic Banking & Finance: Another Approach’ 











9.1 A New Solution to Unfair Distribution of Wealth and Systemic 
Financial Instability   
 
Having recognised that the modern economic and financial systems have failed to 
secure a lasting solution to a just and fair system of distribution of wealth and have 
frequently been exposed as containing systemic failures, this research project suggests 
a new paradigm called “Balancism” (a balance of rights and duties) to address these 
very citical problems. Rights are either granted (in principle, on the basis of needs) or 
acquired (in principle, on the basis of contribution). In other words, rights are granted 
over primary wealth and acquired over subordinate wealth. Duties, in turn, follow 
rights. Justice is met when the rights or benefits (one side of the scales) and duties or 
burdens (the other side of the scales) are balanced.             
 
9.2 The First Tier of the Model 
It is thought that the starting point in designing any proper model is to designate 
the ultimate aim of the system and, accordingly, the foundational theory and the 
fundamental principles and policies. On the basis of this understanding, the thesis 
considers “social justice/social balance” as the ultimate objective of the new paradigm 
and “balance in rights-and-duties1 in the general sense, and benefits-and-burdens in 
the economic sense”, as the foundational theory. As a consequence of the implications 
of the ultimate aim and foundational theory of the alternative model, the underlying 
principles and policies on the basis of which the rest of the model i.e., the second and 
                                                   
1
 The “Rights-and-Duties Balance” theory is applicable and adaptable to a variety of different subjects, 
e.g., politics. Its proper variant in the field of politics is “Powers and Accountabilities Balance” theory.  
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the third tiers of the model formed are clearly defined. The followings are the most 
important principles and policies of the new model:   
One. Every human being is entitled to enjoy and benefit from the natural wealth 
resources entrusted to them by the absolute owner (the Creator) yet nobody can in 
principle claim to be the beneficiary of a specific part of the natural wealth until it is 
distributed on the basis of reasonable and legitimate needs of every person. 
Two. The proceeds of natural wealth resources is essentially distributed to 
secure basic essentiasl needs of every person such as a dwelling house, education and 
health care facilities and the provision of basic infrastructure utilities. 
Three. People can never acquire the ownership of the natural wealth resources 
(“the origins of wealth”) and it remains always under the control of the people as a 
whole. 
Four. People are unable to transfer the ownership and control of the natural 
wealth resources to anybody else including the state. 
Five. The equitable distribution prevails over efficiency rule. As a result, in case 
there is any conflict between distribution and efficiency rules, the distribution policy 
will override the efficiency theory. This is simply because the social balance and social 
welfare are given priority over the concentration and maximization of material wealth. 
Six. Everybody has to be provided with equal access to economic and business 
opportunities.2 
Seven. The benefits and burdens arising out of the profit-making activities have 
to be shared pro rata among all participants according to their contribution; whether it 
is a tangible (e.g., capital) contribution or an intangible (e.g., labour) one. In 
consequent, currently practiced labour employment structure (i.e., employer-
employee relationship) and the fixed compensation practices are abolished in the 
                                                   
2
 For a similar regulatory support see the Constitution of Iran article 43 (section 2).  
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business and investment context. Instead, partnership structures and profit and loss 
sharing rules will be in operation. In other words, everybody that contributes some 
form of tangible or intangible values to a given for-profit business form or collective 
financial scheme has to be treated as a shareholder or partner of the given scheme 
with the right of joint ownership and control.3 On this basis, the wealth that is 
concentrated in the given business or financial scheme is not controlled by a few but 
by all contributing participants to the scheme. This is a kind of synergy of belongings 
that benefits the economies of scale and improves effectiveness. Therefore, the 
practice of modern partnerships, joint stock companies, venture capitals and mutual 
funds (in which all the partners and shareholders benefit from a joint right of 
ownership and control) are largely acceptable practices though the operation of the 
limited liability shield and also the implementation of the employment structure and 
fixed compensation schemes are still major concerns in these modern business forms. 
However, those of modern banks are not acceptable, as depositors have no right of 
ownership and control over the use of their deposits. 
Eight. The return to contributors in a profit-making context should not be firmly 
fixed (as it is practised nowadays in interest-based loans), because it is not only an 
irresponsible form of making a profit (as a result of disregarding socio-economic 
realities) but also creates inequality and an imbalanced distribution of wealth which 
eventually leads to injustice. Following this policy, the zero-sum techniques such as 
betting and gambling in which a gain by one participant is an exact equal loss of the 
other participant, have to be totally discarded. Also, the techniques in which the gain 
and loss of the participants of the scheme are significantly disproportionate or 
                                                   
3
 Unlike the current practices, in the new suggested model, the right of control is not separated from 
the right of ownership. In other words, Ownership and control unity is applied. They are owners that 
control the business form or collective financial scheme. On this basis, the traditional agency problem 
and the problem of conflict of interests are no longer considered problems in the new model.   
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imbalanced4 especially those transactions in which the purpose is to take advantage of 
the risk of others have to be entirely prevented. The current lending5 techniques, 
which are disconnected from real economic commitments, have to be replaced by new 
alternative financing methods designed mainly on the basis of profit and loss sharing 
and commitments in real economic terms.6 For this purpose, new investment products 
have to be introduced and the accounting standards and tax rules changed 
accordingly. 
Nine. Business forms and products, and financial facilities have to be clearly 
defined and also simply structured in a way that they are easily usable by and 
understandable7 to any participant in the business environment and financial system. 
Simplification of business and financial products may reduce transaction costs and 
                                                   
4
 In Islamic law, this is supported by the concept of “ghabn” (intolerable excessive loss). In case a 
ghabn is found in a transaction, it gives the losing party an option to terminate the contract.  
5
 By definition, banks are not allowed to engage in real economic activities but just act as lenders to 
economic actors irrespective of the fact that their advanced loan to a given borrower results in loss or is 
consumed by the borrower with no profit-earnings. It is this disconnection from the real economic 
investments that makes banks unfit for lending. Therefore, lending activities have to be left to other 
institutions that are able and have no barriers to engage in real economic activities. However, in case, by 
a new definition, the inherent function of the banking institutions is radically changed from being just 
financial intermediaries to getting involved with real economic activities, and they act on a contingent 
profit and loss sharing basis, then the banking industry is no longer considered a financial intermediary 
industry but categorised and governed under the rules of for-profit business schemes.  
6
 Unlike the current lending techniques in which the main concern is the predetermination of interest 
rates (requiring strict and static decisions and supervisions), profit and loss sharing arrangements 
require flexible and dynamic solutions.   
7
 It is obvious that the function of law is to provide legal certainty and security. This feature is missing 
in Islamic law simply because there is a diverse interpretation on various Sharia issues across Islamic 
jurisdictions, which stems from the different schools of thought among Sharia scholars. Different 
jurisdictions have employed different practices and there is a lack of a uniform approach in addressing 
regulatory issues pertaining to Islamic products and services. Therefore, it would be too risky to 
designate Sharia or Islamic law as the governing substantive law in business and financial transactions. 
To serve as an applicable law, it has to be in the first place harmonised, standardised and eventually 
codified in the form of statutes and regulations. For a somewhat similar finding see International 
Organisation of Securities Commission (IOSCO) ‘Islamic Capital Market Task Force Report’ (2004) pp. 63-
65.        
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enhance transparency. Complexity, on the other hand, can be a cause of imbalance 
and instability. 
Ten. The limited liability shield currently in place should be replaced by an 
unlimited proportionate liability rule in a business and investment environment.8 
Eleven. The application of legal personality concept is adopted due to practical 
concers but only for very limited purposes. 
Twelve. Concerning the provision of not-for-profit facilities, the supply of these 
products made by anybody is essentially to help others free of charge and for some 
good purposes. 
Thirteen. As regards microbusiness activities, microfinance tools and products 
are designed to empower poor to obtain their economic independence. The 
instruments designed for microbusiness purposes are basically cooperative-oriented 
schemes seeking to foster a spirit of cooperation. 
Fourteen. Socially-responsible and cooperative schemes have to be initiated and 
developed on a very large scale in the entire economy. 
Fifteen. With regard to intermediary tools and services, in cases where an 
intermediary is used for not-for-profit purposes the intermediary has to be rewarded 
on fixed-compensation basis and in the case of using the services of an intermediary 
                                                   
8
 A comparative research of business associations conducted by Foster shows how the Islamic world 
has adopted and implemented the Western-style limited liability rule and its very closely connected 
concept i.e., legal personality with no practical resistance and enough critical attitude towards its 
compatibility with Sharia. See Nicholas H. D. Foster ‘Islamic Perspectives on the Law of Business 
Organisations II: The Sharia and the Western-style Law of Business Organisations’ (European Business 
Organization Law Review, vol. 11, issue 2, 2010) pp. 283-288. In its Resolution (63/1/7, para. 12, 1992) 
the Council of the Islamic Fiqh Academy has approved the compatibility of (company) limited liability 
with Sharia, simply reasoning that since the operation of the limited liability rule is known to the clients 
of a company there could be no deception in this regard. The Resolution is available at: 
http://www.fiqhacademy.org.sa. However, as it was discussed before (especially in the foundational 
theory and also musharakas sections of the thesis), the reason for the incompatibility of limited liability 
is not deception but other strong intellectual reasons and religious authorities.  
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for profit-making purposes the intermediary has to be rewarded on sharing-in-benefits 
basis. 
Sixteen. The philosophy of financial intermediaries operating in the financial 
system should be the circulation of wealth across the economy rather than its 
concentration.9 In consequent, unlike the current commercial banking practices, 
Payment and Deposit Intermediaries (PDIs) will receive only service fee in return for 
the provision of intermediary services where the ownership and control of the 
payments and deposits remain with the customers and depositors themselves. The 
most proper legal tool for deposit-taking facilities is a wadi’a contract. 
Seventeen. The concentration of wealth in the economy should be seriously 
prevented10 because it is an unjust transfer11 of wealth (or at least has a detrimental 
element), that the deposit-taking institutions are allowed to take the deposits that 
belong to others under their sole control and ownership and then become powerful 
enough to dictate their self-interest wishes across the economy as well as expose the 
                                                   
9
 Unlike current practices, banks should act merely as capital-circulators but not capital-lenders. In 
modern banking practice, unlike their historically earlier practices, banks do not use their own funds to 
lend borrowers but in fact the funds that they have in their custody on depositors’ behalf. Depositors 
receive a deposit interest (because they are treated as lenders to banks) and the banks, in turn, receive 
loan interest (because they, but not depositors, are considered as lenders to borrowers). That is why, 
the legal relationship between depositors and banks has to be radically overhauled according to the 
policy that ‘banks should act merely as capital-circulators but not capital-lenders’. In this thesis, it is 
concluded that there is no legitimate and compelling reason to believe that banks can take the 
ownership of the deposits and lend them out (which in fact belong to others) as their own. 
10
 For regulatory support see the Constitution of Iran article 43 (section 2) and Act on Cooperative 
Sector of Economy of Islamic Republic of Iran 1991article 1 (section 3). For a religious support of this 
idea see the Quran (59:7) “so that it (wealth) should not merely circulate between the rich among you” 
(…kay laa yakuna dowlatan bayn al-aghniya’ minkum…).  
11
 In practice, banks take deposits from everybody that they can (from individuals to corporations and 
from the poor to the rich) but when it comes to lending they do not lend them out to everybody, only to 
corporations or the rich. This is an additional example of how an unjust transfer of wealth happens in 
the modern banking system. This unjust transfer gets even worse when the central banks set the 
interest rate too low whereby the rich borrowers take a chance to utilise the wealth that belong to 
depositors at very low cost of borrowing while the depositors receive too little interest on their 
deposits.           
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financial system to catastrophic systemic risk when they go bankrupt. Furthermore, 
concentration of wealth can lead subsequently to concentration of power and 
eventually cause massive corruption in the whole system. Also, as per Sharia, savings 
accounts are strongly discouraged by the extra imposition of zakat (tax) on savings. 
Eighteen. With regard to access to financial facilities, everybody (especially 
concerning a not-for-profit context) has to be rated and provided with facilities 
according to one’s credit background12 rather than one’s ability to provide human or 
capital collateral. If it comes to a choice between using one of these two types of 
collateral, priority should be given to the human collateral rather than capital 
collateral.                 
Nineteen. The underlying rational for risk insurance is to minimise risk rather 
than taking advantage of risk and trading in it. The risk insurance and hedging 
providers should not be allowed to get involve in profit-making investment and trade 
activities. 
Twenty. Currency and legal tender should be used merely as an official medium 
of payment and redemption of a debt not as a pricing index. Value measurement 
should be linked to a combination of assets (called a “basket of valuables”), 
representing the average movement of the value of assets in the economy.13      
 
 
                                                   
12
 However, it should be noted that, in credit rating process, any payment default occurred due to the 
inability of the customer to pay has to be disregarded. In other words, only those defaults happened 
despite the ability of the customer to pay will be taken into account in his credit background rating.         
13
 This initiative may resolve some major concerns in Islamic banking and finance: riba and inflation. It 
may be argued whether the old Islamic rules governing gold-based and silver-based coins are still 
applicable to paper currency. This concern, however, will simply be removed if the paper currency is 
considered a mere medium of payment but not a pricing (value measurement) index. This approach can 




9.3 The Second Tier of the Model  
 
The followings are the building blocks of the second tier of the model: 
 
One. Primary (natural) wealth has to be distributed on the basis of reasonable 
and legitimate needs of every person subject to equity14 (insaaf) principle, i.e., 
according to the type and amount of needs of every person in society when all 
circumstantial evidence has been taken into account.15 On the other hand, subordinate 
wealth has to be distributed according to the amount of contributions (sa’y) everybody 
has made in a given economic or business activity.16 The distribution of primary 
wealth, unlike the distribution of subordinate wealth that has to be governed in 
principle by private law, is ruled in principle by public law. 
Two. The granted or acquired right/wealth may be consumed, accumulated or 
disposed of. With regard to the consumption of wealth, it has to be for reasonable and 
legitimate needs while avoiding israf (consuming beyond reasonable needs, 
extravagance) and itlaf/tabdhir (consuming wastefully, dissipation). In respect of the 
accumulation of wealth, the wealth may be stored up for reasonable needs but it 
should not be hoarded (ihtikar). Regarding the disposal of wealth, it may be circulated 
in the economy using the legitimate transactional tools and it can be disposed of either 
for-profit, profit-free, or for benevolent purposes. 
                                                   
14
 As per equity, all surrounding circumstances with regard to a given matter have to be taken into 
consideration. It is the concept of equity that gives way to the exercise of maslaha (discretion) in some 
necessary circumstances.  
15
 It is clear that the type and amount of needs of human beings are not exactly the same and equal. 
That is why the distribution of primary wealth has to be made equitably rather than equally. However, in 
this regard, eventually there has to be a balance between the rights and duties of everybody.  
16
 The major cause of the ever-increasing gap between the rich and poor is inequitable and unjust 
distribution of primary and subordinate wealth among the people. Compliance with the mentioned 
distribution rules may significantly contribute to poverty alleviation and reduce the gap between the 
rich and poor.     
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Three. Usually, a holder of right/wealth would use his wealth for profit-making 
(investment or trade) purposes though he may use it for not-for-profit causes.17 The 
techniques used to make a profit have to be responsible forms of investment. For this 
purpose, profit and loss sharing arrangements will have to be implemented rather than 
lending and borrowing techniques. By applying profit and loss sharing schemes 
(musharakas), the obligations of the investors and entrepreneurs will be contingent 
and subject to the outcome of the investment activities, unlike the lending 
transactions where the investors are certainly obliged to repay the loans irrespective 
of the outcome of the relevant investment projects. That is why the use of musharakas 
can effectively prevent businesses and entrepreneurs going bankrupt due their 
inability to pay back their loans, which may cause devastating systemic instabilities in 
the whole economic and financial system. In musharakas, the return for each 
participant-investor is computed on the basis of profit and loss statements of the 
investment scheme at the end of the accounting period. In contrast to the modern 
practices of anticipated and pre-fixed scandal-prone accounts, the profit and loss 
accounts are realised accounts and hence, neither speculation nor uncertainty is 
involved in these accounts.18 Every participant-investor that contributes to the 
                                                   
17
 “whoever enjoys profit has to shoulder all associated costs and losses”, “nobody can own something 
unless that thing is acquired as a result of one’s (effort) contribution”, and “unlimited proportionate 
liability” standards are the rules that are mainly applicable in a profit-making context but not in the 
context of not-for-profit and philanthropic purposes. The rules applicable to the latter category are 
governed under the Sharia concepts, mainly, “try to excel one another in good works” according to the 
Quran (2:148); “try to spend out of what the Creator has provided you with or what you have acquired” 
according to the Quran (14:31- 2:3 & 4 & 5 & 254 & 261 & 262 & 263 & 264 & 265 & 267 & 268- 42:38- 
3:134- 4:38- 8: 36 & 60- 34:39- 57:7 & 10- 63:7 & 10- 64:16); “surely Allah enjoins justice, kindness and 
the doing of good” according to the Quran (16:90); “can the reward of goodness be any other than 
goodness?” according to the Quran (55:60). Therefore, to determine the applicable rules, the financial 
products and facilities that are used for not-for-profit and benevolent causes have to be distinguished 
from those that are used for profit-making purposes. The products and their governing rules must match 
their purpose.    
18
 A similar approach has been concluded by some Islamic scholars. See A. L. M. Abdul Gafoor ‘Islamic 
Banking & Finance: Another Approach’ (Kuala Lumpur: A.S. Noordeen, 2000) pp. 9-10. 
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investment project whether his contribution is in an intangible form (e.g., labour, 
expertise, or professional management) or in a tangible form (e.g., capital or 
equipment) he shares in profits and also losses (if any) in proportion to his 
contributions made to the investment scheme. As a result, unlike the modern 
practices, as per the new alternative model, there will be no employment setting in 
operation in the profit-making context.19 All participants-investors in a given 
investment activity will establish a partnership setting among themselves. For 
example, a third party financier who provides capital to the investment scheme is no 
longer considered to be a lender but rather one of the partners of the investment 
scheme whose supply of capital is considered as his contribution to the investment 
scheme.20 Similarly, a worker who works for the investment project is no longer 
considered an employee but rather one of the partners of the investment arrangement 
whose supply of labour is deemed as his contribution to the investment activity.21 
There are Western investment schemes that can be considered best practice, which 
are capable of being implemented within the new alternative model with some 
minimal amendments. These are: partnerships, joint stock companies, venture capital 
firms, mutual funds (open-end and closed-end), and private equity (funds). In respect 
of trading and business activities, an owner of an asset may trade his assets using 
murabaha (cost plus mark-up sale), bay nasiya (spot delivery in return for deferred 
payment sale), ijara wa iqtina (leasing with an option of purchase), salam (spot 
                                                   
19
 As per the Constitution of Iran article 43 (section 4), the exploitation of another’s labour has to be 
prevented. For another regulatory support see “Act on Cooperative Sector of Economy of Islamic 
Republic of Iran 1991” article 1 (section 5).   
20
 This approach, in which the return to the financier is contingent and it is linked to the revenues 
generated from the investment project, may resolve one of the major challenging issues in 
contemporary Islamic banking and finance, namely, the problem of riba.   
21
 This attitude, in which the positive or negative return to every single participant of the scheme is 
adjusted according to his contributions made to the scheme, may resolve some major ever-challenging 
issues in the modern economies namely the problem of workers’ compensation, high unemployment 
rates, and the gap between the rich and poor.   
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payment in return for deferred delivery sale), istisna (selling a would-be constructed 
product), and bay shart (sale with an option of repurchase). 
Four. A holder of wealth may dispose of his wealth not only on for-profit 
activities but also for not-for-profit and microbusiness purposes. Major legal 
techniques that are suitable for surrendering benefits while keeping the corpus of the 
property itself are: qard hasana22 (interest-free loan), a’riya (use-free contract), and 
haq intifa (enjoyment privilege). Moreover, the holder of wealth may sometimes 
intend to or in some circumstances is obliged to surrender some part of his wealth for 
some specific purposes. The former surrender, which is essentially for philanthropic 
causes can be achieved by way of using one of these facilities: waqf (voluntary 
endowment), hiba (voluntary gift), or sadaqa (voluntary almsgiving). The best modern 
practices in this regard, which are capable of being implemented within the new model 
with only some minimal adjustments are (charitable) trusts and pension funds. Those 
types of surrenders that have to be made to the (Treasury of) the House of Wealth and 
also in some cases to the Treasury of State23 are; kharaj (a certain portion of the 
proceeds of natural wealth/resources in return for the use of the licensees) and zakat 
(tax-like obligatory payment) duties. The revenues of (the Treasury of) the House of 
Wealth are mainly used to ensure the living essentials of the needy in society and also 
                                                   
22
 A loan (qard hasana) may be used by its borrower for his profit-making purposes; though, it has 
been basically recognised for financing the essential needs rather than for-profit purposes. That is why 
one of the most proper facilities that can be used for microbusiness (profit-making) purposes is qard 
hasana. For a somewhat different view in this regard see A. L. M. Abdul Gafoor ‘Interest, Usury, Riba and 
the Operational Costs of a Bank’ (A.S. Noordeen, 2005) p. 38. 
To avoid riba as well as the problem of value erosion of the money currency (as a result of inflation), 
the asset (i.e., the purpose) for the provision of which the loan (qard) is provided can be used as a 
pricing index. Therefore, there would be no single pricing criterion, e.g., gold standard index but rather 
different pricing indexes in accordance with the different needs and purposes for the provision of which 
the loans are provided. This multiplicity approach in defining different price indexes would help in turn 
to avoid the negative consequences of speculative hyper-inflation of one single asset like gold if only 
that single asset (like gold) were to be designated as a pricing index.  
23
 As per the research model, the state should not get involve in economic and business activities but 
rather it should protect and help the enforcement of economic and business rules.  
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basic public goods. The income of the Treasury of State is basically used to run the 
political government including the salaries of civil servants, the protection of borders 
and national defence. With respect to the microbusiness purposes, the most suitable 
and powerful tools for alleviation of poverty and achieving economic independence 
are cooperative-oriented (ta’awun) arrangements. 
Five. It is not possible for everybody to conduct all their economic, business, or 
financial activities personally and sometimes they have no choice but to use some 
appropriate intermediary services or facilities to carry out specific purposes e.g., 
transfer of funds, safe-keeping, agency, and marketplace services. Using intermediary 
services is not, in and of itself, to make profit from the endeavours of the service 
provider,24 otherwise, the rules governing profit-making schemes will be applied to the 
relationship of the parties (the rules of mudaraba arrangement, mainly). In general, 
the intermediary services may be needed either for legal and administrative tasks, or 
physical works. The proper legal tools for the former purpose are: hiwala (assignment 
of a debt or credit contract) and aqd daman (debt guarantee contract) regarding the 
facilitation of payments or transfer of funds and also the provision of assurances in 
order for the discharge of debt obligations; wadi’a or amana facility for the purposes 
of safe-keeping-deposits; and wakala contract for agency purposes. The proper legal 
tools for the latter purpose are ijara al-shakhs (labour employment) and ji’ala (reward 
contract) tools.25 The most suitable modern facilities concerning intermediary services, 
                                                   
24
 In case it is adopted that the intermediaries, unlike the current practices, cannot make profit from 
their intermediary services but rather they have to be merely compensated with certain remunerations 
in return for their provision of services, the detrimental role of intermediaries in conducting highly risky 
and speculative activities in the economy will be significantly reduced.  
25
 Ji’ala may be used in both a profit-making context and a not-for-profit context. In the former 
context, the reward to an a’mil has to be a portion of the result of performance (e.g., a discovered 
product) or a percentage of its total market value in proportion to the contribution of an a’mil. In the 
latter context, the reward to an a’mil has to be a fixed known recompense (i.e., fixed compensation). 
Ijara al-shakhs can only be used for not-for-profit purposes, not for profit-making.    
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which are capable of being implemented within the new model with only some 
minimal changes, are: commercial papers, documentary letters of credit, debit and 
credit cards, and agency. Regarding the agency, a major change is needed in respect of 
the compensation made to the agent by the principal while distinguishing profit-
making agents from agents employed for not-for-profit activities. To facilitate the 
trade and exchange among the sellers and buyers, appropriate marketplaces have to 
be set up where the necessary trades and exchanges will happen among different 
market participants on the basis of bay (sale), mu’awada (exchange of non-monetary 
assets), and sarf (exchange of monetary assets) including different variants of these 
basic legal tools such as salam (deferred delivery sale), murabaha (cost plus mark-up 
sale), and bay nasiya (deferred payment sale). 
Six. Very reasonable and legitimate needs of people are to protect their lives and 
assets against risk of loss and damage. Therefore, hedging facilities are needed to 
address this concern. The philosophy and underlying rationale of hedging and 
insurance is to minimize rather than take advantage of risk, that is to say, risk-trading is 
not allowed.26 Hedging can be made either through human collateral such as aqd 
daman (debt payment guarantee) and kifala (personal surety) or capital collatera such 
as rahn (collateral), daman uhda (guaranteeing legal risks pertaining to a given 
property) or daman darak (guaranteeing economic risks pertaining to a property). As a 
last resort, the hedging can be made on the basis of a sulh (compromise) facility: the 
                                                   
26
 Taking advantage of or trading in risk is closely linked to the concept of forbidden gharar in Islamic 
laws. In modern terminology, it can be said that the philosophy and the economic rationale of the 
prohibition of taking advantage of risks (or tradings in risks) is to avoid systemic risks of bankruptcy and 
the creation of bubbles in economic values which in turn may cause social imbalance. As per al-Gamal 
“the transfer of credit and risk [is allowed] only if bundled within a financial transaction such as sales, 
leases, and partnerships. Such bundling regulates the riskiness of financial transactions, thus allowing for 
necessary risk taking to encourage investment and economic growth, while minimizing individual and 
systemic risks of bankruptcy and wild fluctuations in economic values”. See Mahmoud A. El-Gamal 
‘Islamic Finance: Law, Economics, and Practice’ (Cambridge University Press, 2006) pp. 164-165.   
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compensation of damages (if any) in return for payment of a premium. It is legitimate 
to make a compromise if the subject matter of the compromise (sulh) is a legitimate, 
reasonable, and beneficial act.  
 
9.4 The Third Tier of the Model              
From political economy perspective, the superstructure of the suggested model 
makes a dramatic change in the separation of powers governance which is currently a 
dominant model in modern political regimes and has been widely incorporated in the 
constitution code of these political governments. A new “Economic Authority” which is 
conceptually and institutionally a separate and independent authority from the 
political government is set up to take over the administration of distribution of natural 
wealth resources and the control of circulation of subordinate wealth. The Economic 
Authority consists of a House of Wealth and a House of Market Control. The 
distribution of primary wealth is conducted by the House of Wealth. A board of 
trustees (mutawallis) will be elected directly by the people or indirectly by the 
representatives of the people i.e., a Parliament to run the House of Wealth and 
distribute the primary wealth among the members of the public.27 On the other hand, 
to ensure the proper functioning of the economic and financial system it is 
unavoidable to have to establish an authority to control the system. This authority, as 
an exclusive and unified policy maker of the system, is called the “House of Market 
                                                   
27
 The political government has no ownership right in primary wealth i.e., natural resources. It is only 
human beings that hold the privilege of enjoyment of the natural wealth resources in compliance with 
equity distribution rules as explained above. The Creator of natural wealth resources has entrusted 
these resources to human beings as a whole for their legitimate and reasonable use and enjoyment. The 
ownership of the primary wealth remains with the Creator or the public as a whole, forever and the 
political government has no right of ownership and control over this natural wealth.    
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Control” (HMC).28 The philosophy underlying the establishment of HMC is to control 
the proper production, distribution and circulation of subordinate wealth in the 
economy in order to ensure that the ultimate objective of the system, i.e., “social 
justice” prevails. The HMC is run by a board, appointed by representatives of the 
people, i.e., a Parliament29 or elected directly by the people (similar to the House of 
Wealth) with broad policymaking and regulatory powers over the operation of the 
products, institutions and markets, including the power to issue rules with the force of 
rules and policies. The Parliament, in turn, controls the performance of the HMC and 
also the House of Wealth.           
                                                   
28
 It is noteworthy that the HMC set up under the new model here is different from the Financial 
Services Authority (“FSA”) set up in the UK after the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (“FSMA”). 
The HMC will have to control not only all financial activities but also all other non-financial activities with 
the exception of distribution of natural wealth resources.   
The FSA was a single integrated regulatory and institutional authority for administration of all financial 
services and financial markets in the UK. As per Walker, this sophisticated and complex regulatory and 
institutional regime (when it was in operation) made the UK financial system clearly distinguishable 
from many other similar foreign experiments including the US. The FSA was a private as opposed to 
public entity although its board was appointed and supervised by the Treasury and it was carrying out 
public functions (but independently of government). See George Alexander Walker ‘Financial Services 
Authority’ in Michael Blair QC, George Walker and Robert Purves ‘Financial Services Law’ (Oxford 
University Press, 2
nd
 Edition, 2009) pp. 7-66. See also George Alexander Walker ‘United Kingdom 
Regulatory Reform: A New Beginning in Policy and Programme Construction’ in D Arner and JJ Lin 
‘Financial Regulation- A Guide to Structural Reform’ (2003), chapter 7. It should be noted that the 
Financial Services Act 2012 received royal assent on 19 December 2012 abolished the FSA with effect on 
1 April 2013 when the Act came into force. The functions of the FSA have now been split between the 
Bank of England, the Prudential Regulation Authority, and the Financial Conduct Authority. See Gonzalo 
Vina ‘U. K. Scraps FSA in Biggest Bank Regulation Overhaul Since 1997’ (Businessweek, Bloomberg) 
Retrieved 17 April, 2013.    
29
 It seems proper if an independent Parliament (separate from the one that is practised today, on the 
basis of the theory of separation of powers, as one of the branches of the government) is set up to 
establish and control the House of Market Control and also the House of Wealth. The major rationale for 
this initiative is that if the control of these Houses rests in the hands of the political state, the state (in 
addition to its excessive entanglement with economic and business activities) will likely spend the 
natural wealth resources and public income more on the development of its political ambitions and 
hence ignore the priorities in spending the public wealth for the well-being and prosperity of members 
of the public, who are indeed the true beneficiaries of all such revenues and wealth resources. The state 
has to be dependent on and remains under the control of the public but not vice versa. Otherwise, if the 
state feels independent of its nation, it will not take care of the true needs of the people. The state, in 
and of itself and without its relevant nation, has no philosophy and reason to exist at all.        
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A true alternative economic, business, and financial model will never be 
discovered or created by the sudden actions of governments or communities, unless it 
is done on an individual and a collective level and in an interdisciplinary way, to 
include: philosophy, religion, law, sociology, economics, and politics. In other words, 
the true solution should benefit from major subjects of social science and it cannot be 
imposed or suddenly legislated, it can only grow up from the ideas of dedicated 
researchers over a long period. Undoubtedly, once this sound model like the one 
suggested by this research project has been created it will not flourish unless it is 
implemented in an appropriate political environment with the backing of trustworthy 

















9.5 Suggestions for Further Research   
- Whether and to what extent is the application of Balancism efficient and 
can lead to economic developments? 
- How can the House of Wealth be organised and managed? What is the 
relationship between the House of Wealth, the House of Market Control and the 
Government? 
- What can be considered a contribution and how can the contributions of 
different participants in profit-making schemes be measured and awarded? 
- Whether and to what extent risk-trading practices are reasonable and 
legitimate? And, whether and how far can they cause systemic risks? 
- To what extent is the concentration of wealth and systemic instabilities 
interrelated?  
- Is it possible to use money (currency) merely as a medium of payment 
but not as a pricing index? What would be a more suitable pricing index? 
- Whether it is legally possible and economically viable to set up an 
international financial organisation in order to respond to the financing needs of 
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